February 3, 2023
Why Did the Allies Win?
Angelo Juarez
Victory!, by Pyotr Krivonogov (1948)
Several factors were crucial for the Allied victory in World War II. Combined, British and American naval capabilities proved unmatched by those of the Axis powers. The United States Navy alone had the largest fleet of the world, with 6,768 vessels. The sinking of 785 German U-boats (out of 1,162) by Allied submarine forces, mainly in the English Channel and the North Sea, between 1939 and 1945, was a major setback to the Kriegsmarine.[1] Similarly, the Allies possessed greater airpower than the Axis powers, being able to inflict major losses on Axis positions across Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific on an unprecedented scale. Air raids had the advantage of causing tremendous destruction on bombarded enemy territory with comparatively much less harm on the side of the aggressor (i.e., Allied firebombing of Hamburg and Dresden which combined killed an estimated 62,000 Germans, with only seven Allied aircraft and their crew lost in Dresden and no Allied human losses in Hamburg[2]). Though involving a cruel process of collectivization and dekulakization, Stalin’s industrialization of the Soviet Union from an agrarian estate from May 1929 to June 1941 proved, nonetheless, effective in debilitating Nazi Germany in WWII. The USSR’s greater industrial and military capacities slowed the German advance across Eastern Europe, and the Soviet victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, on February 2nd, 1943, turned the tide on the Eastern Front against the Nazis. It is believed that the eventual victory of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Front was the most significant factor leading to the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Axis powers[3].
Historians conclude that the Nazis (and as a result the other Axis powers) lost the war largely because of three fatal strategic decisions made parallelly by Hitler: 1) waging war against the United States, 2) invading the Soviet Union, and 3) fueling the massive extermination campaign of Jews and other minorities in Nazi-occupied territories across Europe. Nazi Germany, the most powerful of the eight Axis countries, thus overstretched its industrial, economic, and logistic resources, trying to fight in three fronts (Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Northern Africa) against two military and economic superpowers in addition to many other Allied countries, while also dealing with a massive and costly internal program of ethnic cleansing. With the Axis powers defeated in Europe, the Allies were subsequently able to fully concentrate their military might in the Pacific theater against Japan.
The Axis powers made another catastrophic miscalculation when Japan prompted the US to depart from its isolationist stance with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Japan’s expansionist ambitions had jeopardized the political ties the US had with several of its partners in Southeast Asia, which resulted in highly crippling oil import sanctions imposed on Japan by Washington. Japan wrongly believed that, by attacking Pearl Harbor, they would threaten what they underestimated as an irresolute opponent, unwilling of militarily intervening in a distant, Japanese-occupied region across the Pacific[4].
Additionally, the Allies were at the forefront of the arms race, developing nuclear weapons earlier than their Axis counterparts. The Manhattan Project, was the top, costliest research priority of the US, Canada, and the UK at the time (2BN USD by 1946, equivalent to 24BN USD in 2021), as it attracted the most prominent scientists of the era, many of them from Europe, to work on the development of the atomic bomb across thirty-two sites between 1942-1946.
Even though the Allies were winning by inflicting significantly more loses on their enemy during the Pacific War, such as in the battles of Peleliu (September 15th – November 25, 1944 – 13,600 Japanese killed, 1,460 Americans killed) and Okinawa (April 1st – June 22nd, 1945 – 110,000 Japanese killed, 12,500 Americans killed), and the Great Tokyo Air Raid (March 9th – 10th, 1945 – 100,000 Japanese killed, 96 American airmen killed), the Japanese were offering a fierce resistance leading to thousands of Allied casualties and had no intent of surrendering. Consequently, the United States forced them to capitulate with two atomic bombs, dropped in Hiroshima, on August 6th, 1945, and in Nagasaki, three days later (129,000-226,000 Japanese killed, 20 British, Dutch and American POWs killed)[5].
Hitler’s vitriolic antisemitism led to many Jewish scientists, including physicists Albert Einstein and Hans Bethe, fleeing to the West to conduct their research for the Allies, leaving the Third Reich without the necessary intellectual power to develop the atomic bomb first. Ironically, nuclear fission (the atomic-energy-releasing process with the potential of creating a bomb, where nuclei of enriched radioactive elements like uranium-235 are split into less massive elements through bombardment with neutrons) was discovered on December 19th, 1938, by Germans and Austrians. German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann were opponents of antisemitism, and their Austrian collaborators, physicists Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, were Jewish. The latter was the first, in 1940, to postulate a theoretical mechanism for the detonation of an atomic bomb. Just as improvidently, the Führer did not listen to his advisors, such as Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments and War Production of Nazi Germany, who insisted on prioritizing special weapon research as early as 1942. Germany had only partially focused on nuclear research before then, in what was known as the Uranprojekt, began in 1939. The Nazi leader finally ordered dedicated arms research in 1944, including the development of highly destructive Vergeltungswaffe weapons, at a time the Axis nations were already losing the war in Europe and could no longer revert its fate. Following the war, the Alsos Mission revealed that Nazi Germany was nowhere near the development of a nuclear weapon[6].
