

Is Accounting an Information Science?¹

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Abstract: The central result is an equality connecting accounting numbers with information. $\ln\left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{\text{assets}}\right) = r_f + I(X; Y)$, r_f is the risk free rate, \ln is the natural logarithm, Y is the outcome of interest, X is the information signal about Y , and $I(X; Y)$ is a Shannon information measure. The equality is derived using economic income accounting; it is shown to hold, under appropriate conditions, for declining balance and straight line depreciation methods. Some social welfare implications are explored.

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1 Introduction

The paper is a modest attempt at a positive answer to the question about accounting being an information science. The main result is that accounting numbers are a statement about *how much* information the reporting entity has access to. We do not analyze the communication of the details of the information available to the reporting entity; the entity conveys a measure of the *amount* of information it holds, not the information itself. In a way, the accounting problem is changed from the question "What is the value of the asset?" to the question "How much information does the asset possess?" In order to confront the latter question, a metric is required which specifies the amount of information. That is, information is treated as something physical which can be manipulated and processed like other physical quantities such as mass or energy.

The metric for amount of information is Shannon entropy—a function of probabilities (Shannon 1948). Shannon's entropy concept has amplified the importance of information. Some other sciences are routinely referred to as "information sciences," physics, for example, where quantum information is a central idea. Biology, as well, studies the information content of the genetic code. The title of the paper questions whether accounting is properly included as a similar and complementary scientific inquiry.

Roughly speaking, the result herein is that the accounting rate of return is equal to the amount of information possessed by the reporting entity. Accounting, then, is a consistent ranking of information systems. As this conclusion is counter to Blackwell—a general, context free ranking of information systems does not exist (see Demski 1973)—there must necessarily be some theoretical restrictions placed upon the environment in which accounting operates. There are three such restrictions. The first is that the decision maker's preferences are distinctly long run in nature. Further, the opportunities available to the decision maker are characterized by a state-act-payoff matrix and a price vector for the opportunities. While the state-act-payoff format is not restrictive, there are some restrictions on the form of the matrix and the price vector. The matrix must be full rank. Also, the price vector must be free of arbitrage opportunities: a fairly weak, but nonetheless quite instructive equilibrium condition.

In notation the accounting and information relation is the following:

$$\ln \left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{\text{assets}} \right) = r_f + I(X; Y).$$

The left hand side utilizes accounting stocks and flows: income flow is divided by the stock of assets available for production and investment activities. \ln is the natural logarithm. On the right hand side r_f is the risk free rate of return, Y is the payoff/outcome of interest, X is the information signal about Y , and $I(X; Y)$ is an entropy measure of increase in amount of information about Y due to X . The measure $I(X; Y)$ consists entirely of probabilities, and is, then, free of decision context.

The next section introduces the information numbers as entropy measures. Section 3 presents conditions under which accounting numbers are connected with information numbers. The relation is derived in a setting in which accounting is done under the economic income depreciation. The relation is also derived for declining balance depreciation and straight line depreciation. Section 4 confronts what happens when the explicit long run preference assumption for the decision maker is relaxed, and some speculations about accounting and social welfare are offered. We conclude in section 5.

2 Information and Rate of Return

2.1 Entropy and mutual information

Shannon entropy is a measure of uncertainty associated with a random variable, say Y , taking discrete values y . The variable Y represents some payoff/outcome of interest. The greater the measure, the larger the uncertainty.

Definition 1 *Shannon entropy is a function of probabilities $p(y)$,*

$$H(Y) = - \sum_y p(y) \ln p(y). \quad (1)$$

Using the sum rule, $p(y) = \sum_x p(x, y)$, for joint probabilities, there is a simple rearrangement of (1),

$$H(Y) = - \sum_y \sum_x p(x, y) \ln p(y). \quad (2)$$

The measure is elegantly designed so it is natural to think of the working definition of information as whatever reduces entropy.

Of interest is the entropy associated with the payoff Y when an information system X is available. The information system X produces discrete signals x about Y . Conditional entropy, defined by summing over all possible signals, measures the uncertainty in the payoff Y for a given information system X .

$$\begin{aligned} H(Y|X) &= -\sum_x p(x) \sum_y p(y|x) \ln p(y|x) \\ &= -\sum_x \sum_y p(x,y) \ln p(y|x) \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

It is sensible to subtract which gives an expression for the reduction of uncertainty in Y if an information system X is available.

Definition 2 *Mutual information is defined as*

$$I(X;Y) = H(Y) - H(Y|X). \quad (4)$$

That is, mutual information $I(X;Y)$ measures the reduction in entropy associated with Y due to an information system X .

An important property of entropy is additivity. The following proposition holds for any random variables X and Y .

Proposition 1 *Conditional and marginal entropies add to joint entropy.*

$$H(Y|X) + H(X) = H(X,Y) \quad (5)$$

Proof. The entropy measure of the variable X is written as

$$H(X) = -\sum_x \sum_y p(x,y) \ln p(x). \quad (6)$$

Adding the expressions (3) and (6) yields

$$\begin{aligned} H(Y|X) + H(X) &= -\sum_x \sum_y p(x,y) [\ln p(y|x) + \ln p(x)] \\ &= -\sum_x \sum_y p(x,y) \ln p(x,y) \\ &= H(X,Y). \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

The last equality of (7) is the definition of joint entropy. ■

Substituting the additivity relationship (5) into the definition (4) yields a convenient expression for the computation of mutual information.

$$I(X;Y) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X,Y) \quad (8)$$

The right-hand side of (8) consists entirely of marginal probabilities of X and Y and their joint probability. We next formulate a decision problem that demands information.

2.2 A decision problem

The decision problem can be completely specified with a state-act-payoff matrix A and a price vector v . Each row of A is an act, or investment opportunity; the acts are controllable by the decision maker. The columns of A are the possible states of the world, uncontrollable by the decision maker, and v is a vector with the prices of the various acts.

Example 1 *For a simple example, let A be a 2×2 matrix with two states and two acts.*

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$$

The first act is a risk-free security which returns a payoff of one in each of the two states. The second act is a security which pays off one unit in state one and four in state two. The security prices are denoted in the price vector v .

$$v = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

The state prices, s , solve the linear system

$$As = v;$$

and the solution is

$$s = \begin{bmatrix} 2/3 \\ 1/3 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The payoffs can be framed in scaled Arrow-Debreu format. The acts are the investments of Arrow-Debreu securities.

