Analyzing Stability With Rawlsian and Nozickian Theories
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Perhaps the most stereotypical example of a popular uprising or protest stems from income inequality and the perceived injustice therein. Motivated by either poverty or poor prospects for upward mobility amid economic growth, the lower and middle classes take to the streets in order to voice their disapproval—much to the chagrin of the current regime and those supporting it—potentially ending in democratic reform or a leftist coup. This agitation and commensurate support for leftist parties leads to economic reforms—at least as a logical extension of popular theory. Therefore, the stability of government, one may logically conclude, is intrinsically linked with the relative distribution of wealth and resulting class conflict. However, empirical research has found that economic inequality—as well as support for leftist policies that address it—is not necessarily linked to the stability of democracy.
Before addressing whether or not the above scenario is realistic, it is first important to address the fact that economic inequality is often approached by the populace as a normative rather than positive issue—subjective notions of fairness or justice may inform one’s political stance rather than empirical analysis. As such, should a given individual—regardless of her relative socioeconomic state—deem inequality acceptable or irrelevant, she is unlikely to participate in class conflict. Rawlsian logic, though particularly relevant when discussing egalitarian institutional reform, does not seem to play a large role in determining one’s approach to solving economic inequality–as Kauffman writes, “these political orientations and beliefs are not strongly related to their underlying socioeconomic position. As discussed above, social class is not a reliable predictor of left orientations…” (366).
Though many pinpoint economic inequality as an injustice endemic among Latin American countries, it is also important to note that some scholars do not see some distributional disparities as inherently unjust at all. As such, it is critical that one understand the philosophical debates surrounding the issue before attempting to understand the actions influenced by them. Robert Nozick, an influential scholar, asserts that inequality, given that it is the result of voluntary exchanges between free individuals, is not fundamentally unjust (Lacewing, 3) The raw distribution of wealth itself is amoral; the process leading to it, however, determines its justness or immorality—at least according to Nozickian entitlement theory. The opposing view comes from John Rawls, who argues that society must be constructed in a way that benefits the least advantaged. Justice, in Rawlsian theory, is tantamount to fairness (Lacewing, 1). Distributional fairness—of political rights, income, or economic opportunity—is more important than achieving high rates of growth that may benefit all of society. In effect, an extreme Rawlsian may assert that a relatively poor, though equal, society is inherently more just than—and therefore preferable to–a rich, but slightly less equal, one—even if the poor of the wealthy state are objectively better off than those of the less prosperous one (Lacewing, 2). However, popular theories explaining the stability of democracy tacitly assert that a Rawlsian—or at least more economically equal—democracy would be more stable than an unequal Nozickian one.
Because socioeconomic conditions do not seem to dictate political affiliation, one may logically conclude that normative judgements play a large role in the determining the potential for class conflict. Put simply, it would benefit the poor and middle classes to promote Rawlsian ideals and the leftist parties that have internalized his theory of justice. Indeed the proletariat holding Rawlsian notions of distributive justice is critical to the stereotypical “bread riot” and push for liberal democracy as described above. However, such theories lack empirical backing as “the direct effects of socioeconomic position on perceptions of unfairness also appear weak or inconsistent,” indicating that the working class does not uniformly hold Rawlsian or Nozickian ideals—even if doing so would benefit them (Kaufman, 366).
Despite Acemoglu and Robinson writing that inequalities harms the stability of democracy—popular uprisings may facilitate the rise of a personalist authoritarian regime—data taken from the most recent wave of democratization does support their hypothesis (Kaufman, 361). Chile and Uruguay have Gini coefficients far higher than much of the developed world, but their democracies are regarded as among the strongest in Latin America (Kaufman, 367). Furthermore, rampant inequality has not yet led widespread democratic backslide. Even if one assumes that frequent and sudden shifts in voter behavior may imply great discontent, research has found “no relation between inequality and swings toward the opposition,” indicating that Nozickian ideals (or at least great inequality, though the two are not necessarily identical) are not necessarily anathema to sustainable democracy (Kaufman, 364).
Modern examples support the assertion that high levels of inequality does not necessarily lead to weak democracies; countries with similar Gini coefficients—though it is an imperfect tool– have wildly varying levels of stability, and some countries with higher coefficients are more stable than those with lower ones (Kaufman, 367). Consequently, though economic inequality can explain some popular uprisings, it is important to understand that it is rarely the sole factor prompting economic or institutional reform. Rather, its nature, like that of the state questioned, is subject to interpretation.
Works cited:
Kaufman, Robert F. “Review: The Political Effects of Inequality in Latin America: Some Inconvenient Facts.” Comparative Politics 41.3 (2009): 359-79. Web.
Lacewing, Michael. “Rawls and Nozick on Justice.” Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, n.d. Web.