Of Bouncing Balls and a Big Blue Shift

It is a fortuitous coincidence that the University of Virginia’s Journal of Law & Politics has just published a piece of mine that shows the relevance of the current vote-counting process in Virginia’s Attorney General election to what might happen if the 2016 presidential election turns on a similar vote-counting process in Virginia.  (The piece was presented at a symposium on “The Voting Wars” that took place last spring at UVa.)

The piece is an analysis of shifts that have occurred in presidential elections between initial returns and final certified margins of victory.  The piece analyzes these shifts for all presidential elections going back to 1960, for potential swing states—including Virginia—as well as all states.  The major takeaway from the piece is that something has changed in the canvassing process since 2000 that makes it significantly more likely that a Democratic candidate for president will be able to gain large number of votes during the canvassing process.

Consider Colorado, for example.  As shown in Table A, on page 511 of the piece, prior to the 2004 election the Republican candidate for president gained during the canvass every time except 1964, the year of LBJ’s landslide.  Then, in 2004, Kerry gained over 30,000 votes during the canvass—not enough to overcome Bush’s initial lead of over 130,000 votes (see Appendix B, page 543), but a significant cut in that lead nonetheless.  Then in 2008, Obama padded his lead during the canvass in Colorado by over 70,000 votes, huge amount.  He did not do quite as well in the state in 2012, extending his lead there by “only” 26,884 votes.

The fact that in the three most recent elections Kerry and Obama have been able to gain significantly during the canvass in Colorado, whereas Democrats generally could not do so before, suggests that something new is occurring in the canvassing process that did not happen prior to 2004.  Is it a consequence of HAVA and its nationwide requirements concerning provisional ballots?  Is it increased reliance on absentee voting?  A combination of both, or some other factors?

My piece explores these issues for all swing states as well as the nation as whole.  But more data, and more sophisticated statistical analysis of the numbers, will be necessary to draw any definitive conclusions.  Charles Stewart and I plan to collaborate on future efforts to see what more illumination we can tease out of available evidence.

Meanwhile, with current attention focused on the Virginia Attorney General’s election, here are some observations.

The AG race is undoubtedly important in its own right.  But it is also a chance to see how Virginia’s procedures would handle a super-close presidential election.  Whenever there has been a vote-counting dispute in Ohio recently (as there have been in some congressional and local races), the participants involved—including the lawyers—know that they are potentially setting precedents that might affect a presidential election.  Indeed, the Sixth Circuit’s 2011 decision concerning provisional ballots in a judicial election, Hunter v. Hamilton County Board of Elections, was a major Equal Protection precedent for litigation that occurred in Ohio during the 2012 presidential campaign.

Virginia, albeit to a lesser extent than Colorado, seems consistent with the general trend showing that Democratic presidential candidates now are able to do better during the canvass than they usually did in the past.  Obama was able to gain almost 80,000 votes during the canvass there in 2008 and over 40,000 in 2012.  But Kerry did not gain during the canvass in 2004; Bush did by almost 10,000 votes.  And both Carter and Clinton were able to gain during the canvass in the three years that those Democratic candidates won the White House: 1976, 1992, and 1996.  Thus, Virginia’s numbers suggest that what may matter more there is the prevailing political atmosphere at the time: the candidate that wins the White House tends to gain during Virginia’s canvass.  But, interestingly, it is not uniformly a situation in which the candidate who won the state added to his lead during the canvass: although Obama won Virginia in both 2008 and 2018, Carter and Clinton lost Virginia in 1976, 1992, and 1996.   And it is worth noting that Carter and Clinton’s gains in Virginia during the canvass were miniscule in comparison to Obama’s: about 500 votes in 1992, about 1200 in 1976, and less than 2000 in 1996.