America’s stance to directly attack the Nazis coming from Northern France into Germany resulted in a faster Allied victory than would have been attained only with Great Britain´s indirect peripheral strategy. By the end of 1941, Churchill had aimed at slowly exhausting the European Axis nations into surrender through a naval blockade on territories occupied by Germany, bombing German cities to hinder Nazi industries and lower enemy morale, providing support to guerrilla resistance groups across Nazi-occupied Europe and conducting ground operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The British approach concentrated on weakening Vichy France and Italy and avoided setting boots on German soil for fear of a human loss comparable to that of WWI.
Politically, both sides made coalitions to guarantee financial, material, human, and logistical resources, often despite profound ideological differences. By September 1st, 1939, the Allies comprised the UK, Poland and France, capitalist nations, but as the war intensified, they deemed necessary to incorporate communist Russia and China. Stalin believed Great Britain had avoided an all-out confrontation with Germany not only to spare Anglo-American lives but also to purposely maximize Soviet and German human losses, thus strengthening Britain’s postwar sphere of influence. After all, Britain had long sought for imperial control in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Likewise, the Tripartite Pact of September 27th, 1940, became a partnership of interest between Germany and Japan, even though the Japanese did not fit the Aryan construct of the Nazis.
Economically, the most vital resource in WWII was oil. The Allies had abundant reserves at their disposal, and geographical features to extract and transport it favored them. At the time, the Soviet Union alone possessed 10% of the world’s crude deposits. In comparison, the Axis powers were at a clear disadvantage, as they depended largely on foreign oil to run their militaries[7]. Another raw material crucial for the war cause was rubber. The Allies largely relied on British Malayan caoutchouc until the swift invasion of Southeast Asia by Japan, which sought out strategic commodities in the region to sustain the war with China. To suffice the urgent natural rubber demand, the Allies turned to Brazil, while researching more efficient ways to produce synthetic rubber. The US Synthetic Rubber Program focused on the production of GR-S between 1939-1945, making 782,000 tons yearly by 1945[8]. The economy of the US between 1941-1945 was so strong it could afford the Lend-Lease system to give free aid to the UK, the USSR, China, and other allied nations, in the form of food, oil, and materiel, totaling 719BN USD in today’s currency[9].
Finally, intelligence and deception were crucial in determining the course of the war. Many historians assert that the role of Polish, American, and British cipher counter communications intelligence potentially shortened the war or was decisive for an Allied victory. Germany’s Enigma cipher was decrypted as early as 1932 by the Polish Cipher Bureau, and during the war in Europe by Britain’s Ultra intelligence, and Japan’s equivalent, the Type B Cipher, by the US Army’s Signals Intelligence Service during the Pacific War[10]. Likewise, without deceptive operations Bodyguard and Fortitude, or the Ghost Army, the Battle of Normandy, which led to Nazi troops being repelled east across the Seine, marking the beginning of the end of the war in Europe, may have been lost. Such operations included placement of fake tanks, tents, and other military equipment in strategic areas to deceive German spy airplanes, and release of fake radio communications to be intercepted by the enemy. Thanks to these efforts the Nazis were tricked into believing that the Allies planned to invade France through a 20-mile stretch of the English Channel between Dover and Calais, instead of the actual Normandy location designated for D-Day, 100 miles from the English south coast. At 6:30 AM on June 6th, 1944, when the largest amphibious assault in history began, the Nazis had the bulk of their forces futilely concentrated at Calais[11].
References:
[1] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “U-boat.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 7, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/technology/U-boat.
[2] Fisher, George. “Incendiary Warfare”. McGraw-Hill, 1946.
[3] Bellamy, Chris. “Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War”. Macmillan, October 14, 2008.
[4] Imperial War Museums. “The Reason Japan Attacked Pearl Harbor.” November 10, 2021. Video, 0:12:08, https://youtu.be/so4v_2zq35k.
[5] Allen, Louis. “History of the Second World War” (Vol. 6). Purnell, 1969.
[6] Groves, Leslie. “Now It Can Be Told; The Story of the Manhattan Project”. Harper, 1962.
[7] Miller, Keith. “How Important Was Oil in World War II?” The George Washington University Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, 2023.
[8] American Chemical Society National Historic Chemical Landmarks Editors. “U.S. Synthetic Rubber Program”. American Chemical Society, August 29, 1998.
[9] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “lend-lease.” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 16, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/lend-lease.
[10] Keegan, John. “Intelligence in Warfare“. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
[11] Webb, Mason. “Deception in WWII”. WWII Quarterly, 2021. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/issue/wwii-quarterly-winter-2021-issue/
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January 27, 2023
The Impact of Military Deception and Intelligence in World War II
Angelo Juarez
Rubber tank used to deceive Nazi espionage operations in the south of England, ca. 1939 (Source: Roger Viollet/Getty Images)
Military deception is defined as “actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission”[1]. Deception is crucial in the outcome of a war due to its ability to optimize objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, and unity of command in warfare, thus helping the side that masters it target the opponent with greater efficacy and efficiency. Intelligence is defined as “ (1) the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations; (2) the activities that result in the product; and (3) the organizations engaged in such activities”[2]. Intelligence is necessary to plan effective deceptive operations and is also used on its own to make strategic and tactical decisions. Many historians believe that deception and intelligence in World War II both expedited its end and were decisive for the Allied victory.
The Allies were more successful in their use of military deception than their Axis counterparts because they were more flexible, had technological advantages, owned more resources, possessed better coordination and communication, were more culturally diverse, and exercised superior intelligence gathering. These capabilities consequently made the Allies more effective at surprise and security, two key principles of war required to conduct military deception successfully. Surprise allows a deceptive operation to strike the enemy at a time and place when it is most unaware and unprepared, while security aids the deception effort in preventing the enemy from gaining an unanticipated advantage, by decreasing susceptibility to enemy offensives.
The remarkable flexibility of the Allies was clearly exemplified in Operation Fortitude South. This operation was initially meant to come to an end soon after the Normandy landings, as they were expected to reveal the Allied real intent. Yet, once the Allies realized Hitler´s Fifteenth Army could counterassault the Normandy foothold from the Pas de Calais position it was stationed at, they opted to alter the original plan, calling it Operation Fortitude South II, which sought to perpetuate the fantasy that an Allied assault at Pas de Calais was still plausible. This diversion tactic succeeded at befuddling the German Fifteenth Army, which awaited at Calais for a new invasion that never occurred[3].
Thanks to their joint economic strength and their vast natural, infrastructural, and human resources, the forty-six Allied nations, led by the US, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China[4], took the lead in technological development necessary for espionage and deception, including advancements in cryptanalysis, needed to conduct attacks on enemy ciphers like the Enigma machine used by the Nazis, whose algorithm they deemed as unbreakable. Furthermore, the Allies invested in other techniques. They included superior radio and wireless technology used to transmit deceitful information, and the creation of fictional deployments that resorted on atmosphere tactics, sonic deception that included recordings of car engines, tanks and mobilizing troops, as well as visual effects, like the installation of inflatable tanks and airplanes, dummy runways and tents, all to mislead enemy espionage into believing the illusion that the Allies were conducting operations or organizing attacks in designated locations. The US’ Ghost Army unit carried out more than twenty of these operations in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Germany, between January 1944 and July 1945.
Other Allied display campaigns in the ETO of note included Operation Bodyguard (July 1943 – June 1944), aimed at disguising the Allied timing and location of D-Day, and Operation Bertram (September – October 1942), led by Montgomery in Egypt, to deceive Rommel about the time and location of the Second Battle of El Alamein, and Operation Barclay (June – July 1943), directed at supporting the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky, July – August 1943), by suggesting that the Allies had a remarkably larger force in the Mediterranean than they actually did and were planning to invade Corsica, Sardinia and Greece, instead.
Allied deception tactics in the PTO, starting in 1944, often included feints. One such operation took place in the Battle of Tinian (July – August 1944), when the Allies attacked the Tinian Town, southwest of the island, to divert Japanese focus from the main assault that came from the northwest. The largest deception campaign in the Pacific War happened during the Battle of Burma (December 1941 – September 1945), when, in 1944, Slim distracted the Japanese with British unit demonstrations across the river from Mandalay while another corps surprised them from the south across the Irrawaddy River[5].
A successful Axis diversion campaign included Operation Kreml (May – June 1942), which convinced the Soviets of a second German offensive on Moscow, when the actual intent was an attack on the south of the Eastern Front, thus permitting much-needed Nazi access to oilfields in the Caucasus[6]. Nonetheless, Axis deception campaigns were generally minor in scope and less effective than those of the Allies and had a lesser impact on the outcome of the war.
