I’m a Professor in the Philosophy Department at Ohio State University. I got my Ph.D. from Princeton in 1996, and was on the faculty in Philosophy at UCLA from 1998-2002, and at the University of Illinois at Chicago from 2002-2006. My research is in the philosophy of action and mind, with a current focus on shared agency and related areas in ethics (promising), epistemology (testimony) and social ontology (now serving on the Steering Committee for the International Social Ontology Society). Papers include “Entitlement to Reasons for Action” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility v.4 (2017), “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation” in Ethics (2016), “Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity” in Noûs (2014), “Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments” in the Philosophical Review (2004); “Practical Intersubjectivity”, in Socializing Metaphysics, Frederick Schmitt, ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); “Reasons Explanation of Action: Causal, Singular, and Situational”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1999); and “The Self-Referentiality of Intentions”, in Philosophical Studies (2000). I have also written on Hume, including “What Was Hume’s Problem with Personal Identity?”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (July 2000), and “The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume’s Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2011).

Click here for his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on shared agency.

Click here for a free download of “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation” Ethics (2016).

My philpapers site: