## Accounting and causal effects: challenges and potential remedies

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#### outline

- accounting ingredients causal effect of strategic disclosure
- focus on treatment effects
- challenges identification
- potential remedies
  - · ignorable treatment identification strategies
  - · instrumental variable identification strategies
  - $\cdot$  partial identification strategies
- varieties of treatment effects and data analytic approaches
- examples of effective/ineffective identification strategies

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### accounting causal effects

- endogenous nature of causal effects makes assessing welfare impact of accounting choice challenging
- strategic disclosure:
  - discrete recognize/disclose or not
  - · continuous information precision

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### accounting causal effects

- ingredients:
  - uncertainty
  - $\cdot$  asymmetric information
  - $\cdot\,$  multiple sources of information
  - $\cdot$  equilibrium behavior
  - · audited reports may result in welfare improvement

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#### treatment effects

- special case of causal effects
- for concreteness and simplicity, we'll focus on binary treatment effects; for example, disclose or don't disclose
  - $\cdot \ TE = Y_1 Y_0$
  - $Y_1$  is (potential) outcome with treatment
  - $\cdot$   $Y_0$  is (potential) outcome without treatment
  - $\cdot \qquad D=1$  treatment is chosen or assigned
  - $\cdot$  D = 0 no treatment is chosen or assigned
  - observed outcome:  $Y = DY_1 + (1 D) Y_0$
  - $\cdot$  observable data:  $Y_1|D=1$  and  $Y_0|D=0$
  - $\cdot$  counterfactuals:  $Y_1|D=0$  and  $Y_0|D=1$

# common treatment effects conditional average treatment effects

• average treatment effect for individuals who selected treatment conditional on observables/regressors

$$ATT(X) = E[Y_1 - Y_0 | X = x, D = 1]$$

• average treatment effect for individuals who selected no treatment conditional on observables/regressors

$$ATUT(X) = E[Y_1 - Y_0 | X = x, D = 0]$$

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# common treatment effects

conditional average treatment effects

• average treatment effect for individuals chosen or assigned treatment at random conditional on observables/regressors

$$\begin{array}{rcl} ATE \left( X \right) & = & E \left[ Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x \right] \\ & = & Pr \left( D = 1 \mid X \right) ATT \left( X \right) + Pr \left( D = 0 \mid X \right) ATUT \left( X \right) \end{array}$$

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## common treatment effects

conditional average treatment effects

• for propensity score matching, covariates X = x are replaced by P(x) = p in the conditional expectation expression

$$ATE (P(x)) = E [Y_1 - Y_0 | P(x) = p] = Pr (D = 1 | P(x) = p) ATT (P(x)) + Pr (D = 0 | P(x) = p) ATUT (P(x))$$

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#### common treatment effects unconditional average treatment effects

- with full common support (so-called identification at infinity), unconditional average effects are derived from conditional average effects via iterated expectations
  - · otherwise, we're only able to identify local average effects
  - · description of common support indicates range of evidence
- for example, the average treatment effect for individuals who are selected for treatment at random

$$ATE = E_X [E [Y_1 - Y_0 | X]] \\ = E [Y_1 - Y_0]$$

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#### • Identification! Identification! Identification!

- $\cdot$  framing the causal effect problem
  - rich variety of potential effects of interest makes this
    - step of paramount importance
- $\cdot$  causal effect parameter identification
  - typically maps observable outcome Y to effect via probability theory

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- counterfactual nature
- common support (treated and untreated)
- unobservability (partial observability) of beliefs, preferences, and potential outcomes

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- observable and unobservable heterogeneity
  - how likely is homogeneity?
- instrumental variable strategies can accommodate outcome heterogeneity but require uniform treatment adoption
- greater explanatory power may increase selection bias

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#### • more ambitious agendas

- $\cdot$  suspend stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) allow interaction effects among individuals
- Cowles' commission fully structural analysis (including specification of preferences and incentives) of general equilibrium effects in environments with which we have no prior experience

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- thought experiments
  - framing problem and focal parameter(s)
  - $\cdot$  identification of quantities of interest

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- thought experiments
  - probability assignment
  - Jaynes' maximum entropy is one probability assignment approach
  - Ross' recovery theorem assigns probabilities and preferences from state prices
  - Leamer's specification searches with various priors and likelihoods allows the reader to judge the data summaries for themselves
  - Manski's partial identification & law of decreasing credibility



- varieties of treatment effects and questions posed
  - $\cdot$  discrete/continuous treatment
  - conditional (on observables/regressors) and unconditional (iterated expectations) treatment effects
  - · population-level effect
  - marginal
  - average
  - quantile
  - *MTE* connects to other treatment effects via weighting functions

