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Second Book
Analytic of the Sublime

§ 23.
Transition from the faculty for judging[a] the beautiful to that for judging the sublime.

The beautiful coincides with the sublime in that both please for themselves.[1] And further in that both presuppose neither a judgment of sense nor a logically determining judgment, but a judgment of reflection: consequently the satisfaction does not depend on a sensation, like that in the agreeable, nor on a determinate concept, like the satisfaction in the good; but it is nevertheless still related to concepts, although it is indeterminate which, hence the satisfaction is connected to the mere presentation or to the faculty for that, through which the faculty of presentation or the imagination is considered, in the case of a given intuition, to be in accord with the **faculty of concepts** of the understanding or of reason, as promoting the latter. Hence both sorts of judgments are also **singular**, and yet judgments that profess to be universally valid in regard to every subject, although they lay claim merely to the feeling of pleasure and not to any cognition of the object.

But notable differences between the two also strike the eye. The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation; the sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as **limitlessness** is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is also thought as a totality: so that the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding, but the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason. Thus the satisfaction is connected in the first case with the representation of **quality**, but in this case with that of **quantity**. Also the latter pleasure is very different in kind from the former, in that the former (the beautiful)[b] directly brings with it a feeling of the promotion of life,[2] and hence is
5: 245 compatible with charms and an imagination at play, while the latter (the feeling of the sublime)[c] is a pleasure that arises only indirectly, being generated, namely, by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of

[a] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*
[b] The parenthetical phrase was added in the second edition.
[c] The parenthetical phrase was added in the second edition.

the vital powers and the immediately following and all the more powerful outpouring of them; hence as an emotion it seems to be not play but something serious in the activity of the imagination. Hence it is also incompatible with charms, and, since the mind is not merely attracted by the object, but is also always reciprocally repelled by it, the satisfaction in the sublime does not so much contain[a] positive pleasure as it does admiration or respect, i.e., it deserves to be called negative pleasure.[3]

The most important and intrinsic difference between the sublime and the beautiful, however, is this: that if, as is appropriate, we here consider first only the sublime in objects of nature (that in art is, after all, always restricted to the conditions of agreement with nature),[4] natural beauty (the self-sufficient kind) carries with it a purposiveness in its form, through which the object seems as it were to be predetermined for our power of judgment, and thus constitutes an object of satisfaction in itself, whereas that which, without any rationalizing, merely in apprehension, excites in us the feeling of the sublime, may to be sure[b] appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination, but[c] is nevertheless judged all the more sublime for that.

But from this one immediately sees that we express ourselves on the whole incorrectly if we call some **object of nature** sublime, although we can quite correctly call very many of them beautiful; for how can we designate with an expression of approval that which is apprehended[d] in itself as contrapurposive? We can say no more than that the object serves for the presentation of a sublimity that can be found in the mind; for what is properly sublime cannot be contained in any sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reason, which, though no presentation adequate to them is possible, are provoked and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy, which does allow of sensible presentation. Thus the wide ocean, enraged by storms, cannot be called sublime. Its visage is horrible; and one must already have filled the mind with all sorts of ideas if by means of such an intuition it is to be 5: 246
put in the mood for a feeling which is itself sublime, in that the mind is incited to abandon sensibility and to occupy itself with ideas that contain a higher purposiveness.

The self-sufficient beauty of nature reveals to us a technique of nature, which makes it possible to represent it as a system in accor-

[a] This verb was added in the second edition.
[b] In the second edition, *zwar*; in the first edition, *gar* (even).
[c] Added in the second edition.
[d] *aufgefaßt*; in the first edition, *abgefaßt* (conceived).

dance with laws the principle of which we do not encounter anywhere in our entire faculty of understanding, namely that of a purposiveness with respect to the use of the power of judgment in regard to appearances, so that this must be judged[a] as belonging not merely to nature in its purposeless mechanism but rather also to the analogy with[b] art. Thus it actually expands not our cognition of natural objects, but our concept of nature, namely as a mere mechanism, into the concept of nature as art: which invites profound investigations into the possibility of such a form. But in that which we are accustomed to call sublime in nature there is so little[c] that leads to particular objective principles and forms of nature corresponding to these that it is mostly rather in its chaos or in its wildest and most unruly disorder and devastation, if only it allows a glimpse of magnitude and might, that it excites the ideas of the sublime. From this we see that the concept of the sublime in nature is far from being as important and rich in consequences as that of its beauty, and that in general it indicates nothing purposive in nature itself, but only in the possible use of its intuitions to make palpable in ourselves a purposiveness that is entirely independent of nature. For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground outside ourselves, but for the sublime merely one in ourselves and in the way of thinking that introduces sublimity into the representation of the former – a very necessary introductory remark, which entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness of **nature**, and makes of the theory of the sublime a mere appendix to the aesthetic judging[d] of the purposiveness of nature, since by this means no particular form is represented in the latter, but only a purposive use that the imagination makes of its representation is developed.

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§ 24.
On the division of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime.

As far as the division of the moments of the aesthetic judging[e] of objects in relation to the feeling of the sublime is concerned, the analytic will be able to proceed in accordance with the same principle that was used in the analysis of judgments of taste. For as a judgment of the aesthetic reflecting power of judgment, the satisfaction in the sublime, just like that in the beautiful, must be represented as univer-

[a] *beurtheilt*
[b] The words "the analogy with" were added in the second edition.
[c] Following the first edition in reading *so gar nichts* instead of *sogar nichts* (even nothing).
[d] *Beurtheilung*
[e] *Beurtheilung*

sally valid in its **quantity**, as without interest in its **quality**, as subjective purposiveness in its **relation**, and the latter, as far as its **modality** is concerned, as necessary. Thus the method here will not depart from that in the preceding section,[a] though some account must be taken of the fact that there, where the aesthetic judgment concerned the form of the object, we began with the investigation of quality, but here, in view of the formlessness that can pertain to that which we call sublime, we will begin with quantity as the first moment of the aesthetic judgment on the sublime; the ground for which, however, is to be seen from the preceding §.

But one division is necessary in the analysis of the sublime which that of the beautiful did not require, namely that into the **mathematically** and the **dynamically sublime.**[5]

For since the feeling of the sublime brings with it as its characteristic mark a **movement** of the mind connected with the judging[b] of the object, whereas the taste for the beautiful presupposes and preserves the mind in **calm** contemplation, yet this movement is to be judged[c] as subjectively purposive (because the sublime pleases), thus this movement is related through the imagination either to the **faculty of cognition** or to the **faculty of desire**, but in both relations the purposiveness of the given representation is judged[d] only with regard to this **faculty** (without an end or interest): for then the first is attributed to the object as a **mathematical**, the second as a **dynamical** disposition of the imagination, and thus the object is represented as sublime in the twofold manner intended.

A.
On the mathematically sublime

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§ 25.
Nominal definition of the sublime.

We call **sublime** that which is **absolutely great.**[e] However, to be great[f] and to be a magnitude[g] are quite different concepts (*magnitudo*

[a] That is, the "Analytic of the Beautiful."
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *beurtheilt*
[d] *beurtheilt*
[e] *schlechthin groß*
[f] *Groß-sein*
[g] *eine Größe sein*; since Kant equates *Größe* with *quantitas* and contrasts that with *magnitudo*, it would seem natural to translate *Größe* as "quantity" rather than "magnitude." However, he also equates it with *quantum*; in § 23 he has used *Quantität* as a distinct German word; and in many of the claims that follow, "magnitude" will be a more

and *quantitas*). Likewise, **simply**[a] (*simpliciter*) **to say** that something is great is also something entirely different from saying that it is **absolutely**[b] great (*absolute, non comparative magnum*).[c] The latter is that **which is great beyond all comparison.** – So what does the expression that something is great or small or medium-sized say? It is not a pure concept of the understanding that is thereby designated,[d] still less an intuition of sense, and just as little a concept of reason, since it does not bring with it any principle of cognition at all. It must therefore be a concept of the power of judgment, or derive from such a concept, and be grounded in a subjective purposiveness of the representation in relation to the power of judgment. That something is a magnitude (*quantum*) may be cognized from the thing itself, without any comparison with another; if, that is, a multitude of homogeneous elements together constitute a unity. But **how great** it is always requires something else, which is also a magnitude, as its measure. However, since in the judging[e] of magnitude not merely the multitude (number) but also the magnitude of the unit (of the measure) is involved, and the magnitude of this latter in turn always needs something else as a measure with which it can be compared, we see that any determination of the magnitude of appearances is absolutely[f] incapable of affording an absolute[g] concept of a magnitude but can afford at best only a comparative concept.

Now if I simply say that something is great, it seems that I do not have in mind any comparison at all, at least not with any objective measure, since it is not thereby determined at all how great the object is. However, even though the standard for comparison is merely subjective, the judgment nonetheless lays claim to universal assent;[h] the judgments "The man is beautiful" and "He is great" do not restrict themselves merely to the judging subject, but, like theoretical judgments, demand everyone's assent.

5: 249 But because in a judgment by which something is described simply as great it is not merely said that the object has a magnitude, but rather this is attributed to it to a superior extent than to many others of the

natural translation than "quantity." We will therefore follow the practice of all the previous English translators in using "magnitude."

[a] *schlechtweg*

[b] *schlechthin*

[c] absolutely, not comparatively great

[d] The words "that is thereby designated" were added in the second edition.

[e] *Beurtheilung*

[f] *schlechterdings*

[g] *absoluten*

[h] Reading *Beistimmung* with the second edition rather than *Bestimmung* (determination) with the first.

same kind, yet without this superiority being given determinately, this judgment is certainly grounded on a standard that one presupposes can be assumed to be the same for everyone, but which is not usable for any logical (mathematically determinate) judging[a] of magnitude, but only for an aesthetic one, since it is a merely subjective standard grounding the reflecting judgment on magnitude. It may be, by the way,[b] empirical, as in the case of the average magnitude of the people known to us, of animals of a certain species, of trees, houses, mountains, etc., or a standard given *a priori*, which because of the deficiencies of the judging[c] subject is restricted to subjective conditions of presentation *in concreto*: as in the practical sphere, the magnitude of a certain virtue, or of public freedom and justice in a country; or in the theoretical sphere, the magnitude of the accuracy or inaccuracy of an observation or measurement that has been made, and so on.

Now it is noteworthy here that even if we have no interest at all in the object, i.e., its existence is indifferent to us, still its mere magnitude, even if it is considered as formless, can bring with it a satisfaction that is universally communicable, hence it may contain a consciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive faculties: but not a satisfaction in the object, as in the case of the beautiful (since it can be formless), where the reflecting power of judgment finds itself purposively disposed in relation to cognition in general; rather in the enlargement of the imagination in itself.

If (under the above-mentioned restriction) we say of an object absolutely[d] that it is great, this is not a mathematically determining judgment but a mere judgment of reflection about its representation, which is subjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers in the estimation of magnitude, and in that case we always combine a kind of respect with the representation, just as we combine contempt with that which we call absolutely small. Moreover, the judging[e] of things as great or small applies to everything, even to all their properties; hence we call even beauty great or small; the reason for which is to be sought 5: 250
in the fact that whatever we may present in intuition in accordance with the precept of the power of judgment (and hence represent aesthetically) is entirely appearance, and hence is also a quantum.

If, however, we call something not only great, but simply, absolutely[f] great, great in every respect (beyond all comparison), i.e., sub-

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] The word *übrigens* in the second edition replaces *nun* (now) in the first.
[c] The word *beurtheilenden* was inserted here in the second edition.
[d] Here and at the end of the sentence, *schlechtweg*.
[e] *Beurtheilung*
[f] *schlechthin-, absolut-*

lime, then one immediately sees that we do not allow a suitable standard for it to be sought outside of it, but merely within it. It is a magnitude that is equal only to itself. That the sublime is therefore not to be sought in the things of nature but only in our ideas follows from this; but in which of these it lies must be saved for the deduction.[6]

The above explanation can also be expressed thus: **That is sublime in comparison with which everything else is small.** Here one readily sees that nothing can be given in nature, however great it may be judged[a] to be by us, which could not, considered in another relation, be diminished down to the infinitely small; and conversely, there is nothing so small which could not, in comparison with even smaller standards, be amplified for our imagination up to the magnitude of a world. The telescope has given us rich material for making the former observation, the microscope rich material for the latter.[b] Thus nothing that can be an object of the senses is, considered on this footing, to be called sublime. But just because there is in our imagination a striving to advance to the infinite, while in our reason there lies a claim to absolute totality, as to a real idea, the very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things of the sensible world awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us; and the use that the power of judgment naturally makes in behalf of the latter (feeling), though not the object of the senses, is absolutely great, while in contrast to it any other use is small.[c] Hence it is the disposition of the mind resulting from a certain representation occupying the reflective judgment, but not the object, which is to be called sublime.

Thus we can also add this to the foregoing formulation of the explanation of the sublime: **That is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses.**

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§ 26.
On the estimation of the magnitude of things of nature that is requisite for the idea of the sublime.

The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic. Now we can, to be sure, obtain determinate concepts of **how great** something is only by means of numbers (or at any rate through approximations by means of numerical series progressing to infinity), whose unit is the measure; and to this extent all logical

[a] *beurtheilt*

[b] In the first edition, "telescope" and "microscope" were plural rather than singular.

[c] In the first edition there is a comma rather than a period here.

estimation of magnitude is mathematical. But since the magnitude of the measure must still be assumed to be known, then, if this in turn is to be estimated only by means of numbers whose unit would have to be another measure, and so mathematically, we can never have a primary or basic fundamental measure, and hence we can never have a determinate concept of a given magnitude. Thus the estimation of the magnitude of the basic measure must consist simply in the fact that one can immediately grasp it in an intuition and use it by means of imagination for the presentation of numerical concepts – i.e., in the end all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is aesthetic (i.e., subjectively and not objectively determined).[7]

Now for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is, to be sure, no greatest (for the power of numbers goes on to infinity);[8] but for the aesthetic estimation of magnitude there certainly is a greatest; and about this I say that if it is judged[a] as an absolute measure, beyond which no greater is subjectively (for the judging[b] subject) possible, it brings with it the idea of the sublime, and produces that emotion which no mathematical estimation of magnitudes by means of numbers can produce (except insofar as that aesthetic basic measure is vividly preserved in the imagination), since the latter always presents only relative magnitude through comparison with others of the same species, but the former presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp it in one intuition.

To take up a quantum in the imagination intuitively, in order to be able to use it as a measure or a unit for the estimation of magnitude by means of numbers, involves two actions of this faculty: **apprehension**[c] (*apprehensio*) and **comprehension**[d] (*comprehensio aesthetica*). There is no difficulty with apprehension, because it can go on to infinity; but 5: 252
comprehension becomes ever more difficult the further apprehension advances, and soon reaches its maximum, namely the aesthetically greatest basic measure for the estimation of magnitude. For when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of the intuition of the senses that were apprehended first already begin to fade in the imagination as the latter proceeds on to the apprehension of further ones, then it loses on one side as much as it gains on the other, and there is in the comprehension a greatest point beyond which it cannot go.

This makes it possible to explain a point that Savary[9] notes in his report on Egypt: that in order to get the full emotional effect of the

[a] *beurtheilt*
[b] *beurtheilenden*
[c] *Auffassung*
[d] *Zusammenfassung*

magnitude of the pyramids one must neither come too close to them nor be too far away. For in the latter case, the parts that are apprehended (the stones piled on top of one another) are represented only obscurely, and their representation has no effect on the aesthetic judgment of the subject. In the former case, however, the eye requires some time to complete its apprehension from the base level to the apex, but during this time the former always partly fades before the imagination has taken in the latter, and the comprehension is never complete. – The very same thing can also suffice to explain the bewilderment or sort of embarrassment that is said to seize the spectator on first entering St. Peter's in Rome. For here there is a feeling of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the ideas[a] of a whole, in which the imagination reaches its maximum and, in the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself, but is thereby transported into an emotionally moving satisfaction.

I shall not yet add anything about the basis for this satisfaction, which is associated with a representation from which one should least expect it, namely one that makes us notice the inadequacy, consequently also the subjective non-purposiveness of the representation for the power of judgment in the estimation of magnitude; rather I only note that if the aesthetic judgment is to be **pure (not mixed up with anything teleological** as judgments of reason) and if an example of that is to be given which is fully appropriate for the critique of the **aesthetic** power of judgment, then the sublime must not be shown in products of art (e.g., buildings, columns, etc.), where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude,[10] nor in natural things
5: 253 **whose concept already brings with it a determinate end** (e.g., animals of a known natural determination), but rather in raw nature (and even in this only insofar as it by itself brings with it neither charm nor emotion from real danger), merely insofar as it contains magnitude. For in this sort of representation nature contains nothing that would be monstrous (or magnificent or terrible); the magnitude that is apprehended may grow as large as one wants as long as it can be comprehended in one whole by the imagination. An object is **monstrous** if by its magnitude it annihilates the end which its concept constitutes.[11] The mere presentation of a concept, however, which is almost too great for all presentation (which borders on the relatively monstrous) is called **colossal**, because the end of the presentation of a concept is made more difficult if the intuition of the object is almost too great for our faculty of apprehension. – A pure judgment on the sublime, however, must have no end of the object as its determining ground if it is

[a] Reading *Ideen* as in the second edition, rather than the singular *Idee* as in the first.

to be aesthetic and not mixed up with any judgment of the understanding or of reason.

