Source: China Digital Times (1/17/24)
Xi-Branded Power Bank/Speakers Provides Two Kinds of Positive Energy
Posted by Alexander Boyd

A top Party outlet has created a Xi Jinping Thought-themed combined Bluetooth speaker and power bank for distribution to cadres across the country. The contraption, clunkily titled the “‘Xi Jinping’s “The Governance of China” Volumes 1-4’ Ideology Power Bank,” was unveiled by Guangming Online, a subsidiary of the influential Guangming Daily, in March 2023, but has gained broader attention online this month. The “ideology power bank” is designed to allow on-the-go cadres to charge their phone while listening to any of 72 essays expounding on Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

The text reads: “Xi Jinping’s ‘The Governance of China’ Volumes 1-4. Ideology Power Bank: Charging Phones, Empowering Thought

The product is not available for purchase online. However, CDT Chinese editors have found that many local Party Congress representatives and government employees have received the “ideology power banks.” A press release touting their release quoted a “zoomer” member of China’s rubber stamp national consultative body, who claimed to carry it with her everywhere: “The ‘ideology power bank’ provides us youth with ever-available, ever-informative scenarios. It will be a big hit among youth.” She added that the essays provide a much-needed “north star” and “compass” for the study of ideology. Continue reading →

Happy new year MCLC.

I am wondering if anything more has come to light regarding the closure of the web journal “The China Project” which succeeded “SUP China.”

The China Project web journal was closed down in December for no clear reason, but there was some mention of withdrawal of funds. Were the financial support withdrawn to kill the journal? For what purpose?

We know that one of the key sponsors/financiers, Anla Cheng, who was closely involved and listed as founding the SUPChina journal in 2015, is also involved in both the socalled Committee of 100 Chinese in America, and in the China Institute in New York, neither of which has ever said anything, or permitted any kind of activity that touches on, let alone criticising the monstrous atrocities now under way in Xinjiang (East Turkestan).

At one point, she suggested to the South China Morning Post that the mass atrocities is only a problem of different “perceptions” (!), not reality (see here), and refused to clarify.

Given this context, it is very difficult to avoid speculating that the CP closure had something to do with a desire to silence the good work of the China Project journal, in regularly featuring several knowledgeable writers on the Chinese atrocities in Xinjiang (East Turkestan).

Magnus Fiskesjö,  <magnus.fiskesjo@cornell.edu>, or: <nf42@cornell.edu>

Source: China Digital Times (12/29/23)
THE TOP ███ CHINESE ██████S OF 2023 (PART ONE)
Posted by Alexander Boyd

The following themes, and the six to be covered in part two, are not the “most censored” words of 2023 but rather a retrospective of topics that the Party-state deemed unfit for Chinese eyes, selected by our Chinese team. While some of the censored terms themselves are new, they touch on familiar issues: the personality cult around Xi Jinping, the 1989 democracy movement and its suppression, ongoing youth dissatisfaction, unlikely dissidents, the privileges of the Party-connected, shoddy construction leading to the death of children, botched disaster responses, a cover-up, and protests. Each section will lead with censored terms and then follow with a brief explanation of their provenance and context. For more on many of these themes, see CDT’s newly launched ebook, “China Digital Times Lexicon: 20th Anniversary Edition.”

Xi Jinping’s New Clothes

Censored terms: Unanimous Election, 2952, The Second Coming of Yuan Shikai, Yuan Shikai, The Emperor’s New Clothes, Eliminating The Emperor’s Cronies, Chongzhen, Big G, The One Who Should’ve Died Didn’t, Lil’ Bottle’ Wishes He Were Human, Too! 