Not only were factors intrinsic to Allied military doctrine, resources, and leadership responsible for greater deceptive potential than the Axis powers. The latter, made up of ten co-belligerent countries and two Japanese-controlled states in Southeast Asia, and led by Germany, Italy, and Japan[7], were not as unified as their rivals, and their efforts were hindered by suspicion and lack of collaboration between their militaries and intelligence agencies. The Axis powers had also a centralized structure of power, often dictatorial in nature, that did not allow them to mold to the dynamic conditions of global warfare. For instance, the Nazi generals’ planning was often limited by the decisions of the Führer, who often acted driven by emotions rather than objective judgement.
The impact of multiculturality on effective Allied intelligence can be exemplified by the Marine Corps’ use of the Navajo language to design an unbreakable code of communications, in May 1942[8]. The Allies also excelled at counterintelligence. The Double-Cross System, run by the MI5, used captured or surrendered Nazi spies in Britain to broadcast disinformation back to their Abwehr or Sicherheitsdienst controllers. Following the war, it was discovered that all Nazi spies in Britain were either captured or had surrendered, denoting Axis inferiority in intelligence operations. The Allies eventually applied counterintelligence in their deception operations. For example, thanks to the contributions of Peruvian counterspy Elvira Chaudoir, the Abwehr was misinformed on Allied tactics, preventing the 11th Panzer Division from intervening in the Allied Normandy landings[9].
References:
[1] Headquarters, Department of the Army. “FM 3-13.4 Army Support in Military Deception”. Department of the Army United States of America, February 2019.
[2] Headquarters, Department of the Army. “ADP 2-0 Intelligence”. Department of the Army United States of America, July 2019.
[3] Monroe, James. “Deception: Theory and Practice”. Naval Postgraduate School, June 2012.
[4] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “Allied powers.” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 23, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Allied-Powers-international-alliance
[5] Budge, Kent. “Deception”. The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia, 2017. Pacific War Online Encyclopedia.
[6] Ziemke, Earl and Bauer, Magda. ”Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East”. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987.
[7] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “Axis powers”. Encyclopedia Britannica, February 18, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Axis-Powers
[8] Editors of CIA. “Navajo Code Talkers and the Unbreakable Code”. Central Intelligence Agency, November 6, 2008. https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/navajo-code-talkers-and-the-unbreakable-code/
[9] Macintyre, Ben. Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies. Bloomsbury Publishing, March 27, 2012.
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June 24, 2022
The Strategy of Western Allied Nations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe,
Between December 1941 and June 1944
Angelo Juarez
Top picture – Erwin Rommel, the “Dessert Fox” (top right) (Source: Getty Images) / Bottom picture – George S. Patton (front left), Omar Bradley (middle), and Bernard Montgomery (front right) in August 17, 1944 (Source: US Army Photograph)
Strategically, it was essential for the Western Allies to coalesce in order to block and counteract the advance of the Nazis over Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa. However, Great Britain and the United States initially did not agree on a global and coordinated military strategy to this end, even if they did concur on prioritizing the war in Europe (against the more dangerous and menacing Germany) before concentrating on the war in the Pacific.
The British wanted to debilitate the Nazis with an indirect and peripheral strategy which consisted of a US-lead naval blockade of German-occupied Europe, the bombing of German cities to inflict damage on industrial centers as well as the morale of the enemy, the backing of indigenous guerrilla efforts to deplete German and Italian military forces and setting boots on the ground in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Vichy France and Italy were also important strategic targets in Britain’s military approach. Churchill and his advisers believed that “closing the ring” around Germany in this manner would produce its collapse at the expense of fewer casualties than a head-on confrontation, a major concern for the British ensuing from their great human loss in the trenches of World War I. They were also forced to opt for this strategy because their military forces had been weakened by the defeats of 1940 and the surrender of France[1].
At first, the US would unhesitatingly cooperate with its British counterpart, but, as the war progressed detrimentally for the Allies, the United States (as did the Soviet Union) begun to call for more direct action against the Nazis. By the end of 1941, also the time the US entered World War II (on December 8, a day after the Japanese aerial bombing of Pearl Harbor), American war strategists believed Britain’s approach was indecisive, and that the only way to defeat the Nazis would be by executing an Anglo-American cross-Channel invasion into northern France, thus forcing Hitler into a two-front war. These strategists also feared that evading an Allied confrontation with Germany from the West would lead to either the defeat of the Soviet Union or the signing of a separate peace, making Germany invincible and the Soviet Union incapable of joining the war effort in the Pacific, another highly desired objective of the Western Allies. Also, pressure from other Allied nations (China, Australia, New Zealand), the American public, the US Navy, and the Southwest Pacific commander General Douglas MacArthur, called for a quicker, fully engaged intervention in the Pacific, something that could only be done after dealing with the European conflict. The period between 1941 and 1943 was notoriously unassertive for the US in this regard, as President Roosevelt, disregarding his chiefs of staff, supported the British stance on invading French North Africa instead of northern France in 1942, but, in 1943, turned in favor of his military advisors and ordered the invasion of northern France. This new approach resulted in a successful Western Allied campaign in northwestern Europe between 1944 and 1945[2].