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Since everything that is to please the merely reflecting power of judgment without interest must involve in its representation subjective and as such universally valid purposiveness, though here no purposiveness of the **form** of the object (as in the case of the beautiful) is the basis for the judging,[a] the question arises: what is this subjective purposiveness? and how is it prescribed as a norm that provides a ground for universally valid satisfaction in the mere estimation of magnitude, and indeed where that has been pushed almost to the point of the inadequacy of our faculty of imagination in the presentation of the concept of a magnitude?

The imagination, by itself, without anything hindering it, advances to infinity in the composition that is requisite for the representation of magnitude; the understanding, however, guides this by numerical concepts, for which the former must provide the schema;[12] and in this procedure, belonging to the logical estimation of magnitude, there is certainly something objectively purposive[b] in accordance with the concept of an end (such as all measuring is), but nothing that is purposive and pleasing for the aesthetic power of judgment. There is also in this intentional purposiveness nothing that would necessitate pushing the magnitude of the measure and hence the **comprehension** of the many 5: 254
in one intuition to the boundaries of the faculty of imagination and as far as the latter might reach in presentations. For in the understanding's estimation of magnitudes (in arithmetic) one gets equally far whether one pushes the composition of the units up to the number 10 (in the decadic system) or only to 4 (in the tetradic system);[13] the further generation of magnitude in composition, or, if the quantum is given in intuition, in apprehension, proceeds merely progressively (not comprehensively) in accordance with an assumed principle of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magnitude the understanding is equally well served and satisfied whether the imagination chooses for its unit a magnitude that can be grasped in a single glance, e.g., a foot or a rod, or whether it chooses a German mile or even a diameter of the earth, whose apprehension but not composition is possible in an intuition of the imagination (not through *comprehensio aesthetica* though

[a] *Beurtheilung*

[b] In the first edition, this reads "there is something that is certainly objectively purposive."

certainly through *comprehensio logica* in a numerical concept). In both cases the logical estimation of magnitude proceeds unhindered to infinity.

But now the mind hears in itself the voice of reason, which requires totality for all given magnitudes, even for those that can never be entirely apprehended although they are (in the sensible representation) judged[a] as entirely given, hence comprehension in **one** intuition, and it demands a **presentation** for all members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and does not exempt from this requirement even the infinite (space and past time), but rather makes it unavoidable for us to think of it (in the judgment of common reason) as **given entirely** (in its totality).

The infinite, however, is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great. Compared with this, everything else (of the same kind of magnitude) is small. But what is most important is that even being able to think of it as **a whole** indicates a faculty of the mind which surpasses every standard of sense. For this would require a comprehension that yielded as a measure a unit that has a determinate relation to the infinite, expressible in numbers, which is impossible. But **even to be able to think** the given[b] infinite without contradiction requires a faculty in the human mind that is itself supersensible. For it is only by
5: 255 means of this and its idea of a noumenon, which itself admits of no intuition though it is presupposed as the substratum of the intuition of the world as mere appearance, that the infinite of the sensible world is **completely** comprehended in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude **under** a concept, even though it can never be completely thought in the mathematical estimation of magnitude **through numerical concepts**. Even a faculty for being able to think the infinite of supersensible intuition as given (in its intelligible substratum) surpasses any standard of sensibility, and is great beyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation, not, of course, from a theoretical point of view, in behalf of the faculty of cognition, but still as an enlargement of the mind which feels itself empowered[c] to overstep the limits of sensibility from another (practical) point of view.

Nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances the intuition of which brings with them the idea of its infinity. Now the latter cannot happen except through the inadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination in the estimation of the magnitude of an object. Now, however, the imagination is adequate for the mathematical estimation of every object, that is, for giving an adequate measure for it, because

[a] *beurtheilt*
[b] The word "given" was added in the second edition.
[c] *vermögend*

the numerical concepts of the understanding, by means of progression, can make any measure adequate for any given[a] magnitude. Thus it must be the **aesthetic** estimation of magnitude in which is felt the effort at comprehension which exceeds the capacity[b] of the imagination to comprehend the progressive apprehension in one whole of intuition, and in which is at the same time perceived the inadequacy of this faculty, which is unbounded in its progression, for grasping a basic measure that is suitable for the estimation of magnitude with the least effort of the understanding and for using it for the estimation of magnitude. Now the proper unalterable basic measure of nature is its absolute whole, which, in the case of nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended. But since this basic measure is a self-contradictory concept (on account of the impossibility of the absolute totality of an endless progression), that magnitude of a natural object on which the imagination fruitlessly expends its entire capacity[c] for comprehension must lead the concept of nature to a supersensible substratum (which grounds both it and at the same time our faculty for thinking), which is great beyond any standard of sense and hence allows not so much 5: 256
the object as rather the disposition of the mind in estimating it to be judged[d] **sublime.**

Thus, just as the aesthetic power of judgment in judging[e] the beautiful relates the imagination in its free play to the **understanding**, in order to agree with its **concepts** in general (without determination of them), so in judging[f] a thing to be sublime the same faculty is related to **reason**, in order to correspond subjectively with its **ideas** (though which is undetermined), i.e., in order to produce a disposition of the mind which is in conformity with them and compatible with that which the influence of determinate (practical) ideas on feeling would produce.

It is also evident from this that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the one who judges, not in the object in nature, the judging[g] of which occasions this disposition in it. And who would want to call sublime shapeless mountain masses towering above one another in wild disorder with their pyramids of ice, or the dark and raging sea, etc.? But the mind feels itself elevated in its own judging[h] if, in the consideration of such things, without regard to their form, abandoning itself to the imagination and to a reason which, although it is associated

[a] The word "given" was added in the second edition.
[b] *Vermögen*
[c] *Vermögen*
[d] *beurtheilen*
[e] *Beurtheilung*
[f] *Beurtheilung*
[g] *Beurtheilung*
[h] *Beurtheilung*

with it entirely without any determinate end, merely extends it, it nevertheless finds the entire power of the imagination inadequate to its ideas.

Examples of the mathematically sublime in nature in mere intuition are provided for us by all those cases where what is given to us is not so much a greater numerical concept as rather a great unity as measure (for shortening the numerical series) for the imagination. A tree that we estimate by the height of a man may serve as a standard for a mountain, and, if the latter were, say, a mile high, it could serve as the unit for the number that expresses the diameter of the earth, in order to make the latter intuitable; the diameter of the earth could serve as the unit for the planetary system so far as known to us, this for the Milky Way, and the immeasurable multitude of such Milky Way systems, called nebulae, which presumably constitute such a system among themselves in turn, does not allow us to expect any limits here.[14] Now in the aesthetic judging[a] of such an immeasurable whole, the sublime does not lie as much in the magnitude of the number as in the fact that as we progress we always arrive at ever greater units; the
5: 257 systematic division of the structure of the world contributes to this, representing to us all that is great in nature as in its turn small, but actually representing our imagination in all its boundlessness, and with it nature, as paling into insignificance beside the ideas[b] of reason if it is supposed to provide a presentation adequate to them.

§ 27.
On the quality of the satisfaction in the judging[c] of the sublime.

The feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity[d] for the attainment of an idea **that is a law for us is respect.**[15] Now the idea of the comprehension of every appearance that may be given to us into the intuition of a whole is one enjoined on us by a law of reason, which recognizes no other determinate measure, valid for everyone and inalterable,[e] than the absolute whole. But our imagination, even in its greatest effort with regard to the comprehension of a given object in a whole of intuition (hence for the presentation of the idea of reason) that is demanded of it, demonstrates its limits and inadequacy, but at the same

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] In the first edition this was singular.
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *Vermögens*
[e] In the first edition, this word was "alterable."

time its vocation[a] for adequately realizing that idea as a law. Thus the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we show to an object in nature through a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject), which as it were makes intuitable the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of sensibility.

The feeling of the sublime is thus a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude for the estimation[b] by means of reason, and a pleasure that is thereby aroused at the same time from the correspondence of this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of reason, insofar as striving for them is nevertheless a law for us. That is, it is a law (of reason) for us and part of our vocation to estimate everything great that nature contains as an object of the senses for us as small in comparison with ideas of reason; and whatever arouses the feeling of this supersensible vocation in us is in agreement with that law. Now the greatest effort of the imagination in the presentation of the unity for the estimation of magnitude is a relation to something **absolutely great**, and consequently also a relation to the law of reason to adopt this alone as the supreme measure of magnitude. Thus the inner perception of the inadequacy of any sensible standard for the estimation of magnitude by reason corresponds with reason's laws, and is a displeasure that arouses the feeling of our supersensible vocation in us, in accordance with which it is purposive and thus a pleasure to find every standard of sensibility inadequate for the ideas of the understanding.[c] 5: 258

The mind feels itself **moved** in the representation of the sublime in nature, while in the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful in nature it is in **calm** contemplation. This movement (especially in its inception) may be compared to a vibration, i.e., to a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to one and the same object. What is excessive for the imagination (to which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is as it were an abyss, in which it fears to lose itself, yet for reason's idea of the supersensible to produce such an effort of the imagi-

[a] *Bestimmung*. Some occurrences of this word in this and the following sections could be translated as "determination," but some can only be translated as "vocation," so for the sake of consistency all will be translated that way.

[b] The second edition repeats the word "estimation" (*Schätzung*) instead of just using the pronoun "that" (*die*).

[c] Following the second edition, which prints "of understanding" (*des Verstandes*) instead of "of reason" (*der Vernunft*).

nation is not excessive but lawful, hence it is precisely as attractive as it was repulsive for mere sensibility. Even in this case, however, the judgment itself remains only aesthetic because, without having a determinate concept of the object as its ground, it represents merely the subjective play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious even in their contrast. For just as imagination and **understanding** produce subjective purposiveness of the powers of the mind in the judging of the beautiful through their unison, so do imagination and **reason** produce subjective purposiveness through their conflict: namely, a feeling that we have pure self-sufficient reason, or[a] a faculty for estimating magnitude, whose preeminence cannot be made intuitable through anything except the inadequacy of that faculty which is itself unbounded in the presentation of magnitudes (of sensible objects).

The measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time the description of it, thus an objective movement in the imagination and a progression; by contrast, the comprehension of multiplicity in the unity not of thought but of intuition, hence the comprehension in one moment of that which is successively apprehended, is a regression,
5: 259 which in turn cancels the time-condition in the progression of the imagination and makes **simultaneity** intuitable. It is thus (since temporal succession is a condition of inner sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement of the imagination, by which it does violence to the inner sense, which must be all the more marked the greater the quantum is which the imagination comprehends in one intuition. Thus the effort to take up in a single intuition a measure for magnitudes, which requires an appreciable time for its apprehension, is a kind of apprehension which, subjectively considered, is contrapurposive, but which objectively, for the estimation of magnitude, is necessary, hence purposive; in this way, however, the very same violence that is inflicted on the subject by the imagination is judged[b] as purposive **for the whole vocation** of the mind.

The **quality** of the feeling of the sublime is that it is a feeling of displeasure concerning the aesthetic faculty of judging[c] an object that is yet at the same time represented as purposive, which is possible because the subject's own incapacity[d] reveals the consciousness of an unlimited capacity[e] of the very same subject, and the mind can aesthetically judge[f] the latter only through the former.

[a] The word "or" was added in the second edition.
[b] *beurtheilt*
[c] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*
[d] *Unvermögen*
[e] *Vermögens*
[f] *beurtheilen*

In the logical estimation of magnitude, the impossibility of ever attaining to absolute totality through the progression of the measurement of the things of the sensible world in time and space was recognized as objective, i.e., as an impossibility of **thinking** the infinite as even given, and not as merely subjective, i.e., as an incapacity[a] for **grasping** it; for there nothing at all turns on the degree of comprehension in one intuition as a measure, but everything comes down to a numerical concept. But in an aesthetic estimation of magnitude the numerical concept must drop out or be altered, and the comprehension of the imagination in respect of the unity of measure (so that the concept of a law of the successive generation of concepts of magnitude is avoided) is alone purposive for it. – Now if a magnitude almost reaches the outermost limit of our faculty of comprehension in one intuition, and yet the imagination is by means of numerical concepts (our capacity[b] for which we are aware is unlimited) summoned to aesthetic comprehension in a greater unity, then we feel ourselves in our mind as aesthetically confined within borders; but with respect to the necessary enlargement of the imagination to the point of adequacy to that which is unlimited in our faculty of reason, namely the idea of 5: 260
the absolute whole, the displeasure and thus the contrapurposiveness of the faculty of imagination is yet represented as purposive for the ideas of reason and their awakening. It is precisely in this way, however, that the aesthetic judgment itself becomes purposive for reason, as the source of ideas, i.e., for an intellectual comprehension for which all aesthetic comprehension is small; and the object is taken up as sublime with a pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure.

B.
On the Dynamically Sublime in Nature

§ 28.
On nature as a power.

Power is a capacity[c] that is superior to great obstacles. The same thing is called **dominion** if it is also superior to the resistance of something that itself possesses power. Nature considered in aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us is **dynamically sublime.**

If nature is to be judged[d] by us dynamically as sublime, it must be represented as arousing fear (although, conversely, not every object

[a] *Unvermögen*
[b] *Vermögens*
[c] *Vermögen*
[d] *beurtheilt*

that arouses fear is found sublime in our aesthetic judgment). For in aesthetic judging[a] (without a concept) the superiority over obstacles can only be judged[b] in accordance with the magnitude of the resistance. However, that which we strive to resist is an evil, and, if we find our capacity[c] to be no match for it, an object of fear. Thus, for the aesthetic power of judgment[d] nature can count as a power,[e] thus as dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is considered an object of fear.

We can, however, consider an object as **fearful** without being afraid of it, if, namely, we judge[f] it in such a way that we merely **think** of the case in which we might wish to resist it and think that in that case all resistance would be completely futile. Thus the virtuous man fears God without being afraid of him, because he does not think of the case of wishing to resist God and his commands as anything that is worri-
5: 261 some for **him**. But since he does not think of such a case as impossible in itself, he recognizes God as fearful.

Someone who is afraid can no more judge about the sublime in nature than someone who is in the grip of inclination and appetite can judge about the beautiful. The former flees from the sight of an object that instills alarm in him, and it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously intended. Hence the agreeableness in the cessation of something troublesome is **joyfulness**. But this joyfulness on account of liberation from a danger is accompanied with the proviso that one never again be exposed to that danger; indeed one may well be reluctant to think back on that sensation, let alone seek out the opportunity for it.

Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc., make our capacity[g] to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison with their power. But the sight of them only becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, as long as we find ourselves in safety, and we gladly call these objects sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity[h] for

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *beurtheilt*
[c] *Vermögen*
[d] *Urtheilskraft*
[e] *Macht*
[f] *beurtheilen*
[g] *Vermögen*
[h] *Vermögen*

resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature.

For just as we found our own limitation in the immeasurability of nature and the insufficiency of our capacity[a] to adopt a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its **domain**, but nevertheless at the same time found in our own faculty of reason another, nonsensible standard, which has that very infinity under itself as a unit against which everything in nature is small, and thus found in our own mind a superiority over nature itself even in its immeasurability: likewise the irresistibility of its power certainly makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical[b] powerlessness, but at the same time it reveals a capacity[c] for judging[d] ourselves as independent of it and a superiority over nature on which is grounded a self-preservation of quite another kind than that which can be threatened and endangered by nature outside us, whereby the humanity in our 5: 262
person remains undemeaned even though the human being must submit to that dominion. In this way, in our aesthetic judgment nature is judged[e] as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear, but rather because it calls forth our power[f] (which is not part of nature) to regard those things about which we are concerned (goods, health and life) as trivial, and hence to regard its power[g] (to which we are, to be sure, subjected in regard to these things) as not the sort of dominion over ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow if it came down to our highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment. Thus nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to the point of presenting those cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation even over nature.

This self-esteem is not diminished by the fact that we must see ourselves as safe in order to be sensible of this inspiring satisfaction, in which case (it might seem), because the danger is not serious, the sublimity of our spiritual capacity[h] is also not to be taken seriously.[16] For the satisfaction here concerns only the **vocation** of our capacity[i] as it is revealed to us in such a case, just as the predisposition to it lies in our nature; while the development and exercise of it is left to us and

[a] *Vermögens*
[b] The word "physical" was added in the second edition.
[c] *Vermögen*
[d] *beurtheilen*
[e] *beurtheilt*
[f] *Kraft*
[g] *Macht*
[h] *Geistesvermögen*
[i] *Vermögens*

remains our responsibility.[a] And there is truth here, however much the person, if he takes his reflection this far, may be conscious of his present actual powerlessness.