Definition 3 *An Arrow-Debreu security is one that returns one unit in state i and zero elsewhere. The price of an Arrow-Debreu security is referred to as the state price, since it is the amount which must be paid to yield a payoff of one unit in a particular state.*

Scaling sets the price of the security equal to one; the payoffs are scaled up accordingly. The revised state-act-payoff matrix faced by the decision maker, then, is a diagonal matrix with the scaled payoffs on the diagonal, denoted by y_i , equal to $1/s_i$.

act \ state	state 1	state 2	...	state i	
act 1	y_1	0	...	0	
act 2	0	y_2	...	0	(9)
...	0	
act i	0	0	0	y_i	

Back to Example 1, the scaled matrix \tilde{A} is written as

$$\tilde{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 3/2 & 0 \\ 0 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$

so that it is easy to verify

$$\tilde{A}s = \begin{bmatrix} 3/2 & 0 \\ 0 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 2/3 \\ 1/3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Any state-act-payoff matrix, A , can be scaled to the form (9) as long as A has full rank—a complete set of independent rows and columns, that is, the states are spanned by the acts. This is where the full rank requirement is used.

An interpretation of the full rank requirement is that there exists an Arrow-Debreu security for every state of the world. So failure of the requirement can be characterized as an incomplete market condition—Arrow-Debreu security does not exist in some states. It is well known that information asymmetries cause incompleteness. However, repeated encounters ease the information asymmetry problem.² Consider, for example, the sale of a used car. The seller has private information about the car’s history: how well it has been maintained, and collisions, and so forth. The buyer, of course, is in the dark, and, hence, is likely

²Accounting references on this topic include Antle and Fellingham (1990) and Arya et al (1997).

reluctant to buy something the privately informed seller would like to dispose of. This is the famous "market for lemons" problem posed by George Akerlof (1970).

Attempts to alleviate the private information problem naturally, and perhaps inevitably, turn to ways of extending the time horizon. Warranties, maintenance contracts, and the corporate form, itself, are examples of multi-period contracts. If the relationship is an enduring one, the uninformed buyer becomes more willing to purchase, made more secure in the knowledge that there will be future interactions down the road. And the privately informed seller, aware of potential benefits in the future, will be less apt to make an early exploitative decision. In any event the full rank requirement is consistent with the long run orientation of the analysis. Indeed, one plausible purpose of accounting statements is to facilitate repeated encounters.³

Now the problem confronted by the decision maker can be entirely characterized by a vector of scaled payoffs y . Each payoff y_i is the return for every dollar of investment in an Arrow-Debreu (AD) security i (which pays off in state i). If a decision maker bets a fraction b_i of the initial wealth P_0 on security i , the payoff in state i is $b_i P_0 \times y_i$. Without loss of generality, the initial wealth is normalized to a dollar. A decision maker's problem looks like the following:

state	1	2	...	i	
AD security payoff	y_1	y_2	...	y_i	
bet payoff	$b_1 y_1$	$b_2 y_2$...	$b_i y_i$	(10)
bet rate of return	$\ln(b_1 y_1)$	$\ln(b_2 y_2)$...	$\ln(b_i y_i)$	
probability	$p(y_1)$	$p(y_2)$...	$p(y_i)$	

Using continuous compounding, the rate of return in state i , denoted by r_i , is determined as

$$b_i y_i = e^{r_i} \Rightarrow r_i = \ln(b_i y_i). \quad (11)$$

Notice that a negative y_i will cause trouble, as we must take the natural logarithm of $b_i y_i$ and the natural log of a negative number is not well-defined for this purpose. (b_i must also be non-negative, but we will confront that issue in the next subsection.) As y_i is the reciprocal of the state price, the existence of positive state prices is sufficient to avoid the problem. A direct implication

³As Basu and Waymire (2006) hypothesize, recordkeeping provides effective memory of past exchanges and therefore expands economic exchanges among agents.

of Ross's (2005) fundamental theorem of finance is that the absence of arbitrage opportunities guarantees a positive set of state prices. So a sufficient condition for positive y is arbitrage free prices. The assumption is that market forces have enough time to work so that arbitrage opportunities have been competed away. The equilibrium characterized by arbitrage free prices is consistent with a long run perspective associated with the accounting activity.

For convenience at this stage, we will also specify a vector of probabilities, $p(y)$, the likelihood that each state is realized (the last row of Table (10)). The derivation of these probability numbers will be discussed in section 3.2.

2.3 Kelly criterion

A decision maker, called a Kelly decision maker, chooses a vector of bets b to invest in each state so as to maximize the expected rate of return (more specifically, expected continuously compounded rate of return).

$$\begin{aligned} \max_b E[r] &= \sum p(y_i) \ln(b_i y_i) & (12) \\ \text{subject to } \sum b_i &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

Maximizing the expected rate of return is equivalent to maximizing the terminal wealth as long as the decision maker repeats the bets for a sufficient number of rounds. This is where the law of large numbers is used. (Additional discussions are provided in section 3.1.)⁴

To solve the optimization problem (12), the Lagrange multiplier method yields that the fraction of wealth bet in each state is equal to the state probability, that is, for all i ,

$$b_i = p(y_i). \quad (13)$$

This is the Kelly "bet your beliefs" criterion (Kelly 1956).⁵ The optimal bets are always positive, implying a Kelly decision maker never goes short in an Arrow-Debreu security.

⁴An alternative interpretation of a Kelly decision maker's problem (12), based on Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation theorem, is that a Kelly decision maker is equivalent to an expected utility maximizer with log utility.

⁵The Lagrangian function is written as

$$L(b; \mu) = \sum p(y_i) \ln(b_i y_i) - \mu \left[\sum b_i - 1 \right],$$

where μ is the multiplier. Solving $\frac{\partial L(\cdot)}{\partial b_i} = 0$ yields $b_i = \frac{p(y_i)}{\mu}$. Since $\sum b_i = 1$, the multiplier is $\mu = 1$ and the optimal bet is $b_i = p(y_i)$.

Note that the equilibrium we consider is one in which some decision-makers have private information. The uninformed decision-makers will, of course, try to infer the privately held information. And everyone will attempt to acquire private information. This information gathering process is outside the scope of our analysis.

Substituting the optimal bets (13) into the expression $E[r]$ in (12) yields the maximum rate of return available,

$$E[r] = \sum p(y_i) \ln [p(y_i) y_i]. \quad (14)$$

The expression (14), in turn, allows computing the expected rate of return with, and without, an information source.