When the United States entered the North African campaign on 11 May 1942, the British Commonwealth had been fighting the Axis Powers in the region for nearly two years (since Italy’s declaration of war on June 1940). During this time, the Western Allies were effective in Libya and Egypt, such as in the First Battle of El Alamein (1-27 July 1942, with British Commonwealth but no American participation), which ended on a stalemate but prevented Axis forces from reaching Alexandria, and in the Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October–11 November 1942, with British Commonwealth, American, Free French, and Greek intervention) that resulted in Allied victory under Montgomery and the retreat of Rommel’s Afrika Korps into Tunisia. A further Western Ally victory against Vichy France in French Morocco and French Algeria during a massive Anglo-American naval-air assault (Operation Torch, 8-16 November 1942), was a tactical prowess achievement. However, the operation had significant opposition from those in the U.S. interested in a direct confrontation with Nazi Germany, including Admiral Ernest King and General George Marshal. Nonetheless, President Roosevelt, in agreement with Churchill’s firm stance on the matter, ordered the offensive. A simultaneous American and British Commonwealth attack led by Eisenhower on Casablanca, Oran and Algiers resulted on their swift capture, allowing the subsequent maneuver of forces into Tunis (while at the same time combating Vichy belligerents) to engage German and Italian troops and meet British Allies coming from Egypt in the east (Battle of Tunisia, which started on 17 November 1942), in a pincer movement that eventually left most of Rommel’s Afrika Korps and Italian forces isolated and defeated by 13 May 1943, putting an end to the North African Campaign[3].
The victory of the Western Allies in North Africa was crucial because it allowed them to weaken the Axis Powers in the region to then amphibiously assault Sicily (Operation Husky, 9 July-17 August 1943) and Salerno, Calabria and Taranto (Invasion of Italy, 3-17 September 1943) beginning the Italian Campaign. It ultimately resulted in the capture and shooting of Mussolini on 28 April 1945 and the collapse of the fascist regime in Italy four days later, thus defeating Germany’s main ally in the European continent[4].
The gradual debilitation of the Axis powers in the Mediterranean gave more confidence to Ally decision-makers in believing that an invasion of Nazi-occupied Northern France would be attainable. Churchill proposed an invasion of Germany coming from the Mediterranean theatre, but the U.S.’s invasion approach across the English Channel prevailed. Led by Eisenhower, 160,000 Ally invaded Normandy on 6 June 1944, on the largest amphibious assault in history, D-Day. This event marked the start of Operation Overlord, which ended with the retreat of Nazi troops east across the Seine river on 30 August that year[5].
Even though the Western Allies were victorious against the Nazis in North Africa and the Mediterranean, historians still argue whether an earlier head-on approach would have been plausible and more advantageous than Churchill’s peripheral strategy of attacking Europe’s “soft underbelly”[6].
References:
[1] Rogers, Clifford, Seidule, Ty and Waddell, Steve (Editors). The West Point History of World War II Volume 1. The United States Military Academy. Simon & Schuster, 2015.
[2] Stoler, Mark and Michelmore, Molly (Editors). The United States in World War II A Documentary History. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2018.
[3] The National WWII Museum (Editors). The Great Debate. The National WWII Museum, New Orleans. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/great-debate
[4] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Editors). Allied Military Operations in North Africa. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/allied-military-operations-in-north-africa#:~:text=The%20Allied%20victory%20in%20North,to%20British%20supply%20lines%20to
[5] Rogers, Clifford, Seidule, Ty and Waddell, Steve (Editors). The West Point History of World War II Volume 2. The United States Military Academy. Simon & Schuster, 2015.
[6] A famous phrase attributed to W. Churchill, alluding to the Mediterranean as being a weak access point in Nazi defense.
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August 17, 2021
Book Review – E. B. Sledge, With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa (New York: Presidio Press, 1981)
Angelo Juarez
Eugene Bondurant Sledge (1923-2001), a native of Mobile, AL, enlisted as US Marine in 1942, and served as mortarman, rifleman and stretcher bearer with K Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division at Peleliu (thirty days) and Okinawa (eighty-two days) during the Pacific War. Following the capitulation of Japan and end of the Pacific War on September 2nd, 1945, Sledge was assigned a post in Beijing for four months, after which he returned to the United States, ranked corporal, in 1946. Later, he obtained a doctorate in biology from the University of Florida in 1960. He was a professor and researcher at University of Montevallo (formerly Alabama College) between 1962 and 1990. Nicknamed “Sledgehammer” by his comrades during the war, he displayed bravery, physical and mental strength, loyalty to his comrades, and commitment to his fellow Marines in the toughest times of the struggle. Only a warrior in the frontline of combat could have described the horrors of war with such realism and intensity. He published his memoirs in 1981. In writing the work, the author intended to give a clearer understanding of living conditions in the battlefield than other authors had done previously (e.g., by describing sanitary conditions in battle), stressed the importance of discipline, teamwork, and luck in surviving combat, and sought to inspire readers on the importance of assuming responsibilities and making sacrifices to defend American values and freedom when necessary.
