

## XI—SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, NEGATION, AND DISAGREEMENT

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It seems obvious that judgement is a propositional attitude, articulated into force and content, into what is affirmed and its affirmation. We need to distinguish force from content, so it seems, in order to understand elementary features of judgement, for example, that a judgement stands opposed to its negation and that people can disagree in their judgements. However, this common opinion is mistaken. Judgement is no propositional attitude, because judgement is self-conscious: judging something is understanding oneself to judge it. Thus its affirmation is inside what is affirmed. This affects everything essential to judgement, in particular negation and disagreement.

### I

*The Self-Consciousness of Judgement.* In judging that things are so, I understand myself to do that: judge that things are so. I understand that *in* judging. I do not on the one hand judge that things are so, and on the other hand think that I do. My judging something and my comprehending myself to judge it are one act of the mind.

I shall not argue for this. It is not the kind of thought that is capable of being justified. Instead, I will begin to bring out the character of this thought by which it is incapable of justification.

Lest this seem too dogmatic a beginning, let me observe that what I said about judgement is universally accepted for assertion. She who asserts that things are so understands herself to do that: assert that things are so. This emerges when we consider the idea that assertion is subject to rules.

Assertion has been said to be subject to the truth-rule: assert that things are so only if they are; or the knowledge-rule: assert that things are so only if you know they are. These are to be rules that she who asserts something follows (as transpires from the use of the second-

person pronoun in stating them: assert ... only if *you* ...). And following a rule is not just acting in conformity with it; it is acting in conformity with it *understanding oneself to conform to it*. Aristotle contrasts virtue as a *hexis meta tou orthou logou*, a disposition to act *with* the right concept, with a *hexis kata ton orthon logon*, a disposition to act in a manner that fits the right concept.<sup>1</sup> A virtuous person not only acts in a manner that fits a certain *logos*, but acts with an understanding of how she acts; when this understanding is articulated, then the *logos* that articulates it is one *with which, meta ou*, she acts. The distinction of *kata logon* and *meta logou* is constitutive of the idea of following a rule. The thought that assertion follows rules thus reflects a recognition that she who asserts something does so *with* an idea of correct assertion: not only is her assertion subject to a measure; she understands this *in* asserting what she does.<sup>2</sup>

This brings to light something that has been implicit in what I said about judgement. She who asserts something does so *with* the concept of correct assertion. She understands herself to assert what she, thereby, asserts, in such a way as to take it to be right to assert what she, thereby, asserts. It is the same with judgement: someone who judges that things are so understands herself to judge what she, thereby, judges, thinking it right to judge as she, thereby, judges. It is easy to see why understanding oneself to judge, or assert, is taking oneself to judge, or assert, correctly: the concept of judgement, or assertion, is the concept of correct judgement, or assertion. She who judges that things are so judges *with* the concept of judgement, and this is to say, with the concept of correct judgement.

In judging, she who judges understands herself to judge what she, thereby, judges. I shall express this by saying that judgement is self-conscious. The term *self-consciousness* indicates the internality of a consciousness to that of which it is a consciousness. Judgement is self-conscious as one's thought of judging is internal to that of which it is the thought: one's judgement; assertion is self-conscious as one's thought of asserting what one does is internal to one's asserting it.

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1144b.

<sup>2</sup> Whether this understanding of hers is capable of being articulated in a *logos*, or rule, is secondary. The question arises only after this formal character of assertion has been recognized.

The word *self-consciousness* calls to mind the first-person pronoun, *I*. And rightly so. *I* signifies the internality to what is thought of its being thought. *I* is not the only term that does that; it is not the only term indicative of self-consciousness. But it is one of those. When someone thinks *I am F*, then not only is she who thinks someone to be *F* the one whom she thinks to be *F*. As what she thinks requires for its expression the first-person pronoun, this identity is contained in what she thinks. Hence, when someone thinks *I am F*, then what she thinks contains its being thought by her who, in this thought, is thought to be *F*. Castañeda saw this. He noted that the rule of detachment, which licenses the inference from *S knows p* to *p*, does not apply when what is known is specified by the special pronoun he honoured with a star, *S knows that she\* is F*. *She\** is a first-person pronoun; it is that pronoun in indirect speech. When someone knows *she\* is F*, then there is no detaching what she knows from her knowing it (Castañeda 1966). This explains why, in describing judgement as self-conscious, it is necessary to use the first-person pronoun: she who judges that things are so understands *herself\** so to judge; the *herself* bears a star, a star that you, I trust, heard when I said that.