To be sure, this principle seems far-fetched and subtle, hence excessive for an aesthetic judgment; but the observation of human beings shows the opposite, that it can be the principle for the most common judgings[b] even though one is not always conscious of it. For what is it that is an object of the greatest admiration even to the savage? Someone who is not frightened, who has no fear, thus does not shrink before danger but energetically sets to work with full deliberation. And even in the most civilized[c] circumstances this exceptionally high esteem for the warrior remains, only now it is also demanded that he at the same time display all the virtues of peace, gentleness, compassion and even proper care for his own person, precisely because in this way the incoercibility of his mind by danger can be recognized. Hence however much debate there may be about whether it is the statesman or the
5: 263 general who deserves the greater respect in comparison to the other, aesthetic judgment decides in favor of the latter. Even war, if it is conducted with order and reverence for the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and at the same time makes the mentality of the people who conduct it in this way all the more sublime, the more dangers it has been exposed to and before which it has been able to assert its courage; whereas a long peace causes the spirit of mere commerce to predominate, along with base selfishness, cowardice and weakness, and usually debases the mentality of the populace.

This analysis of the concept of the sublime, to the extent that it is ascribed to power, seems to run counter to the fact that we usually represent God as exhibiting himself in anger but at the same time in his sublimity in thunder, storm, earthquake etc., where to imagine that our minds have any superiority over the effects and as it seems even over the intentions of such a power would seem to be at once both foolishness and outrage. Here it seems to be not a feeling of the sublimity of our own nature but rather submission, dejection, and a feeling of complete powerlessness that is the appropriate disposition of the mind to the appearance of such an object, and which is also usually associated with the idea of it in the case of natural occurrences of this sort. In religion in general submission, adoration with bowed head, and remorseful and anxious gestures and voice, seem to be the only appropriate conduct in the presence of the Deity, and so to have been

[a] In the first edition, this period was a comma, and the sentence continued to the end of the paragraph.
[b] *Beurtheilungen*
[c] *allergesittesten*

adopted and still observed by most people. But this disposition of the mind is far from being intrinsically and necessarily connected with the idea of the **sublimity** of a religion and its object. Someone who is genuinely afraid because he finds cause for that within himself, because he is conscious of having offended with his contemptible disposition[a] a power whose will is irresistible and at the same time just, certainly does not find himself in the right frame of mind to marvel at the greatness of God, for which a mood of calm contemplation and an entirely free[b] judgment is requisite. Only when he is conscious of his upright, God-pleasing disposition do those effects of[c] power serve to awaken in him the idea of the sublimity of this being, insofar as he recognizes in himself a sublimity of disposition suitable to God's will, and is thereby raised above the fear of such effects of nature, which he does not regard as outbursts of God's wrath. Even humility, as the 5: 264
pitiless judging[d] of one's own failings, which otherwise, given consciousness of good dispositions, could easily be covered with the mantle of the fragility of human nature, is a sublime state of mind, that of voluntarily subjecting oneself to the pain of self-reproach in order gradually to eliminate the causes of it. In this way alone does religion internally distinguish itself from superstition, the latter not providing a basis in the mind for reverence[e] for the sublime, but only for fear[f] and anxiety before the being of superior power, to whose will the terrified person sees himself as subjected without holding him in great esteem; from which of course nothing can arise but the attempt to curry favor and ingratiate oneself, instead of a religion of the good conduct of life.[17]

Thus sublimity is not contained in anything in nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us and thus also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us). Everything that arouses this feeling in us, which includes the **power**[g] of nature that calls forth our own powers,[h] is thus (although improperly) called sublime; and only under the presupposition of this idea in us and in relation to it are we capable of arriving at the idea of the sublimity of that being who produces inner respect in us not merely through his power, which he displays in nature, but even more by the

[a] *Gesinnung*
[b] In the second edition, *freyes*; in the first edition, *zwangfreyes* (uncoerced or free from coercion).
[c] *der*; in the first edition, *seiner*, that is, God's power.
[d] *Beurtheilung*
[e] *Ehrfurcht*
[f] *Furcht*
[g] *Macht*
[h] *Kräfte*

capacity[a] that is placed within us for judging[b] nature without fear and thinking of our vocation as sublime in comparison with it.

§ 29.
On the modality of the judgment on the sublime in nature.

There are innumerable things in beautiful nature concerning which we immediately require consensus with our own judgment from everyone else and can also, without being especially prone to error, expect it; but we cannot promise ourselves that our judgment concerning the sublime in nature will so readily find acceptance by others. For a far greater culture, not merely of the aesthetic power of judgment, but also of the cognitive faculties on which that is based, seems to be requisite in order to be able to make a judgment about this excellence of the objects of nature.

5: 265 The disposition of the mind to the feeling of the sublime requires its receptivity to ideas; for it is precisely in the inadequacy of nature to the latter, thus only under the presupposition of them, and of the effort of the imagination to treat nature as a schema for them, that what is repellent for the sensibility, but which is at the same time attractive for it, consists, because it is a dominion that reason exercises over sensibility only in order to enlarge it in a way suitable for its own proper domain (the practical) and to allow it to look out upon the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss. In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined person. He will see in the proofs of the dominion of nature given by its destructiveness and in the enormous measure of its power, against which his own vanishes away to nothing, only the distress, danger, and need that would surround the person who was banished thereto. Thus the good and otherwise sensible Savoyard peasant (as Herr de Saussure relates) had no hesitation in calling all devotees of the icy mountains fools.[18] And who knows whether that would have been entirely unjust if that observer had undertaken the dangers to which he there exposed himself, as most travelers usually do, merely as a hobby, or in order one day to be able to describe them with pathos? But his intention was the edification of mankind, and this excellent man experienced the elevating sentiment[c] that he gave to the readers of his travels as part of the bargain.

But just because the judgment on the sublime in nature requires

[a] *Vermögen*
[b] *beurtheilen*
[c] *seelenerhebende Empfindung*

culture (more so than that on the beautiful), it is not therefore first generated by culture and so to speak introduced into society merely as a matter of convention; rather it has its foundation in human nature, and indeed in that which can be required of everyone and demanded of him along with healthy understanding, namely in the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to that which is moral.[a]

This is the ground for the necessity of the assent of the judgment of other people concerning the sublime to our own, which we at the same time include in the latter. For just as we reproach someone who is indifferent in judging[b] an object in nature that we find beautiful with lack of **taste**, so we say of someone who remains unmoved by that which we judge to be sublime that he has no **feeling.** We demand both, however, of every human being, and also presuppose it in everyone who has any culture – only with this difference, that we immediately require the former of everyone because in it the power of judgment relates the imagination merely to the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, but because the latter relates the imagination to reason, as the faculty of ideas, we require it only under a subjective presupposition (which, however, we believe ourselves to be justified in demanding of everyone), namely that of the moral feeling in the human being,[c] and so we also[d] ascribe necessity to this aesthetic judgment. 5: 266

In this modality of aesthetic judgments, namely their presumed necessity, lies a principal moment for the critique of the power of judgment. For it makes us cognizant of an *a priori* principle in them, and elevates them out of empirical psychology, in which they would otherwise remain buried among the feelings of enjoyment and pain (only with the meaningless epithet of a **more refined** feeling),[e,19] in order to place them and by their means the power of judgment in the class of those which have as their ground *a priori* principles, and as such to transpose them into transcendental philosophy.

General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments.[20]

In relation to the feeling of pleasure an object is to be counted either among the **agreeable** or the **beautiful** or the **sublime** or the (absolutely) **good** (*iucundum*, *pulchrum*, *sublime*, *honestum*).

[a] *dem moralischen*; in the first edition, *den moralischen*, which would refer back to the previous clause and thus be translated as "to the moral ideas."
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] The words "in the human being" were added in the second edition.
[d] The word "also" was added in the second edition.
[e] The parenthetical remark was added in the second edition.

The **agreeable**, as an incentive for the desires, is of the same kind throughout, no matter where it comes from and how specifically different the representation (of sense and of sensation, objectively considered) may be.[21] Hence in judging[a] of its influence on the mind it is only a matter of the number[b] of the charms (simultaneous and successive), and as it were only of the mass of the agreeable sensation; and thus this cannot be made intelligible except by **quantity**. It also does not contribute to culture, but is simply a matter of enjoyment. – The **beautiful**, by contrast, requires the representation of a certain **quality** of the object, which also makes itself intelligible, and can be brought to concepts (although in the aesthetic judgment it is not brought to that); and it does contribute to culture, in that it at the same time teaches us to attend to purposiveness in the feeling of pleasure. – The **sublime** consists merely in the
5: 267 **relation** in which the sensible in the representation of nature is judged[c] as suitable for a possible supersensible use of it. – The **absolutely good**, judged[d] subjectively in terms of the feeling that it instills (the object of the moral feeling) as the determinability of the powers of the subject by means of the representation of an **absolutely necessitating** law, is distinguished chiefly by the **modality** of a necessity resting on concepts *a priori*, which contains in itself not merely a **claim** but also a **command** that everyone should assent, and belongs in itself not to the aesthetic but to the pure intellectual[e] power of judgment; it is also ascribed, not in a merely reflecting but in a determining judgment, not to **nature** but to **freedom**.[22] But the **determinability of the subject** by means of this idea, and indeed of a subject that can sense in itself **obstacles** in sensibility but at the same time superiority over them through overcoming them as a **modification of its condition**, i.e., the moral feeling, is nevertheless related to the aesthetic power of judgment and its **formal conditions** to the extent that it can serve to make the lawfulness of action out of duty representable at the same time as aesthetic, i.e., as sublime, or also as beautiful, without sacrificing any of its purity; which would not be the case if one would place it in natural combination with the feeling of the agreeable.

If one draws the result from the exposition thus far of the two kinds of aesthetic judgment, the outcome would be the following brief explanations:

That is **beautiful** which pleases in the mere judging[f] (thus not by means of the sensation of sense nor in accordance with a concept of the understanding). From this it follows of itself that it must please without any interest.

That is **sublime** which pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of the senses.

Both, as explanations of aesthetically universally valid judging,[g] are related to subjective grounds, namely on the one hand to those of sensibility, as it is

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Menge*
[c] *beurtheilt*
[d] *beurtheilt*
[e] In the first edition, the words "but to the pure intellectual" were enclosed in parentheses.
[f] *Beurtheilung*
[g] *Beurtheilung*

purposive in behalf of the contemplative understanding, on the other, **in opposition** to those, as purposive for the ends of practical reason; and yet both, united in the same subject, are purposive in relation to the moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest.[23]

One can describe the sublime thus: it is an object (of nature) **the representation of which determines the mind to think of the unattainability of nature as a presentation of ideas.** 5: 268

Taken literally, and considered logically, ideas cannot be presented. But if we extend our empirical faculty of representation (mathematically or dynamically) for the intuition of nature, then reason inevitably comes in as a faculty of the independence of the absolute totality, and produces the effort of the mind, though it is in vain, to make the representation of the senses adequate to that. This effort, and the feeling of the unattainability of the idea by means of the imagination, is itself a presentation of the subjective purposiveness of our mind in the use of the imagination for its supersensible vocation, and compels us to **think** nature itself in its totality, as the presentation of something supersensible, subjectively, without being able to produce this presentation **objectively.**

For we quickly realize that nature falls completely short of the unconditioned in space and time, and thus of absolute magnitude, even though this is demanded by the commonest reason. And precisely by this are we reminded that we have to do only with a nature as appearance, and that this itself must be regarded as the mere presentation of a nature in itself (which reason has in the idea). This idea of the supersensible, however, which of course we cannot further determine, so that we cannot **cognize** nature as a presentation of it but can only **think** it, is awakened in us by means of an object the aesthetic judging[a] of which stretches imagination to its limit, whether that of enlargement (mathematically) or of its power over the mind (dynamically), in that it is grounded in the feeling of a vocation of the mind that entirely oversteps the domain of the former (the moral feeling), in regard to which the representation of the object is judged[b] as subjectively purposive.

In fact a feeling for the sublime in nature cannot even be conceived without connecting it to a disposition of the mind that is similar to the moral disposition; and, although the beautiful in nature likewise presupposes and cultivates a certain **liberality** in the manner of thinking, i.e., independence of the satisfaction from mere sensory enjoyment, nevertheless by means of it freedom is represented more as in **play** than as subject to a lawful **business**, which is the genuine property of human morality, where reason must exercise dominion over sensibility; it is just that in the aesthetic judgment on the sublime this dominion is represented as being exercised by the imagination itself, as an instrument of reason. 5: 269

The satisfaction in the sublime in nature is thus also only **negative** (whereas that in the beautiful is **positive**), namely a feeling of the deprivation of the

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *beurtheilt*

freedom of the imagination by itself, insofar as it is purposively determined in accordance with a law other than that of empirical use. It thereby acquires an enlargement and power which is greater than that which it sacrifices, but whose ground is hidden from it, whereas it **feels** the sacrifice or deprivation and at the same time the cause to which it is subjected. The **astonishment** bordering on terror, the horror and the awesome shudder, which grip the spectator in viewing mountain ranges towering to the heavens, deep ravines and the raging torrents in them, deeply shadowed wastelands inducing melancholy reflection, etc., is, in view of the safety in which he knows himself to be, not actual fear, but only an attempt to involve ourselves in it by means of the imagination, in order to feel the power of that very faculty, to combine the movement of the mind thereby aroused with its calmness, and so to be superior to nature within us, and thus also that outside us, insofar as it can have an influence on our feeling of well-being. For the imagination, in accordance with the law of association, makes our state of contentment physically dependent; but the very same imagination, in accordance with principles of the schematism of the power of judgment (consequently to the extent that it is subordinated to freedom), is an instrument of reason and its ideas, but as such a power to assert our independence in the face of the influences of nature, to diminish the value of what is great according to these,[a] and so to place what is absolutely great only in its (the subject's) own vocation. This reflection of the aesthetic power of judgment, elevating itself to adequacy to reason (yet without a determinate concept of the latter), represents the object, precisely by means of the objective inadequacy of the imagination in its greatest extension to reason (as a faculty of ideas), as subjectively purposive.

Here one must attend above all to what was already pointed out above, that
5: 270 in the transcendental aesthetic of the power of judgment it is strictly pure aesthetic judgments that are at issue, consequently the examples must not be drawn from those beautiful or sublime objects of nature that presuppose the concept of an end; for in that case it would be either teleological or grounded in mere sensations of an object (gratification or pain), and thus in the first case would not be an aesthetic purposiveness and in the second case not a merely formal purposiveness. Thus, if someone calls the sight of the starry heavens **sublime**, he must not ground such a judging[b] of it on concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, taking the bright points with which we see the space above us to be filled as their suns, about which they move in their purposively appointed orbits, but must take it, as we see it, merely as a broad, all-embracing vault; and it must be merely under this representation that we posit the sublimity that a pure aesthetic judgment attributes to this object. In just the same way, we must not take the sight of the ocean as we **think** it, enriched with all sorts of knowledge (which are not, however, contained in the immediate intuition), for example as a wide realm of water creatures, as the great storehouse of water for the evaporation which impregnates the air with

[a] The first and second editions have *der ersteren*, the third *der letzteren*; in either case, the reference is back to "the influences of nature."

[b] *Beurtheilung*

clouds for the benefit of the land, or as an element that separates parts of the world from one another but at the same time makes possible the greatest community among them, for this would yield merely teleological judgments; rather, one must consider the ocean merely as the poets do, in accordance with what its appearance shows, for instance, when it is considered in periods of calm, as a clear watery mirror bounded only by the heavens, but also when it is turbulent, an abyss threatening to devour everything, and yet still be able to find it sublime. The same is to be said about the sublime and the beautiful in the human figure, where we do not look to concepts of the ends for which all its members exist for determining grounds of our judgment and must not let agreement with them influence our aesthetic judgment (which in that case would no longer be pure), though that they do not conflict with those ends is of course a necessary condition even of aesthetic satisfaction.[24] Aesthetic purposiveness is the lawfulness of the power of judgment in its freedom. The satisfaction in the object depends on the relation in which we would place the imagination: namely, that it entertain the mind by itself in free activity. If, on the contrary, something else determines the judgment, whether it be a sensation of the senses or a concept of the understanding, then it is certainly lawful but not the judgment of a free power of judgment. 5: 271

Thus if one speaks of an intellectual beauty or sublimity, then, first, these expressions are not entirely correct, because they are kinds of aesthetic representation that would not be found in us at all if we were simply pure intelligences (or even if we were to transform ourselves into such in our thoughts); second, although both, as objects of an intellectual (moral) satisfaction, are certainly compatible with the aesthetic insofar as they do not rest on any interest, nevertheless they are still difficult to unite with the aesthetic because they are supposed to produce an interest which, if the presentation is to agree with the satisfaction in aesthetic judging,[a] would never occur except by means of an interest of the senses, which is combined with it in the presentation, through which, however, damage would be done to the intellectual purposiveness and it would become impure.

The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual satisfaction is the moral law in all its power, which it exercises in us over each and every incentive of the mind antecedent to it; and, since this power actually makes itself aesthetically knowable only through sacrifices (which is a deprivation, although in behalf of inner freedom, but also reveals in us an unfathomable depth of this supersensible faculty together with its consequences reaching beyond what can be seen),[b] the satisfaction on the aesthetic side (in relation to sensibility) is negative, i.e., contrary to this interest, but considered from the intellectual side it is positive, and combined with an interest. From this it follows that the intellectual, intrinsically purposive (moral) good, judged[c] aesthetically, must not be represented so much as beautiful but rather as sublime, so that it arouses more the feeling of respect (which scorns charm) than that of love and intimate

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] The parentheses around this part of the sentence were added in the second edition.
[c] *beurtheilt*

affection, since human nature does not agree with that good of its own accord, but only through the dominion that reason exercises over sensibility. Conversely, even that which we call sublime in nature outside us or even within ourselves (e.g., certain affects) is represented only as a power of the mind to soar above **certain**[a] obstacles of sensibility by means of moral[b] principles, and thereby to become interesting.