A Kelly decision maker can extract information about payoffs y from the background knowledge consisting of a state-act-payoff matrix A and a price vector v (as long as A has full rank). In the absence of information, the decision maker faces the uncertainty associated with Y measured by $H(Y)$; and obtains the expected rate of return $E[r]$. Observing signal x from an information source X , the decision maker faces the uncertainty $H(Y|X)$; and obtains the expected rate of return $E[r|X]$.⁶

The following theorem establishes the equivalence relation between the increase of the expected rate of return and the reduction of uncertainty due to information X .

Theorem 1 (Mutual Information Theorem) *Mutual information measures the increase in the expected rate of return.*

$$E[r|X] - E[r] = I(X; Y) \quad (15)$$

Proof. The expected rate of return absent an information source $E[r]$ is defined in (14) and further derived as

$$E[r] = \sum_y p(y) \ln [p(y) y] = -H(Y) + \sum_y p(y) \ln y. \quad (16)$$

With information X , the bets can be adjusted using conditional probabilities, and then summing over all possible signals x .

$$E[r|X] = \sum_x p(x) \sum_y p(y|x) \ln [p(y|x) y]$$

⁶Information is only available to one decision maker (or one firm). More conventional notations include $W(Y)$ and $W(Y|X)$ representing the expected rate of return without or with information X , respectively (see for example, Cover and Thomas 1991).

$$\begin{aligned}
&= -H(Y|X) + \sum_x \sum_y p(x, y) \ln y \\
&= -H(Y|X) + \sum_y p(y) \ln y
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Comparing (16) and (17) yields

$$E[r|X] - E[r] = H(Y) - H(Y|X) = I(X; Y). \tag{18}$$

The increase of the expected rate of return due to information X is the mutual information as stated in Definition 2. ■

Theorem 1 connects the entropy measure to a decision problem. Information reduces uncertainty (measured by an entropy associated with payoff); and increases the expected rate of return by the exact same amount.

3 Accounting and Rate of Return

Now it is time to connect entropy and mutual information to accounting numbers. Accounting is done initially using the economic income method; that is, assets are reported at an amount equal to discounted cash flows. Economic income is the discount rate multiplied by the beginning asset value. The discount rate is the *periodic* accounting rate of return, denoted by r_p .

$$r_p = \frac{\text{income}}{\text{assets}} \tag{19}$$

In this setting, the periodic rate r_p is related to the observed rate of return, the latter is a continuously compounded rate of return based on all the available information (say X) and denoted by $r(X)$.

$$\begin{aligned}
r_p &= e^{r(X)} - 1 \\
\Rightarrow r(X) &= \ln(1 + r_p)
\end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

The Mutual Information Theorem (Theorem 1) provides the connection between the expected rate of return and mutual information,

$$E[r|X] = E[r] + I(X; Y). \tag{21}$$

It is very tempting to specify conditions under which the two relations, (20) and (21), can be combined. Two steps are necessary. The first step is to consider

when the observed rate of return ($r(X)$) converges to the expected rate of return ($E[r|X]$). This will be done in section 3.1. The second step is to establish the connection between the rate of return without information ($E(r)$) and the risk-free rate (r_f). This will be done in section 3.2. Then we will establish the main result in section 3.3.

3.1 The law of large numbers

The law of large numbers states that the mean of several observations of a random variable approaches the expected value of the random variable as the number of observations becomes large. Let r_j be the actual rate of return in the j th round (based on any information available). The initial wealth is normalized to one dollar. Using continuous compounding, the wealth after t rounds, denoted by P_t , is determined as

$$\begin{aligned} P_t &= e^{r_1} e^{r_2} \dots e^{r_t} = e^{r_1+r_2+\dots+r_t} \\ \Rightarrow \frac{1}{t} \ln P_t &= \frac{r_1+r_2+\dots+r_t}{t}. \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

Applying the law of large numbers yields

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{r_1+r_2+\dots+r_t}{t} = E[r|\cdot]. \tag{23}$$

The notation $E[r|\cdot]$ denotes the expected rate of return conditional on any information available or no information at all. The equality (23) holds true in any information environment.

The accounting numbers are generated by actual rates of return. As there are more and more observed returns, the effect is as if the observed returns were all the expected returns. This effect, of course, requires many observations. It is also consistent with our long run accounting frame. The firm is a "going concern" whose expected life is long relative to individuals who comprise the firm.

Recall a Kelly decision maker maximizes the expected rate of return which leads to the maximization of the terminal wealth. This is immediate after combining (22) and (23).

$$\begin{aligned} E[r|\cdot] &= \frac{1}{t} \ln P_t \\ \Rightarrow P_t &= e^{E[r|\cdot]t}. \end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

That is, P_t is a monotonic transformation of $E[r|\cdot]$, and hence, maximizing P_t is the same as maximizing $E[r|\cdot]$ for large t . We establish the equivalence between the actual rate of return (which determines P_t) and the expected rate of return. Note also a Kelly decision maker repeatedly betting for many rounds is consistent with the emphasis on the long run.

3.2 Maximum entropy probability assignment

We now establish that the expected rate of return without information is the risk free rate. From (14), the expected rate of return ($E[r]$) is a function of the probabilities ($p(y)$). Therefore, determining $E[r]$ requires assigning probabilities based on prior information (background knowledge). Assigning probabilities from scratch is a fairly hard problem. Nonetheless, there is some broad guidance to keep in mind, as well as some tools at our disposal. A reasonable goal is to translate all the information available (including background knowledge) into probability assignments. See Jaynes (2003) on this topic who chooses to work with entropy measure to assign probabilities.

To search for reasonable probabilities that define the entropy $H(Y)$, we could proceed in two ways: (i) we could pick probabilities that *minimize* the residual uncertainty until we bump into something we don't know, or (ii) we could pick probabilities that *maximize* the residual uncertainty until we bump into something we know. Both approaches seem hard, but the first one appears impossible. How can we write constraints which describe the unknown? So the approach we are left with is to maximize uncertainty (entropy) subject to the information available. This is the well-known maximum entropy probability assignment technique. (For an accounting application of maximum entropy probability assignment see Lev and Theil, 1978.)

