Institutions Alter Incentives and Executive Power Everywhere

In light of recent events in the United States and abroad, the reading was particularly applicable. Put simply, institutions often play a significant role in determining the scope and nature of executive power, as well as who eventually gets to use that power at all. Furthermore, elected officials can manipulate institutions to extend their terms through nominally democratic processes—forming broad coalitions that, somehow, contain groups with opposing goals. The authors point to Venezuela and the institutional machinations through which Chavez forged his iron fist. He crippled the opposition and dramatically increased presidential power by manipulating the institutions that regulated them, allowing Chavez to make his presidency a veritable reign.

The effect of institutions on the democratic process is clear throughout the world. In the United States for example, the Electoral College has had a profound impact on U.S. policy. Though both Al Gore and Hillary Clinton both won the popular vote in their respective elections, they lost the Electoral College and therefore the presidency to George W. Bush and Donald J. Trump, respectively. Interestingly, however, Clinton was heavily favored in part due to the perceived, though empirically dubious, existence of the “Blue Wall,” a set of supposedly reliably Democratic states that would hamstring any current or future GOP presidential campaign, regardless of raw vote totals—not unlike Chavez capping the ascent of the opposition. The wall, however, collapsed, perhaps ironically as a direct result of the institutional factors that gave it strength—focusing on regional electoral votes, rather than national popular ones; Trump formed a coalition of rural manufacturing workers opposed to globalization and the wealthy that profit from it, realigning the electoral map by ignoring broad swaths of the population. By accurately identifying states and populations that are most likely to leave the Democrats, Trump could exploit the institution and win the election, just as the “Blue Wall” and demographic shifts would theoretically allow the Democrats to do the same.

Furthermore, one could find American parallels to the Chavez maneuvers where institutions encouraged or facilitated certain vote-seeking behaviors, like clientelism. The United States, however, might have institutionalized regional swing-state, rather than class, pandering. For example, U.S. candidates do not have an incentive to campaign in states that they cannot win, and consequently tailor their proposals to states they can in order to consolidate support; Republican presidential candidates have no reason to campaign in California or make green energy measures an important part of their platform—it is more efficient to focus upon Middle-America swing-state (Pennsylvania, Michigan) manufacturing and protecting the middle class from supposedly unfair foreign competition—just as Trump did. The Electoral College alters the real value of a single vote—a GOP vote in California is worth decidedly less than one in Ohio, just as a Democratic vote is more valuable in Florida than in Texas—changing incentives and therefore the policies the government ultimately pursues. Eliminating the Electoral College would normalize the value of a single vote and therefore force politicians to run truly national campaigns.

Chavez also maximized the power of his majority, disproportionately filling the representative body with sympathizers. Though the United States allocates congressional seats in such a way that generally parallels popular trends, it is important to note how institutional structures can affect the legislative process and therefore executive power. Parliamentary, proportional-representation systems facilitate ruling coalitions and place constraints upon executive power. Chavez was able to expand his influence due to the unique structure of the Venezuelan legislative body. Though he had popular support, it dramatically exaggerated his mandate, which could not necessarily happen in a classic proportional-representation or American system, and led to an artificially strong dictatorship of the proletariat, a quasi-totalitarian government that had popular support.