5: 272 I should like to dwell a little on the last point. The idea of the good with affect is called **enthusiasm.**[c,25] This state of mind seems to be sublime, so much so that it is commonly maintained that without it nothing great can be accomplished. Now, however, every affect* is blind, either in the choice of its end, or, even if this is given by reason, in its implementation; for it is that movement of the mind that makes it incapable of engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to determine itself in accordance with them.[d] Thus it cannot in any way merit a satisfaction of reason. Nevertheless, enthusiasm is aesthetically sublime, because it is a stretching of the powers through ideas, which give the mind a momentum that acts far more powerfully and persistently than the impetus given by sensory representations. But (what seems strange) even **affectlessness** (*apatheia*, *phlegma in significatu bono*)[e] in a mind that emphatically pursues its own inalterable principles is sublime, and indeed in a far superior way, because it also has the satisfaction of pure reason on its side.[27] Only such a mentality is called **noble** – an expression subsequently also applied to things, e.g., buildings, costume, a literary style, a bodily posture, etc., if it arouses not so much **astonishment** (an affect in the representation of novelty that exceeds expectation)[28] as **admiration** (an astonishment that does not cease when the novelty is lost), which happens when ideas in their presentation unintentionally and without artifice agree with aesthetic satisfaction.

Every affect of the **courageous sort** (that is, which arouses the consciousness of our powers to overcome any resistance (*animi strenui*)[f]) is **aesthetically sublime,** e.g., anger, even despair (that is, the **enraged,** not the **despon-**

* **Affects** are specifically different from **passions.** The former are related merely to feeling; the latter belong to the faculty of desire, and are inclinations that make all determinability of the faculty of choice by means of principles difficult or impossible. The former are tumultuous and unpremeditated, the latter sustained and considered; thus indignation, as anger, is an affect, but as hatred (vindictiveness), it is a passion. The latter can never, in any circumstances, be called sublime, because while in the case of an affect the freedom of the mind is certainly **hampered,** in the case of passion it is removed.[26]

[a] The emphasized word "certain" (*gewisse*) in the second edition replaces "the" in the first.

[b] Reading *moralische* with the first edition rather than *menschliche* with the second.

[c] Here Kant uses the word "*Enthusiasm*," not, as he usually does, "*Schwarmerei*."

[d] In the first edition, "that makes it incapable of determining itself through principles in accordance with free consideration."

[e] apathy, being phlegmatic in a positive sense

[f] vigorous spirits or mental powers

dent kind). Affect of the **yielding** kind, however (which makes the effort at resistance itself into an object of displeasure (*animum languidum*)[a]) has nothing **noble** in it, although it can be counted as belonging to beauty of the sensory kind.[29] Hence the **emotions** that can reach the strength of an affect are also quite diverse. We have **brave** as well as **tender** emotions. The latter, if they reach the level of an affect, are good for nothing at all; the tendency toward them is called **oversensitivity**.[30] A sympathetic pain that will not let itself be consoled, or with which, when it concerns invented evils, we consciously become involved, to the point of being taken in by the fantasy, as if it were real, proves and constitutes a tenderhearted but at the same time weak soul, which reveals a beautiful side, and which can certainly be called fantastic but not even enthusiastic. Novels, sentimental plays, shallow moral precepts, which make play with (falsely) so-called noble dispositions, but in fact enervate the heart, and make it unreceptive to the rigorous precept of duty and incapable of all respect for the dignity of humanity in our own person and the right of human beings (which is something entirely different from their happiness), and in general incapable of all firm principles; even a religious sermon that preaches a groveling, base currying of favor and self-ingratiation, which abandons all confidence in our own capacity[b] for resistance against evil, instead of the energetic determination to seek out the powers that still remain in us, despite all our frailty, for overcoming inclinations; the false humility that finds the only way to be pleasing to the supreme being in self-contempt, in whimpering, feigned remorse and a merely passive attitude of mind – none of these have anything to do with that which can be counted as the beauty, let alone the sublimity, of a mentality.[31] 5: 273

But even tumultuous movements of the mind, whether they be associated with ideas of religion, under the name of edification, or, as belonging merely to culture, with ideas that contain a social interest, no matter how much they stretch the imagination, can in no way claim the honor of being a **sublime** presentation, if they do not leave behind a disposition of mind that, even if only indirectly, has influence on the consciousness of its strength and resolution in regard to that which brings with it intellectual purposiveness (the supersensible). For otherwise all these emotions belong only to the **motion**[c] that we are glad to have for the sake of health. The agreeable exhaustion that follows such an agitation by the play of affects is an enjoyment of the well-being resulting from the equilibrium of the various vital forces that is thus produced in us, which in the end comes down to the same thing as that which the voluptuaries of the Orient find so comforting when they have their bodies as it were kneaded, and all their muscles and joints softly pressed and flexed; only in the first case the moving principle is for the most part in us, while in the latter it is entirely outside us. Now many a person does believe himself to be edified by a sermon in which, however, nothing (no system of good maxims) has been erected, or improved by a tragedy when he is merely glad about a 5: 274

[a] enfeebled spirit
[b] *Vermögen*
[c] Here Kant uses the Latinate word *Motion* instead of *Bewegung* (movement).

lucky escape from boredom. Thus the sublime must always have a relation to the **manner of thinking,** i.e., to maxims for making the intellectual and the ideas of reason superior to sensibility.

There need be no anxiety that the feeling of the sublime will lose anything through such an abstract presentation, which becomes entirely negative in regard to the sensible; for the imagination, although it certainly finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach itself, nevertheless feels itself to be unbounded precisely because of this elimination of the limits of sensibility; and that separation is thus a presentation of the infinite, which for that very reason can never be anything other than a merely negative presentation, which nevertheless expands the soul. Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Book of the Law than the commandment: Thou shalt not make unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness either of that which is in heaven, or on the earth, or yet under the earth, etc.[32] This commandment alone can explain the enthusiasm that the Jewish people felt in its civilized[a] period for its religion when it compared itself with other peoples, or the pride that Mohammedanism inspired. The very same thing also holds of the representation of the moral law and the predisposition to morality in us. It is utterly mistaken to worry that if it were deprived of everything that the senses can recommend it would then bring with it nothing but cold, lifeless approval and no moving force or emotion. It is exactly the reverse: for where the senses no longer see anything before them, yet the unmistakable and inextinguishable idea of morality remains, there it would be more necessary to moderate the momentum of an unbounded imagination so as not to let it reach the point of enthusiasm,[b][33] rather than, from fear of the powerlessness of these ideas, to look for assistance for them in images and childish devices. That is why even governments have gladly allowed religion to be richly equipped with such supplements and thus sought to relieve the subject[c] of the bother but at the same time also of the capacity[d] to extend the powers of his soul beyond the limits that are arbitrarily set for him and by means of which, as merely passive, he can more easily be dealt with.

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This pure, elevating,[e] merely negative presentation of morality, by contrast, carries with it no risk of **visionary rapture,**[f] which is **a delusion of being able to *see*[g] something beyond all bounds of sensibility,**[h] i.e., to dream in accordance with principles (to rave with reason), precisely because the presentation in this case is merely negative. For **the inscrutability of the idea of freedom** entirely precludes any positive presentation;[34] but the moral law is sufficient in itself in us and originally determining, so that it does not even

[a] *gesitteten*
[b] Here and in the next paragraph, *Enthusiasm*.
[c] *Unterthan*
[d] *Vermögen*
[e] *seelenerhebende*, literally "soul-elevating."
[f] *Schwärmerei*
[g] This word is set in spaced *Fettdruck* in Kant's text.
[h] Following the second edition in reading *Sinnlichkeit* instead of *Sittlichkeit* (morality) as in the first.

allow us to look around for a determining ground outside it. If enthusiasm can be compared with the **delusion of sense,**[a] then visionary rapture is to be compared with the **delusion of mind,**[b] the latter of which is least of all compatible with the sublime, since it is brooding and absurd. In enthusiasm, as an affect, the imagination is unreined; in visionary rapture, as a deep-rooted, oppressive passion, it is unruled. The former is a passing accident, which occasionally affects the most healthy understanding; the latter is a disease that destroys it.

Simplicity (artless purposiveness) is as it were the style of nature in the sublime, and so also of morality, which is a second (supersensible) nature, of which we know only the laws, without being able by intuition to reach the supersensible faculty in ourselves that contains the ground of this legislation.

It should further be remarked that, although the satisfaction in the beautiful, as much as that in the sublime, is not only clearly distinguished among the other aesthetic judgings[c] by means of universal **communicability,** but also, by means of this property, acquires an interest in relation to society (in which it can be communicated), nevertheless the **separation from all society** is also regarded as something sublime if it rests on ideas that look beyond all sensible interest. To be self-sufficient, hence not to need society, yet without being unsociable, i.e., fleeing it, is something that comes close to the sublime, just like any superiority over needs. In contrast, to flee from human beings out of **misanthropy,** because one is hostile to them, or out of **anthropophobia** (fear 5: 276
of people), because one fears them as enemies, is in part hateful and in part contemptible. Nevertheless there is a kind of misanthropy (very improperly so called), the predisposition to which is often found in the mind of many well-thinking people as they get older, which is certainly philanthropic enough as far as their **benevolence** is concerned, but is because of long, sad experience far removed from any **pleasure**[d] in human beings; evidence of this is to be found in the tendency to withdraw from society, the fantastic wish for an isolated country seat, or even (in young people) the dream of happiness in being able to pass their life on an island unknown to the rest of the world with a small family, which the novelists or poets who write Robinsonades[35] know so well how to exploit. Falsehood, ingratitude, injustice, the childishness in ends that we ourselves hold to be important and great, in the pursuit of which people do every conceivable evil to each other, so contradict the idea of what they could be if they wanted to, and are so opposed to the lively wish to take a better view of them that, in order not to hate them, since one cannot love them, doing without all social joys seems to be only a small sacrifice. This sadness, not about the evil that fate imposes on other human beings (which is caused by sympathy), but over that which they do to themselves (which is based on antipathy in fundamental principles) is, since it rests on ideas, sublime,

[a] *Wahnsinn*
[b] *Wahnwitz*
[c] *Beurtheilungen*
[d] Here *Wohlgefallen*, in contrast to *Wohlwollen* ("benevolence") in the previous clause.

whereas the former can at best only count as beautiful. – Saussure,[16] as inspired as he is thorough, in the description of his travels in the Alps says of Bonhomme, one of the mountains of Savoy: "There reigns there a certain **tedious sadness.**" But he also knew of an **interesting** sadness, which is instilled by the view of a wasteland to which human beings would move in order to hear or experience nothing more of the world, but which nevertheless must not be so completely inhospitable that it would offer human beings only an extremely burdensome refuge. – I make this remark only with the intention of recalling that even sorrow (not dejected sadness) can be counted among the **vigorous** affects if it is grounded in moral ideas, but if it is grounded in sympathy, and, as such, is also lovable, it belongs merely to the **mellowing** affects, only in order to draw attention to the disposition of the mind that is **sublime** only in the former case.

* * *

5: 277 The transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments that has now been completed can be compared with the physiological[a] exposition, as it has been elaborated by a **Burke** and many acute men among us, in order to see whither a merely empirical exposition of the sublime and the beautiful would lead. **Burke,*** who deserves to be named as the foremost author in this sort of approach, brings out in this manner (p. 223 of his work) "that the feeling of the sublime is grounded on the drive to self-preservation and on **fear**, i.e., a pain, which, since it does not go as far as the actual destruction of bodily parts, produces movements which, since they cleanse the finer or cruder vessels of dangerous and burdensome stoppages, are capable of arousing agreeable sensations, not, to be sure, pleasure, but a kind of pleasing horror, a certain tranquility that is mixed with terror."[18] The beautiful, which he grounds on love (which, however, he would have known as separate from desire), he traces (pp. 251–52) "to the relaxation, loosening and slackening of the fibers of the body, hence to a softening, a dissolution, an enervation, a sinking away, a dying away, a melting away of gratification."[19] And now he confirms this sort of explanation through cases in which the imagination is able to arouse the feeling of the beautiful as well as the sublime not only in association with the understanding, but even in association with sensory sensations. – As psychological remarks, these analyses of the phenomena of our mind are extremely fine,[b] and provide rich materials for the favorite researches of empirical anthropology. Moreover, it cannot be denied that all representations in us, whether they are

* According to the German translation of his essay, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über dem Ursprung unserer Begriffe vom Schönen und Erhabenen* (Riga: Hartknoch, 1773).[17]

[a] In the first edition, the word printed here was "psychological."
[b] *schön*

objectively merely sensible or else entirely intellectual, can nevertheless subjectively be associated with gratification or pain, however unnoticeable either might be (because they all affect the feeling of life, and none of them, insofar as it is a modification of the subject, can be indifferent), or even that, as Epicurus maintained, **gratification** and **pain** are always[a] ultimately corporeal,[40] whether they originate from the imagination or even from representations of the understanding: because life without the feeling of the corporeal organ is merely consciousness of one's existence, but not a feeling of well- or ill-being, i.e., the promotion or inhibition of the powers of life; because the mind for itself is entirely life (the principle of life itself), and hindrances or promotions must be sought outside it, though in the human being himself, hence in combination with his body. 5: 278

If, however, one locates the satisfaction in the object entirely in the fact that it gratifies by means of charm and emotion, then one must not expect of **others** that they will assent to the aesthetic judgments that **we** make; for about that everyone is justified in consulting only his own private sense. In that case, however, all criticism[b] of taste also ceases entirely; for one would then have to make the example that others give by means of the contingent correspondence among their judgments into a **command** for assent from us, in opposition to which principle, however, we would presumably struggle and appeal to the natural right to subject the judgment that rests on the immediate feeling of our own well-being to our own sense, and not to that of others.

If, therefore, the judgment of taste must not be counted as **egoistic**, but necessarily, in accordance with its inner nature, i.e., of itself, not for the sake of the examples that others give of their taste, as **pluralistic**, if one evaluates it as one that may at the same time demand that everyone should consent to it, then it must be grounded in some sort of *a priori* principle (whether objective or subjective), which one can never arrive at by scouting about among empirical laws of the alterations of the mind: for these allow us to cognize only how things are judged, but never to prescribe how they ought to be judged, particularly in such a way that the command is **unconditioned**; though it is something of this sort that the judgments of taste presuppose when they would have the satisfaction known to be **immediately** connected with a representation. Thus the empirical exposition of aesthetic judgments may always make a start at furnishing the material for a higher investigation, yet a transcendental discussion of this faculty is still possible and essential for the critique of taste.[c] For unless this has *a priori* principles, it could not possibly guide the judgments of others and make claims[d] to approve or reject them with even a semblance of right.

What belongs to the remainder of the analytic of the aesthetic power of judgment contains first of all the:[e]

[a] In the first edition, "all."
[b] *Censur*
[c] In the first edition, the next sentence followed after a comma rather than a period.
[d] In the first edition, "judgments."
[e] This lead-in to the next section was added in the second edition.

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Deduction of pure aesthetic judgments[a,1]

§ 30.
The deduction of aesthetic judgments concerning the objects of nature may not be directed towards that which we call sublime among them, but only to the beautiful.

The claim of an aesthetic judgment to universal validity for every subject, as a judgment that must be based on some principle *a priori*, needs a deduction (i.e., a legitimation of its presumption), which must be added to its exposition, if, that is, it concerns a satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the **form of the object**. The judgments of taste concerning the beautiful in nature are of this sort. For in this case the purposiveness has its ground in the object and its shape,[b] even if it does not indicate the relation of the object to others in accordance with concepts (for judgments of cognition), but rather generally concerns merely the apprehension of this form insofar as it shows itself in the mind to be suitable to the **faculty** both of concepts and of the presentation of them (which is one and the same as that of apprehension). Hence one can also raise many questions in regard to the beautiful in nature, concerning the cause of this purposiveness of its forms: e.g., how is one to explain why nature has spread beauty so extravagantly everywhere, even at the bottom of the ocean, where it is only seldom that the human eye (for which alone, after all, it is purposive) penetrates? and so on.

Only the sublime in nature – if we make a pure aesthetic judgment about it, which is not mixed with concepts of perfection, as objective purposiveness, in which case it would be a teleological judgment – can be considered as entirely formless or shapeless, but nevertheless as the object of a pure satisfaction, and can demonstrate subjective purposiveness in the given representation; and the question now arises, whether in the case of this kind of aesthetic judgment, beyond the exposition of what is thought in it, a deduction of its claim to some sort of (subjective) principle *a priori* could also be demanded.

5: 280 It will serve as an answer to this that the sublime in nature is only improperly so called, and should properly be ascribed only to the manner of thinking, or rather to its foundation in human nature.[c] The

[a] In the first edition, the heading "Third Book" (*Drittes Buch*) preceded this title.