## II

*The Distinction of Force and Content.* Since judgement is self-conscious, judgement cannot be conceived as articulated into force and content; it cannot be conceived as a propositional attitude.

It seems no more than common sense that judgement bears this articulation: there is what is judged, and there is the act of judging it; there is what is asserted, and the act of asserting it. What is judged is the content, the act of judging it the force; what is asserted is the proposition, its assertion an attitude one adopts toward this proposition. Yet this is no conception of judgement. It is not, because judgement is self-conscious. In judging that things are so, she who judges understands herself so to judge. She does not, in one act of the mind, judge that things are so, and in a second act comprehend herself to judge that. Judging that things are so and thinking oneself to judge that are *one act of the mind*. So *I judge* is thought in every judgement; a judgement is the first-person thought of itself. And since *I judge* is thought in every judgement, it is contained in everything judged. Taking oneself to judge *It is so* is not a different act of the

mind from judging this; the act expressed by *It is so* is the same as the one expressed by *I judge it is so*. As the act is one, so is what is thought in this act: *I judge* is inside what is judged.

This cannot be put by saying that in every judgement, two things are judged: *p* and *I judge p*. On the contrary. Since judging *p* is understanding oneself to judge it, there is no such thing as judging, in addition to judging *p*, that one judges this. If our notation confuses us, suggesting that *I judge* is added to a *p* that is free from it, we may devise one that makes it internal to *p*, for example, forming the letter *p* by means of the letters *I judge* arranged in the shape of *p*.

Kant holds that the *I think* accompanies all my thoughts.<sup>3</sup> Hegel calls this way of putting it ‘inept’.<sup>4</sup> In defence of Kant, we note that he added that the *I think* cannot in turn be accompanied by any representation. Thus he sought to make it plain that *I think* is not something thought alongside a thought that it accompanies, but is internal to what is thought as such. I said that *I judge* is contained in what is judged. This may with equal justice be called inept. It suggests two things, one containing the other. Perhaps we should say, what is judged is suffused with the *I judge*. But here too, if we undertake to think through the metaphor, we come to grief before long. People have tried saying that the *I think* is in the background while what is thought is in the foreground, or that what is thought is thematic while the *I think* is unthematic. These metaphors solidify the notion that there are two things represented, the object and my thinking it: in a visual scene, what is in the foreground and what is in the background are distinct things seen (the house in the foreground, the trees in the background); in a piece of music, the theme is heard alongside its accompaniment. But we must not spend time on these figurative ways of speaking; it is not through images that we understand self-consciousness. I will continue to talk of containment, not to provide illumination, but to have a convenient way of speaking.

As judgement is self-conscious, the *I judge* is inside what is judged. This is to say that judgement cannot be conceived through a distinction of what is judged and the act of judging it. The force-content

<sup>3</sup> Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B131. He says that the *I think* must be able to accompany all my representations, for all my representations must be capable of being thought. This presupposes (what is the starting point of Kant’s philosophy and not the kind of thing for which he ever purports to give an argument) that the *I think* does accompany (not: can accompany) all my thoughts.

<sup>4</sup> Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, §20: ‘ungeschickt’.

distinction is untrue to the self-consciousness of judgement. Therefore it is an impediment to understanding judgement.

As I say this, I anticipate the objection that the distinction of force and content is fundamental to the way in which we think of a vast array of topics in a variety of philosophical fields. In all these fields, the distinction has proved useful: it is by means of this distinction that we frame our basic conception of the topic; without it, we do not even know how to identify our object of inquiry. Negation and disagreement are two examples.

First, negation. In order to see that the judgement  $p$  contradicts the judgement  $not-p$ , we need to recognize the same  $p$  in both. But  $p$  is asserted only in the judgement  $p$ ; it is not asserted in the judgement  $not-p$ , precisely not. Hence, it cannot be internal to what is asserted in the judgement  $p$  that it be asserted. If it were, the same  $p$  could not figure in what is asserted in the judgement  $not-p$ . Hence  $p$  is a content that is free of assertoric force. This explains how the judgement  $p$  contradicts the judgement  $not-p$ : the nexus of judgements rests on a relation of contents. The contents  $p$  and  $not-p$  are related in this way:  $not-p$  is true if and only if  $p$  is not. In virtue of this relation of  $p$  and  $not-p$ , the judgement  $p$  stands opposed to the judgement  $not-p$ . The reasoning can be extended to yield an argument brought forward by Frege and insisted upon by Geach for the necessity of distinguishing force from content. If it is to be right to reason from  $p$  and  $p$  entails  $q$  to  $q$ , then the same  $p$  must figure in the first and in the second premiss. However,  $p$  is asserted only in the first premiss, not in the second. Hence it cannot be internal to what is asserted in the first premiss that it be asserted.

