Thoughts on Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma

The Euthyphro dilemma raises the question, “Are acts that are considered morally good willed by God because they are morally good?”, or, “Are these acts morally good because because they are willed by God?” The Divine Command Theory is seen to be refuted by this dilemma mainly because of the premise that one of these cases has to be correct. The problem is if that if acts considered morally good are that way because they are good by nature, then these acts are independent of God. This means that these morally good acts would not need a God to determine them as good, and if God commanded certain things to be good, then whatever is good would be considered arbitrary, meaning that murder could have been considered good when God was deciding what is good and what is not. Since good being arbitrary does not seem like a plausible case, I consider the Divine Command Theory to be false unless there was another expanation besides the two mentioned at the beginning of this post.