#### • identification strategies

- ignorable treatment (selection on observables or unconfoundedness)
  - treatment is mean conditionally independent
  - strong ignorability involves stochastic conditional
    - independence

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#### • identification strategies

- instrumental variables (exclusion restrictions)
  - instruments are independent of outcomes
  - instruments are related to treatment adoption
  - instruments allow manipulation of treatment
    - without affecting outcomes to infer counterfactuals

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— treatment adoption is uniform in the instruments

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#### • identification strategies

 bounding/partial identification when point-identification is not feasible or credible

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#### • common support

- · evaluate overlap in covariate distribution
- examine histograms of the estimated propensity score by treatment status
- · propensity score matching to determine sample

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limited common support

• example — nonparametric identification with limited common support

• DGP

| $Y_1$ | $Y_0$ | ΤE | Y  | D | X  |
|-------|-------|----|----|---|----|
| 11    | 4     | 7  | 4  | 0 | 0  |
| 2     | 6     | -4 | 6  | 0 | -1 |
| 1     | 5     | -4 | 5  | 0 | -1 |
| 11    | 4     | 7  | 4  | 0 | 0  |
| 11    | 4     | 7  | 11 | 1 | 0  |
| 11    | 4     | 7  | 11 | 1 | 0  |
| 9     | 3     | 6  | 9  | 1 | 1  |
| 10    | 2     | 8  | 10 | 1 | 1  |

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#### Examples limited common support

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• various treatment effects

$$ATT (X = 0) = ATT (X = 1)$$
  
= ATT = 7  
$$ATUT (X = -1) = -4, ATUT (X = 0) = 7$$
  
= ATUT = 1.5  
$$ATE (X = -1) = -4, ATE (X = 0) = ATE (X = 1) = 7$$
  
= ATE = 4.25

only conditional treatment effects (at X = 0) are nonparametrically identified by the data:
 ATT (X = 0) = ATUT (X = 0) = ATE (X = 0) = 7

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- some varieties of data analytic strategies
  - nonparametric regression
  - general matching
  - propensity score matching
  - $\cdot$  fixed effects
  - · difference-in-differences (*DID*)
  - · linear 2SLS-IV
    - interpretation depends on instruments & covariates

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- · control or replacement functions
- · local *IV* (semi-nonparametric)

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- some varieties of data analytic strategies
  - regression discontinuity design
  - doubly-robust combination methods
    - regression with propensity score weighting (WLS)

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- subclassification and regression
- matching and regression
- correlated random coefficients for continuous treatment
- simulation, say, of general equilibrium effects
- McMC Bayesian data augmentation
- and more . . .

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#### • assessing refutability

- no direct tests due to counterfactual nature credibility is a thought experiment
- evaluate refutable partial identification bounds against the data
- highly context specific for example, check for change in means or distribution of covariates around the threshold for regression discontinuity designs

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#### • data

- better data is perhaps the most effective, albeit nontrivial, remedy
- outcomes, regressors/covariates, instruments, etc. are typically inadequate for addressing the questions we wish to probe (welfare effects)
- the efforts of empiricists toward this goal are typically undervalued — a disservice to the discipline

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2SLS-IV identifies LATE — treatment effect depends on instrument choice

• DGP — nonignorable, heterogeneous treatment effect

| $Y_1$ | $Y_0$ | ΤE | Y  | D | Ζ |
|-------|-------|----|----|---|---|
| 15    | 10    | 5  | 15 | 1 | 1 |
| 15    | 10    | 5  | 15 | 1 | 0 |
| 10    | 10    | 0  | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 10    | 10    | 0  | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| 5     | 10    | -5 | 10 | 0 | 1 |
| 5     | 10    | -5 | 10 | 0 | 0 |

- $LATE = E[Y_1 Y_0 \mid D_1 D_0 = 1] = IVE = \frac{E[Y|Z=1] E[Y|Z=0]}{E[D|Z=1] E[D|Z=0]}$
- regressors:  $\{1, D\}$ ; instruments:  $\{1, Z\}$
- *LATE* is the instrument-dependent treatment effect for an unidentified subpopulation of compliers
- compliers are rows 3 and 4

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#### examples 2SLS-IV identifies LATE — treatment effect depends on instrument choice

• various treatment effects

$$\begin{array}{ll} ATT = 3\frac{1}{3} & ATUT = -3\frac{1}{3} \\ ATE = 0 & OLS = 3\frac{1}{3} \\ LATE = 0 & IVE = 0 \end{array}$$