Second, disagreement. X and Y disagree as X affirms something Y denies. Hence, it cannot be internal to what X affirms that it be affirmed. Or X affirms  $p$ , and Y  $not-p$ . The same  $p$  must figure in X's and in Y's affirmation. But only X affirms  $p$ ; Y does not. Hence, it cannot be internal to what X affirms—it cannot be internal to  $p$ —that it be affirmed. Disagreement in judgement is grounded in a relation of contents judged. These can be affirmed, but the idea of their being affirmed is no part of them. As disagreement in judgement is grounded in a relation of contents, it is one thing for X to disagree with Y; it is another for X to understand that she disagrees with Y. X understands that she disagrees with Y as she thinks these two things: Y thinks  $p$  and  $not-p$ . If affirmation were internal to what is

affirmed, this would be impossible. It would be impossible to think someone else affirms something without affirming it oneself.

I shall work through these examples of things allegedly establishing the force–content distinction. It will emerge that we can think neither negation nor disagreement as long as we conceive of judgement through a distinction of force and content. This will begin to show why the thought that judgement is self-conscious is not the kind of thought to be justified.

### III

*Negation.* Frege presents it as a great achievement to have isolated predication from assertoric force. The predicative structure of a thought is functional: what is asserted in an elementary predicative judgement is the value that a function associated with the predicate assigns to the sense of a name. A value of this function is something that can be affirmed. But its functional structure must not be understood through the idea of affirmation. If she who affirms the content understands its predicative structure, this understanding of hers does not bring into play the idea of affirmation.

Frege treats *not-p* as bearing a structure of the same kind: what is asserted in judging *not-p* is the value that a function associated with *not* assigns to *p*. *Not*, negation, is a function from contents on contents. An account of this function does not invoke affirmation. If she who asserts *not-p* understands *not-p* to be a function of *p*, she does not, in understanding this, deploy the idea of affirmation. Negation constitutes an order of contents. This order is not, not as such, an order of judgement. Someone who asserts something, understanding its functional structure, recognizes an order in which contents are placed; she does not, not therein, think of judgement at all; a fortiori, she does not, not therein, understand an order of judgement.

Suppose someone judges *not-p*, understanding *not-p* to be the negation of *p*. In so judging, she has no thought of restricting her possibilities of judging in any way. In particular, she has no thought of setting her face against judging *p*. It is no part of her understanding of *not* that, judging *not-p*, she opposes the judgement *p*. She understands negation; she does not, not *in* understanding negation, recognize an order of judgement by which judging one thing excludes judging another.

The lack comes out even more glaringly when we undertake to supply it. Let it be that our subject thinks *not-(p and not-p)*. Thus she represents a relation of contents that underlies an opposition of judgements. However, just as, and for the same reason that, she does not, judging *not-p*, understand herself to set her face against judging *p*, she does not, in judging *not-p* and *not-(p and not-p)*, understand herself to contradict the judgement *p*. She affirms a further content. She understands its functional structure. As this understanding is not a thought of an order by which judging one thing is restricting the possibility of judging others, adding it does not bring us any nearer the thought we seek: her thought of ruling out, judging what she does, the judgement *p*.

The point continues to hold if we include, among the contents the subject affirms, contents that contain the concept of judgement. It continues to hold because it is independent of the content. Let us suppose she affirms: *it cannot be right to affirm both p and not-p*. This looks as though we are getting somewhere. Let us credit our subject with access to her own judgements: she scans her mind and finds these judgements: *p* and *not-p*. 'O my god,' she thinks, 'this is bad. It cannot be right to judge both *p* and *not-p*. Something is wrong. I must do something about this.' We seem to have restored the efficacy of logic in our subject: she monitors her judgements and steps in if they do not conform to her idea of how they should be. (We hope, we pray, that, perhaps by divine or evolutionary grace, this idea of hers conforms to logic.) But this is an illusion. No matter what the contents of her thoughts are, our subject does not, *in* affirming a content, think of excluding the affirmation of any other content. Just as, and for the same reason that, in judging *not-p* and *not-(p and not-p)*, she has no idea of an obstacle in the way of her judging *p*, so she has no idea of such an obstacle in judging *not-p* and *it cannot be right to judge both p and not-p*. Should she conjoin in one judgement these three contents, *p*, *not-p*, and *it cannot be right to judge both p and not-p*, she will not, in so judging, be conscious of any tension within her judgement.

Judgement is self-conscious; this is to say, it is not articulated into force and content. Yet Frege appears to recognize the self-consciousness of judgement. He includes in the sign of an assertion the judgement stroke. A significant part of a sign signifies an aspect of the consciousness of her who uses the sign. So, if the judgement stroke is a part of the sign of an assertion, then she who makes an

assertion understands herself to affirm what she does. It is worth our while to bring out that Frege is inconsistent in crediting the subject of assertion with this understanding.

If content is distinct from force, then the sign of force is empty in this sense: its meaning is pure assertion, pure yes, without any determination. Any determination of a judgement resides in what is judged, the content, whose sign is placed outside the sign of force. That the sign of force is empty means, specifically, that its meaning does not contain an order of judgement by which judging one thing constrains the possibility of judging others.

If the self-consciousness of judgement is confined to the empty judgement stroke, then there is no manifold of contents. There is but one content, pure being, as we may call it. The many letters to the right of the judgement stroke are so many ways of decorating the judgement stroke. They do not signify any difference in judgement. To see this, suppose I assert *not-p*. In asserting something, we concede, I understand myself to assert it. Assertion is self-conscious. So, asserting *not-p*, I understand myself to assert *not-p*. However, the functional structure of the content is not, not as such, a structure of acts of affirmation. Understanding that I affirm the negation of *p*, I do not, not therein, understand myself to oppose the judgement *p*. There is no such thing as seeing myself facing a question *p or not?* Now consider the judgements *p* and *q*. They are different, it seems, for the signs are different. However, I do not, in judging *p*, understand myself to constrain my possibilities of judging in any way. It can never be that I comprehend myself to oppose a judgement *q* in judging *p*. I may affirm a further content: *p entails not q*. But I do not recognize any tension in my judgement as I judge *p*, *p entails not-q*, *q*. The difference of *p* and *q*, as far as I understand *p* and *q*, makes no difference, not to judgement. There is no such thing as seeing myself facing a question, *p or q?* Judgement is pure affirmation, without any negativity inside it; it is the pure thought of yes, being, nothing else.

Perhaps it helps to have two forces, affirmation and denial. Now there is opposition in force; it seems that she who affirms *p* therein sets her face against denying *p*. However, as the force is outside content, this is not so. Denying *p*, she denies, precisely, *p*. And *p*, forceless content that it is, contains no thought of affirmation or denial. As our subject denies *p*, she does not, not therein, understand herself to oppose affirming *p*. She denies *p*; she does not deny *affirming p*. These are different things. Furthermore, and again, as she affirms *p*,



she therein has no idea of denying any  $q$ . Nor does she come by this idea as she affirms, in addition to  $p$ ,  $p$  entails not- $q$ . Not, negation, constitutes an order of contents, which is not, not as such, an order of affirmation and denial. The bifurcated judgement stroke is as empty as the simple one. The meaning of the sign of affirmation is pure yes, pure being, without any determination. The meaning of the sign of denial is pure no, pure nothing, without any determination. As both are pure, as all determination is outside them, there is no difference of affirmation from denial, no difference of being from nothing.<sup>5</sup>

If force is outside content, the act of asserting it outside what is asserted, then negation is unintelligible. It is to be an order of contents, which grounds an opposition of judgements in an additional step. Then there is no recognizing one judgement to contradict another. In consequence, the opposition of contents vanishes, and so does any difference of content. Nor does it help to divide force into affirmation and denial. As no difference of content makes a difference, neither does the difference of forces.