What may be most intriguing about Virginia’s numbers is the possibility they suggest of a Democrat being able to come from behind and overtake a Republican opponent during the canvass.  Suppose, for example, that in 2016 Hillary Clinton trails Chris Christie in Virginia by just 1000 votes on the morning after Election Day—and that whoever wins Virginia wins the White House.  The numbers from previous presidential elections in the state suggest that Clinton might well overtake Christie during the canvass.  (I make this observation, not from a partisan perspective, but as an analyst concerned at how rules governing the vote-counting process might affect conduct by actors, especially partisans, within that process.  Any rules that potentially have an effect of engendering distrust in the vote-counting process are a cause for concern, and if one party has an asymmetrical advantage as a result of some rules, there is a risk that this asymmetry might breed distrust.)

It is with what might happen in 2016 in mind that I’ve been watching the numbers move during the canvass in this year’s Virginia Attorney General race.

I don’t profess to have followed all the numerical shifts during the canvass as closely as others have, especially Dave Wasserman of Cook Political Report (whom Chuck Todd of NBC News has nominated for the yet-to-be-created position of national director of counting votes).  Wasserman has been keeping a Google Doc of all these vote changes so far and tweeting as they come in.  (This VA AG canvass has put Twitter in a whole new light for me.)  My impression, from keeping an eye on his great work as well as related tweets from others, is that the lead has gone back and forth repeatedly since Election Day, sometimes because of an accumulation of small shifts and sometimes because of single larger ones (like the so-called “Seven Corners Surprise”).  So far, I haven’t detected a distinct trend in either direction, and I haven’t seen shifts of the magnitude that have occurred in presidential elections.

Of course, the canvass is not yet finished.  As I understand it, counties must certify their results this coming Tuesday, but the State Board of Election has until Nov. 25 to certify a statewide result, and a recount most probably will follow that.  Thus, final certification of the election is likely weeks away.  And, if recent reports are any indication, there may be litigation over provisional ballots.  As Rick Hasen observes, if it is true that the State Board of Elections has ordered a change in the procedures by which provisional ballots may be validated, that rule change potentially raises federal constitutional questions under both Bush v. Gore and the earlier important appellate precedent of Roe v. Alabama.

But for now I’m curious about the “bouncing ball” quality of the Virginia AG canvass so far in comparison to the “big blue shift” that I generally observed in my analysis of the numbers from presidential elections.  If there is a difference, what accounts for it?  Are presidential elections simply distinct from other statewide races, especially in “off year” elections—or “off off year” ones, as some people call elections in odd-numbered years when there are no federal races on the ballot?

Since working on this “Big Blue Shift” piece, I’ve wanted to expand the project by collecting equivalent data for gubernatorial, U.S. Senate, and other major statewide elections.  It will be interesting to see if in each state there are similar shifts in the canvass each year regardless of which statewide race is at issue (in other words, for example, a presidential year whether the state is also electing a governor or U.S. Senator).  Or, conversely, perhaps there are race-distinctive patterns that emerge even within particular states.  Maybe, perhaps, this “Big Blue Shift” is a uniquely presidential phenomenon.  But if so, why?

So stay tuned.  Both to the Virginia AG race specifically and to the implications it might have for the understanding of the vote-counting process more generally.

There is so much more to learn about how the vote-counting process actually works in our fifty states, as well as the extent to which this process may have changed in each state since 2000.  As Doug Chapin, Heather Gerken, and others like to say, we really need more data on how our whole election administration works.  This point certainly applies to the canvassing of returns after Election Day and the effect the canvass can have in super-close races.

Law as Tiller, Justice as Compass: A Tribute to Tom Moyer

These remarks were delivered at the Ohio Judicial Conference’s 50th anniversary celebration, on September 12, 2013, to honor the late Chief Justice Thomas Moyer. In light of the theme of reflecting on the differences in our legal system between 1963 and now, this talk focused on the Reapportionment Revolution that occurred a half-century ago, how it compares to the Progressive Era’s political reforms a full century ago, and how future generations will look back upon our time and the way in which we handle the current dysfunction of our political system. The talk specifically mentioned the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission, an inherently bipartisan body tasked with proposing political reforms for the state, and concluded with the observation that Tom Moyer would have wished for this Commission to succeed.