- the local average treatment effect is identified via 2SLS-IV as the binary instrument, Z, satisfies the exclusion restriction, Pr (Y<sub>i</sub> | Z = 1) = Pr (Y<sub>i</sub> | Z = 0) for i = 0, 1, and is related to selection, D, Pr (D | Z) ≠ Pr (D)
- treatment effect identified depends on instrument and applies to an unidentified subpopulation of compliers,  $D_1 D_0 = 1$

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#### examples LATE = ATT

#### • DGP — nonignorable, heterogeneous treatment effect

| $Y_1$ | $Y_0$ | ΤE | Y  | D | Ζ |
|-------|-------|----|----|---|---|
| 15    | 10    | 5  | 15 | 1 | 1 |
| 15    | 10    | 5  | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| 20    | 20    | 0  | 20 | 0 | 1 |
| 20    | 20    | 0  | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| 10    | 10    | 0  | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 10    | 10    | 0  | 10 | 0 | 0 |

- $LATE = E[Y_1 Y_0 \mid D_1 D_0 = 1] = IVE = \frac{E[Y|Z=1] E[Y|Z=0]}{E[D|Z=1] E[D|Z=0]}$
- regressors:  $\{1, D\}$ ; instruments:  $\{1, Z\}$
- compliers are rows 1, 2, 5, and 6

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#### examples LATE = ATT

• various treatment effects

$$ATT = 2.5$$
  $ATUT = 1.25$   
 $ATE = 1\frac{2}{3}$   $OLS = -2.5$   
 $LATE = 2.5$   $IVE = 2.5$ 

- the local average treatment effect is identified via 2SLS-IV as the binary instrument, Z, satisfies the exclusion restriction, Pr (Y<sub>i</sub> | Z = 1) = Pr (Y<sub>i</sub> | Z = 0) for i = 0, 1
- LATE equals ATT as Pr(D = 1 | Z = 0) = 0

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#### examples LATE = ATUT

#### • DGP — nonignorable, heterogeneous treatment effect

| $Y_1$ | $Y_0$ | ΤE | Y  | D | Ζ |
|-------|-------|----|----|---|---|
| 15    | 10    | 5  | 15 | 1 | 1 |
| 15    | 10    | 5  | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| 20    | 10    | 10 | 20 | 1 | 1 |
| 20    | 10    | 10 | 20 | 1 | 0 |
| 10    | 10    | 0  | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 10    | 10    | 0  | 10 | 0 | 0 |

- $LATE = E[Y_1 Y_0 \mid D_1 D_0 = 1] = IVE = \frac{E[Y|Z=1] E[Y|Z=0]}{E[D|Z=1] E[D|Z=0]}$
- regressors:  $\{1, D\}$ ; instruments:  $\{1, Z\}$
- compliers are rows 1, 2, 5, and 6

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#### examples LATE = ATUT

#### • various treatment effects

$$\begin{array}{ll} ATT = 6.25 & ATUT = 2.5 \\ ATE = 5 & OLS = 6.25 \\ LATE = 2.5 & IVE = 2.5 \end{array}$$

- the local average treatment effect is identified via 2SLS-IV as the binary instrument, Z, satisfies the exclusion restriction, Pr (Y<sub>i</sub> | Z = 1) = Pr (Y<sub>i</sub> | Z = 0) for i = 0, 1
- LATE equals ATUT as  $\Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = 1) = 1$

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#### examples LATE — defiers, 2SLS-IV fails

• DGP — nonignorable, heterogeneous treatment effect

| $Y_1$ | $Y_0$ | ΤE | Y  | D | Ζ |
|-------|-------|----|----|---|---|
| 10    | 5     | 5  | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 10    | 5     | 5  | 5  | 0 | 0 |
| 10    | 5     | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 10    | 5     | 10 | 10 | 1 | 0 |
| 10    | 5     | 0  | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 10    | 5     | 0  | 5  | 0 | 0 |
| 10    | -5    | 0  | -5 | 0 | 1 |
| 10    | -5    | 0  | 10 | 1 | 0 |

- regressors:  $\{1, D\}$ ; instruments:  $\{1, Z\}$
- compliers are rows 1, 2, 5, and 6
- last two rows are defiers

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• various treatment effects

$$ATT = 7 \quad ATUT = 8\frac{1}{3}$$
$$ATE = 7.5 \quad OLS = 8\frac{1}{3}$$
$$LATE = 5 \quad IVE = -5$$