We do recognize judgements to oppose one another. Thereby we show that judgement is not articulated into force and content. A perspicuous notation does not place the sign of force outside the sign of content. It makes the sign of force, the *I judge*, the graphic matter of all sentence letters. Now we can understand negation. It is not a function on contents. Nor is it an opposition of forces outside content. It is contained in the self-consciousness of judgement: judging that things are so, I understand myself to oppose the judgement that they are not. As negation is contained in the *I judge*, it is in what is judged in so far as it is something judged. What is judged, as such, contains the thought of an order of judgement by which judgements exclude and include judgements. A perfect Begriffsschrift makes the sign of this order the graphic matter of all sentence letters. This is the central, and the best, thought of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

#### IV

*Disagreement.* If force is outside content, then X disagrees with Y just in case Y affirms the negation of what X affirms. The contents

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<sup>5</sup>These two paragraphs may serve as an interpretation of Hegel's demonstration, in his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, that being is nothing.

they affirm do not contain the idea of affirmation. A fortiori, they do not contain the idea of disagreement. Thus we must distinguish X and Y's being in disagreement from X and Y's understanding themselves to be in disagreement. In order for X and Y to understand that they disagree, it does not suffice that X affirm  $p$  and Y *not-p*. X must affirm, in addition to  $p$ , *Y affirms not-p*. Conversely, Y must affirm, in addition to *not-p*, *X affirms p*.

Hence *X and Y know they disagree* means: X knows that she disagrees with Y, and Y knows that he disagrees with X. We can say *They know that they disagree* in this sense; we cannot say *They know that they\* disagree*. A starred plural pronoun occurs only in the expression of something known in knowledge whose subject is originally plural. I shall return to this.

X thinks she disagrees with Y as she thinks both  $p$  and *Y affirms not-p*. As X affirms  $p$ , what she affirms does not contain the idea of affirmation. It does not contain an idea of one judgement opposing another. Therefore, affirming  $p$  and *Y thinks not-p*, X does not, not therein, apprehend any conflict; she is not conscious of clashing with Y. She thinks *Y affirms not-p*, and she thinks  $p$ . These two things are the case, she thinks. There is no disharmony among the contents she affirms; they lie next to each other peacefully in her judgement.

We have spoken as though  $p$  and *Y judges not-p* were like  $p$  and  $q$ , two contents having nothing to do with each other. It may be objected that this is wrong. In judging *Y affirms not-p*, X deploys the concept of judgement. Thus she is acquainted with the measure of judgement, the measure to which it is bound as judgement: a judgement is as it is to be, simply as judgement, only if things are as they are judged to be in it. Applying this to Y's judgement, X understands that Y, judging *not-p*, is wrong so to judge, if  $p$ . Given this, X is in a position to infer, from  $p$ , that Y goes wrong in her judgement *not-p*. Drawing this conclusion, X thinks three things:  $p$ , *Y thinks not-p*, *Y is wrong to think not-p*. These three things are the case, she thinks. There is no disharmony among these contents; they lie next to each other peacefully in her judgement.

Perhaps if X is to understand herself to disagree with Y in judgement, she herself must figure in her thought as judging. So to the contents she affirms we add one that represents her as judging  $p$ . In addition to judging  $p$ , *Y thinks not-p*, *Y goes wrong in judging not-p*, she judges *I judge p*. Applying the principle she applied to Y, she can infer from  $p$ : *I am right to judge p*. Thus she affirms these

contents: *p*, *I judge p*, *I am right to judge p*, *Y judges not-p*, *Y is wrong to judge not-p*. These things are the case, she thinks. There is no disharmony among them; we are no nearer a sense of conflict.

We tend to think that, seeing that someone affirms something that I deny, I should think again. If force and content are outside one another, nothing in the representation of someone as affirming the negation of something I affirm, or as affirming something I deny, unsettles me in my ideas of what is the case in the least. *Y thinks not-p*, and *p*: there is no lack of harmony, no tension among these contents.

Let us grant that, given that these two things hold—*X thinks p* and *Y thinks not-p*—I should suspend judgement on whether *p*. And let us grant that this does not change when *I* takes the place of *X*: given these two things, I think *p* and *Y thinks not-p*, I should suspend judgement. For, who am I to claim for myself a tighter nexus to reality than I grant *X*? However, we are speaking of a situation in which I judge not only *I judge p* and *Y judges not-p*. Crucially, I also judge *p*. It may be true that, given that I think *p* and *Y thinks not-p*, I should suspend judgement. But given that I think all of these, *I think p*, *Y thinks not-p*, and crucially, *p*, I have no business suspending judgement on whether *p*.