Important themes running through this memoir include the difficult life of a Marine and his bravery and resilience amidst adversity, the horror of warfare, and the high cost of victory. Sledge accurately described the challenges faced even early on as a trainee in San Diego. There, the in-depth combat drills, as he himself acknowledged, helped him survive the Peleliu and Okinawa campaigns. Few were pleasant moments, such as the visit of actor and comedian Bob Hope to uplift Marine morale, while most experiences were harsh, even those seemingly trivial in comparison to combat, as when Sledge described being served bread made with flour infested with weevils for lunch in Pavuvu. Since setting foot on the beaches of Peleliu, Sledge fought with death right by his side. His comrades were killed by the thousands in the heat of battle; their quick replacement gave the chronicler the impression they were all expendable, and he soon felt he was cannon fodder. Recurring and frightening are his descriptions of the filth and desolation of life under those conditions. Lacking any ability for personal hygiene for weeks, being surrounded by rotting corpses from both sides covered in maggots and all kinds of human waste, surrounded by the unbelievable odor enduring sleep deprivation, and living with the perennial fear of being stabbed or shot during a surprise Japanese attack, corroded the spirit of Marines. Noteworthily, Sledge tells about the crushing despair of hearing artillery shells approach and explode near their foxholes in nocturnal attacks, often making the most valiant men realize mere chance also played a role in their survival, causing them to break down. The price of victory was death, of those close to Sledge as well as those held in high regard by his company, such as Capt. A. Haldane, his commander on Peleliu; those with truncated destinies, like the Marine who wanted to become a neurosurgeon; or the highly distinguished he did not meet, like Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. They were among the 14,000 or so Americans killed in the two battles combined, who made the ultimate sacrifice in the name of freedom.
Equally salient in the chronicle are the themes of humanity and dehumanization. Mostly throughout the book, Sledge and fellow Marines rightfully manifested their hatred for the enemy when their comrades were hit, but, at times, humane actions were also shown, including rescuing a horse trapped in a ditch, sympathy for an Okinawan child punished by his mother with a squirt of breast milk, and, most notably, Doc Caswell’s made-up excuse about oral germs to make Sledge abstain from pulling gold teeth from dead enemy, thus preventing their defilement and the narrator’s own loss of humanity. Contrastingly, of outermost sadness was the description of a completely desensitized Marine who extracted the gold teeth from a living Japanese soldier, who writhed in agony while he was tortured.
An earlier generation of Marines is honored by the title of the book. It alludes to Sledge and his young comrades (who were, on average, in their early twenties), that fought with older and more experienced Marines, deemed illustrious by the author for their combat veteran standing, their toughness and gallantry, and their wisdom.
Firsthand account of events in battle constituted the main source of evidence by the author, as it is a personal story. External references, including reputed history books, military reports, biographies, and other war chronicles (i.e., Okinawa: The Last Battle, by Appleman et al), were only consulted to verify facts, names, and places, and to situate the narrative within the greater Pacific War context. Sledge properly cites important data, like number of casualties on both sides. However, the work shed light mainly on the desolation of warfare as seen from the American perspective.
Two important factors were not emphasized adequately in the book. First, even though suffering was intense for Marines, they were winning and advancing nonetheless, which should have been a logical source of encouragement to keep on fighting, but there was no mention of uplifting comments of that nature throughout the narrative. Second, the author does not opine of the overwhelming number of Japanese soldiers who died in the two campaigns combined (~123,000), and the reader is left alone to imagine the hell the Japanese, regardless of their blind obedience, must have gone through when realizing they would not win, yet had to follow orders from their superiors to fight to their death.
Being a memoir and not a military history text, the book is not focused on providing a detailed sequence of historical events. Yet, the narrative, dating from the beginning of Sledge’s military life up to the end of the fight for Okinawa, transpires linearly within the context of the war. The book is narrated clearly, but the author frequently quotes his comrades using a Southern accent for the sake of realism. To the same effect, his language becomes at times vividly pictorial and poetical (e.g., use of metaphors in “I am the harvest of man’s stupidity. I am the fruit of the holocaust.” (pg. 294)). Dividing the text in two parts, one per battle, and making chapters around twenty pages long, allow rests to ponder on the reading.