Thank you for inviting me to speak tonight as the first Moyer Professor. I call it the “Moyer Professor” for short because the full title is rather long. “Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer Professor for the Administration of Justice & the Rule of Law.” But it really does need to be that long.

The beginning is my favorite part. “Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer.” That’s because of the man it appropriately honors. He is the whole reason for the creation of this professorship, and he is every bit worthy of the recognition—and more. Anyone who knew Tom Moyer admired him immensely and would want to pay tribute to his legacy in this and other ways.

This tribute however is bittersweet, because it comes much too soon. Tom Moyer should be with us still. His work here remains unfinished, and it is up to us to carry on in his honor and memory.

This is where the rest of the title comes in. “Administration of Justice and the Rule of Law.” Justice and Law. The twin pillars of Tom Moyer’s lifework. It is absolutely necessary to have both because, as Tom Moyer knew, that you can’t have one without the other.

You can’t have Justice without the Rule of Law, because without Law there is either anarchy or arbitrary despotism and neither of those is just. And without Justice, what purports to be Law is merely Force. The exercise of sovereign power needs more than the sheer capacity to coerce to qualify as the Rule of Law. It needs the ingredients of regularity and predictability. It needs the imprimatur of legitimacy. It needs also comply with an elementary requirement of Justice, namely treating like cases alike. To be the Rule of Law, in other words, and not just the Rule of Force, two cases presenting equivalent facts must be treated the same, according to the same impartial application of the governing principle of law.

Tom Moyer knew all this. For it was he who said, upon reaffirming his judicial oath in 2005, “the American justice system resolves disputes by a process that is guided by fundamental principles of fairness and impartiality.”

But Tom Moyer also knew that the relationship between Law and Justice is not a simple or static one. It is an ever-evolving, dynamic relationship. It was different a half-century ago from what it is today, as it was different another half-century before that, and likely will be different another half-century hence. Thus, as we appropriately celebrate 50 years of serving justice at this gala dinner, and the whole conference of which the dinner is a part, it is worth taking a few moments to examine the present relationship of law and justice, how it compares to fifty years ago, and how it might look another fifty years into the future.

A half-century ago, the nation was on the cusp of what scholars today call the “reapportionment revolution.” In the fall of 1963, the case of Reynolds v. Sims was argued in the U.S. Supreme Court. When Chief Justice Earl Warren announced the Court’s ruling in the following spring, he declared that both houses of every state legislature must comply with the constitutional standard of one-person-one-vote. It was the universality of that sweeping standard that caused the reapportionment revolution, as all fifty states scrambled to redraw their legislative maps to comply with the new constitutional requirement.

As you can imagine, the decision caused an uproar. And one can understand why. It was an exercise of judicial activism. Earl Warren had invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for the one-person-one-vote principle, but the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment had not intended the Equal Protection Clause to affect legislative apportionment or even voting rights more broadly. Indeed, section two of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly details how a state is entitled to deny voting rights to its citizens, with the only consequence being a loss of seats for that state in the U.S. House of Representatives. Furthermore, after the Civil War, everyone one knew that it was necessary to adopt the separate Fifteenth Amendment to prohibit states from denying voting rights on the basis of race.

Yet despite its judicial activism, the one-person-one-vote doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims has stood the test of time. In this respect it differs from many other Warren Court decisions, which have remained much more controversial and have been overruled or pruned significantly back. Indeed, Earl Warren himself called Reynolds v. Sims his most important decision, even more than Brown v. Board of Education. And the reason that Warren gave is interesting; he justified the judicial activism of that case as necessary to reduce the overall need for judicial activism in our system of government. He said and I quote: “If everyone in this country has an opportunity to participate in government on equal terms with everyone else, and can share in electing representatives who will be truly representative of the entire community and not some special interest, then most of the problems that we are confronted with would be solved through the political process rather than through the courts.” A few years later, in another one-person-one-vote case, Warren expanded on this rationale. He said that for the law to be legitimate, and thus worthy of judicial enforcement, it must stem from the people pursuant to one-person-one-vote. Therefore, the judiciary must insist upon compliance with one-person-one-vote in order to uphold the rule of law itself. On Warren’s view, law and justice were inextricably entwined in this specific way.