It may be said that *X* and *Y* are epistemic peers and that therefore, if they disagree, one affirming *p*, the other denying it, it cannot be certain whether *p*. If this is right, then it is right to infer, from *p*, that *X* and *Y* are not epistemic peers. After all, given *p*, *X* is right and *Y* is wrong about whether *p*. This counts against their being epistemic peers with respect to the question whether *p*.

If force is outside content, then a disagreement of *X* and *Y* is grounded in a relation of the contents of their judgements. These contents do not contain the idea of judgement, nor, a fortiori, the idea of opposition in judgement. In consequence, it is one thing for *X* and *Y* to disagree and another for them to understand that they do. In affirming the content she affirms, *X* has no thought of *Y* and her opposition to him: affirming *p* is one act of the mind, thinking of *Y* and his thoughts on *p* another. Once we think in this way, we have no way of recovering the consciousness of conflict of those who disagree. We do not recover it by elaborating on the contents affirmed.

This shows that, where there is consciousness of conflict in judgement, the judgement that things are so and the thought that *Y* goes

wrong in thinking they are not is *one act of the mind*. My opposition to Y, who thinks *p*, is internal to my thinking *not-p*. In thinking *not-p*, I stand up against, I challenge, I question Y's assertion. My opposition to Y is inside the opposition of what we assert.

The original scene of opposition in judgement is dialogue: I say *no*, say it *to you*, who assert *p*. In saying *no*, in asserting *not-p*, I place myself in opposition to you. This I understand *in* saying *no*. Saying how things are and opposing you is one act; it is one act of speech, and one act of the mind, of which this speech is the sensory appearance.

As you say *p* and I say *no*, we are locked in conflict. Our conflict is sustained by, it consists in, our understanding of our conflict. Our understanding ourselves to be in conflict is internal to our being in conflict. Our conflict is self-conscious. As judgement is self-conscious, conflict in judgement is self-conscious conflict. When I say *I assert p*, I put into words something I understand in asserting, simply, *p*. I put into words the self-consciousness of assertion. When I say, *You say p, but that is wrong. Rather, not-p*, I put into words something I understand in saying, to you, simply: *no*. I put into words the self-consciousness of contradiction, in the literal meaning of the word *contradiction*: speaking against.

*It is so* and *I think it is so* do not express distinct acts of the mind. Nor do *It is so* and *I am right to think that it is*. I think it right to judge as I, thereby, judge. In the same way, as I speak to you, *No, it is not so* and *You think it is* do not express distinct acts of the mind. Nor do *No, it is not so* and *You go wrong in thinking it is*. *You think p* is not a separate content I think in addition to thinking *not-p*. *You think p* expresses my consciousness of opposition to you, a consciousness that is already in my saying, to you, *No: wrong!*

We noted above that, if *p* and *Y thinks not-p* are distinct contents, then there is no such thing as X and Y knowing that they\* know they disagree. X can know that she\* opposes Y; Y can know that X opposes him\*. But there is no such thing as this: X and Y know that she\* opposes him\*. For the two stars signify that Y figures, in what X knows, as knowing it, and that X figures, in what Y knows, as knowing it. Now, what X and Y know, knowing that she\* opposes him\*, is something X would express by saying 'I oppose you', and Y by 'You oppose me'. The *she\** is the *I* and the *you* of the direct speech; the *him\** is the *you* and the *me* of the direct speech. We said, *she\** is the first-person pronoun in indirect speech. If we say this, we

must say that both *I* and *you* are forms of the first-person pronoun. But this is a confusing way of speaking. Better to say that the star signifies self-consciousness: the internality to what is known of its being known. Then we can see that, while the first-person pronoun signifies self-consciousness, it is not the only term that does so. Another is the second-person pronoun. We use the first-person pronoun to express the self-consciousness of a monadic determination of a subject; we use the second-person pronoun to express the self-consciousness of a dyadic determination, a relation, a transaction, of subjects. We use it to represent disagreement in judgement.

Dialogue is the original scene of disagreement in judgement. It is the original scene because disagreement, as such, is conceived through it. There is no consciousness of conflict if *p* and *Y thinks not-p* are distinct contents. As there is consciousness of opposition, my thought of *Y*'s opposition to me is internal to my judgement *p*. The thought of *Y* judging *not-p* is not, is never, the thought of an indifferent content, to be laid alongside *p*; the thought of *Y* and his judgement is contained in the self-consciousness of judgement. Hence, not only *I* and *you* signify self-consciousness. So does every name of a person. The name of a person has a different logical form from the name of a river (Elbe), or a dessert (Kaiserschmarrn). A personal name is founded in address; it is the name by which she who bears that name is called.