[b] *Gestalt*

[c] In the first edition, there was a comma rather than a period here, and the sentence continued thus: "for which the apprehension . . . merely provides the occasion."

apprehension of an otherwise formless and nonpurposive object merely provides the occasion for becoming conscious of this, which in this way is **used** in a subjectively purposive way, but is not judged to be such **for itself** and on account of its form (as it were *species finalis accepta, non data*).[a] Hence our exposition of the judgments on the sublime in nature was at the same time their deduction. For when we analyzed the reflection of the power of judgment in these, we found in them a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties, which must ground the faculty of ends (the will) *a priori*, and hence is itself purposive *a priori*, which then immediately contains[b] the deduction, i.e., the justification of the claim of such a judgment to universally necessary validity.

We shall thus have to seek only the deduction of judgments of taste, i.e., of the judgments about the beauty of things in nature, and by this means accomplish the task for the whole of the aesthetic power of judgment in its entirety.

§ 31.
On the method of the deduction of judgments of taste.

The obligation to provide a deduction, i.e., the guarantee of the legitimacy, of a kind of judgment arises only if the judgment makes a claim to necessity, which is the case even if it demands subjective universality, i.e., the assent of all, in spite of the fact that it is not a judgment of cognition, but only of the pleasure or displeasure in a given object, i.e., a presumption of a subjective purposiveness that is throughout valid for everyone, which is not supposed to be grounded in any concept of the thing, because it is a judgment of taste.

Since in the latter case we do not have before us a judgment of cognition, neither a theoretical one, grounded in the concept of a **nature** in general through the understanding, nor a (pure) practical one, grounded in the idea of **freedom** as given *a priori* by reason, and thus have to justify *a priori* the validity of neither a judgment that represents what a thing is nor one that I, in order to produce it, ought to perform something, it is only the **universal validity** of a **singular** 5: 281
judgment, which expresses the subjective purposiveness of an empirical representation of the form of an object, that has to be shown for the faculty of judgment in general in order to explain how it is possible that something could please merely in the judging[c] (without a sensa-

[a] The appearance of finality is assigned, not given.
[b] In the first edition, "is."
[c] *Beurtheilung*

tion of the senses or a concept) and that, just as the judging[a] of an object for the sake of a **cognition** in general has universal rules, the satisfaction of one[b] can also be announced as a rule for everyone else.

Now if this universal validity is not to be grounded on collecting votes and asking around among other people about the sort of sensations they have, but is as it were to rest on an autonomy of the subject judging about the feeling of pleasure in the given representation, i.e., on his own taste, but yet is also not to be derived from concepts, then such a judgment has – as the judgment of taste in fact does – a twofold and indeed logical peculiarity: namely, **first**, universal validity *a priori*, yet not a logical universality in accordance with concepts, but the universality of a singular judgment; **second**, a necessity (which must always rest on *a priori* grounds), which does not, however, depend on any *a priori* grounds of proof, by means of the representation of which the approval that the judgment of taste requires of everyone could be compelled.

The resolution of these logical peculiarities, in which a judgment of taste differs from all judgments of cognition, if we here initially abstract from all its content, namely the feeling of pleasure, and merely compare the aesthetic form with the form of objective judgments, as logic prescribes it, will by itself be sufficient for the deduction of this unusual faculty. We will therefore first of all offer a representation of these characteristic properties of taste, elucidated by means of examples.

§ 32.
First peculiarity of the judgment of taste.

The judgment of taste determines its object with regard to satisfaction (as beauty) with a claim to the assent of **everyone**, as if it were objective.

To say "This flower is beautiful" is the same as merely to repeat its
5: 282 own claim to everyone's satisfaction. On account of the agreeableness of its smell it has no claims at all. For one person is enraptured by this smell, while another's head is dizzied by it. Now what should one infer from this except that the beauty must be held to be a property of the flower itself, which does not correspond to the difference of heads and so many senses, but to which instead the latter must correspond if they would judge it? And yet this is not how it is. For the judgment of taste consists precisely in the fact that it calls a thing beautiful only in accordance with that quality in it by means of which it corresponds with our way of receiving it.

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] The phrase "of one" (*eines Jeden*) was added in the second edition.

Moreover, it is required of every judgment that is supposed to prove the taste of the subject that the subject judge for himself, without having to grope about by means of experience among the judgments of others[a] and first inform himself about their satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the same object, and thus that he should pronounce his judgment not as imitation, because a thing really does please universally, but *a priori*.[2] One would think, however, that an *a priori* judgment must contain a concept of the object, for the cognition of which it contains the principle; the judgment of taste, however, is not grounded on concepts at all, and is above all not cognition, but only an aesthetic judgment.

Hence a young poet does not let himself be dissuaded from his conviction that his poem is beautiful by the judgment of the public nor that of his friends, and, if he does give them a hearing, this is not because he now judges[b] it differently, but rather because, even if (at least in his view) the entire public has a false taste, he nevertheless (even against his judgment) finds cause to accommodate himself to the common delusion in his desire for approval. Only later, when his power of judgment has been made more acute by practice, does he depart from his previous judgment of his own free will, just as he does with those of his judgments that rest entirely on reason. Taste makes claim merely[c] to autonomy. To make the judgments of others into the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy.

That the works of the ancients are rightly praised as models, and their authors called classical, like a sort of nobility among writers, who give laws to the people through their precedence, seems to indicate *a posteriori* sources of taste and to contradict the autonomy of taste in every subject. But one could just as well say that the ancient mathe- 5: 283
maticians, who have been regarded until now as nearly indispensable models of the greatest thoroughness and elegance of the synthetic method, also demonstrate an imitative reason on our part and its incapacity to produce from its own resources strict proofs, with the greatest intuitive evidence,[d] by means of the construction of concepts. There is no use of our powers at all, however free it might be, and even of reason (which must draw all its judgments from the common source *a priori*), which, if every subject always had to begin entirely from the raw predisposition of his own nature, would not fall into mistaken attempts if others had not preceded him with their own, not

[a] In the first edition, this clause could be translated as "to grope about . . . among others for their judgments."
[b] *beurtheilt*
[c] The word "merely" (*bloß*) was added in the second edition.
[d] *mit der größten Intuition*

in order to make their successors into mere imitators, but rather by means of their method[a] to put others on the right path for seeking out the principles in themselves and thus for following their own, often better, course. Even in religion, where, certainly, each must derive the rule of his conduct from himself, because he also remains responsible for it himself and cannot shift the guilt for his transgressions onto others, whether as teachers or as predecessors, general precepts, which one may either have acquired from priests or philosophers or drawn from oneself, never accomplish as much as an example of virtue or holiness, which, established in history, does not make the autonomy of virtue out of one's own original idea of morality (*a priori*) dispensable or transform this into a mechanism of imitation.[3] **Succession**, related to a precedent, not imitation, is the correct expression for any influence that the products of an exemplary author[b] can have on others, which means no more than to create from the same sources from which the latter created, and to learn from one's predecessor[c] only the manner of conducting oneself in so doing. But among all the faculties and talents, taste is precisely the one which, because its judgment is not determinable by means of concepts and precepts, is most in need of the examples of what in the progress of culture has longest enjoyed approval if it is not quickly to fall back into barbarism and sink back into the crudity of its first attempts.

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§ 33.
Second peculiarity of the judgment of taste.

The judgment of taste is not determinable by grounds of proof at all, just as if it were merely **subjective.**

If someone does not find a building, a view, or a poem beautiful, then, **first**, he does not allow approval to be internally imposed upon himself by a hundred voices who all praise it highly. He may of course behave[d] as if it pleased him as well, in order not to be regarded as lacking in taste; he can even begin to doubt whether he has adequately formed his taste by acquaintance with a sufficient number of objects of a certain kind (just as one who believes himself to recognize something in the distance as a forest, which everyone else regards as a town, doubts the judgment of his own eyes). But what he does see clearly is this: that the approval of others provides no valid proof for the judging

[a] *Verfahren*
[b] *Urhebers*
[c] In the first edition, "predecessors."
[d] In the second edition, *stellen*; in the first edition, *anstellen*.

of beauty,[a] that others may perhaps see and observe for him, and that what many have seen in one way what he believes himself to have seen otherwise, may serve him as a sufficient ground of proof for a theoretical, hence a logical judgment, but that what has pleased others can never serve as the ground of an aesthetic judgment. The judgment of others, when it is unfavorable to our own, can of course rightly give us reservations about our own, but can never convince us of its incorrectness. Thus there is no empirical **ground of proof** for forcing the judgment on anyone.

Second, an *a priori* proof in accordance with determinate rules can determine the judgment on beauty even less.[4] If someone reads me his poem or takes me to a play that in the end fails to please my taste, then he can adduce **Batteux**[5] or **Lessing**,[6] or even older and more famous critics of taste, and adduce all the rules they established as proofs that his poem is beautiful; certain passages, which are the very ones that displease me, may even agree with rules of beauty (as they have been given there and have been universally recognized): I will stop my ears, listen to no reasons and arguments, and would rather believe that those rules of the critics are false or at least that this is not a case for their application than allow that my judgment should be determined by 5: 285
means of *a priori* grounds of proof, since it is supposed to be a judgment of taste and not of the understanding or of reason.[7]

It seems that this is one of the chief causes on account of which this faculty of aesthetic judging[b] has been given the very name of "taste." For someone may list all the ingredients of a dish for me, and remark about each one that it is otherwise agreeable to me, and moreover even rightly praise the healthiness of this food; yet I am deaf to all these grounds, I try the dish with **my** tongue and my palate, and on that basis (not on the basis of general principles) do I make my judgment.

In fact, the judgment of taste is always made as a singular judgment about the object. The understanding can make a universal judgment by comparing how satisfying the object is with the judgments of others, e.g., all tulips are beautiful; but in that case that is not a judgment of taste, but a logical judgment, which makes the relation of an object to taste into a predicate of things of a certain sort in general; but that by means of which I find a single given tulip beautiful, i.e., find my satisfaction in it universally valid, is the judgment of taste alone. Its peculiarity, however, consists in this: that although it has merely subjective validity, it nevertheless makes a claim on **all** subjects of a kind

[a] In the second edition, *Beurtheilung der Schönheit*; in the first edition, *Schönheits-Beurtheilung*.
[b] *ästhetische Beurtheilungsvermögen*

that could only be made if it were an objective judgment resting on cognitive grounds and capable of being compelled by means of a proof.

§ 34.
No objective principle of taste is possible.

By a principle of taste would be understood a fundamental proposition[a] under the condition of which one could subsume the concept of an object and then by means of an inference conclude that it is beautiful. But that is absolutely impossible.[8] For I must be sensitive of the pleasure immediately in the representation of it, and I cannot be talked into it by means of any proofs.[b] Thus although critics, as Hume says, can reason more plausibly than cooks, they still suffer the same fate as them.[9] They cannot expect a determining ground for their judgment
5: 286 from proofs, but only from the reflection of the subject on his own state (of pleasure or displeasure), rejecting all precepts and rules.

However, what critics nonetheless can and should reason about, in a way that is useful for correcting and broadening our judgments of taste, is this: not the exposition of the determining ground of this sort of aesthetic judgments in a universally usable formula, which is impossible, but the investigation of the faculties of cognition and their functions in these judgments and laying out in examples the reciprocal subjective purposiveness, about which it has been shown above that its form in a given representation is the beauty of its object. Thus the critique of taste itself is only subjective, with regard to the representation by means of which an object is given to us: that is, it is the art or science of bringing under rules the reciprocal relation of the understanding and the imagination to each other in the given representation (without relation to an antecedent sensation or concept), and consequently their concord or discord, and of determining it with regard to its conditions. It is **art** if it shows this only in examples; it is **science** if it derives the possibility of such a judging[c] from the nature of this faculty as a faculty of cognition in general. It is with the latter, as transcendental critique, that we are here alone concerned. It should develop and justify the subjective principle of taste as an *a priori* principle of the power of judgment. Criticism,[d] as an art, merely seeks to apply the physiological (here psychological) and hence em-

[a] *Grundsatz*
[b] *Beweisgründe*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *Die Critik*

pirical rules, according to which taste actually proceeds to the judging[a] of its objects (without reflecting on its possibility), and criticizes the products of fine art just as the **former** criticizes the faculty of judging[b] them itself.

§ 35.
The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general.

The judgment of taste differs from logical judgment in that the latter subsumes a representation under concepts of the object, but the former does not subsume under a concept at all, for otherwise the necessary universal approval could be compelled by proofs. All the same, however, it is similar to the latter in that it professes a universality and 5: 287
necessity, though not in accordance with concepts of the object, and hence a merely subjective one. Now since the concepts in a judgment constitute its content (that which pertains to the cognition of the object), but the judgment of taste is not determinable by means of concepts, it is grounded only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments is the faculty for judging[c] itself, or the power of judgment. This, employed with regard to a representation by means of which an object is given, requires the agreement of two powers of representation: namely, the imagination (for the intuition and the composition of the manifold of intuition), and the understanding (for the concept as representation of the unity of this composition). Now since no concept of the object is here the ground of the judgment, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation by means of which an object is given) under the condition that the understanding in general advance from intuitions to concepts. I.e., since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its **freedom** and the understanding with its **lawfulness**, thus on a feeling that allows the object to be judged[d] in accordance with the purposiveness of the representation (by means of which an object is given) for the promotion of the faculty of cognition in its free play; and taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intui-

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *beurtheilen*
[d] *beurtheilen läßt*

tions under **concepts**, but of the **faculty** of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the **faculty** of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as the former **in its freedom** is in harmony with the latter **in its lawfulness.**

Now in order to discover this justifying ground through a deduction of judgments of taste, only the formal peculiarities of this kind of judgments, that is, only insofar as it is merely their logical form that is considered, can serve as our guideline.

§ 36.
On the problem for a deduction of judgments of taste.

The perception of an object can be immediately combined with the concept of an object in general, for which the former contains the
5: 288 empirical predicates, for a judgment of cognition, and a judgment of experience can thereby be produced. Now this is grounded in *a priori* concepts of the synthetic unity of the manifold, in order to think it as the determination of an object; and these concepts (the categories) require a deduction, which, moreover, was given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by means of which the solution to the problem "How are synthetic *a priori* judgments of cognition possible?" was provided.[10] This problem thus concerned the *a priori* principles of pure understanding and its theoretical judgments.

However, a perception can also be immediately combined with a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) and a satisfaction that accompanies the representation of the object and serves it instead of a predicate, and an aesthetic judgment, which is not a cognitive judgment, can thus arise. Such a judgment, if it is not a mere judgment of sensation but a formal judgment of reflection, which requires this satisfaction of everyone as necessary, must be grounded in something as an *a priori* principle, even if only a merely subjective principle (if an objective principle for this kind of judgment would be impossible), but which, as such a principle, also requires a deduction, by means of which it may be comprehended how an aesthetic judgment could lay claim to necessity. This is the basis of the problem with which we are now concerned: How are judgments of taste possible? This problem thus concerns the *a priori* principles of the pure power of judgment in **aesthetic** judgments, i.e., in those where it does not (as in theoretical judgments) merely have to subsume under objective concepts of the understanding and stands under a law, but where it is itself, subjectively, both object as well as law.

This problem can also be represented thus: How is a judgment possible which, merely from **one's own** feeling of pleasure in an object,

independent of its concept, judges[a] this pleasure, as attached to the representation of the same object **in every other subject**, *a priori*, i.e., without having to wait for the assent of others?

That judgments of taste are synthetic is readily seen, because they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, and add to that as a predicate something that is not even cognition at all, namely the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). However, that such judgments, even though the predicate (of **one's own** pleasure that is combined with the representation) is empirical, are nevertheless, as far as the requisite assent **of everyone** is concerned, *a priori* judgments, or would 5: 289
be taken as such, is already implicit in the expressions of their claim; and thus this problem of the critique of the power of judgment belongs under the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?

§ 37.
What is really asserted *a priori* of an object in a judgment of taste?

That the representation of an object is immediately combined with a pleasure can be perceived only internally, and would, if one wanted to indicate nothing more than this, yield a merely empirical judgment. For I cannot combine a determinate feeling (of pleasure or displeasure) *a priori* with any representation, except where my ground is an *a priori* principle of reason determining the will; for then the pleasure (in the moral feeling) is the consequence of it, but precisely on that account it cannot be compared with the pleasure in taste at all, since it requires a determinate concept of a law, while the judgment of taste, by contrast, is to be combined immediately with the mere judging,[b] prior to any concept. Hence all judgments of taste are also singular judgments, since they combine their predicate of satisfaction not with a concept but with a given singular empirical representation.

Thus it is not the pleasure but **the universal validity of this pleasure** perceived in the mind as connected with the mere judging[c] of an object that is represented in a judgment of taste as a universal rule for the power of judgment, valid for everyone. It is an empirical judgment that I perceive and judge[d] an object with pleasure. But it is an *a priori* judgment that I find it beautiful, i.e., that I may require that satisfaction of everyone as necessary.[11]

[a] *beurtheilte*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *beurtheile*

§ 38.
Deduction of judgments of taste.