Consistently, the initial probability vector p maximizes the entropy measure $H(Y)$ subject to the background knowledge (matrix A and vector v).

$$\begin{aligned} \max_p H(Y) &= -\sum_y p(y) \ln p(y) & (25) \\ \text{s.t. } & \{A, v\} \end{aligned}$$

Applying the Mutual Information Theorem, as $H(Y)$ increases, $E[r]$ declines by the same amount. So maximizing the entropy $H(Y)$ is equivalent to minimizing the expected rate of return. Reframe the decision maker's problem (25) as

choosing p to minimize $E[r]$ using the payoff vector y . It is noted that the payoff vector y is a sufficient statistics for the state-act-payoff matrix A and the price vector v . The only constraint is that the probabilities sum to one. The problem now looks like

$$\begin{aligned} \min_p E[r] &= \sum p(y_i) \ln [p(y_i) y_i] \\ \text{s.t. } \sum p(y_i) &= 1 \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

Proposition 2 presents the solution to the problem (26) and summarizes the maximum entropy probability assignment absent any information other than the background knowledge (A and v).⁷

Proposition 2 *The prior probabilities are assigned as*

$$p(y_i) = \frac{\frac{1}{y_i}}{\sum \frac{1}{y_i}}. \quad (27)$$

Proof. Once again the Lagrange multiplier method is fruitful and yields⁸

$$p(y_i) = \lambda \frac{1}{y_i}. \quad (28)$$

The probabilities sum to one so that λ is determined as $\lambda = 1 / \left[\sum \frac{1}{y_i} \right]$. Plugging λ in (28) provides (27). ■

An immediate corollary from Proposition 2 is to determine the expected rate of return with no information. Substituting the optimal probabilities (27) in the expected rate of return (26) yields

$$\begin{aligned} E[r] &= \sum \frac{\frac{1}{y_i}}{\sum \frac{1}{y_i}} \ln \left(\frac{\frac{1}{y_i}}{\sum \frac{1}{y_i}} y_i \right) \\ &= -\ln \left(\sum \frac{1}{y_i} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

⁷Proposition 2 states that the probability distribution can be directly inferred from the state price (as the inverse of the Arrow-Debreu security payoff). This result is a special case of the Recovery Theorem in Ross (2015).

⁸The Lagrangian function of the problem (26) is written as

$$L(p; \mu) = -\sum p(y_i) \ln [p(y_i) y_i] - \mu \left[\sum p(y_i) - 1 \right],$$

where μ is the multiplier. Solving $\frac{\partial L(\cdot)}{\partial p(y_i)} = 0$ yields

$$p(y_i) = \frac{e^{-1-\mu}}{y_i}.$$

Define $\lambda = e^{-1-\mu}$ as a function of the multiplier μ .

Corollary 1 *The expected rate of return absent information is the risk free rate, that is, $E[r] = r_f$.*

Proof. Recall y_i is the payoff to a scaled Arrow-Debreu security, so $1/y_i$ is the price of an Arrow-Debreu security with a state payoff of one (previously denoted s_i). Hence, $\sum 1/y_i$ is the price of a risk-free security; that is, one which pays one unit in all states. The continuously compounded interest rate on the risk-free investment—the risk free rate r_f —can then be derived from the continuous interest relationship.

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \left[\sum \frac{1}{y_i} \right] e^{r_f} \\ \Rightarrow r_f &= -\ln \left(\sum \frac{1}{y_i} \right) \end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

Comparing (29) and (30) yields $E[r] = r_f$. ■

Maximum entropy probability assignment implies that the expected rate of return with no information is the risk free rate—the rate of return from a security that promises a constant payout. Combining this result with the Mutual Information Theorem provides the right hand side of the central result of this paper,

$$E[r|X] = r_f + I(X;Y). \tag{31}$$

A Kelly decision maker’s problem can be parameterized such that information generates an extra return (relative to the risk free rate) exactly equal to the mutual information (measure of uncertainty reduction).

A numerical example is in order before we proceed to the main result in section 3.3.

Example 2 *Recall from Example 1, the background knowledge is*

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 4 \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } v = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

which can be framed as the vector of payoffs for Arrow-Debreu securities

$$y = \begin{bmatrix} 3/2 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}.$$

As a risk free security is already available in A , it is easy to see the risk free (and no information) rate of return is

$$r_f = -\ln \left(\frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3} \right) = 0.$$

As $1/y_i$ already sums to one, the maximum entropy state probabilities are $p_1 = 2/3$ and $p_2 = 1/3$.⁹ An alternative computation of the risk free rate is

$$\begin{aligned} E[r] &= \sum p(y_i) \ln p(y_i) y_i \\ &= \frac{2}{3} \ln \left(\frac{2}{3} \times \frac{3}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{3} \ln \left(\frac{1}{3} \times 3 \right) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Continue with the example to calculate the expected rate of return when additional information is available. Start with a perfect information system available where signal x_i predicts y_i with certainty. The joint probabilities are defined as follows. (Note that the marginal probabilities for y match up with the no information benchmark case.)¹⁰

$p(x, y)$	y_1	y_2
x_1	2/3	0
x_2	0	1/3

Perfect information means there is no residual uncertainty, that is, $H(Y|X) = 0$. The expected rate of return with perfect information is $H(Y)$.

$$\begin{aligned} E[r|X] &= r_f + I(X; Y) = H(Y) - H(Y|X) = H(Y) \\ &= - \left(\frac{2}{3} \ln \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3} \ln \frac{1}{3} \right) = \ln 3 - \frac{2}{3} \ln 2 \simeq .6365 \end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, a Kelly decision maker can bet all his wealth in the state i after observing x_i (so that $b_i = 1$); and earns the expected rate of return $E[r|x_i] = \ln y_i$. The expected rate of return $E[r|X]$ is determined as

$$\begin{aligned} E[r|X] &= p(x_1) E[r|x_1] + p(x_2) E[r|x_2] \\ &= \frac{2}{3} \left[\ln \frac{3}{2} \right] + \frac{1}{3} [\ln 3] \simeq .6365. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, consider an imperfect information system as represented by the fol-

⁹ A risk free rate is positive if and only if the sum of the state prices is less than one. Suppose the state-act-payoff matrix is $A = \begin{bmatrix} 3/4 & 9/5 \\ 1 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$ while keeping all the other parameters intact in the example. Then the risk free rate is $r_f \simeq 29\%$; and the probabilities are $p_1 = 4/9$ and $p_2 = 5/9$.

¹⁰ The probability $p(x, y) = 0$ is used for numerical convenience. It is intended to represent an event with very small probability $p(x, y) = \varepsilon$ so that ε approaches to zero. The limiting case $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} \varepsilon \ln \varepsilon = 0$ applies.

lowing joint probabilities.