Now, to give you a sense of how settled the doctrine of one-person-one-vote has become, I’d like to share with you a case from my own experience. I had the tremendous fortune to clerk at the U.S. Supreme Court in 1989, and in that year one of the cases on the docket concerned the application of the one-person-one-vote doctrine to the government of New York City. To understand the case, you need to know that New York City is the union of what previously were five independent municipalities. The so-called boroughs of the city—Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island—were five separate cities before their union in 1897. At the time of this union, it was thought necessary to give the new federated city a bicameral legislature for the same reason that Congress is bicameral. One chamber of the city’s legislature would represent all the citizens of the city on the basis of population—and thus comply with the principle one-person-one-vote. But the other chamber of the city’s legislature would represent each of the five boroughs—the five previously independent cities—in the same way that the U.S. Senate represents each of the fifty states as such. It was thought just as necessary to protect State Island, the least populous borough, as it was thought necessary to protect Rhode Island and Delaware, the least populous states.

In the Supreme Court, the claim was that Reynolds v. Sims required both chambers of the city’s legislature to comply with one-person-one-vote, regardless of the particular historical circumstances of the city’s federation. The Supreme Court easily could have rejected this claim, precisely because of this special history. Just as Reynolds itself had said that the U.S. Senate was a special circumstance, exempt from the doctrine of one-person-one-vote, so too the Court could have said that New York City and its upper chamber were exempt for the same sort of reason. As long as the city’s lower chamber complied with one-person-one-vote, as it did, and as long as the internal subsidiary governments of each borough complied with one-person-one-vote, as they did, then it could have been okay for the city’s upper chamber to be structured according to the same rationale as the U.S. Senate.

But the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously and emphatically rejected this attempt to limit the applicability of Reynolds v. Sims. From Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the one hand, to Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, on the other, all nine Justices unequivocally agreed that one-person-one-vote applied to both chambers. There was no appetite among any of the Justices to carve out an exception or roll back Reynolds v. Sims. Nor has any such appetite developed since then. Indeed, just last year, the U.S. Supreme Court again unanimously reaffirmed the principle of one-person-one-vote in a case from West Virginia. There was not a whiff of abandoning or cutting back on the doctrine.

Thus, “one-person-one-vote” has become “one of the fixed stars of our constitutional constellation.”

This does not mean, however, that all the details of our democracy are fixed forever more. On the contrary, our democracy is an evolving process—like the relationship of Law and Justice, of which democracy is an essential part, as Earl Warren said. If we go back a half-century before Reynolds v. Sims, to 1914—one hundred years ago—our nation’s democracy looked very different from how it looked fifty years later in 1964. Remember, women did not get the right to vote until 1920, with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. And 1914 was the very first year in which Americans had the right to vote for U.S. Senators, as a result of the Seventeenth Amendment.

Now it is important to recognize one obvious difference between the profound changes in our democracy that occurred a century ago compared to the reapportionment revolution of a half-century later. The monumental expansion of voting rights one hundred years ago occurred by means of explicit constitutional amendments, the Seventeenth and the Nineteenth. The reapportionment revolution occurred by judicial decree. I think both Chief Justices, Earl Warren and Tom Moyer, would agree that it is far, far preferable to produce such constitutional change by means of a written amendment rather than innovative judicial interpretation. The question on which they might differ is, when does it become unavoidably necessary to engage in innovative judicial interpretation because the system has become incapable of generating imperative constitutional amendments and is susceptible of losing legitimacy without innovative judicial interpretation.