If it is admitted that in a pure judgment of taste the satisfaction in the object is combined with the mere judging[a] of its form, then it is
5: 290 nothing other than the subjective purposiveness of that form for the power of judgment that we sense as combined with the representation of the object in the mind. Now since the power of judgment in regard to the formal rules of judging,[b] without any matter (neither sensation[c] nor concept), can be directed only to the subjective conditions of the use of the power of judgment in general (which is restricted[d] neither to the particular kind of sense nor to a particular concept of understanding), and thus to that subjective element that one can presuppose in all human beings (as requisite for possible cognitions in general), the correspondence of a representation with these conditions of the power of judgment must be able to be assumed to be valid for everyone *a priori*. I.e., the pleasure or subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation of the cognitive faculties in the judging[e] of a sensible object in general can rightly be expected of everyone.*

Remark

This deduction is so easy because it is not necessary for it to justify any objective reality of a concept; for beauty is not a concept of the object, and the judgment of taste is not a judgment of cognition. It asserts only that we are

5: 290 * In order to be justified in laying claim to universal assent for judgments of the aesthetic power of judgment resting merely on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to admit: 1) In all human beings, the subjective conditions of this faculty, as far as the relation of the cognitive powers therein set into action to a cognition in general is concerned, are the same, which must be true, since otherwise human beings could not communicate their representations and even cognition itself. 2) The judgment has taken into consideration solely this relation (hence the **formal condition** of the power of judgment), and is pure, i.e., mixed with neither concepts of the object nor with sensations as determining grounds. If an error is made with regard to the latter, that concerns only the incorrect application to a particular case of the authority that a law gives us, by which the authority in general is not suspended.

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *Sinnenempfindung*
[d] Here we follow the first edition, which has *eingeschränkt*, rather than the second, which prints *eingerichtet* (arranged for or equipped for).
[e] *Beurtheilung*

justified in presupposing universally in every human being the same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves; and then only if we have correctly subsumed the given object under these conditions.[a] Now although this latter has unavoidable difficulties that do not pertain to the logical power of judgment (because in the latter one subsumes under concepts, but in the aesthetic power of judgment one subsumes under a relation that is merely a matter of sensation, that of the imagination and the understanding reciprocally attuned to each other in the represented form of the object, where the subsumption can easily be deceptive);[b] yet nothing is thereby taken away from the legitimacy of the claim of the power of judgment in counting on universal assent, which only comes down to this: the correctness of the principle for validly judging for everyone on subjective grounds. For as far as the difficulty and the doubt about the correctness of the subsumption under that principle is concerned, it makes the legitimacy of the claim to this validity of an aesthetic judgment in general, and thus the principle itself, no more doubtful than the equally (although not as often and as easily) erroneous subsumption of the logical power of judgment under its principle can make the latter, which is objective, doubtful. But if the question were to be "How is it possible[c] to assume nature as a sum of objects of taste *a priori*?," then this problem is related to teleology, because producing forms that are purposive for our power of judgment would have to be regarded as an end of nature that pertains to its concept essentially. But the correctness of this assumption is still very dubious, whereas the reality of the beauties of nature is open[d] to experience. 5: 291

§ 39.
On the communicability of a sensation.

If sensation, as the real in perception, is related to cognition, it is called sensory sensation;[e] and its specific quality can be represented as completely communicable in the same way only if one assumes that everyone has a sense that is the same as our own – but this absolutely cannot be presupposed in the case of a sensory sensation. Thus, to someone who lacks the sense of smell, this kind of sensation cannot be communicated; and, even if he does not lack this sense, one still cannot be sure that he has exactly the same sensation from a flower that we have from it. Still more, however, we must represent people as differing with regard to the **agreeableness** or **disagreeableness** of the sensation of one and the same object of the sensations; and it is absolutely not to be demanded that pleasure in the same objects be conceded to every-

[a] In the first edition, there was a comma instead of a period here, and the sentence continued "which has unavoidable . . ."
[b] In the first edition, this clause was not enclosed in parentheses.
[c] The first edition here includes the word *auch* (also), omitted from the second.
[d] The first edition has *bloß* (merely) instead of *offen*.
[e] *Sinnenempfindung*

5: 292 one. Pleasure of this kind, since it comes into the mind through the senses and we are therefore passive with regard to it, can be called the pleasure of **enjoyment.**

The satisfaction in an action on account of its moral quality is by contrast not a pleasure of enjoyment, but of self-activity and of its appropriateness to the idea of its vocation. This feeling, however, which is called moral, requires concepts; and does not exhibit a free, but rather a lawful purposiveness, and therefore also cannot be universally communicated other than by means of reason, and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind in everyone, by means of very determinate practical concepts of reason.

The pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a pleasure of contemplation involving subtle reasoning,[a] also lays claim to universal participation, yet already presupposes another feeling, namely that of its supersensible vocation, which, no matter how obscure it might be, has a moral foundation.[b] But that other human beings will take regard of it and find a satisfaction in the consideration of the brute magnitude of nature (which cannot be truthfully ascribed to the sight of it, which is rather terrifying) is not something that I am justified in simply presupposing. Nevertheless, in consideration of what should be taken account of in those moral predispositions on every appropriate occasion, I can still require even that satisfaction of everyone, but only by means of the moral law, which for its part is in turn grounded on concepts of reason.

By contrast, the pleasure in the beautiful is neither a pleasure of enjoyment, nor of a lawful activity, and not even of a contemplation involving subtle reasoning in accordance with ideas, but of mere reflection.[c] Without having any purpose or fundamental principle for a guide, this pleasure accompanies the common apprehension of an object by the imagination, as a faculty of intuition, in relation to the understanding, as a faculty of concepts, by means of a procedure of the power of judgment, which it must also exercise for the sake of the most common experience: only in the latter case it is compelled[d] to do so for the sake of an empirical objective concept, while in the former case (in the aesthetic judging)[e] it is merely for the sake of perceiving the suitability of the representation for the harmonious (subjectively purposive) occupation of both cognitive faculties in their freedom, i.e., to sense the representational state with pleasure. This pleasure must nec-

[a] *vernünftelnde Contemplation*
[b] In the first edition, there is a comma rather than a period here.
[c] In the first edition, there is a comma and the word *und* (and) rather than a period here.
[d] The word *genötigt* (compelled or necessitated) was added in the second edition.
[e] *Beurtheilung*

essarily rest on the same conditions in everyone, since they are subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general, and the proportion of these cognitive faculties that is required for taste is also 5: 293
requisite for the common and healthy understanding that one may presuppose in everyone. For this very reason, one who judges with taste (as long as he does not err in this consciousness, and does not take the matter for the form, the charm for beauty) may also require the subjective purposiveness, i.e., his satisfaction in the object, of everyone else, and may assume his feeling to be universally communicable, even without the mediation of concepts.

§ 40.
On taste as a kind of *sensus communis*.[12]

The power of judgment, when what is noticed is not so much its reflection as merely the result of that, is often called a sense, and there is talk of a sense of truth, a sense for propriety, for justice, etc., although one surely knows, or at least properly ought to know, that these concepts cannot have their seat in a sense, and that even less could such a sense have the slightest capacity for the expression of universal rules, but rather that a representation of truth, suitability, beauty, or justice could never enter our thoughts if we could not elevate ourselves above the senses to higher cognitive faculties. **The common human understanding**, which, as merely healthy (not yet cultivated) understanding, is regarded as the least that can be expected from anyone who lays claim to the name of a human being, thus has the unfortunate honor of being endowed with the name of common sense (*sensus communis*), and indeed[a] in such a way that what is understood by the word **common** (not merely in our language, which here really contains an ambiguity, but in many others as well) comes to the same as the *vulgar*,[b] which is encountered everywhere, to possess which is certainly not an advantage or an honor.

By "***sensus communis***,"[c] however, must be understood the idea of a **communal** sense, i.e., a faculty for judging[d] that in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of everyone else's way of representing in thought, in order **as it were** to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental

[a] "Indeed" (*zwar*) added in the second edition.
[b] Kant prints the Latin word *vulgare*.
[c] Kant prints the first word in roman type and the second in italics, presumably meaning to add emphasis to the word "*communis*."
[d] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*

5: 294 influence on the judgment. Now this happens by one holding his judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible judgments of others, and putting himself into the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that contingently attach to our own judging;[a] which is in turn accomplished by leaving out as far as is possible everything in one's[b] representational state that is matter, i.e., sensation, and attending solely to the formal peculiarities of his representation or his representational state. Now perhaps this operation of reflection seems much too artificial to be attributed to the faculty that we call the **common** sense; but it only appears thus if we express it in abstract formulas; in itself, nothing is more natural than to abstract from charm and emotion if one is seeking a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule.

The following maxims of the common human understanding do not belong here, to be sure, as parts of the critique of taste, but can nevertheless serve to elucidate its fundamental principles. They are the following: 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself.[13] The first is the maxim of the **unprejudiced** way of thinking, the second of the **broad-minded** way, the third that of the **consistent** way. The first is the maxim of a reason that is never **passive**. The tendency toward the latter, hence toward heteronomy of reason, is called **prejudice**; and the greatest prejudice of all is that of representing reason as if it were not subject to the rules of nature on which the understanding grounds it by means of its own essential law:[c] i.e., **superstition.** Liberation from superstition is called **enlightenment,*** since, although this designation is also applied to liberation from prejudices in general, it is

5: 294 * One readily sees that while enlightenment is easy *in thesi, in hypothesi* it is a difficult matter that can only be accomplished slowly; for while not being passive with his reason but always being legislative for himself is something that is very easy for the person who would only be adequate to his essential end and does not demand to know that which is beyond his understanding, nevertheless, since striving for the latter is hardly to be forbidden and there will never be lacking many who confidently promise to be able to satisfy this desire for knowledge, it must be very difficult to maintain or establish the merely negative element (which constitutes genuine enlightenment) in the manner of thinking (especially in that of the public).

[a] *Beurtheilung*

[b] In the first edition, "in our" (*in unserm*).

[c] Following the second edition; the first edition has *unter welchen das größte, die Natur sich Regeln, die der Verstand ihr durch . . . zum Grunde liegt*, which would imply that it is nature rather than reason which in the case of prejudice fails to be subjected to the essential law of understanding.

superstition above all (*in sensu eminenti*) that deserves to be called a prejudice, since the blindness to which superstition leads, which indeed it even demands as an obligation, is what makes most evident the need 5: 295
to be led by others, hence the condition of a passive reason.[14] As far as the second maxim of the way of thinking is concerned, we are accustomed to calling someone limited (**narrow-minded**, in contrast to **broad-minded**) whose talents do not suffice for any great employment (especially if it is intensive). But the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the **way of thinking** needed to make a purposive use of it, which, however small the scope and degree of a person's natural endowment may be, nevertheless reveals a man of a **broad-minded way of thinking** if he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a **universal standpoint** (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others). The third maxim, namely that of the **consistent** way of thinking, is the most difficult to achieve, and can only by achieved through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic. One can say that the first of these maxims is that maxim of the understanding, the second that of the power of judgment, the third that of reason. –

I take up again the thread that has been laid aside through this digression, and say that taste can be called *sensus communis* with greater justice than can the healthy understanding, and that the aesthetic power of judgment rather than the intellectual can bear the name of a communal sense,* if indeed one would use the word "sense" of an effect of mere reflection on the mind: for there one means by "sense" the feeling of pleasure. One could even define taste as the faculty for judging[a] that which makes our feeling in a given representation **universally communicable** without the mediation of a concept.

The aptitude of human beings for communicating their thoughts also requires a relation between the imagination and the understanding in order to associate intuitions with concepts and concepts in turn with intuitions, which flow together into a cognition; but in that case the agreement of the two powers of the mind is **lawful**, under the constraint of determinate concepts. Only where the imagination in its 5: 296
freedom arouses the understanding, and the latter, without concepts, sets the imagination into a regular[b] play is the representation commu-

* One could designate taste as *sensus communis aestheticus*, common human 5: 295
understanding as *sensus communis logicus*.

[a] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*
[b] *regelmäßiges*

nicated, not as a thought, but as the inner feeling of a purposive state of mind.

Taste is thus the faculty for judging[a] *a priori* the communicability of the feelings that are combined with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept).

If one could assume that the mere universal communicability of his feeling must in itself already involve an interest for us (which, however, one is not justified in inferring from the constitution of a merely reflective power of judgment), then one would be able to explain how it is that the feeling in the judgment of taste is expected of everyone as if it were a duty.[15]

§ 41.
On the empirical interest in the beautiful.[16]

That the judgment of taste, by which something is declared to be beautiful, must have no interest **for its determining ground** has been adequately demonstrated above. But from that it does not follow that after it has been given as a pure aesthetic judgment no interest can be combined with it. This combination, however, can always be only indirect, i.e., taste must first of all be represented as combined with something else in order to be able to connect with the satisfaction of mere reflection on an object a further **pleasure in its existence** (as that in which all interest consists). For what is said of cognitive judgments (of things in general) also holds here in the aesthetic judgment: *a posse ad esse non valet consequentia.*[b] Now this other element can be something empirical, namely, an inclination that is characteristic of human nature, or something intellectual, as a property of the will of being determinable *a priori* through reason; both of which contain a satisfaction in the existence of an object, and can thus provide the ground for an interest in that which has already pleased for itself and without respect to any sort of interest.[17]

The beautiful interests empirically only in **society**; and if the drive to society is admitted to be natural to human beings, while the suit-
5: 297 ability and the tendency toward it, i.e., **sociability**, are admitted to be necessary for human beings as creatures destined for society, and thus as a property belonging to **humanity**, then it cannot fail that taste should also be regarded as a faculty for judging[c] everything by means of which one can communicate even his **feeling** to everyone else, and

[a] *zu beurtheilen*

[b] There is no valid inference from possibility to actuality.

[c] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*

hence as a means for promoting what is demanded by an inclination natural to everyone.

For himself alone a human being abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either his hut or himself, nor seek out or still less plant flowers in order to decorate himself;[18] rather, only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a human being but also, in his own way, a refined human being (the beginning of civilization): for this is how we judge[a] someone who is inclined to communicate his pleasure to others and is skilled at it, and who is not content with an object if he cannot feel his satisfaction in it in community with others. Further, each expects and requires of everyone else a regard to universal communication, as if from an original contract dictated by humanity itself; and thus, at first to be sure only charms, e.g., colors for painting oneself (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iroquois),[19] or flowers, mussel shells, beautifully colored birds' feathers, but with time also beautiful forms (as on canoes, clothes, etc.) that do not in themselves provide any gratification, i.e., satisfaction of enjoyment, become important in society and combined with great interest, until finally civilization that has reached the highest point makes of this almost the chief work of refined inclination, and sensations have value only to the extent that they may be universally communicated; at that point, even though the pleasure that each has in such an object is merely inconsiderable and has in itself no noticeable interest, nevertheless the idea of its universal communicability almost infinitely increases its value.

However, this interest, attached to the beautiful indirectly, through an inclination to society, and thus empirical, is of no importance for us here, for we must find that importance only in what may be related to the judgment of taste *a priori*, even if only indirectly. For even if in this latter form an interest combined with it should be revealed, then taste would reveal in our faculty for judging[b] a transition from sensory enjoyment to moral feeling; and not only would one thereby be better guided in the purposive employment of taste, but also a mediating link 5: 298
in the chain of human faculties *a priori*, on which all legislation must depend, would thereby be exhibited as such. This much can certainly be said about the empirical interest in objects of taste and in taste itself, namely, that since the latter indulges inclination, although this may be ever so refined, it also gladly allows itself to blend in with all the inclinations and passions that achieve their greatest variety and highest level in society, and the interest in the beautiful, if it is grounded on this, could afford only a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable

[a] *beurtheilt*
[b] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*

to the good.[a] But whether the latter could not perhaps be promoted by taste, if it is taken in its purity, we have cause to investigate.

§ 42.
On the intellectual interest in the beautiful.

It has been with a good intention that those who would gladly direct all of the occupations of human beings to which these are driven by their inner natural predisposition to the ultimate end of humanity, namely the morally good, have taken it as a sign of a good moral character to take an interest in the beautiful in general. But they have been contradicted by others, not without ground, who have appealed to the experience that virtuosi of taste, who are not only often but even usually vain, obstinate, and given to corrupting passions, could perhaps even less than others lay claim to the merit of devotion to moral principles; and so it appears that the feeling for the beautiful is not only specifically different from the moral feeling (as it actually is), but also that the interest that can be combined with it can be united with the moral interest with difficulty, and by no means through an inner affinity.

Now I gladly concede that the interest in the **beautiful in art** (as part of which I also count the artful use of the beauties of nature for decoration, and thus for vanity) provides no proof of a way of thinking that is devoted to the morally good or even merely inclined to it.[b] By contrast, however, I do assert that to take an **immediate interest** in the beauty of **nature** (not merely to have taste in order to judge[c] it) is
5: 299 always a mark of a good soul, and that if[d] this interest is habitual, it at least indicates a disposition of the mind that is favorable to the moral feeling, if it is gladly combined with the **viewing of nature.** It must be remembered, however, that I mean here strictly the beautiful **forms** of nature, and by contrast set to one side the **charms** that it usually combines so abundantly with them, since the interest in them is to be sure also immediate, but nevertheless empirical.