I had never read a war memoir. As a US Army officer candidate, I concurred with Sledge because I was able to identify similarities between my experiences and his impressions on bootcamp training, as well as his comments on the high demands of being an untried lieutenant, who had to make major decisions in combat “amid hardened, seasoned Marine combat veterans in a proud, elite division like the First” (pg. 237). My understanding of military life grew, consequently.
This book is ideal for a broad audience, including lay readers, soldiers, students, historians and scholars, and anybody interested in WWII in the Pacific Theater of Operations as told from the US perspective.
Revised by Peter Mansoor, PhD (2021)
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June 3, 2021
Book Review – Michael J. Lynch, Hitler (Oxon: Routledge, 2013)
Angelo Juarez
The British historian Michael J. Lynch, Honorary Fellow in the School of Historical Studies at the University of Leicester, is known for his extensive research and publications in the areas of modern European and Chinese history. In his biography of Adolf Hitler, Lynch brings a modern historical perspective into the life of the infamous dictator, deep within the context of events surrounding him in Germany and other countries crucially involved in the World Wars. This biography, while including known and broadly accepted facts, largely uses current historical evidence and research to shed light on certain inconclusive or controversial aspects about the personal life of Hitler and the policies and decisions that determined the course of World War II in Europe, thus attempting to create a more accurate representation of the Nazi leader and the forces that brought about his ascension to power and ultimate fall.
Several themes run throughout this historical biography. Notably, there is the debate on the degree to which Hitler was responsible for the Holocaust. The intentionalist versus structuralist approaches attempt to answer this question. Lynch concludes that, even though Hitler, as a leader, had no organized plan of action, and often did not make policy, he was the one that ultimately consented or rejected it, thus making him largely responsible for the events that took place. Lynch denies the theory of some historians that the inevitable culmination of Germany’s “special path” (Sonderweg) was an extremist dictator. “There was nothing inevitable about Hitler and Nazism,” Lynch writes (pg. 253).
Another theme running through this historical biography is Hitler’s strength. It is suggested that he was weak because he diluted decision-making at crucial moments, as when running for president in 1932 to succeed Hindenburg. Likewise, at key moments his orders were not followed, as with the refusal of Generals Rommel and von Paulus at El Alamein and Stalingrad, respectively, to obey his orders. Lastly, some theorists sustain that he was unable to make real policy, especially in economic and foreign affairs, exemplified by his passive stance when the Nazi party needed to set a concise economic strategy to combat the depression that began in 1929. Instead, Hitler made anti-Bolshevik, anti-Communist, and anti-Jewish propaganda the dominant features of the Nazi agenda. Characteristic was his refusal to involve himself with the specifics of governance, thus delegating that responsibility onto others. In favor of the view (supported by Lynch) that the Nazi leader was strong, many point out that Hitler evoked euphoric admiration among the masses with his discourse, as recounted by those who created propaganda for him, like Leni Riefenstahl, and Joseph Goebbels. The power in his words and body language could easily convince and coerce, leading him to enormous success. Additionally, the Enabling Act of 1933 gave Hitler broader autonomous capabilities, resulting in the establishment of totalitarian control (Gleichschaltung) by 1934. The Wehrmacht swore unconditional loyalty to the dictator, obliging generals to comply with even the most radical of his orders towards the end of the war. Lynch concludes that weak/strong arguments must juxtapose rather than compete, since it is reasonable to believe a leader can be weak and strong at different times.
Other important themes throughout this work include Hitler’s fixation on lebensraum, the destruction of so-called “international jewery” (antisemitism), and his struggle against communism, socialism, and bolshevism; the nearly absolute lack of popular opposition to (in fact, the widespread support of) his execution of radical ideas; and the banalization of Hitler as a disorganized leader, without concise and structured direction, who mesmerized the masses with loud but sometimes trivial harangues and whose ascension to power and initial expansionist achievements were the result of opportunism or mere luck.
Lynch relies largely on well-established evidence from reputed historians, such as Sir Ian Kershaw. However, he also utilized quotes from individuals in isolated encounters with Hitler to support many of his points, which appears less reliable. There is, for example, his remark that Hitler was asexual. It is hard to understand how the author made this asseveration while also acknowledging that Hitler was hermetic and barely known privately. Most importantly, regarding the German Jews, there is a void in this book (as in other sources), where history does not seem entirely explained. The hatred of Hitler and millions of German citizens toward Jews, which led to the final solution, cannot be explained solely by the antisemitic remarks that are quoted in the text, which appear unspecific. Could only the broad, general hate speeches given by a man, about Jewish people assaulting the German economy and destroying German values be enough to instill so much hatred in the civil population and the military, to a degree of desiring the extermination of an entire ethnic group? The need for racial purity, living space or even envy are not enough to explain the German hatred that led to the Holocaust.