$p(x, y)$	y_1	y_2
x_1	1/3	0
x_2	1/3	1/3

The expected rate of return now is determined as

$$\begin{aligned}
E[r|X] &= I(X; Y) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X, Y) \\
&= \left[-\frac{1}{3} \ln \frac{1}{3} - \frac{2}{3} \ln \frac{2}{3} \right] + \left[-\frac{2}{3} \ln \frac{2}{3} - \frac{1}{3} \ln \frac{1}{3} \right] - \left[-\ln \frac{1}{3} \right] \\
&= \left[\ln 3 - \frac{2}{3} \ln 2 \right] + \left[\ln 3 - \frac{2}{3} \ln 2 \right] - \ln 3 \\
&\simeq .1744.
\end{aligned}$$

So the imperfect information rate of return is a little over 17%. Alternatively, a Kelly decision maker can bet all his wealth in the first state after observing x_1 ; and earns the expected return $E[r|x_1] = \ln y_1$. After observing x_2 , the decision maker equally splits his wealth between the two states and earns the expected return $E[r|x_2] = \frac{1}{2} \ln [\frac{1}{2}y_1] + \frac{1}{2} \ln [\frac{1}{2}y_2]$. The expected rate of return is then written as

$$\begin{aligned}
E[r|X] &= p(x_1) E[r|x_1] + p(x_2) E[r|x_2] \\
&= \frac{1}{3} \ln \frac{3}{2} + \frac{2}{3} \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \ln \left[\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{3}{2} \right) \right] + \frac{1}{2} \ln \left[\frac{1}{2} (3) \right] \right\} \\
&\simeq .1744.
\end{aligned}$$

3.3 A fundamental theorem of accounting

In this subsection, the central result of this paper, connecting accounting income and asset values (computed under the economic income method) with expected rate of return, is established. Recall under the economic income method of accounting, assets are discounted cash flows and income is the discount rate multiplied by the beginning asset value. First, the law of large numbers allows the combination of (20) and (21).

$$\begin{aligned}
r(X) &= E[r|X] \\
\Leftrightarrow \ln(1 + r_p) &= E[r] + I(X; Y)
\end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

Second, applying Corollary 1, the relationship (32) becomes

$$\ln(1 + r_p) = r_f + I(X; Y). \quad (33)$$

Theorem 2

$$\ln\left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{\text{assets}}\right) = r_f + I(X; Y) \quad (34)$$

when economic income accounting is done using the information-conditioned expected rate of return as the continuously compounded accounting discount rate.

Theorem 2 is fundamental in that it equates accounting numbers with information numbers. That is, balance sheets and income statements tell how much information an entity obtains in terms of reduced entropy (without having to spell out what the information is).

Theorem 2 holds as long as (i) the state-act-payoff matrix that describes a decision problem has full rank in that it can be scaled to an Arrow-Debreu matrix; (ii) the scaled Arrow-Debreu securities' payoffs are positive as implied by arbitrage-free pricing and prevent taking logarithms of negative amounts; and (iii) the decision problem is long run in nature so that maximizing the expected rate of return is equivalent to maximizing terminal wealth, and the expected rate of return is best approximated by the realized rate of return—both are implied by the law of large numbers.

3.4 Illustration with continuous asset replacement

To illustrate Theorem 2, we consider a setting in which assets are acquired in a continuous replacement fashion—that is, one identical asset is acquired each year. The additional structure allows us to derive the steady state where there is only one income statement and only one balance sheet so that accounting numbers are easily assigned. We verify Theorem 2 when the economic income method of accounting, the declining balance depreciation method, or the straight line depreciation method is considered, respectively.

3.4.1 Analysis under economic income accounting

Suppose a new asset is acquired at the beginning of *each* period and generates periodic cash flows for n periods after acquisition: CF_1, CF_2, \dots, CF_n . All

assets generate the same cash flow sequence. The present value of discounted cash flows at the time of investment is denoted by C so that

$$C = \sum_i \frac{CF_i}{(e^r)^i}. \quad (35)$$

Since one asset is acquired each period, the entity will hold n productive assets for any period $\geq n$. The asset valuation converges to a stable amount after n periods.¹¹ Then there is only one steady state asset amount B to keep track of. The steady state amount is relatively easy to compute using the asset T-account.

Asset	
•	
•	
•	
B	
C	$\sum CF_i - (e^r - 1)(B + C)$
B	

The economic depreciation is $\sum CF_i - (e^r - 1)(B + C)$, where $(e^r - 1)(B + C)$ is the income for the period, and $\sum CF_i$ while equal to the total cash inflows over n periods from one asset, is also, conveniently, equal to one period's total cash inflows from n assets. So the steady state income statement looks like the following,

cash revenue	$\sum CF_i$
depreciation expense	$\sum CF_i - (e^r - 1)(B + C)$
income	$(e^r - 1)(B + C)$

From the asset T-account, the following relation must hold—that is, in steady state there is always one asset fully depreciated so that the total depreciation is equal to the initial cost C ,

$$C = \sum CF_i - (e^r - 1)(B + C)$$

¹¹Our analysis applies to the initial investment C_0 of any amount. In particular, if C_0 differs from C , there is economic profit/loss due to imperfect market (Christensen and Demski 2003). In this case, at the time of investment, the asset value is written up/down by the economic profit/loss so that $new\ asset = C_0 + (C - C_0) = C$, which is also the amount of economic depreciation recognized in each period in steady state. The sum of cash flows ($\sum CF_i$) equals to the sum of the total economic income and the economic profit/loss. The periodic income is the total cash flows minus depreciation expense, that is, $income = \sum CF_i - C$.

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Rightarrow Be^r - B + Ce^r = \sum CF_i \\
&\Rightarrow B = \frac{\sum CF_i - e^r C}{e^r - 1}.
\end{aligned} \tag{36}$$

The asset value B in the steady state is the present value of a perpetuity of the amount of net cash received in each period ($\sum CF_i$ less the adjusted cost $e^r C$).¹² The relation in Theorem 2 can be verified:¹³

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\text{income}}{\text{assets}} &= \frac{\sum CF_i - C}{B + C} = \frac{(e^r - 1)(B + C)}{B + C} = e^r - 1 \\
\Rightarrow r &= \ln \left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{B + C} \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

To construct illuminating (it is hoped) numerical examples, it is necessary to specify the time sequence of cash flows. A convenient way to do so is a "timing" vector, k ,

$$k = \left[k_1 \quad k_2 \quad \dots \quad k_n \right] \tag{38}$$

where $\sum k_i = 1$. The cash flow for each asset in period i after acquisition is a function of an optimal information conditioned act, and defined as

$$CF_i = k_i (e^r)^i. \tag{39}$$

With this additional structure, the economic value of the acquired asset is scaled to one.