This is a point worth keeping in mind as we think about the current state of our democratic government, both in the nation as a whole and here in Ohio. The conditions are unfortunately not good, as you well know. Almost every day we hear in the news about the dysfunctional nature of Congress, its incapability of handling the nation’s finances or other issues because of gridlock and paralysis. Some people blame gerrymandering. Others blame the way we do primary elections. Still others see more complicated causes. But whatever the diagnosis, the disease is regrettably deep, and it affects Ohio as well as the nation.

We are fortunate, however, here in Ohio that we have a Constitution Modernization Commission, that is up-and-running. It is inherently bipartisan, and has a decade-long mission to modernize our own Ohio constitution so as to improve the operation of democracy here in Ohio. Let us hope with all our hearts that it is successful. I know Tom Moyer would hope so, and one reason again is to avoid the necessity of constitutional change coming from the judiciary that would much better come from the people through explicit constitutional amendments.

Therefore, when fifty years in the future the Ohio Judicial Conference holds another gala celebrating its 100 anniversary, I hope that it is able to look back to our time and say now was when the political process was able to improve itself through much-needed constitutional amendments. I hope they don’t look back and lament that the political process became so sclerotic that it was incapable of amending itself, and needed the judiciary to intervene in order to sustain the basic legitimacy of the Rule of Law. Or worse, that our democracy deteriorated to the point that it became no democracy at all.

Let me close with this observation. Tom Moyer was an avid sailor. And as any sailor knows, when facing a headwind, you can’t sail directly ahead. Instead, you have to tack a little bit this way, and a little bit that way, in order to maintain your course overall. Because of his sailor’s instincts, I think, Tom Moyer was so adept at managing the ever-evolving relationship between law and justice during the era of his stewardship. He did not keep too rigid a hand on the tiller. He was capable of tacking a little this way and a little that way, as necessary in order to keep true to his overall course.

And we all know the true course that Tom Moyer set his sights on. It remains a destination just over the horizon, ever worth striving for. The destination is that ideal, full fusion of law and justice. It is that perfect harbor where every citizen is able to fully embrace and applaud the social contract that each of us is obligated to uphold, and every citizen does so because that social contract—and the rule of law that enforces it—is fully fair to each citizen.

In our never-ending quest for that ideal destination, one thing I know is this: if we keep Tom Moyer, his legacy, and his values as our compass, we will be heading in the right direction and we will keep a steady course. Thank you.

What We Could Do With a National Citizens’ Initiative: Control Pay!

By Dale A. Oesterle

The Swiss voters on March 3rd demonstrated the power of a national citizens’ initiative right. Sixty-eight percent of Swiss voters voted in favor of something formally called the Minder Initiative, named after Thomas Minder, the politician who created it, that puts heavy controls on executive salaries at Swiss companies. Informally the Initiative was named the “Rip-Off Initiative.”

Switzerland has a national constitution that enables citizens to amend the Swiss constitution by the initiative process. Both federal and cantonal (state) initiatives are common in Switzerland. The initiative process in Switzerland is surprisingly sensible, and a model for some state constitutions in the United States (notably Mississippi’s). But we do not have a national initiative process.

Any 100,000 Swiss citizens may propose a constitutional amendment. The Swiss federal legislature may agree with the proposal and submit a redraft to the citizens or adopt legislatively a version of the proposal on the condition that its proponents withdraw it. If the legislature rejects the proposal, the Swiss government submits the proposal to the citizens with an official statement in opposition and may submit a counter-proposal to the voters. An initiative must receive a “double” majority, a majority of the votes of those voting and a majority of the votes of those voting in a majority of the twenty-six cantons.