- the local average treatment effect is not identified via 2SLS-IV as there are defiers in the population
- 2SLS-IV is grossly misleading sign of the estimand IVE is opposite of LATE
- failure of treatment adoption uniformity can mean *OLS* is closer to identifying *LATE* than *2SLS-IV*

2SLS-IV with covariates — treatment effect depends on covariates as well as instrument choice

- let X be a fixed design matrix of three indicator variables (a varying intercept model)
- regressors (conditional effects): {X<sub>1</sub>, X<sub>2</sub>, X<sub>3</sub>, X<sub>1</sub>D, X<sub>2</sub>D, X<sub>3</sub>D} or regressors (unconditional effect): {X<sub>1</sub>, X<sub>2</sub>, X<sub>3</sub>, D}; instruments: {X<sub>1</sub>, X<sub>2</sub>, X<sub>3</sub>, X<sub>1</sub>Z, X<sub>2</sub>Z, X<sub>3</sub>Z}

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Accounting and causal effects

 $\mathsf{2SLS}\text{-}\mathsf{IV}$  with covariates — treatment effect depends on covariates as well as instrument choice

• 2SLS - IV effect is a weighted average of the 2SLS - IV effects identified at each  $X_k = 1$ 

$$\gamma = \frac{E\left[Y \cdot \left(E\left[D \mid X, Z\right] - E\left[D \mid X\right]\right)\right]}{E\left[D \cdot \left(E\left[D \mid X, Z\right] - E\left[D \mid X\right]\right)\right]}$$
$$= \frac{E_X\left[\omega\left(X_k = 1\right)\gamma\left(X_k = 1\right)\right]}{E_X\left[\omega\left(X_k = 1\right)\right]}$$

• with weights

$$\omega(X_{k} = 1) = E[E[D \mid X, Z] \cdot (E[D \mid X, Z] - E[D \mid X]) \mid X_{k} = 1]$$

• and 2SLS - IV effects at each  $X_k = 1$ ,

$$\gamma (X_{k} = 1) = \frac{E [Y \cdot (E [D \mid X, Z] - E [D \mid X]) \mid X_{k} = 1]}{E [D \cdot (E [D \mid X, Z] - E [D \mid X]) \mid X_{k} = 1]}$$

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2SLS-IV with covariates — 2SLS-IV effect equal to LATE

• DGP — nonignorable, heterogeneous treatment effect with unobservable outcome V<sub>i</sub>

|                   | $Y_1$    | $Y_0$      | ΤE | Y      | D        | $X_1$    | $X_2$   | <i>X</i> <sub>3</sub> | $V_1$ | $V_0$    | Ζ              |
|-------------------|----------|------------|----|--------|----------|----------|---------|-----------------------|-------|----------|----------------|
|                   | 6        | 4          | 2  | 6      | 1        | 1        | 0       | 0                     | 1     | 3        | 1              |
|                   | 6        | 4          | 2  | 4      | 0        | 1        | 0       | 0                     | 1     | 3        | 0              |
|                   | 4        | -2         | 6  | 4      | 1        | 1        | 0       | 0                     | -1    | -3       | 1              |
|                   | 4        | -2         | 6  | 4      | 1        | 1        | 0       | 0                     | -1    | -3       | 0              |
|                   | 8        | 4          | 4  | 8      | 1        | 0        | 1       | 0                     | 2     | 2        | 1              |
|                   | 8        | 4          | 4  | 4      | 0        | 0        | 1       | 0                     | 2     | 2        | 0              |
|                   | 4        | 0          | 4  | 0      | 0        | 0        | 1       | 0                     | -2    | -2       | 1              |
|                   | 4        | 0          | 4  | 0      | 0        | 0        | 1       | 0                     | -2    | -2       | 0              |
|                   | 10       | 4          | 6  | 10     | 1        | 0        | 0       | 1                     | 3     | 1        | 1              |
|                   | 10       | 4          | 6  | 4      | 0        | 0        | 0       | 1                     | 3     | 1        | 0              |
|                   | 4        | 2          | 2  | 2      | 0        | 0        | 0       | 1                     | -3    | -1       | 1              |
|                   | 4        | 2          | 2  | 2      | 0        | 0        | 0       | 1                     | -3    | -1       | 0              |
|                   |          |            |    |        |          |          |         | < □ ▶                 |       |          |                |
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2SLS-IV with covariates — 2SLS-IV effect equal to LATE