The book is well-organized and follows a chronological order. Chapter seven, “Hitler’s Germany”, interestingly makes a break to comment, among other things, on the personal life of the Nazi leader. My knowledge of Hitler and WWII in Europe has increased dramatically after reading this book. I did not know the degree of recklessness in the decisions made by Hitler from 1942 onwards. The declaration of war on the US by Hitler alone (without consulting Wehrmacht generals!), the greatest economy in the world even then, while being already engaged fighting Great Britain and the Soviet Union, was astonishing. The decision reflected Hitler’s romantic, over-passionate and irrational character, the attitude of a man with airs of superiority, who believed in providence instead of pragmatism. This book is ideal for college students because it synthesizes WWII in Europe in a medium-size book, and raises engaging historical themes.
Revised by Peter Mansoor, PhD (2021)
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February 25, 2021
The Fall of France in World War II:
Were the French Simply Out of Luck?
Angelo Juarez
Left to right: Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler, and Arno Breker.
Paris, June 23, 1940 (Photo: Heinrich Hoffmann)
Several factors contributed to France being invaded by Nazi Germany in May 10, 1940, including the old-fashioned doctrine of its military force, its incompetent High Command and political and emerging sociocultural struggles, resulting in an inability to withstand the war machine superiority of Hitler.
First, the outdated French doctrine of Methodical Battle did not allow for flexibility, as it focused on strict protocols, such as units moving among lines while fulfilling itineraries. This approach focused on attacking the enemy with defensive fire in order to debilitate it. The Germans possessed a much more aggressive stance, which led to faster attacks and progression of their forces across the land. Similarly, an inferior system of communications, which relied principally on courier systems and field telephones, made the French army only capable to operate on orders given at sparse times, without the ability to update its course of action based on fast-evolving events. The Nazis used an overarching communications system far superior than the French. Interestingly enough, the French military was similarly equipped to the German army in terms of tanks and armor. For instance, the French Char B1 could formidably stand frontal attacks, while the Somua S35 was similarly equipped to German Panzer tanks. In the air, the French army had very efficient aircraft (even though in smaller number than German airplanes because of a shortage of spare parts) capable of shooting down German planes with ease. However, the problem consisted in inappropriate military tactical use of these sources on the French side.
Second, the resignation of many seasoned high-rank officials, financial cutdowns and the reduction of time of service from three years to one year caused the French army to weaken. The reason of this changes ensued, in part, from a believe that agreements made at the League of Nations after World War I would bring an extended period of peace to Europe. Financial crisis was likewise responsible for these military modifications. France was not able to recover from the economic ravage left by World War I. In the time preceding World War II, the country lost important commerce partners such as Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, further debilitating its economy. Sociopolitical struggles were concurrently unfolding, consisting of clashes between French political parties, destabilizing the country even more.
Third, the ineffectiveness of French officials was remarkable. This fact could be best illustrated from 68-year-old French General Maurice Gustave Gamelin, remembered for a poor leadership of the French military during the Battle of France in World War II. He would command remotely from the war front, at Chateau de Vincennes, near Paris. He and his generals did not bother to inspect the troops regularly and relied on sending messages by the hour via motorcycle to give orders, instead of having radio communications, as the Germans did. There was a lack of communication with other headquarters in the field, and he would prefer to give guidelines rather than orders. Impressively, Gamelin waited for the allies to gain strength before he would launch any major offence, regardless of indications of German preparation for war. The Maginot line, built in the 1930s by the French at the Franco German border, was made to protect from a German invasion in areas that were of easy access. The Ardennes, a geographic area characterized by dense woods and hills, and seemingly impenetrable, was not well-guarded. The German Army, under the crafty and clever command of General Erich von Manstein, decided attack from this forest and made their way through into a poorly protected part of the border. Thus, operation Sickelschnitt, or Cut of the Sickle, began. Once they entered from the Ardennes, The Germans surprised the French from the back as they waited in the northern border with Belgium, which was neutral.
The Germans learned way more from World War I than the French did. Even though Nazi Germany had a significant lack of resources to build new military equipment, they were able to manage their way to French soil, through intelligence and a restructure of military methods used at the time. On the other hand, the French still maintained old-fashioned techniques from World War I, which, in addition to a lack of preparedness and determination, led to their quick defeat in only six weeks.
References:
- Murray, W & Millett, A. (2000). German Designs, 1939-1940. A war to be won: fighting the Second World War. (pp. 44-62) The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Sandvick, C. & Lambrecht, E. (2019). Why was France defeated in 1940? Daily History.org. Found at: DailyHistory.org