Someone who alone (and without any intention of wanting to communicate his observations to others) considers the beautiful shape of a wildflower, a bird, an insect, etc., in order to marvel at it, to love it, and to be unwilling for it to be entirely absent from nature, even though some harm might come to him from it rather than there being

[a] In the first edition, there was a comma rather than a period here, and the next sentence was a dependent clause introduced with a "which."
[b] In the first edition, there was a comma rather than a period here.
[c] *beurtheilen*
[d] The first edition says simply "if" instead of "and that if."

any prospect of advantage to him from it, takes an immediate and certainly intellectual interest in the beauty of nature. I.e., not only the form of its product but also its existence pleases him, even though no sensory charm has a part in this and he does not combine any sort of end with it.

However, it is worth noting here that if someone had secretly deceived this lover of the beautiful and had planted artificial flowers (which can be manufactured to look entirely similar to natural ones) or had placed artfully carved birds on the twigs of trees, and he then discovered the deception, the immediate interest that he had previously taken in it would immediately disappear, though perhaps another, namely the interest of vanity in decorating his room with them for the eyes of others, would take its place. The thought that nature has produced that beauty must accompany the intuition and reflection, and on this alone is grounded the immediate interest that one takes in it.[a] Otherwise there remains either a mere judgment of taste without any interest, or only one combined with a mediate interest, namely one related to society:[b] which latter affords no sure indications of a morally good way of thinking.

This preeminence of the beauty of nature over the beauty of art in alone awakening an immediate interest,[c] even if the former were to be surpassed by the latter in respect of form, is in agreement with the refined and well-founded thinking of all human beings who have cultivated their moral feeling. If a man who has enough taste to judge about products of beautiful art[d] with the greatest correctness and refinement gladly leaves the room in which are to be found those 5: 300
beauties that sustain vanity and at best social joys and turns to the beautiful in nature, in order as it were to find here an ecstasy for his spirit in a line of thought that he can never fully develop, then we would consider this choice of his with esteem and presuppose in him a beautiful soul, to which no connoisseur and lover of art can lay claim on account of the interest that he takes in his objects. – Now what is the distinction between such different assessments of two sorts of objects, which in the mere judgment of taste would scarcely compete for preeminence over each other?

[a] In the first edition, this period was a comma.
[b] In the first edition, this colon was a period.
[c] In the first edition, "in that in the former alone an interest is taken."
[d] *Produkte der schönen Kunst.* In the eighteenth century, the German phrases *schöne Kunst* and *schöne Künste* were used like the English phrases "fine art" and "fine arts," and could easily be translated that way here. But since there are passages, such as the first paragraph of § 44, where this would require us to translate *schön* two different ways, we will use the literal rather than more idiomatic translation.

We have a faculty of merely aesthetic judgment,[a] for judging of forms without concepts and for finding a satisfaction in the mere judging[b] of them which we at the same time make into a rule for everyone without this judgment being grounded on an interest or producing one. – Alternatively, we also have a faculty of intellectual judgment,[c] for determining *a priori* for mere forms of practical maxims (insofar as they qualify in themselves for universal legislation) a satisfaction which we make into a law for everyone without our judgment being grounded on any interest, **although it produces one.** The pleasure or displeasure in the first judgment is called that of taste, in the second that of moral feeling.

But since it also interests reason that the ideas (for which it produces an immediate interest in the moral feeling) also have objective reality, i.e., that nature should at least show some trace or give a sign that it contains in itself some sort of ground for assuming a lawful correspondence of its products with our satisfaction that is independent of all interest (which we recognize *a priori* as a law valid for everyone, without being able to ground this on proofs), reason must take an interest in every manifestation in nature of a correspondence similar to this; consequently the mind cannot reflect on the beauty of **nature** without finding itself at the same time to be interested in it.[20] Because of this affinity, however, this interest is moral, and he who takes such an interest in the beautiful in nature can do so only insofar as he has already firmly established his interest in the morally good. We thus
5: 301 have cause at least to suspect a predisposition to a good moral disposition in one who is immediately interested in the beauty of nature.

It will be said that this explanation of aesthetic judgments in terms of their affinity with moral feeling looks much too studied to be taken as the true interpretation of the cipher by means of which nature figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms. But, first, this immediate interest in the beautiful in nature is not actually common, but belongs only to those whose thinking is either already trained to the good or especially receptive to such training; and then, even without clear, subtle, and deliberate reflection, the analogy between the pure judgment of taste, which, without depending on any sort of interest, allows a pleasure to be felt and at the same time to be represented *a priori* as proper for mankind in general, and the moral judgment, which does the same thing on the basis of concepts, leads to an equally immediate interest in the object of the former as in that of the latter – only the former is a free interest, the latter one grounded on objective laws. To

[a] *Vermögen der bloß ästhetischen Urtheilskraft*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *Vermögen einer intellectuellen Urtheilskraft*

that is further added the admiration of nature, which in its beautiful products shows itself as art, not merely by chance, but as it were intentionally, in accordance with a lawful arrangement and as purposiveness without an end, which latter, since we never encounter it externally, we naturally seek within ourselves, and indeed in that which constitutes the ultimate end of our existence, namely the moral vocation (the question of the ground of possibility of such a purposiveness of nature, however, will first be investigated in the Teleology).[21]

That the satisfaction in beautiful art in the pure judgment of taste is not combined with an immediate interest in the same way as that in beautiful nature is also easy to explain. For the former is either such an imitation of the latter that it is deceptive, and in that case it has the effect of natural beauty (which it is taken to be); or else it is an art that is obviously intentionally directed toward our satisfaction, in which case the satisfaction in this product would, to be sure, occur immediately by means of taste, but would arouse[a] only a mediate interest in the cause on which it is grounded, namely an art that can interest only through its end and never in itself. One will perhaps say that this is also the case if an object of nature interests through its beauty only insofar as a moral idea is associated with it; but it is not this, 5: 302
but rather the quality inherent in it by means of which it qualifies for such an association, which thus pertains to it internally, that interests immediately.

The charms in beautiful nature, which are so frequently encountered as it were melted together with the beautiful form, belong either to the modifications of the light (in the coloring) or of the sound (in tones). For these are the only sensations which permit not merely sensory feeling but also reflection on the form of these modifications of the senses, and thus as it were contain a language that nature brings to us and that seems to have a higher meaning.[b] Thus the white color of the lily seems to dispose the mind to ideas of innocence, and the seven colors, in their order from red to violet, to the ideas 1) of sublimity, 2) of audacity, 3) of candor, 4) of friendliness, 5) of modesty, 6) of steadfastness, and 7) of tenderness. The song of the bird proclaims joyfulness and contentment with its existence. At least this is how we interpret nature, whether anything of the sort is its intention or not. But this interest, which we here take in beauty, absolutely requires that it be the beauty of nature; and it disappears entirely as soon as one notices that one has been deceived and that it is only art, so much so that even taste can no longer find anything beautiful in it or sight anything charming. What is more highly extolled by poets than the

[a] The word "arouse" (*erwecken*) was added in the second edition.
[b] *Sinn*

bewitchingly beautiful song of the nightingale, in a lonely stand of bushes, on a still summer evening, under the gentle light of the moon? Yet there have been examples in which, where no such songbird was to be found, some jolly landlord has tricked the guests staying with him, to their complete satisfaction, by hiding in a bush a mischievous lad who knew how to imitate this song (with a reed or a pipe in his mouth) just like nature. But as soon as one becomes aware that it is a trick, no one would long endure listening to this song, previously taken to be so charming; and the same is true with every other songbird. It must be nature, or taken to be nature by us, for us to be able to take such an immediate **interest** in the beautiful, and even more so if we are to be at all able to expect of others that they should take this
5: 303 interest in it; which in fact happens, as we consider coarse and ignoble the thinking of those who have no **feeling** for beautiful nature (for this is what we call the receptivity to an interest in its contemplation), and who confine themselves to the enjoyment of mere sensory sensations at table or from the bottle.

§ 43.
On art in general.[22]

1) **Art** is distinguished from **nature** as doing (*facere*) is from acting or producing[a] in general (*agere*), and the product or consequence of the former is distinguished as a **work** (*opus*) from the latter as an effect[b] (*effectus*).

By right, only production through freedom, i.e., through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason, should be called art. For although people are fond of describing the product of the bees (the regularly constructed honeycombs) as a work of art, this is done only on account of the analogy with the latter; that is, as soon as we recall that they do not ground their work on any rational consideration of their own, we say that it is a product of their nature (of instinct), and as art it is ascribed only to their creator.

If someone searching through a moorland bog finds, as sometimes happens, a piece of carved wood, he does not say that it is a product of nature, but of art; the cause that produced it conceived of an end, which the wood has to thank for its form. In other cases too one sees an art in everything that is so constituted that a representation of it in its cause must have preceded its reality (as even in the case of bees), although it may not exactly have **thought of** the effect; but if something is called a work of art without qualification, in order to distin-

[a] *Wirken*
[b] *Wirkung*

guish it from an effect of nature, then by that is always understood a work of human beings.

2) **Art** as a skill of human beings is also distinguished from **science** (**to be able** from **to know**), as a practical faculty is distinguished from a theoretical one, as technique is distinguished from theory (as the art of surveying is distinguished from geometry).[23] And thus that which one **can** do as soon as one **knows** what should be done is not exactly called art. Only that which one does not immediately have the skill to do even if one knows it completely belongs to that extent to art. 5: 304
Camper[24] describes quite precisely how the best shoe must be made, but he certainly was not able to make one.*

3) **Art** is also distinguished from **handicraft**: the first is called **liberal**,[a] the second can also be called **remunerative art**.[26] The first is regarded as if it could turn out purposively (be successful) only as play, i.e., an occupation that is agreeable in itself; the second is regarded as labor, i.e., an occupation that is disagreeable (burdensome) in itself and is attractive only because of its effect (e.g., the remuneration), and hence as something that can be compulsorily imposed. Judging[b] whether, in the hierarchy of the guilds, clockmakers should be counted as artists but smiths as craftsmen requires a different standpoint than the one adopted here, namely, the proportion of the talents on which the one or the other of these occupations must be grounded. Further, I will not here discuss whether among the so-called seven liberal[c] arts there may not have been included some that are to be counted among the sciences, and several others that are to be compared with crafts. But it is not inadvisable to recall that in all liberal arts there is nevertheless required something compulsory, or, as it is called, a **mechanism**, without which the **spirit**, which must be **free**[d] in the art and which alone animates the work, would have no body at all and would entirely evaporate (e.g., in the art of poetry, correctness and richness of diction as well as prosody and meter), since many modern teachers believe that they can best promote a liberal art if they remove all compulsion from it and transform it from labor into mere play.

* In my region, the common man, when confronted with a problem like that 5: 304
of Columbus and his egg, says **That is not an art, it is just a science.** I.e., if one **knows** it, then one **can** do it; and he says the same thing about all the putative arts of the conjuror. But he would never refuse to call those of the tightrope walker art.[25]

[a] *freye*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *freyen*
[d] *frey*

§ 44.
On beautiful art.[a]

There is neither a science of the beautiful, only a critique, nor beautiful science, only beautiful art.[27] For if the former existed, then it would be
5: 305 determined in it scientifically, i.e., by means of proofs, whether something should be held to be beautiful or not; thus the judgment about beauty, if it belonged to a science, would not be a judgment of taste. As for the second, a science which, as such, is supposed to be beautiful, is absurd. For if in it, as a science, one were to ask for grounds and proofs, one would be sent packing with tasteful expressions (*bons mots*). – What has given rise to the customary expression **beautiful sciences**[28] is without doubt nothing but the fact that it has been quite rightly noticed that for beautiful art in its full perfection much science is required, such as, e.g., acquaintance with ancient languages, wide reading of those authors considered to be classical, history, acquaintance with antiquities, etc., and for that reason these historical sciences, because they constitute the necessary preparation and foundation for beautiful art, and also in part because acquaintance with the products of beautiful art (rhetoric and poetry) is even included within them, have because of a verbal confusion themselves been called beautiful sciences.

If art, adequate for the **cognition** of a possible object, merely performs the actions requisite to make it actual, it is **mechanical**; but if it has the feeling of pleasure as its immediate aim, then it is called **aesthetic** art. This is either **agreeable** or **beautiful** art. It is the former if its end is that pleasure accompany the representations as mere **sensations**, the latter, if its end is that it accompany these as **kinds of cognition.**

Agreeable arts are those which are aimed merely at enjoyment; of this kind are all those charms that can gratify the company at a table, such as telling entertaining stories, getting the company talking in an open and lively manner, creating by means of jokes and laughter a certain tone of merriment, in which, as is said, much can be chattered about and nobody will be held responsible for what he says, because it is only intended as momentary entertainment, not as some enduring material for later reflection or discussion. (Also included here is the way in which the table is set out for enjoyment, or even, at big parties, the table-music – an odd thing, which is supposed to sustain the mood

[a] *Von der schönen Kunst.* As noted in the previous section, an idiomatic translation of Kant's expression *schöne Künste* would be "fine arts," but in order to preserve the logic of his argument, as in the first sentence of the following paragraph, we have preferred a literal to an idiomatic translation.

of joyfulness merely as an agreeable noise, and to encourage the free conversation of one neighbor with another without anyone paying the least attention to its composition.) Also included here are all games 5: 306
that involve no interest beyond that of making time pass unnoticed.

Beautiful art, by contrast, is a kind of representation that is purposive in itself and, though without an end, nevertheless promotes the cultivation[a] of the mental powers for sociable communication.[29]

The universal communicability of a pleasure already includes in its concept that this must not be a pleasure of enjoyment, from mere sensation, but one of reflection; and thus aesthetic art, as beautiful art, is one that has the reflecting power of judgment and not mere sensation[b] as its standard.

§ 45.
Beautiful art is an art to the extent that it seems at the same time to be nature.

In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the purposiveness in its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of nature. On this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive powers, which must yet at the same time be purposive, rests that pleasure which is alone universally communicable though without being grounded on concepts. Nature was beautiful, if at the same time it looked like art; and art can only be called beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature.[30]

For we can generally say, whether it is the beauty of nature or of art that is at issue: **that is beautiful which pleases in the mere judging**[c] (neither in sensation nor through a concept). Now art always has a determinate intention of producing something. If however this were a mere sensation (something merely subjective) that is supposed to be accompanied with pleasure, then this product would please, in the judging,[d] only by means of the feeling of sense. If the intention were aimed at the production of a determinate object, then, if it were achieved through art, the object would please only through concepts. But in either case the art would not please **in the mere judging**,[e] i.e., it would not please as beautiful but as mechanical art.

Thus the purposiveness in the product of beautiful art, although it

[a] *Cultur*
[b] *Sinnenempfindung*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *Beurtheilung*
[e] *Beurtheilung*

5: 307 is certainly intentional, must nevertheless not seem intentional; i.e., beautiful art must be **regarded** as nature, although of course one is aware of it as art. A product of art appears as nature, however, if we find it to agree **punctiliously** but not **painstakingly** with rules in accordance with which alone the product can become what it ought to be, that is, without the academic form showing through,[a] i.e., without showing any sign that the rule has hovered before the eyes of the artist and fettered his mental powers.

§ 46.
Beautiful art is art of genius.

Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art. Since the talent, as an inborn productive faculty of the artist, itself belongs to nature, this could also be expressed thus: **Genius** is the inborn predisposition of the mind (*ingenium*) **through which** nature gives the rule to art.[31]

Whatever the case may be with this definition, and whether it is merely arbitrary or is adequate to the concept which is usually associated with the word **genius** or not (which is to be discussed in the following sections), it can nevertheless already be proved at the outset that, according to the significance of the word assumed here, beautiful arts must necessarily be considered as arts of **genius.**

For every art presupposes rules which first lay the foundation by means of which a product that is to be called artistic is first represented as possible. The concept of beautiful art, however, does not allow the judgment concerning the beauty of its product to be derived from any sort of rule that has a **concept** for its determining ground, and thus has as its ground a concept of how it is possible.[b] Thus beautiful art cannot itself think up the rule in accordance with which it is to bring its product into being. Yet since without a preceding rule a product can never be called art, nature in the subject (and by means of the disposition of its faculties) must give the rule to art, i.e., beautiful art is possible only as a product of genius.

From this one sees: That genius 1) is a **talent** for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule, conse-
5: 308 quently that **originality** must be its primary characteristic. 2) That since there can also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e., **exemplary**, hence, while not themselves the result

[a] This clause was added in the second edition.

[b] In the first edition, "and thus does not have have as its foundation any concept of how it is possible."

of imitation, they must yet serve others in that way, i.e., as a standard or a rule for judging.[a] 3) That it cannot itself describe or indicate scientifically how it brings its product into being, but rather that it gives the rule as **nature**, and hence the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself how the ideas for it come to him, and also does not have it in his power to think up such things at will or according to plan, and to communicate to others precepts that would put them in a position to produce similar products. (For that is also presumably how the word "genius" is derived from *genius*,[b] in the sense of the particular spirit given to a person at birth, which protects and guides him, and from whose inspiration those original ideas stem.) 4) That by means of genius nature does not prescribe the rule to science but to art, and even to the latter only insofar as it is to be beautiful art.

