Transitions to Democracy from Authoritarianism

The common theme among this week’s article is that Latin American countries were able to move to a Democratic structure. Different arguments as to why emerge as the three articles get more in-depth. As a quick summary, Hunter uses military force to explain the transition. Their influence had to decline because the military is what backed authoritarian rulers such as Peru’s President Fujimori who relied heavily on the military in his initial rise to power. This aspect is very interesting to note because the military is the most prized possession especially during instability, so it would seem unlikely that anyone in power would ever let their decline happen (via funding and other controllable means). However, the only way for civil power to grow (the cornerstone of democracy) is for military power to fall. The most interesting take from Hunter arises in her findings where the causality is Democracy holding down the military, not the other way around. This means that the people stepped up, parties arose, and politicians gained influence.

 

Alternatively, Karl explains the transitions in a less uniform way across Latin American.  His take on looking at preconditions to democracy and then country case studies show that when one experienced the transition through an economic boom, that can hardly explain the next country’s transition. Karl would probably disagree with Hunter that less influence of the military is to explain the transition across the board, as such is to generalizing for the entirety of Latin America. It seems, to me, that Karl isn’t able to pinpoint anything precisely, as the preconditions mentioned earlier are not even consistent/true. This makes sense because the area so big and inconsistencies across nations is expected since each history is not exactly the same. The most interesting part is once that is established, Karl goes on to explain that the transition is even more complicated because there is not just one type of democracy. The actual transition, whether forced or not for example, can determine what type of democracy arises in the country. This is the explanation that I agree with the most, the large number of variables and inconsistencies make it seem more realistic.

 

O’Donnell and Schmitter also take a look at uncertainty. “Factors which were necessary and sufficient for provoking the collapse or self-transformation of an authoritarian regime may be neither necessary nor sufficient…of another regime.” Karl would agree with this whole-heartedly, but I think disagreement would arise in the question of methods through the transition. I think O’Donnell and Schmitter paint the actors during the transition as more confused/in the dark, rather than Karl who basically says whoever is behind the main wave of the transition will dictate how it plays out (whether it be the civilians or outside forces). O’Donnell and Schmitter insinuate that anyone involved in the transition can come in at anytime with their desired outcome. It seems to fair to me, as though the uncertianty is SO GREAT that it’s truly anyone’s game — which we all know is not true/that simple.