$$C = \sum_i \frac{k_i (e^r)^i}{(e^r)^i} = 1 \tag{40}$$

¹²An alternative derivation of (36) does not rely on the assumption of convergence. Define BV_t as the book value at the end of period t . Start with $BV_0 = 0$. The ending book values for period 1 is $BV_1 = e^r C - CF_1$. The ending book value for period n is

$$BV_n = \frac{e^r (1 - e^{nr})}{1 - e^r} C - \sum_{i=1}^n CF_i \left[\frac{1 - (e^r)^{n+1-i}}{1 - e^r} \right].$$

Since C is the discounted cash flow, $C = \sum_{i=1}^n [CF_i / (e^r)^i]$, it must be $(e^r)^{n+1} C = \sum_{i=1}^n [CF_i (e^r)^{n+1-i}]$. Substituting in the expression BV_n yields

$$BV_n = \frac{e^r}{1 - e^r} C - \frac{(e^r)^{n+1}}{1 - e^r} C - \sum_{i=1}^n CF_i \left[\frac{1}{1 - e^r} \right] + \sum_{i=1}^n CF_i \left[\frac{(e^r)^{n+1-i}}{1 - e^r} \right],$$

which can be simplified to (36) in the text.

¹³This statement holds true for any periodic discount rate (r_p) as long as $e^r = 1 + r_p$.

Example 3 Let $k = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ so the cash flows for every asset are $CF_1 = 0$ and $CF_2 = e^{2r}$. The steady state asset value B is derived as

$$B = \frac{e^{2r} - e^r}{e^r - 1} = e^r.$$

The periodic income is $\sum CF_i - C = e^{2r} - 1$.

The following table numerically computes the expected rate of return and the accounting measures for the three information environments defined in Example 2: null, imperfect, and perfect information.

Information	Null	Imperfect	Perfect
$E[r X]$ $= r_f + I(X; Y)$	0	$\ln 3 - 4/3 \ln 2$ $\simeq .1744$	$\ln 3 - 2/3 \ln 2$ $\simeq .6365$
$assets = B + C = e^r + 1$	2	2.1906	2.8899
$income = e^{2r} - 1$	0	.4174	2.5717
$\ln \left(1 + \frac{income}{assets} \right)$	0	.1744	.6365

As shown, Theorem 2 is verified with the numerical equivalence of the information number (Row 2) and the accounting number (Row 5).

3.4.2 Analysis under declining balance accounting

In this subsection, we show Theorem 2 holds for some specified parameters when declining balance depreciation is considered.

Let D be the declining rate under declining balance depreciation. The periodic depreciation is the asset available for production at the beginning of the period multiplied by the declining rate D . The asset value converges in steady state, denoted by B^D where the superscript refers to declining balance accounting. The T-account analysis supplies a representation.

<i>Asset</i>	
•	
•	
•	
B^D	
C_0	$D(B^D + C_0)$
B^D	

If under declining balance depreciation, the accounting rate of return (income divided by assets) replicates the discount rate under the economic income method, then Theorem 2 holds. This requires a well-designed declining rate D .

In general, accounting income seldom coincides with economic income. (Please see Solomons (1961) and Littleton (2011) on this issue.) We highlight that if the goal is to convey information numbers through accounting numbers, then an accrual policy must ensure the equivalence relation holds—that is, the accounting rate of return replicates $\frac{\text{income}}{\text{asset}}$ under the economic income method.

Corollary 2 *Assume declining balance accounting is in place. With the continuous replacement asset structure, the equivalence relation holds*

$$\ln \left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{B^D + C_0} \right) = r_f + I(X; Y) \quad (41)$$

where the declining balance rate, book value and the accounting income are

$$D = \frac{(e^r - 1) C_0}{\sum CF_i - C_0}; \quad (42)$$

$$B^D = \frac{\sum CF_i - e^r C_0}{e^r - 1}; \text{ and} \quad (43)$$

$$\text{income} = \sum CF_i - C_0. \quad (44)$$

Proof. From the T-account depreciation expense is $D(B^D + C_0) = C_0$, so the income statement is

cash revenue	$\sum CF_i$
depreciation expense	$\frac{C_0}{\sum CF_i - C_0}$
income	$\sum CF_i - C_0$

In steady state, convergent income is the same for any declining balance depreciation rate. Again from the T-account, we also derive the book value of the assets in steady state,¹⁴

$$C_0 = D(B^D + C_0)$$

¹⁴Alternatively, B^D can be derived without relying on the assumption of convergence. Define BV_t as the book value at the end of period t . At the beginning of each period, a new asset with cost C_0 is purchased and the declining rate is D . The book value at the end of period t can be written as

$$BV_t = (1 - D)(BV_{t-1} + C_0).$$

Because $BV_0 = 0$, BV_t can be further written as

$$BV_t = \left(\sum_{i=1}^t (1 - D)^i \right) C_0 = \left[\frac{1 - (1 - D)^t}{D} \right] (1 - D) C_0.$$

$$\Rightarrow B^D = \frac{C_0}{D} - C_0. \quad (45)$$

Given the declining rate (42), the accounting rate of return in a steady state is equal to the discount rate ($e^r - 1$), the discount rate provided by (37) under the economic income method (which is a special case of Theorem 2).

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{income}}{\text{assets}} &= \frac{\text{income}}{B^D + C_0} = \frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{\frac{C_0}{D} - C_0 + C_0} \\ &= \frac{\frac{(e^r - 1)C_0}{\sum CF_i - C_0}}{C_0} \left[\sum CF_i - C_0 \right] \\ &= e^r - 1 \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

The algebra in (46) uses the declining rate (42), the income expression (44) and the asset expression (45) to verify the equivalence relation (41). Plugging the expression of D from (42), the asset value in steady state (the expression (45)) is derived as

$$\begin{aligned} B^D &= \frac{C_0}{D} - C_0 = \frac{C_0}{\frac{(e^r - 1)C_0}{\sum CF_i - C_0}} - C_0 \\ &= \frac{\sum CF_i - e^r C_0}{(e^r - 1)}. \end{aligned} \quad (47)$$

Both (43) and (44) are the counterparts of the economic value and the economic income under the economic income method. In the special case in which $C_0 = C$, the declining rate is $D = \frac{(e^r - 1)C}{\sum CF_i - C}$ and the accounting numbers (the book value of assets and the periodic income) are the same under both methods. ■

There is some intuition associated with the declining rate: the numerator is the amount of income generated by the asset in the first year, and the denominator is total income over the entire life of the asset. The rate is the portion of the economic income realized in the first year.¹⁵

Example 4 *Continue with Example 3 where $C = 1$ and $\sum CF_i = e^{2r}$. Assume the acquisition cost $C_0 = .8$. The declining rate can be simplified as*

In the limit, the ending book value converges to a constant $B^D = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} BV_t = \left(\frac{1-D}{D}\right) C_0$, the same expression as (45) in the text.

