Political Clientelism: Are We So Different?
I thoroughly enjoyed this feature analysis of political clientelism in grassroots Latin America. Throughout the article, Auyero explores the everyday relationship between broker and client, one that has been relatively untouched through the well-meaning but unfortunately misplaced judgement that betrays the democratic northern lens through which current literature views the system.
In “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account,” Auyero defines political clientelism as it exists in the slums of Argentina while making careful note of the societal factors that allow such a system to thrive. According to Auyero, clientelism is rooted in two things: widespread poverty and reciprocal help. He claims that in the slums, were everyone struggles, the relationships between family members, neighbors, and friends can be built on mutual reliance on each other. This puts poverty-ridden communities at risk to be taken advantage of by the Peronist party wishing to gain votes in the area by indebting individuals to brokers who provide for them and the community at large. The people receive what they need, and in return they are loyal to the party and may even cast their votes in favor of supporting candidates in local elections. It is a system that, however corrupt and violating of the tenets of democracy, appears to benefit all groups involved.
While I agree with the statements made by Auyero in his analysis, I propose to take it one step further and argue that political clientelism at its core is not far from the current system here in the United States. The premise of our politics is such that candidates run with the promise of providing and caring for, nigh rewarding, those who vote for them. You help me, I help you. It’s the way we govern ourselves. The one difference I see is that while our framework is based on further action, theirs runs on things done in the past. A cycle of debt from one person to the next.
However, as stated by Auyero, the analysis of political clientelism today is lacking. Research cannot easily explore the complexities of the relationships between the people involved. Therefore I look forward to learning more about the way political clientelism functions in both Latin American societies, and possibly our own.
Clientelism in Villa Paraiso in Argentina was very much based on individual, personal relationships. How would you characterize similar relationships in the U.S.? Moreover, how do U.S. political parties/politicians target constituents in an “exchange for material goods and political support”? Is it fair to classify U.S. political strategies as “clientelism”? Or something else?
The first thing that I thought when reading this post was that there seem to be many similarities between clientelism in Latin America and the United States. There are many parts of the US political system that involve a pay to play attitude. For example, during the last election, it was uncovered that Hillary Clinton offered meetings in exchange for campaign donations. This no doubt happens frequently in politics, whether it’s a meeting, speaking engagement, job, or a donation to get politicians to work on certain issues. However, I don’t think that this is enough of a relationship to call the whole U.S. political system clientelist. Politicians don’t generally make constituents support them or make campaign donations in exchange for simple services, it mainly happens among political and societal elites. Having money absolutely helps further a constituent’s political agenda as they can be taken more seriously by leaders, but because this happens with relatively few people, it does not make the entire system clientelist. I believe that pay to play is a better classification for political and societal elites, but for the system as a whole, the better term may be elitist politics.
Great summary of Auyero’s analysis of political clientelism. As we discussed in class, it seems that clientelism emerges when governmental institutions are too weak or ill-funded to work comprehensively and therefore the discretion of party brokers can be used to gain public support. As you highlight, despite the inherent corruption involved in clientelism, it seems like a win-win. the political party gets votes and their supporters get medicine, CCT payments, etc. The problem with this set up, which you mention, is that is props up corrupt ruling parties. If people depend on the party for favors than there is no way they could support the opposition, unless of course the opposition offers the same kind of brokered relationship as the ruling-party. An interesting way to approach clientelism is that perhaps, despite corruption, it keeps lower-classes, who have been marginalized and kept distant from political participation in other Latin American states, involved in the political process. If there are multiple parties trying to gain votes, lower-class individuals my actually be more empowered through clientelism.
Clientelism was/is also very prevalent in African Politics. Why do you think that this phenomenon occurred at relatively the same time in these places that are an ocean apart?