We ended our discussion of negation by observing that negation is not a part of a forceless content *not-p* derived from another content *p*. It is a moment of the self-consciousness of judgement: judging that things are so is understanding oneself to negate, to exclude, the contradictory judgement. What we then said of *not*, we now say of *Y thinks*: it is not a part of a forceless content *Y thinks p* derived from another content *p*. It is a moment of the self-consciousness of judgement: judging that things are so is understanding oneself to oppose your assertion that they are not.

It is worthwhile inquiring in what way the second thing we say, what we say about disagreement, goes beyond the first, what we say about negation. In judging *p*, I oppose judging *not-p*. This thought of an opposition of judgements may seem already to be a thought of an opposition of subjects of judgement. Setting my face against judging *not-p*, I oppose anyone, whoever it may be, who judges *not-p*. This idea will be familiar to the Kantian. It is the subjective universality of judgement, its universality with respect to subject: in

judging, I think it valid so to judge, and the validity that I think my judgement possesses is validity for everyone. However, there is reason to be doubtful of this. The idea of a manifold of subjects, the idea of *everyone*, comes out of the blue. There is no way to get it from the idea of opposition of judgements alone. If I have the idea of other subjects, then my thought of the validity of my judgement will be the thought of its validity for every subject. But the idea of other subjects does not come to me through the idea of an opposition of judgements.

The Kantian proposal comes to this: in judging *p*, I understand myself to oppose someone else if she judges *not-p*. In order to derive from this a consciousness of opposition, I need to ascertain that the condition is satisfied: there is someone, this one, who judges *not-p*. This is a separable step, and therefore my thought of her as judging *not-p* is not internal to my judgement *p*; it is a different act of the mind. Once we think this, we can never retrieve the consciousness of conflict that constitutes disagreement in judgement. If the thought of the other subject is not original to the self-consciousness of judgement, it cannot enter it.

This shows that Kant misrepresents the subjective universality of judgement, representing it as an abstract concept of a subject of judgement: I judge for everyone. If this were right, then there would be no consciousness of conflict in judgement. The universality of judgement is not an abstract concept, but a universal relation, a real relation in which I stand to everyone in judging anything at all. The subject of judgement is not the universal *I*, it is the universal *I-You*. The self-consciousness of judgement is not *I think*. It is *I think to you*, that is, *I speak to you*.<sup>6</sup> Self-consciousness originally includes the difference, nay, the opposition, of me and you. The recognition that the subjective universality of judgement is not the abstract

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<sup>6</sup> A note on a feature of this argument for the linguistic nature of thought. It is to be contrasted with the following form of argument: I observe a feature of judgement, say negation, which does not on the face of it show any relation to other subjects, or language. Then I say: in order for there to be that, there must be language. For example, it must be possible for me to go wrong, and I must be able to understand this. How can I? Only if there is a linguistic practice to whose norms I am bound. And so on. The present argument is different. We consider a reality: I say *p*, you say *no*. This involves on its face the apprehension of another subject as such; it is, on its face, linguistic. And now we see that this can be real only if it is original, or ultimate. It is not the kind of thing that can be added in a further step to an activity that is intelligible and possible without it. (Just as Kant adds the idea of everyone only in a further step.) Since, in this reality, there is a unity of judging what is and apprehending you, this unity belongs to judgement originally.

concept of the judger but a concrete nexus of subjects is the central, and the best, thought of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.

## V

*Conclusion.* I said I would begin to bring out why the thought that judgement is self-conscious is not the kind of thought that is capable of justification. We saw that, as judgement is self-conscious, any judgement is a consciousness of an order of judgement by which judgements exclude and include judgements. And we saw that, as judgement is self-conscious, any judgement is a universal relation of subject to subject as disagreeing or agreeing in judgement. Now, a thought is such as to be justified, as there is such a thing as questioning whether it is right, and challenging someone who says that it is. Hence, he who undertakes to justify his claim that judgement is self-conscious, or asks someone else to give reasons for her claim that it is, needs no justification. He already knows what he pretends he needs to be shown.

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