In practice, fewer than three percent of the initiatives reach Swiss voters with the legislature’s official blessing. Close to one-half of the initiatives never reach the ballot, as the Swiss assembly takes action that satisfies the initiative’s sponsors. The assembly has offered the voters a counterproposal in about one-quarter of the votes, and voters usually adopt the counter-proposal over the citizens’ proposal. Citizens may vote yes on both citizen and government proposals; the proposal with the most votes wins, even though both may have achieved a legal majority.

The advantage of the Swiss national initiative process was on display in early March of this year. Mr. Minder proposed a twenty-four item measure that, among other things, makes shareholder votes on executive pay required and binding, bans golden-handshake and golden parachute severance agreements, and requires disclosure of loans and retirement packages for senior executives and directors. The government had proposal a milder plan of non-binding shareholder votes, such as we have under the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States.

Such a proposal could not pass in any state in the United States that has an initiative process because the leaders would argue, persuasively, that corporations would simply leave the State and incorporate in others that had not passed such a plan. It has to be a national rule. In other words, we need a national initiative process to do this and we do not have one.

The Swiss business community is apoplectic. But their misbehavior led to the initiative. Swissair took bankruptcy but managed to pay its disgraced CEO $9.6 million in severance money that same year. And the fallout may not be over.

Emboldened by Minder’s success, the Young Socialists have collected a sufficient number of signatures to put the “1:12 Initiative for Fair Play” on the next ballot. The proposal limits executive salaries to 12 times the salaries of a company’s lowest paid employee.

Do not get too giddy, however. In 2007, Swiss voters passed a national initiative banning the construction of new minarets in Switzerland. 57.5% of the citizens and twenty-two of 26 cantons supported the initiative. The initiative sparked international condemnation.

Arizona: Voter Registration and the Road Ahead

By Justin Levitt

Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School

June arrived with two election law cases at the Supreme Court. One is still pending: a highly anticipated decision on section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The other, more frequently overlooked, was decided yesterday. And there are some quirks of the opinion that seem to depart from the swiftly congealing conventional wisdom that Arizona (and other state regulatory efforts) might actually have “won,” and now need only run out the clock.

The case is called Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., but it has bounced through the courts under various names for seven years. In 2004, Arizona voters passed Prop 200, increasing identification requirements at the polls (one valid photo ID or two non-photo documents with name and current address) and requiring new voters to submit documentary proof of citizenship with a voter registration form.

There are policy reasons to question the merits of laws like these, whose costs can be larger than their benefits. Americans do not emerge from the womb with paperwork stamped on their skin, and as our Medicaid experience demonstrates, there are real individuals born in the country who do not have documentation of their citizenship readily available. The burdens on those people have to be assessed against the minimal fraud that such requirements incrementally deter, over and above prosecution and deportation. (Incidentally, it’s not unusual for popular initiatives to disproportionately burden a minority of residents; that’s a problem I’ve called to the Court’s attention in the also-still-pending Prop 8 case.) But yesterday’s decision had little to do with those policy questions, or on the constitutional limits of that cost-benefit assessment.

Instead, yesterday’s decision was about a relatively narrow slice of the case: whether Arizona can require that voters submit documentary proof of citizenship in order to process a standardized federal voter registration form for federal elections, when Congress appeared to have said otherwise. The Court was not asked to discuss what Arizona can require for its own elections for state office, or what Arizona can require of individuals attempting to register using state paperwork. But in the 1993 NVRA (better known as “motor-voter”), in order to cut through a maze of state bureaucracy and provide simplified one-stop procedures for voter registration, Congress required that as an alternative to any state-based procedures, states like Arizona must “accept and use” a federal voter registration form for elections to federal office, period. The court below, both in panel and en banc, found that this 1993 statute preempted Arizona’s requirement of additional documentation before accepting the federal form.

