I know that during our discussion of free will we talked about the scenario – and others like it – where, for instance, a father wanted his son to jump into a lake and the child slips and falls in. The child did not choose to jump into the lake, so his father should not praise him for the action. We also discussed scenarios where someone was forced to do an action, indicating a lack of free will. This got me thinking about the Nuremberg Trials, in which the defense (many leaders in Nazi Germany) argued for lesser punishment by arguing “superior order.” They claimed that they only did what they did because they had to; it was what the higher-ups ordered. Our discussions have allowed me to see that what they were essentially saying was that they had no free will. They had to follow orders or they themselves would be harmed. While there is obviously no debating the monstrosity of their actions, it would be interesting to see what others, given that they believe in free will, think of this or simply the claim of “superior order” in general.

While researching the idea of consciousness that we have been discussing in class I came across an article published this summer entitled “Scientists discover the on-off switch for human consciousness deep within the brain.” The consciousness discovered by these neuroscientists (which is still in the very early stages of research) seems slightly similar to what Chalmers would call our “inner-movie consciousness.” They discovered that when a certain area of the brain of a woman was stimulated, the woman lost “consciousness” but was still awake. Where the traditional view of consciousness might be that of being awake or not awake, this part of the brain (the claustrum) certainly points to a more philosophical view of consciousness, which is possibly being controlled by a physiological area in the brain. This discovery, which again is still in its very early stages, seems to point towards property dualism. As a neuroscience major, I hope and believe that more research like this will begin to materialize, and that even the consciousness that Chalmers describes will be able to be explained by a physical entity in the brain. It’s important to understand that brain research is essentially in its infancy, so when Chalmers says that perhaps science will never be able to understand consciousness, that is probably a bit of a stretch.

Here’s a link to the article if anyone is interested: http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/185865-scientists-discover-the-on-off-switch-for-human-consciousness-deep-within-the-brain

I found many flaws in Gallagher’s piece opposing same-sex marriage. One point that left me dumbfounded was Gallagher’s argument that marriage is for the reproduction of children, and thus same-sex marriage should not be allowed. It’s true that same-sex couples cannot themselves reproduce, but it’s not as if disallowing any type of union between people of the same sex would drive them into heterosexual relationships, where they could reproduce. Furthermore, Gallagher refutes the idea that there is evidence that children raised in same-sex households are not worse off than children raised by heterosexual parents. She then goes on to discuss how the institution of marriage is in shambles – half of marriages end in divorce, the majority of children will experience a fatherless or motherless household, etc. Does Gallagher not consider that even if children raised by gay parents are worse than children raised by straight parents, they are almost certainly better off raised by any two people (same sex or not) than only a mother or father? She is essentially making the argument for proponents of same-sex marriage by saying this because it would seem that a homosexual couple adopting children would be better than what they are currently experiencing. She goes on to shoot herself in the foot again by almost pinning the problems facing marriage on the same ideals that allow same-sex marriage, when she previously states how little of the population is made up of “same-sex registered domestic partnerships.”

From class discussions and reading various blog posts I have deducted that most of the class finds at least some flaw or problem with utilitarianism. I find it interesting then, that when voting for which charity we wanted to give the money to, Evidence Action – which is, from what I can tell, the most cost effective charity that will help the most people in need of all the nominated charities – won by a landslide. This is the charity, of the ones that were nominated, that a Utilitarian would most likely pick. This tells me that the problem most of us, including myself, have with utilitarianism isn’t that it aims to help the most people, but that it could potentially harm people. One person could be sacrificed for the benefit of many in the eyes of a strict utilitarian. Perhaps a better moral theory is a less extreme utilitarianism, a utilitarianism where the aim is to help the most people possible, only if no one is seriously harmed in the process. Of course, “seriously harmed” is extremely ambiguous, but I think the point gets across. The Giving Game was a great example of this; our class chose to go the utilitarian route. I don’t think we would utilitarians though, if someone had to be seriously harmed to help those in need. This act of utilitarianism did not require anything from us, which is another reason we chose it. Utilitarianism asks a lot of people, so perhaps a less extreme version wouldn’t require that the benefit of others must be maximized, but only increased in some degree.

One thing that comes up in almost any discussion on altruism is that an action is never truly altruistic because the person is performing the action is his or her self interest. I think this is true, but why should it matter? Say one person gives $10,000 to a charity out of truly altruistic purposes, and another person does because they feel guilty if they don’t. That $10,000 doesn’t do less good if the action is not purely altruistic. Whether or not altruism exists does not matter; doing good does. Furthermore, it almost speaks poorly of your character if you don’t feel happy about helping out someone in need, and it speaks poorly of your character if you don’t feel guilty by not helping. That happiness that you feel could then be the cause of more helping of those in need, which certainly does not make your contribution mean any less. You’re even affecting more people positively if by helping others you feel some sense of satisfaction and happiness because you are improving your own life as well. Singer never says that this should not be the case with effective altruism, as he discusses in his TED talk many people whose lives have improved after they began giving, including a woman who was deeply depressed before she began devoting her life to helping others, and some time after she began this endeavor she became one of the happiest people she knew. She was able to positively affect the lives of many others in need as well as her own, all without acting out of purely altruistic tendencies.