- compliers are rows 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10
- various treatment effects

|                             | treatment effects |             |           |               |  |  |  |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|-----------|---------------|--|--|--|
|                             | C                 | conditional |           |               |  |  |  |
|                             | $X_1 = 1$         | $X_2 = 1$   | $X_3 = 1$ | unconditional |  |  |  |
| OLS                         | 0.6667            | 6.6667      | 7.3333    | 4.1143        |  |  |  |
| LATE                        | 2                 | 4           | 6         | 4             |  |  |  |
| 2 <i>SLS — IV</i>           | 2                 | 4           | 6         | 4             |  |  |  |
| $\omega\left(X_{k}=1 ight)$ | 0.0625            | 0.0625      | 0.0625    |               |  |  |  |
| ATT                         | 4.6667            | 4           | 6         | 4.8           |  |  |  |
| ATUT                        | 2                 | 4           | 3.3333    | 3.4286        |  |  |  |
| ATE                         | 4                 | 4           | 4         | 4             |  |  |  |

• the local average treatment effects are identified via 2SLS-IV as  $E[V_j Z \mid X_k = 1] = E[V_j \mid X_k = 1] = 0$ 

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2SLS-IV with covariates — 2SLS-IV effect unequal to LATE

#### • DGP — nonignorable, heterogeneous treatment effect

| $Y_1$ | $Y_0$ | ΤE | Y  | D | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | <i>X</i> <sub>3</sub> | $V_1$ | $V_0$ | Ζ |  |
|-------|-------|----|----|---|-------|-------|-----------------------|-------|-------|---|--|
| 6     | 4     | 2  | 6  | 1 | 1     | 0     | 0                     | 1     | 3     | 1 |  |
| 6     | 4     | 2  | 4  | 0 | 1     | 0     | 0                     | 1     | 3     | 0 |  |
| 8     | 0     | 8  | 8  | 1 | 1     | 0     | 0                     | 3     | -1    | 0 |  |
| 8     | 0     | 8  | 8  | 1 | 1     | 0     | 0                     | 3     | -1    | 0 |  |
| 8     | 4     | 4  | 8  | 1 | 0     | 1     | 0                     | 2     | 2     | 1 |  |
| 8     | 4     | 4  | 4  | 0 | 0     | 1     | 0                     | 2     | 2     | 0 |  |
| 6     | -1    | 7  | -1 | 0 | 0     | 1     | 0                     | 0     | -3    | 1 |  |
| 6     | -1    | 7  | -1 | 0 | 0     | 1     | 0                     | 0     | -3    | 1 |  |
| 4     | 4     | 0  | 4  | 1 | 0     | 0     | 1                     | -3    | 1     | 1 |  |
| 4     | 4     | 0  | 4  | 0 | 0     | 0     | 1                     | -3    | 1     | 0 |  |
| 4     | 1     | 3  | 1  | 0 | 0     | 0     | 1                     | -3    | -2    | 0 |  |
| 4     | 1     | 3  | 1  | 0 | 0     | 0     | 1                     | -3    | -2    | 0 |  |
|       |       |    |    |   |       |       |                       |       |       |   |  |

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2SLS-IV with covariates — 2SLS-IV effect unequal to LATE

- compliers are rows 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10
- various treatment effects

|  | treatment effects |             |             |               |  |
|--|-------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|--|
|  | (                 | conditional | 1           |               |  |
|  | $X_1 = 1$         | $X_2 = 1$   | $X_{3} = 1$ | unconditional |  |
| OLS  | 3.3333            | 7.3333      | 2           | 5.0857        |  |
| LATE   | 2                 | 4           | 0           | 2             |  |
| 2SLS - IV  | -2                | -6          | 2           | 0.9091        |  |
| $\omega\left(X_{k}=1 ight)$                        | 0.02083           | 0.02083     | 0.1875      |               |  |
| ATT  | 6                 | 4           | 0           | 4.4           |  |
| ATUT   | 2                 | 6           | 2           | 3.7143        |  |
| ATE  | 5                 | 5.5         | 1.5         | 4             |  |
| 2SLS-IV identifies a different effect than LATE as |                   |             |             |               |  |
| 2SLS-IV identifies                                 |                   |             |             |               |  |

| $E\left[V_{j}Z\mid X_{k}=1 ight] eq0$ , $E\left[V_{j}\mid X_{k}=1 ight] eq0$ | 0 but $E[V_i Z] = E[V_i] = 0$   |
|--|---------------------------------|
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## conclusions

- analysis of causal effects places a greater demand on explication of the thought experiments which underlie the data analysis
- in other words, framing the problem is key to understanding, critiquing, improving the data summaries

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