Abstract: This paper shares initial observations and quotes derived from semi-structured interviews with corporate data ethics practitioners that took place from 2018-2019. Quotes provide first-hand accounts of the privacy, fairness and other ethical issues encountered when managing big data analytics. Emerging processes are noted, in addition to substantive frameworks that firms are employing to address recognized issues. Hypotheses are then made as to why the Corporate Data Ethics field is developing and why different companies may approach the task of data ethics management differently. Future areas of research, including an ongoing survey effort, are noted.

Authors: Dennis D. Hirsch, Tim Bartley, Aravind Chandrasekaran, Srinivasan Parthasarathy, Piers Norris Turner, Davon Norris, Keir Lamont, Christina Drummond

Date: September 10, 2019

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Abstract: Management risk, which reflects uncertainty about the management’s value added, is an important yet unexplored determinant of a firm’s default risk and debt pricing. CDS spreads, loan spreads and bond yield spreads all increase at the time of management turnover, when management risk is highest, and decline over the first three years of CEO and CFO tenure, regardless of the reason for the turnover. These effects all vary with the ex ante uncertainty about the new management. Understanding the effects of management risk on corporate liabilities has a number of implications for the pricing of liabilities and corporate financial management.

Author: Yihui Pan, Tracy Yue Wang, Michael S. Weisbach

Date: May 15, 2016

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Abstract: Financial expertise among independent directors of U.S. banks is positively associated with balance-sheet and market-based measures of risk in the run-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. While financial expertise is weakly associated with better performance before the crisis, it is strongly related to lower performance during the crisis. Overall, the results are consistent with independent directors with financial expertise supporting increased risk-taking prior to the crisis. Despite being consistent with shareholder value maximization ex ante, these actions became detrimental during the crisis. These results are not driven by powerful CEOs who select independent experts to rubber stamp strategies that satisfy their risk appetite.

Author: Bernadette A. Minton, Jérôme Taillard, Rohan Williamson

Date: July 2012

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