¹⁵Depreciation has been extensively studied in settings with performance evaluation. For example, a carefully crafted depreciation policy (in particular, relative benefit depreciation), employed by residual income based performance measure, provides incentives for managers to invest in positive NPV projects (a line of literature that starts with Rogerson 1997 and Reichelstein 1997). In contrast, we are interested in the choice of depreciation that helps establish the connection between accounting numbers and information numbers.

$D = \frac{(e^r - 1)(.8)}{e^{2r} - .8}$, which varies based on the underlying information. (For the null information system with $r = 0$, the book value $(B^D + C_0)$ goes to infinity as $e^r - 1 = 0$. However, the book value multiplied by the declining rate is .8 if we evaluate at the limit.)

Information	Null	Imperfect	Perfect
$r = E[r X]$	0	.1744	.6365
$D = \frac{(e^r - 1)(.8)}{e^{2r} - .8}$	0	.2469	.2569
$B^D + C_0 = \frac{e^{2r} - e^r(.8)}{e^r - 1} + .8$	∞	3.2401	3.1146
Depreciation $= D(B^D + C_0)$	0.8	.2469 (3.2401) = 0.8	.2569 (3.1146) = 0.8
income = $e^{2r} - .8$	0.2	.6174	2.7717
$\ln\left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{B^D + C_0}\right)$	0	.1744	.6365

The information number (Row 2) and the accounting number (Row 7) are the same. Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 are verified. Lastly, the accounting can be verified by checking the respective asset T-account at steady state (the case of imperfect information).

Asset($r = 0.1744$)	
•	
•	
•	
$B^D = 2.4401$	
$C_0 = 0.8$	$D(B^D + C_0) = .2469(3.2401) = 0.8$
2.4401	

3.4.3 Analysis under straight line accounting

In this section, we show Theorem 2 holds for some specified parameters when straight line depreciation is considered.

Under the straight line depreciation, the depreciable cost is evenly allocated over the useful life of an asset. This requires two accounting estimates: the useful life of the asset, denoted by N , and the residual value, denoted by \tilde{C} . The depreciable cost is $(C_0 - \tilde{C})$ and the periodic depreciation for *each* asset is a constant equal to $(C_0 - \tilde{C})/N$. At the N th period, one asset is fully

depreciated; the residual value is written off from the book. In steady state (for any period $\geq n$), the total depreciation expense is C_0 and the income is $\sum CF_i - C_0$. The book value of the assets in the steady state, denoted by B^S , can be found by running through the asset T-account for N periods. The superscript S refers to straight line accounting.

<i>Asset</i>	
C_0	$\frac{1}{N} (C_0 - \tilde{C})$
C_0	$\frac{1}{N} (C_0 - \tilde{C}) + \frac{1}{N} (C_0 - \tilde{C}) = \frac{2}{N} (C_0 - \tilde{C})$
·	·
·	·
C_0	$\frac{N}{N} (C_0 - \tilde{C}) + \tilde{C}$
NC_0	$\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^N i}{N}\right) (C_0 - \tilde{C}) + \tilde{C}$

From the T-account, the ending book value of the asset at the end of N th period (which is also the amount in steady state) is written as

$$\begin{aligned}
B^S &= NC_0 - \left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^N i}{N}\right) (C_0 - \tilde{C}) - \tilde{C} \\
&= NC_0 - \frac{N+1}{2} (C_0 - \tilde{C}) - \tilde{C} \\
&= (N-1)C_0 - \frac{N-1}{2} (C_0 - \tilde{C}). \tag{48}
\end{aligned}$$

(The derivation used the sum of the arithmetic series $\sum N = N(N+1)/2$.) A natural interpretation of the expression (48) is that the book value of the assets in steady state is the cost of $(N-1)$ assets minus the total accumulated depreciation from the $(N-1)$ assets. This can also be seen in the T-account.

If under the straight line depreciation method, the accounting rate of return (income divided by assets) replicates the discount rate under the economic income method, then Theorem 2 holds. This requires a properly estimated pair N and \tilde{C} .

Corollary 3 *Assume straight line accounting is in place. With the continuous replacement asset structure, the equivalence relation holds*

$$\ln \left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{B^S + C_0} \right) = r_f + I(X; Y) \tag{49}$$

for a particular N and the residual value estimation

$$\tilde{C} = \left(\frac{2}{N-1} \right) \left[\frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{e^r - 1} - \left(\frac{N+1}{2} \right) C_0 \right]. \tag{50}$$

Proof. The same logic as in Corollary 2 applies here. The accrual estimates ensure the accounting rate of return in a steady state is equal to the discount rate ($e^r - 1$), the discount rate provided by Theorem 2. For a particular N , applying the estimated residual value (50), the book value of assets in steady state (48) and the income expression ($\sum CF_i - C_0$), the accounting rate of return is derived as

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\text{income}}{\text{assets}} &= \frac{\text{income}}{B^S + C_0} = \frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{(N-1)C_0 - \left(\frac{N-1}{2}\right)(C_0 - \tilde{C}) + C_0} \\
&= \frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{\left(\frac{N+1}{2}\right)C_0 + \left(\frac{N-1}{2}\right)\tilde{C}} \\
&= \frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{\left(\frac{N+1}{2}\right)C_0 + \left(\frac{N-1}{2}\right)\left\{\left(\frac{2}{N-1}\right)\left[\frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{e^r - 1} - \left(\frac{N+1}{2}\right)C_0\right]\right\}} \\
&= \frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{\left(\frac{N+1}{2}\right)C_0 + \left[\frac{\sum CF_i - C_0}{e^r - 1} - \left(\frac{N+1}{2}\right)C_0\right]} \\
&= e^r - 1.
\end{aligned} \tag{51}$$

The equivalence relation (49) is verified. ■

Example 5 Continue with Example 3 where $C = 1$ and $\sum CF_i = e^{2r}$. Assume the acquisition cost $C_0 = .8$. For $N = 5$, the residual value estimate can be written as $\tilde{C} = 2 \left[\frac{e^{2r} - (.8)}{e^r - 1} - (1.2) \right]$, which varies based on the underlying information. (For the null information system with $r = 0$, the residual value and the book value go to infinity as $e^r - 1 = 0$.)