This past year I read a book called The Stranger by Albert Camus. The book is about an apathetic man named Mersault, who is essentially indifferent to the world. Mersault is sentenced to death in what could be perceived as a justified killing, yet his indifference and withdrawal from the trial leads him to be found guilty. While awaiting his death, Mersault adapts the idea of absurdism; he becomes aware that it does not matter if he dies soon by beheading or far into the future, and he becomes aware that like him, the world also displays an indifference. This discovery does not lead him to be depressed, but instead it is a weight off his shoulders, almost as if he is less burdened by knowing that there is no meaning. I wouldn’t say my own viewpoints are as extreme as Mersault’s, but this book, along with the discussions we’ve had in class, have led me to a viewpoint similar to this one. I understand that on a large enough scale, everything I do does not matter. I am not as enlightened as Mersault, but understanding this fact almost allows someone have a burden lifted off of them; they know and are okay with this realization. An absurdist can live a happy, meaningful life (on a small scale). When Mersault makes this realization, in fact, it is the first time during the whole book that he seems to really care about something; he gets very excited to be greeted by the jeers of the people who are there to witness his beheading that do not see the world the same way he does.

I think Nagel was spot on with his chapters on death and the meaning of life. Many of the beliefs that he communicated during these two chapters were ones that I held previously and that are on my mind frequently. The idea of his that I probably agree with most is that Death is neither good nor bad. Death is nothingness, which the human mind simply cannot fathom. When you ask the average human to imagine total nothingness, they might imagine just whiteness, which is not nothing. The only possible way to imagine total nothingness is – and Nagel mentioned this – to imagine what things were like before you were born, which is a task that is beginning to reach impossibility for the human mind; how did you feel prior to your existence, when you were essentially dead (this question is a paradox but aids the point)? Thus I believe that death cannot be good or bad because (a) total nothingness can neither be good or bad and (b) something which we cannot wrap our minds around cannot be labeled as “good” or “bad.” I also agree with Nagel’s opinion on the meaning of life. The ideas of existentialism and absurdism are very intriguing to me. I recognize the absurdity of life, that in the end everything will cease to exist, but I also recognize that it up to each individual person is responsible for determining their own purpose in life.

After reading both Bendict’s and Rachels’ opinions on cultural relativism, I can say that I agree and with some aspects of both of their arguments. I actually think that Benedict and Rachels might agree more than what I expected. Rachels concedes that cultures do have different practices that alter views of what is morally right and morally wrong but still believes that there is objective morality. Benedict, similarly, believes in cultural relativism and that what is right and wrong to specific cultures will be based on what is considered normal and abnormal in that culture, but she never explicitly states that objective morality doesn’t exist; she, like Rachels, could believe that one or many of these cultures is “wrong” in their beliefs. One problem I do have with Rachels’ argument is that while he does state that objective morality does exist, he doesn’t back up this claim enough. I believe he only gives on example – excision – that he can defend as “objectively” wrong even though in another culture it is the norm. Somewhat paradoxically, however, Rachels uses what would be considered the “normal” American viewpoint on this issue to defend why this issue is “objectively” immoral. Of course, I agree with his reasoning that this practice is wrong, but perhaps that is only because my morals are based and were created in the same culture as his.

There was one aspect of the Craig/Kurtz debate that I found particularly interesting. Kurtz replies to one of Craig’s points by saying, “Dr. Craig insists that human morality is created in the image of man and that this is insufficient. On the contrary, I submit that it is theism that is created in the image of man and is anthropomorphic, and that it is human beings who have created gods.” It could just as easily be true that humans created Gods, perhaps out of some cognitive need; we have difficulty explaining our purpose, so we created something that could fulfill this need. Kurtz would probably argue this, that somewhere in our evolutionary development we became intelligent enough to question our place in the universe, and thus created God. Ideas do exist, however, so this could mean that for a person that believes in God, He does actually exist. Thus it would be the objective presence of God that theists and atheists actually argue about. Because if nothing else, someone’s belief in God – if gods are in fact human made – can provide a placebo-type effect, in which a person’s belief in God can help them fill a cognitive void that cries out for some type of purpose for life. Craig and Kurtz, then, are debating on a much broader scale. They are discussing the objective existence of a God (even though their debate is titled “Is Goodness without God Good Enough?” I think most of us can agree they are indirectly debating the existence of God).

On Wednesday in class we discussed the Euthyphro Dilemma, which questions whether God loves things because they are good or if things are good because God loves them. If the latter part were to be true, that God chooses what is good (what Antony referred to as the Divine Command Theory), then many problems can be raised. One student in class – I can’t recall who – stated that if this were the case, then if God decided murder were moral and good, then it would be moral and good. This is true. But, assuming that the Divine Command Theory is correct, how do we know that God at some point in time didn’t decide something as egregious as this is “good?” For all we know, we could be accepting something as morally right that at one point was considered wrong. The question is: does this matter? Does it give us a moral – not God’s morality, in this case – reason to object against God’s good and bad and create for ourselves what these words mean? I suppose the main problem I’m trying to get at is that the Divine Command Theory provides almost a paradoxical view of good and bad; that if we were to accept God’s good as our good, it is impossible to object without being bad, even if what is being objected really is bad. This is why Antony’s Divine Independence Theory must be correct; morality must be independent from God. Good has to be something that comes from within ourselves. It has to be something that individually we can know and understand, because if not it muddles us what good and bad really are.