There were some intriguing aspects of the opinions below, ignored by the Court yesterday. The panel opinion was written by a former clerk of Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice O’Connor herself, retired from the Court but picking up occasional cases. Chief Judge Kozinski, often seen as a leading conservative jurist, wrote an impassioned dissent, focusing largely on the decision’s departure from an earlier panel decision in the case. En banc, Chief Judge Kozinski was able to reconsider the issue anew, and found the legislative history decisive in rejecting Arizona’s law. The Senate version of the NVRA explained that states could require citizenship documentation with the federal form; the House version did not. The conference committee specifically rejected the Senate version, explaining that the Senate provision was “not . . . consistent with the purposes of this Act” and “should be deleted”; both houses voted to adopt the conference bill, over strong dissent. That is, when asked directly whether the NVRA allowed states to require extra documentation, Congress said no.

None of that appeared in Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court — perhaps unsurprising, given the author’s noted distaste for legislative history even at its clearest. The Court rejected Arizona’s claim based on text and context alone: the NVRA mandate to “accept” a federal form means that a complete federal form may not be rejected without some other evidence of invalidity. It further held that Congress had the constitutional authority to issue such a mandate, as long as Congress stuck to its broad Elections Clause authority to decide how federal elections are held, rather than who is eligible to participate.

Marty Lederman has mentioned some intriguing constitutional ramifications of this latter distinction. But I want to focus here on the practical repercussions for Arizona.

Several commentators have suggested that the Court’s discussion of this how/who distinction provides a “road map for Arizona ultimately to win” on remand. I’m not so sure that I agree.

Certainly, the Court did offer a road map for a continued challenge. Federal statutes give the federal Election Assistance Commission authority to decide the extent to which the federal voter registration form may be tailored to include, inter alia, information “necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant.” The EAC has, in the past, allowed various states to request certain information on the form, but it rejected Arizona’s request. The Court noted that Arizona may ask again. But the EAC — which is also the only federal body collecting essential data on how elections are actually run — is, tragically, a ghost agency, with no commissioners and continuing existential threats. So in the absence of EAC action to approve Arizona’s wishes, the Court also suggested that Arizona might seek court assistance.

Still, though the Court invited continued litigation, I am less sure that it forecast the result. The opinion itself carefully disclaims any conclusion. And the merits are messier than the initial public narrative seems to presume.

The EAC has broad discretion to determine the tailoring of the federal form — but this discretion does not, presumably, overcome contrary congressional intent. If, as Chief Judge Kozinski determined, Congress specifically voted to reject a provision permitting states to require citizenship documentation as inconsistent with the Act, an EAC grant of Arizona’s request would be just as inconsistent.

So assume that permission is not forthcoming. The Court also pointed to potential arbitrariness in the EAC’s decision to reject Arizona’s request but approve a “similar” request from Louisiana. Except that Louisiana’s request is not similar at all. The EAC allowed Louisiana to ask for documentation to accompany the federal form in certain circumstances, yes. But Louisiana’s demand mirrors existing requirements of federal law. Under current federal law, first-time voters registering by mail without a driver’s license number or Social Security number must, before voting, submit an identity document from a broad menu. Louisiana asks all voters registering by mail without a driver’s license or Social Security number to attach such a document. The parallel with federal law is clear. By contrast, Arizona sought documentation that is required by no federal law and substantially more restrictive, precluding some eligible individuals from registering who are nevertheless otherwise entitled by federal law to vote. Even for those who disagree with the EAC’s decision, Louisiana’s request and Arizona’s request are sufficiently distinct that agreeing to one (Louisiana) and denying the other (Arizona) isn’t necessarily “arbitrary.”

The Court’s final stop on the road map is a potential case contesting whether Arizona has a right to require documentary proof of citizenship for registration, in the event of EAC rejection or inaction. The standard noted by Justice Scalia appears to be the same under the NVRA as it would be in a potential constitutional challenge: the federal government may not preclude states from collecting information “necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant.” I suspect that Arizona will claim that the documentation it seeks is necessary. But 49 other states — each of which likewise precludes noncitizens from registering, without requiring documentary proof at registration — apparently feel differently. State control over qualifications cannot mean that states may require, in the face of federal objection, any information they would find incrementally useful. Otherwise, state control over “who” would wholly swallow federal control over “how,” gutting the Election Clause entirely.

