Normality and Delegative Democracy
The readings for this week pose a very interesting variation to all the cases we have seen from the aftermaths of the transition. Even if the case is, as we saw during the last couple of weeks – that there is an actual relationship (not in many cases interdependent nor causal) between liberalization and democracy, there might be even more factors contributing to the posteriori scene of an authoritarian regime. Delimiting this thought, there was a big debate whether there was an erosion or a strengthening on horizontal accountability, or the same effect but with vertical accountability.
As a key feature of comparative politics, stating a conclusion as an axiom that polarizes one of the other idea might not be the best case for this week’s topic, but rather I do believe that the ideological discourse between O’Donnell and Schmitter with Vergara and Luna might be luminous to understanding the role of delegative democracy. The intention of this post is not to summarize both points, but rather pointing a specific part of the reading that I think invites to further discussion:
“Normality, in other words, becomes a major characteristic of political life when those active in politics come to expect each other to play according to the rules […]” (Schmitter, P. C. and O’Donnell, G. (1986))
The first thing that I really want to emphasize on is the idea that the reasons that led to a revolution or the end of an authoritarian regime do not ensure a long-lasting democracy. This is where normality fits in. If a country had a massive mobility of the popular class, the fact that it served as a key feature in undermining the regime, it does not entail that the there will be democratic consolidation. So how is this variation of end game (the end of the regime, and the consolidation of democracy) considered a parallel of normality? Are the conditions of normality defined by formal exterior mechanisms, or by internal governmental only mechanisms? i.e. Horizontal v. Vertical Accountability. I invite for further discussion, but my main position here is to say that there has to be some kind of understanding between societal and governmental actors in order to define “normality”. And the contrary, that horizontal accountability, poses a diverged notion of normality, that ultimately leads to further instability.
I unfortunately come short with didactic ideas on normality, however, the “chess analogy” that O’Donnell and Schimtter dig caught most of my interest towards the discussion of normality. Pretty much they intend to say that stating the conditions of a transition and where to delegate the power in the new regime is not axiomatic. Even if two defining actors play the game, a white and a black, this does not limit the other external influences to affect the game. There are hidden actors and outcomes to the players themselves, that exist in the game and might be recognized by other players.
Overall, normality seems to be more of an unorganized situation of a transition. There is no stability amongst the actors, since there are various possibilities to any decision, yet it is normal when the players play with the same rules. Summarizing, every move will alter the situation of the game, but the rules of how each piece moves and its relation to the other pieces does not change, it remains normal. So, what is normality, relying on the system itself or on external influences that might affect the game?
Let’s say, bringing another queen into the board? Landing this analogy to political science terms, there are two players in a state, the government, and the civil society. But each has different actors, that are exactly present on each side (the military has citizens, the unions have citizens, and they all counteract or react with the government pieces). It is normal that civil society and governmental actors will interact, but what about foreign intervention in a coup?