Information	Null	Imperfect	Perfect
$r = E[r X]$	0	.1744	.6365
$\tilde{C} = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \left[\frac{e^{2r} - (.8)}{e^r - 1} - 3(.8) \right]$	∞	.4201	.3573
$B^S + C_0 = (3.2) - 2 \left(.8 - \tilde{C} \right) + (.8)$	∞	3.2401	3.1146
$\text{income} = e^{2r} - .8$	0.2	.6174	2.7717
$\ln \left(1 + \frac{\text{income}}{B^S + C_0} \right)$	0	.1744	.6365

The information number (Row 2) and the accounting number (Row 6) are the same. Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 are verified.

4 Long Run Decisions and Social Welfare

We take a long run perspective on the link between accounting numbers and information numbers. The analysis so far establishes that the accounting rate of return, with judicious attention to accrual details, can be made the long run rate of return (Theorem 2). Maximizing long run expected rate of return is equivalent to maximizing the accounting rate of return. However, it is well known that rational decision makers do not necessarily maximize long run wealth. Samuelson (1971) is particularly eloquent on this point. The purpose of this section is to examine the alternative case where a decision maker is short run oriented.

The following example is illustrative in which a decision maker invests his entire wealth in the state with the highest expected outcome to maximize the expected one period return. Indeed, if short selling is allowed, massive borrowing will occur to finance even larger investments in the preferred outcome, regardless of the decision maker's risk preference. This observation stands in contrast with a Kelly decision maker whose behavior is consistent with long run decision making. If the decision maker pays attention to accounting numbers, they will act like long-run decision maker. This induced behavior can be beneficial for social welfare.

Example 6 *Recall from Example 2, the payoffs for Arrow-Debreu securities and the updated probabilities are*

	state 1	state 2
AD security payoff y	3/2	3
probability $p(y x_2)$	1/2	1/2

The probabilities are (derived) conditional probabilities of payoff y in the imperfect information case of Example 2 when x_2 is observed. One unit investment in state 1 opportunity yields an expected value of

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{3}{2} \right) = \frac{3}{4}$$

A similar investment in state 2 yields 3/2. And, if allowed, the individual will sell one state 1 opportunity in order to buy another state 2, thereby increasing the expected return by another $3/2 - 3/4 = 3/4$. This investment strategy is optimal subject to a constraint on the amount of short selling. One will continue selling short until some constraint is violated.

This behavior could have socially unfortunate consequences. The individual has left an Arrow-Debreu state uncovered. When state 1 occurs, the decision-maker is unable to meet the short position. This, in turn, leads to uncomfortable consequences in the credit market where some investors are unable to meet their obligations, and possibly to a "too big to fail" response on the part of financial authorities.

However, introducing risk aversion does not prevent the decision maker from going short in AD securities. Consider a decision maker with wealth w and the following constant absolute risk aversion preference:

$$U(w) = -e^{-.1w}.$$

Then the decision maker determines wealth allocation b to maximize her expected utility

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_b \quad & \left[-\frac{1}{2}e^{-.1(b_1y_1)} - \frac{1}{2}e^{-.1(b_2y_2)} \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & b_1 + b_2 = 1 \end{aligned}$$

and obtains the optimal allocations:

$$\begin{aligned} b_1 &= -.87366 \\ b_2 &= 1.87366 \end{aligned}$$

The risk averse decision maker goes short in state one to the tune of 87% of initial wealth.

It is important to recall that Kelly "bet your beliefs" behavior will never go short in an Arrow-Debreu security. As shown in Example 2 (with imperfect information), a Kelly decision maker, after observing x_2 , equally splits his wealth over the two states.

While accounting can not, of course, change preferences, it seems possible attention paid to accounting numbers could mitigate the tendency to go short in an Arrow-Debreu security. Non-Kelly behavior necessarily reduces the accounting rate of return calculated in this paper. To the extent that reduced reported accounting rate of return is a cost decision-makers pay attention to, a non-Kelly decision maker might act more like a Kelly decision maker. Since Kelly behavior is socially beneficial, accounting performs a social service.

5 Concluding Remarks

The central result is the equivalence relation between accounting numbers and an entropy-based information metric.

$$\ln \left(1 + \frac{\textit{income}}{\textit{assets}} \right) = r_f + I(X;Y)$$

The equivalence is derived from a sufficient set of conditions. The conditions all depend, to some extent, upon a long run time frame: arbitrage free equilibrium prices, full rank state-act-outcome matrix, and long run preferences. Any speculations on implications of the equivalence are implications of the underlying conditions.

There are, perhaps, implications for how to do accounting: it seems plausible that the accounting numbers of an entity should be supported by its information capabilities. But, of course, the equality goes both ways. Just as the information informs the accounting, it is also the case that accounting can increase our understanding of information. In this sense the preceding analysis is in the spirit of Hatfield (1924): Does accounting deserve a place among other information sciences in this, the information age? We think the answer is yes.

The mutual information theorem result presented herein relies on a complete set of Arrow-Debreu state securities—one security for every state. Accountants are accustomed to working in an economic environment where information asymmetry is an important effect. An implication of information asymmetry is that not all states can be traded, that is, there does not exist a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities. A natural question which arises is: how is the mutual information theorem affected if markets are incomplete?

Surprisingly, one way to confront the question is to access quantum physics and the concept of quantum entropy. In the quantum world the quantum state can never be observed; only probabilistic measurements can be accessed. So in this world trades can be based only on the measurement, not the unobservable states. Further it is quite reasonable for the number of measurements to be exceeded by the number of states: a natural representation of the incomplete market scenario.

A quantum mutual information theorem can be derived which has the following relationship to the classical mutual information theorem (Theorem 1).

A reframing of Theorem 1 is

$$E[r|\text{No Information}] = E[r|\text{Perfect Information}] - H(Y)$$

where $H(Y)$ is the classical entropy without information. The quantum relationship is similar,

$$E[r|\text{No Information}] = E[r|\text{Perfect Information}] - S(Y)$$

where $S(Y)$ is quantum or Von Neumann entropy, named after mathematician John Von Neumann. Von Neumann entropy is always (weakly) less than Shannon entropy, reflecting the (possibly) restricted set of market opportunities in the quantum world. A quantum mutual information theorem is derived and explored in a working paper titled "Quantum Entropy and Accounting" by Fellingham, Lin and Schroeder (2018).

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