What all of this means is that the only certainty moving forward is the plausibility of further litigation, if Arizona clings to the defense of its particular initiative in the face of congressional opposition, as applied to federal elections using the federal registration form. After seven years and two trips to the Supreme Court, Arizona can decide whether it wishes to fight further. But yesterday’s opinion should not give defenders of the restrictive state requirement much solace in the courts.

Silence of the Lambs

By Dale A. Oesterle

With the election of 2012 now well over and past the second inauguration of the incumbent President, the historical analysis of the events has begun and will last as long as written human history lasts. An interesting tidbit may already be lost to the majesty of the moment.

The voters of three very different states, Alaska, New Hampshire, and Ohio, all had an opportunity to call state constitutional conventions. In each state the voters turned the opportunity down by very similar votes, 68%, 64% and 68% respectively against.

The paucity of public comment on the resolutions in each state was deafening. Other than formal messages in newspapers and an occasional editorial comment, lost in paragraphs with much more succulent issues, there was no real public debate or discussion. In each state most voters were surprised totally to find the language on their ballots.

The constitutions of these three states and thirteen others give voters an opportunity, at regular intervals, usually every twenty years, to call a constitutional convention. They never have. Pity.

Why do we fear to vote yes? Our fifty states have held more than 180 additional constitutional conventions after their initial formation conventions. Most states have had an average of three constitutions; New York is on its fifth constitution, adopted in 1938.

State legislatures called most all of these subsequent constitutional conventions (except for some very notorious ad hoc, post-civil war conventions in Southern States), and there’s the rub. A citizen vote to empanel a constitutional convention by-passes the politicians in control of the state’s government. The incumbent members of state legislatures and the governors do not begin them, nor control them, nor write them, nor decide whether to submit them to the populace for ratification.

The Ohio provisions are instructive. If citizens vote to call a convention, each house district holds a second vote to elect delegates, “without party designation,” to the new convention. The delegates’ work is then submitted to the populace in a third vote to be adopted by a “majority of those voting.”

Note what the provision does not require. It does not require a full rewrite by the delegates. The elected delegates can choose to do nothing, to amend the existing constitution, or to start from scratch, all independently, at least formally, from the assent of any governor or state legislature.

My informal inquires on why we do not take such an opportunity usually produce a version of this response: “We could do with some very overdue changes to state government structure and incentives, but…. the crazy people may show up. Who knows what they would do…”

In Ohio the incumbent politician’s fear of a popularly called convention leads to a once every twenty year ritual. The legislature, on the year before the convention language is on the ballot, calls a Constitutional Commission, staffed with appointees named by each political party. The appointees are usually safe, often -retired politicians and a few academics. The Commission meets, discusses some technical changes (anything controversial goes nowhere), and recommends to the legislature that the legislature submit a harmless amendment to the constitution to the voters using the present constitution’s amendment procedures. The quiet point: We in Ohio do not need a convention; the pros are working on amending the constitution on your behalf.

Why so little confidence in the judgment of a new set of elected delegates? The framers of the federal Constitution of 1787 showed some resolve and judgment when they junked the Articles of Confederation, which, by the way, started as an effort to amend rather than scrap the Articles.

In any event, and perhaps most important to re-stabilizing a sensible notion of constitutional theory, the opportunity of sixteen states’ voters to call a constitutional convention reaffirms American constitutional law as based on a Lockean notion of civilian consent. The opportunity and failure to call a convention is a kind of consent. So too is the yearly opportunity, and failure, of state legislatures to call conventions, for that matter.

Many- too many-academics, overwhelmed with the technical problems that accompany any notion of actual consent, have largely abandoned the concept as a foundational justification of American constitutions. It would be great for a state’s voters to call a state convention now and then to show them how wrong they are.