Political Institutions Matter While Determining Strength of Democracy

Though the development of mankind has historically trended towards egalitarianism and political democracy, periods of turmoil are often marked by dramatic increases of executive power and, in dire circumstances, regressions to authoritarianism. Such a phenomenon can be observed throughout Latin American history, where governments have struggled to balance democratic reform and the absolute power of the military being replaced. The balancing, if done poorly, has dire consequences; put simply, elected officials cannot govern effectively if the military has undue influence, but cannot govern at all if reforms lead to another coup. As such, many democratic governments have corrected prior authoritarianism piecemeal and through compromise—allowing the last vestiges of dictatorships to survive and atrocities to go unpunished. However, more ambitious reforms were often stifled by institutional actors implemented by the outgoing regime (Hunter, 457). Studying the actions of these governments, therefore, exposes the incredibly powerful role of institutions in a democracy, as well as the tendency of nations to devolve to authoritarianism amid strife. By understanding such factors, one can gain a deeper understanding of the transition to political democracy across the world—and, specifically in Latin America, better predict which nations will dramatically change regimes in the near future.

Beyond the moral atrocities committed by authoritarian regimes, perhaps the most lasting political aspects of Latin American authoritarianism are the institutions created to consolidate power and limit reform efforts. The binomial electoral system established in Chile by Pinochet, for example, disproportionately allocated senate seats to rightwing politicians—thereby hampering any attempt to amend the constitution or introduce democratic legislation       (Hunter, 457). Other laws sought to force increases in military spending—providing the resources for a future coup (Hunter, 459). These laws are simply tangible examples of the dramatic impact institutions have on democratic governments—such tactics can be used in a variety of ways to promote a number of goals, humanitarian or otherwise. An interesting, though definitely imperfect, parallel to the Chilean electoral system can be found in Europe; just as the Chilean electoral system affected the legislative process, unique voting systems in Europe may explain the development of robust welfare states—and also explain why that of the United States has remained comparatively small (Alesina, Glaeser, Sacerdote, 23). Furthermore, such institutions were often the primary targets of the newly elected officials, as the laws hamstrung their ability to govern and curtailed their power—revealing that power is just as important to officials as it is to the prior regime. Clearly, the institutions formed by the authoritarian government can affect the development and eventual strength of the new democracy. If authoritarian governments simply wanted to maintain stability rather than political influence, it could construct institutions accordingly—aiding the transition to a truly democratic state. However, doing so was not typical behavior; measures implemented by authoritarian governments may have prevented elected officials from addressing important issues, leading to social unrest and potentially an opportunity for the authoritarian regime to return. Such a dynamic implies that a strong, politically active military (in cases of military authoritarianism) and a truly democratic government are fundamentally incompatible. Because the military is inherently powerful, it is therefore always a potential threat to democracy, particularly during times of civil unrest—due either to a coup or a single official consolidating power as Fujimori did    (Hunter, 467).

Given that social unrest—often due to economic collapse or rising inequality– appears to be a significant driver for regime changes, one could look to Venezuela for a nation that could be on the verge of a significant change (Hunter, 475). Though Chavismo still remains state doctrine, shortages and economic stagnation have led to widespread protests, many of which calling for a recall election to replace Maduro. Should conditions continue to worsen and the government continue to be ineffective, the potential for a military coup and the installation of another authoritarian government will increase dramatically. Venezuela has had a history of military coups, as Hugo Chávez was temporarily deposed as recently as 2002, making it an interesting microcosm for the development of democracy not only in Latin America, but the rest of the world.

Works Cited:

Alesina, Albert, Glaeser, Edward, and Sacerdote, Bruce. 2001. Why Doesn’t the US Have a European-Style Welfare State?, Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington, DC, 7 September, 2001

Hunter, Wendy. “Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru.” Political Science Quarterly 1123 (1997): 453-75. The Academy of Political Science. Web. 8 Aug. 2016.