On March 10, China’s rubber-stamp congress re-elected Xi Jinping to a third five-year term as President—an unprecedented move made possible by a 2018 revision to the Chinese constitution that repealed term limits. A massive surge of censorship followed. Banned terms included “unanimous election,” a phenomenon Party leaders including Xi himself had once criticized as undemocratic. People’s Daily even removed a 2011 essay it had published warning, “if the people’s will continues to be hijacked through ‘unanimous elections,’ it will fuel public resentment.” The number “2952” was also banned. Xi received 2952 votes for, none against, none abstaining. References to the 20th century dictator Yuan Shikai were also censored. 111 years earlier to the day, Yuan was elected president of the nascent Republic of China, only to later declare himself emperor. The term “The second coming of Yuan Shikai,” a pun in the original Chinese on the term “Anime, Comics, and Games,” was censored, as were simple “this day in history” articles about Yuan. Continue reading →

Source: NYT (12/20/23)
An Egg Fried Rice Recipe Shows the Absurdity of China’s Speech Limits
阅读简体中文版 | 閱讀繁體中文版
A popular chef’s video was attacked as a jab at Mao Zedong’s dead son. But what if a recipe for egg fried rice was just a recipe for egg fried rice?
By Li Yuan

Credit…Xinmei Liu

The United States is entangled in an emotional debate about antisemitism and free speech on college campuses. The latest speech debate in China is about a chef’s video on how to make egg fried rice.

Egg fried rice is a staple of Chinese home cooking and one of the first dishes many Chinese learn to cook. Think of mac and cheese in America. That was probably why Wang Gang, one of China’s most popular food bloggers, has made multiple recipe videos about the dish in the past five years. His “perfect” fried rice recipes attracted reviews, and reviews of those reviews.

Then one of those videos drew the wrath of the official Chinese media and internet.

His offense? He posted an egg fried rice video on Nov. 27, two days after the anniversary of the death of Mao Anying, son of the founder of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong. Mao Anying was killed in the Korean War while, legend has it, cooking egg fried rice. Continue reading →

Source: China Media Project (12/14/23)
Policing Pessimism, and Everything Else
By David Bandurski

The latest notice from China’s top cyberspace control body is clear about just one thing — the absurdity that ensues when an authoritarian system tries to be specific about everything it wants to erase, and everything it doesn’t.

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has struck again. In the latest move in a “clear and bright” (清朗) campaign that has unfolded relentlessly this year, the country’s top internet control body said Tuesday that it would target a range of undesirable attitudes and values in short videos.

The release from the CAC outlines three broad types of content, including “fake information” (虚假信息), “misconduct” (不当行为), and “incorrect concepts” (错误观念). And while some of the language points vaguely to instances of misbehavior that could have real implications for the public, much of it looks like regulatory compulsion from a system that simply cannot stop clarifying itself — to the point that nothing is clear.

The section on fake information begins with what might seem legitimate prohibitions, such as against using AI technology to make fake short videos that impersonate others. Immediately, however, political demands crash onto the scene. The third caution, dealing with “reckless falsification and fabrication,” says short videos must not “alter or take out of context authoritative information issued by government offices.” Continue reading →

Source: China Media Project (12/7/23)
The Vicious Cycle of Rumor in China
Internet control authorities in China routinely portray “online rumors” as a threat to public well-being. But the real concern, which has nothing to do with factualness or accuracy, is that they might be harmful to the Party’s well-being — a fact that inflates the value of rumors, including truly false information.
By David Bandurski

A cartoon posted to the official government web portal of Chongqing Municipality portrays “online rumor” as a fist strangling the internet.

In its latest action to rein in errant behavior on social media platforms in China, the country’s top internet control body announced this week that it had shut down 1,660 online accounts, alleging they had either disturbed social order or “fabricated public policies.”

Posting a statement to its website on Wednesday, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) paired news of the crackdown with eight typical cases from platforms including Weibo, the popular microblogging site, and the short-video sharing platform Kuaishou, to illustrate the nature of the violations.

As is typical of regulatory language on information in China, the notice couched the actions in metaphors of health and safety, urging the need to prevent the spread of fake information to “purify the online environment.” But a closer look at the cases cited by the CAC suggests a real public interest in issues such as safety, food security, regulatory overreach, and the rights of gig economy workers — and an appetite for related information that is not mediated and controlled by the Party-state.

Are the public opinion controls of the CCP fighting rumors, or feeding them? Continue reading →