“The Constitution, therefore, must be understood, not as an enjoining an absolute relative equality, because that would be demanding an impossibility, but as requiring of Congress to make the appointment of Representatives among the several states according to their respective numbers, as near as may be. That which cannot be done perfectly must be done in a manner as near perfection as can be…”
– Daniel Webster Addressing the U.S. Senate, April 5, 1862
Amongst the five existing methods and the three rejected methods, no one means of apportionment exists that encompasses complete equality. Achieving complete equality would mean satisfying the many measures of equality that exist such as:
minimizing the differences between the largest average district size and the smallest within a state (…) minimizing the differences in each person’s individual share of his or her representative (…) minimizing the differences in average district sizes, or in individual shares of a Representative, when those differences are expressed as percentages (…) minimizing the absolute representational surplus among state (…) minimizing the absolute representational deficiency among state (Huckabee 2001).
As a country, we must ask ourselves how we can establish a method of apportionment that better balances fair representation while sustainably maintaining this phenomenon? How can we observe the precedent “one person one vote” as established by a series of three supreme court decisions in 1962 — (Baker v. Carr), (Wesberry v. Sanders), (Karcher v. Daggett) — while respecting the purpose of The Great Compromise? To put it simply, no straightforward answer to either of these questions exists nor will one ever exist (2001). The restraints of our system—a fixed number of representatives, a minimum of one representative for each state no matter its population size, and the limits that state lines place on district size—makes is innately impossible to eradicate inequality. What legislators can control, however, is the susceptibility to bias that our chosen apportionment methods experience. Therefore, I propose Congress reverse its apportionment method back to the method used in 1840: The Webster Method, for its unbiased tendencies in dealing with large and small states.
The Webster Method proposes that a set divisor is chosen such that the sum of the rounded quotas is equal to the total number of seats in The House of Representatives to be appointed. Any remainder is then rounded up or down based off the figures arithmetic mean. This method ensures that each state is allotted its fair share of representatives. The Jefferson Method follows the same procedure, but remainders are not considered and at the time of its use, in 1790, there was no set number of seats in The House of Representatives. This property puts States with a quotient at a disadvantage as constituents represented by the remainder are left out of the apportionment. Our current method, the Hill Method or The Method of Equal Proportions, follows a similar procedure as the Webster and Jefferson Method, except the figure is rounded at the geometric mean. Because of this, the rounding point between two number is far more variable then the Webster Method as rounding is based on the square root of the multiplication of two numbers (Public Mapping Project).
In October of 1991, The Supreme Court ruled in favor of The Department of Commerce in the case The Department of Commerce v. Montanna, reversing a district court decision regarding the constitutionality of Congress’s use of The Method of Equal Proportions in reapportioning seats after the 1990 census. This landmark case would explicitly set the precedent that Congress retains complete discretion in choosing the method of apportionment and The Executive Branch branch retains complete discretion in determining who should be included in the “population” that is counted in each census. Montana had argued, “that the equal proportions formula violated the Constitution because it “[did] not achieve the greatest possible equality in the number of individuals per representative” (2001). In my opinion, Montana was right, but the Supreme Court clearly disagrees. The Court argued that Congress’s “experience, experimentation, and debate about the substance of the constitutional requirement” made this legislative body uniquely qualified to choose there desired method, in the Court’s view, there was no real argument for the state of Montana’s case. The Court also stated that “both mathematical and political reasons point to the Method of Equal Proportions as the best plan for a just apportionment. It is very desirable that this permanent plan should embody the best method now known…Reapportionment will be taken out of politics” (Department of Commerce v. Montana). It seems that the Supreme Court was relying on the comfort of tradition and the hopes of avoiding future partisan conflict to rationalize the continued use of this method of apportionment—The Method of Equal Proportions — that favors small states by 3-5%. As the 2001 CRS Report for Congress states: the best method of apportionment is “a matter of judgment — not some indisputable mathematical test,” therefore we can deduce that the Supreme Court’s mathematical rationale in forming their opinion was not the best measure for claiming one measure superiority over another (2001).
Methods favoring small states should be considered further innately unequal when compared to methods favoring large states as many facets of the Great Compromises—two representatives per state allocated to the Senate and one minimum representative per state allocated to The House of Representatives—ensures that small states are not overshadowed. We must guarantee that this phenomenon does not allow the votes of citizen’s living within larger states to be overshadowed by a state with fewer inhabitant. This only reaffirms that Congress must strive to actively observe the rule of “one person, one vote.” This rule is not only acknowledged but put into practice with The Webster Method and its adherence to the concept of fair share.
The Webster Method of Major Fractions retains many of the same properties as the Jefferson Method, without favoring large states, and includes quota representation in which each State’s apportion follows the concept of fair share when rounding quotients. The Webster Method is the least biased method of any existing method and ensures that positive bias, as shown through our current method, towards small states is not present.
Works Cited
“Congressional Apportionment.” Public Mapping Project, www.publicmapping.org/apportionment.
“Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 .” Oct. 1992.
Huckabee, David C. “The House of Representatives Apportionment Formula: An Analysis of Proposals for Change and Their Impact on States.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 10 Aug. 2001, pp. 1–23.
Young, H Peyton. Dividing the House: Why Congress Should Reinstate an Old Reapportionment Formula. Brookings, 2001, pp. 1–7, Dividing the House: Why Congress Should Reinstate an Old Reapportionment Formula.