§ 47.
Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of genius.

Everyone agrees that genius is entirely opposed to the **spirit of imitation.**[32] Now since learning is nothing but imitation, even the greatest aptitude for learning, facility for learning (capacity) as such, still does not count as genius. But even if one thinks or writes[c] for himself, and does not merely take up what others have thought, indeed even if he invents a great deal for art and science, this is still not a proper reason for calling such a great **mind** (in contrast to someone who, because he can never do more than merely learn and imitate, is called a **blockhead**) a **genius**, since just this sort of thing **could** also have been learned, and thus still lies on the natural path of inquiry and reflection in accordance with rules, and is not specifically distinct from that which can be acquired with effort by means of imitation.[33] Thus everything that Newton expounded in his immortal work on the principles of natural philosophy,[34] no matter how great a mind it took to discover it, can still be learned; but one cannot learn to write inspired poetry, however exhaustive all the rules for the art of poetry and however excellent the models for it may be. The reason is that Newton could make all the steps that he had to take, from the first elements of geometry to his great and profound discoveries, entirely intuitive not only to himself but also to everyone else, and thus set them out for posterity quite determinately; but no Homer or Wieland[35] can indicate 5: 309

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] That is, the German word *Genie* is derived from the Latin word *genius*.
[c] *dichtet*

how his ideas, which are fantastic and yet at the same time rich in thought, arise and come together in his head, because he himself does not know it and thus cannot teach it to anyone else either. In the scientific sphere, therefore, the greatest discoverer differs only in degree from the most hard working imitator and apprentice, whereas he differs in kind from someone who is gifted by nature for beautiful art. This is not to belittle those great men, to whom the human race owes so much, in comparison to those favorites of nature with respect to their talent for beautiful art. In their very talent for ever advancing greater perfection of cognition and all the utility that depends on it, and likewise in the education of others for the acquisition of the same knowledge, lies the great advantage of such people over those who have the honor of being called geniuses: since for the latter art somewhere comes to a halt, because a limit is set for it beyond which it cannot go, which presumably has also long since been reached and cannot be extended any more; and moreover such a skill cannot be communicated, but is apportioned to each immediately from the hand of nature, and thus dies with him, until nature one day similarly endows another, who needs nothing more than an example in order to let the talent of which he is aware operate in a similar way.

Since the gift of nature must give the rule to art (as beautiful art), what sort of rule is this? It cannot be couched in a formula to serve as a precept, for then the judgment about the beautiful would be determinable in accordance with concepts; rather, the rule must be abstracted from the deed, i.e. from the product, against which others may test their own talent, letting it serve them as a model not for **copying**[a] but for **imitation.**[b,16] How this is possible is difficult to explain. The ideas of the artist arouse similar ideas in his apprentice if nature has equipped him with a similar proportion of mental powers. The models
5: 310 of beautiful art are thus the only means for transmitting these to posterity, which could not happen through mere descriptions (especially not in the field of the arts of discourse); and even in the latter case it is only those in old and dead languages, now preserved only as learned ones, that can become classical.[17]

Although mechanical and beautiful art, the first as a mere art of diligence and learning, the second as that of genius, are very different from each other, still there is no beautiful art in which something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules, and thus something **academically correct**, does not constitute the essential condition of the art.[18] For something in it must be thought of as an end, otherwise one cannot ascribe its product to any art at all; it would

[a] *Nachmachung*
[b] *Nachahmung*

be a mere product of chance. But in order to aim at an end in the work, determinate rules are required, from which one may not absolve oneself. Now since the originality of his talent constitutes one (but not the only) essential element of the character of the genius, superficial minds believe that they cannot show that they are blossoming geniuses any better than by pronouncing themselves free of the academic constraint of all rules, and they believe that one parades around better on a horse with the staggers than one that is properly trained. Genius can only provide rich **material** for products of art; its elaboration and **form** require a talent that has been academically trained, in order to make a use of it that can stand up to the power of judgment. But when someone speaks and decides like a genius even in matters of the most careful rational inquiry, then it is completely ridiculous; one does not rightly know whether one should laugh more at the charlatan who spreads about himself such a mist that one cannot judge[a] clearly but can indulge in imagination all the more, or at the public, which trustingly imagines that its incapacity to recognize clearly and grasp the masterpiece of insight comes from the fact that whole masses of new truths are being thrown at it, in contrast with which detail (achieved by careful explanations and the academically correct examination of fundamental principles) seems to be merely the work of amateurs.

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§ 48.
On the relation of genius to taste.

For the **judging**[b] of beautiful objects, as such, **taste** is required; but for beautiful art itself, i.e., for **producing** such objects, **genius** is required.[39]

If genius is considered as a talent for beautiful art (which the proper meaning of the word implies), and with this in mind it is to be analyzed into the faculties that must come together to constitute such a talent, then it is necessary first to determine precisely the difference between the beauty of nature, the judging[c] of which requires only taste, and the beauty of art, the possibility of which (which must also be taken account of in the judging[d] of such an object) requires genius.

A beauty of nature is a **beautiful thing**; the beauty of art is a **beautiful representation** of a thing.[40]

[a] *beurtheilen*
[b] ***Beurtheilung***
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *Beurtheilung*

In order to judge[a] a beauty of nature as such, I do not need first to have a concept of what sort of thing the object is supposed be, i.e., it is not necessary for me to know the material purposiveness (the end), but the mere form without knowledge of the end pleases for itself in the judging.[b] But if the object is given as a product of art, and is as such supposed to be declared to be beautiful, then, since art always presupposes an end in the cause (and its causality), a concept must first be the ground of what the thing is supposed to be, and, since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with its inner determination as an end is the perfection of the thing, in the judging of the beauty of art the perfection of the thing will also have to be taken into account, which is not even a question in the judging of a natural beauty (as such). – To be sure, in the judging especially of living objects in nature, e.g., a human being or a horse, objective purposiveness is also commonly taken into account for judging[c] its beauty; but in that case the judgment is also no longer purely aesthetic, i.e., a mere judgment of taste. Nature is no longer judged as it appears as art, but to the extent that it really is art (albeit superhuman); and the teleological judgment serves as the foun-
5: 312 dation for the aesthetic and as a condition of which the latter must take account. In such a case, if, e.g., it is said "That is a beautiful woman," then in fact one thinks nothing other than that in her figure nature represents the ends in the feminine physique beautifully, for it is necessary to look beyond the mere form to a concept with which the object is thought in such a way through a logically conditioned aesthetic judgment.

Beautiful art displays its excellence precisely by describing beautifully things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The furies, diseases, devastations of war, and the like can, as harmful things, be very beautifully described, indeed even represented in painting; only one kind of ugliness cannot be represented in a way adequate to nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, hence beauty in art, namely, that which arouses **loathing.** For since in this strange sensation, resting on sheer imagination, the object is represented as if it were imposing the enjoyment which we are nevertheless forcibly resisting, the artistic representation of the object is no longer distinguished in our sensation itself from the nature of the object itself, and it then becomes impossible for the former to be taken as beautiful. The art of sculpture, since in its products art is almost confused with nature, has

[a] *beurtheilen*; except where noted, further forms of the verb "to judge" in this paragraph are translations of this verb.

[b] *Beurtheilung*; all occurrences of the noun "judging" throughout the rest of this paragraph translate this term.

[c] *urtheilen*

also excluded the representation of ugly objects from its images,[a] and thus permits, e.g., death (in a beautiful genius) or the spirit of war (in the person of Mars) to be represented through an allegory or attributes that look pleasing, hence only indirectly by means of an interpretation of reason, and not for the aesthetic power of judgment alone.[41]

So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is really only the form of the presentation of a concept by means of which the latter is universally communicated. – To give this form to the product of beautiful art, however, requires merely taste, to which the artist, after he has practiced and corrected it by means of various examples of art or nature, holds up his work, and after many, often laborious attempts to satisfy it, finds the form that contents him; hence this is not as it were a matter of inspiration or a free swing of the mental powers, but a slow and indeed painstaking improvement, in order to let it become adequate to the thought and yet not detrimental to the freedom in the play of the mental powers. 5: 313

Taste, however, is merely a faculty for judging,[b] not a productive faculty; and what is in accordance with it is for that very reason not a work of beautiful art, although it can be a product belonging to a useful and mechanical art or even to science, conforming to determinate rules which can be learned and which must be precisely followed. But the pleasing form which one gives to it is only the vehicle of communication and a manner, as it were, of presentation, in regard to which one still remains[c] to a certain extent free, even if one is otherwise bound to a determinate end. Thus one demands that table settings, or a moral treatise, or even a sermon must have in themselves this form of beautiful art, though without seeming **studied**; but they are not on this account called works of beautiful art. Among the latter, however, are counted a poem, a piece of music, a picture gallery, and so on; and there, in one would-be work of beautiful art, one can often perceive genius without taste, while in another, taste without genius.

§ 49.
On the faculties of the mind that constitute genius.

One says of certain products, of which it is expected that they ought, at least in part, to reveal themselves as beautiful art, that they are without **spirit**, even though one finds nothing in them to criticize as far as taste is concerned. A poem can be quite pretty and elegant, but

[a] *Bildungen*
[b] *Beurtheilungs-*
[c] In the first edition, "is" (*ist*) instead of "remains" (*bleibt*).

without **spirit.** A story is accurate and well organized, but without spirit. A solemn oration is thorough and at the same time flowery, but without spirit. Many a conversation is not without entertainment, but is still without spirit; even of a woman one may well say that she is pretty, talkative and charming, but without spirit. What is it then that is meant here by "spirit"?

Spirit, in an aesthetic significance, means the animating principle in the mind. That, however, by which this principle animates the soul, the material which it uses for this purpose, is that which purposively sets the mental powers into motion, i.e., into a play that is self-maintaining and even strengthens the powers to that end.[42]

5: 314 Now I maintain that this principle is nothing other than the faculty for the presentation of **aesthetic ideas;** by an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., **concept,** to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible. – One readily sees that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an **idea of reason,** which is, conversely, a concept to which no **intuition** (representation of the imagination) can be adequate.

The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too mundane to us; we transform the latter, no doubt always in accordance with analogous laws, but also in accordance with principles that lie higher in reason (and which are every bit as natural to us as those in accordance with which the understanding apprehends empirical nature); in this we feel our freedom from the law of association (which applies to the empirical use of that faculty), in accordance with which material can certainly be lent to us by nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond nature.

One can call such representations of the imagination **ideas:**[43] on the one hand because they at least strive toward something lying beyond the bounds of experience, and thus seek to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason (of intellectual ideas), which gives them the appearance of an objective reality; on the other hand, and indeed principally, because no concept can be fully adequate to them, as inner intuitions. The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc., as well as to make that of which there are examples in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame, etc., sensible beyond the limits of experience, with a completeness that goes beyond anything of which there is an example in nature, by means

of an imagination that emulates the precedent of reason in attaining to a maximum; and it is really the art of poetry in which the faculty of aesthetic ideas can reveal itself in its full measure. This faculty, however, considered by itself alone, is really only a talent (of the imagination).

Now if we add to a concept a representation of the imagination that belongs to its presentation, but which by itself stimulates so much thinking that it can never be grasped in a determinate concept, hence which aesthetically enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way, then in this case the imagination is creative, and sets the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into motion, that is, at the instigation of a representation it gives more to think about than can be grasped and made distinct in it (although it does, to be sure, belong to the concept of the object). 5: 315

Those forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself, but, as supplementary representations of the imagination, express only the implications connected with it and its affinity with others, are called (aesthetic) **attributes** of an object whose concept, as an idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented. Thus Jupiter's eagle, with the lightning in its claws, is an attribute of the powerful king of heaven, as is the peacock of the splendid queen of heaven. They do not, like **logical attributes**, represent what lies in our concepts of the sublimity and majesty of creation, but something else, which gives the imagination cause to spread itself over a multitude of related representations, which let one think more than one can express in a concept determined by words; and they yield an **aesthetic idea**, which serves that idea of reason instead of logical presentation, although really only to animate the mind by opening up for it the prospect of an immeasurable field of related representations. Beautiful art, however, does this not only in painting or sculpture (where the names of the attributes are commonly used); rather, poetry and oratory also derive the spirit which animates their works solely from the aesthetic attributes of the objects, which go alongside the logical ones, and give the imagination an impetus to think more, although in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept, and hence in a determinate linguistic expression. – For the sake of brevity, I must limit myself to only a few examples.

When the great king expressed himself in one of his poems thus: "Let us depart from life without grumbling and without regretting anything, leaving the world behind us replete with good deeds. Thus does the sun, after it has completed its daily course, still spread a gentle light across the heavens; and the last rays that it sends forth into the sky are its last sighs for the well-being of the world,"[H] he animates his idea of reason of a cosmopolitan disposition even at the end of life by 5: 316

means of an attribute that the imagination (in the recollection of everything agreeable in a beautiful summer day, drawn to a close, which a bright evening calls to mind) associates with that representation, and which arouses a multitude of sensations and supplementary representations for which no expression is found. Conversely, even an intellectual concept can serve as the attribute of a representation of sense, and so animate the latter by means of the idea of the supersensible; but only insofar as the aesthetic, which is subjectively attached to the consciousness of the latter, is used to this end. Thus, e.g., a certain poet says in the description of a beautiful morning: "The sun streamed forth, as tranquillity streams from virtue."[45] The consciousness of virtue, when one puts oneself, even if only in thought, in the place of a virtuous person, spreads in the mind a multitude of sublime and calming feelings, and a boundless prospect into a happy future, which no expression that is adequate to a determinate concept fully captures.*

In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language.

The mental powers, then, whose union (in a certain relation) constitutes **genius**, are imagination and understanding. Only in the use of the imagination for cognition, the imagination is under the constraint of the understanding and is subject to the limitation of being adequate
5: 317 to its concept; in an aesthetic respect, however, the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord with the concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding, of which the latter took no regard in its concept, but which it applies, not so much objectively, for cognition, as subjectively, for the animation of the cognitive powers, and thus also indirectly to cognitions; thus genius really consists in the happy relation, which no science can teach and no diligence learn, of finding ideas for a given concept on the one hand and on the other hitting upon the **expression** for these, through which the subjective disposition of the mind that is thereby produced, as an accompaniment

5: 316 * Perhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, or any thought more sublimely expressed, than in the inscription over the temple of **Isis** (Mother **Nature**): "I am all that is, that was, and that will be, and my veil no mortal has removed." **Segner** made use of this idea by means of a vignette, **rich in sense**, placed at the beginning of his theory of nature, in order at the outset to fill his pupil, whom he was ready to lead into this temple, with the holy fear that should dispose the mind to solemn attentiveness.[46]

of a concept, can be communicated to others. The latter talent is really that which is called spirit, for to express what is unnameable in the mental state in the case of a certain representation and to make it universally communicable, whether the expression consist in language, or painting, or in plastic art – that requires a faculty for apprehending the rapidly passing play of the imagination and unifying it into a concept (which for that very reason is original and at the same time discloses a new rule, which could not have been deduced from any antecedent principles or examples), which can be communicated without the constraint of rules.[a]

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If, after these analyses, we look back to the explanation given above of what is called **genius**, then we find: **first**, that it is a talent for art, not for science, in which rules that are distinctly cognized must come first and determine the procedure in it; **second**, that, as a talent for art, it presupposes a determinate concept of the product, as an end, hence understanding, but also a representation (even if indeterminate) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, for the presentation of this concept, hence a relation of the imagination to the understanding; **third**, that it displays itself not so much in the execution of the proposed end in the presentation of a determinate **concept** as in the exposition or the expression of **aesthetic ideas**, which contain rich material for that aim, hence the imagination, in its freedom from all guidance by rules, is nevertheless represented as purposive for the presentation of the given concept; finally, **fourth**, that the unsought and unintentional subjective purposiveness in the free correspondence of the imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding presupposes a proportion and disposition of this faculty that cannot be produced by any following of rules, whether of science or of mechanical imitation, but that only the nature of the subject can produce.[47] 5: 318

According to these presuppositions, genius is the exemplary originality of the natural endowment of a subject for the **free** use of his cognitive faculties. In this way the product of a genius (in respect of that in it which is to be ascribed to genius, not to possible learning or schooling) is an example, not for imitation (for then that which is genius in it and constitutes the spirit of the work would be lost),[b] but for emulation by another genius, who is thereby awakened to the feeling of his own originality, to exercise freedom from coercion in his

[a] The words "of rules" were added in the second edition.
[b] In the second edition, *verlorengehen*; in the first, *wegfallen* (disappear).

art in such a way that the latter thereby itself acquires a new rule, by which the talent shows itself as exemplary. But since the genius is a favorite of nature, the likes of which one has to regard as only a rare phenomenon, his example for other good minds gives rise to a school, i.e., a methodical instruction in accordance with rules, insofar as it has been possible to extract them from those products of spirit and their individuality; and for these beautiful art is to that extent imitation, to which nature gave the rule through a genius.

But this imitation becomes **aping** if the student **copies** everything, even down to that which the genius had to leave in, as a deformity, only because it could not easily have been removed without weakening the idea. This courage is a merit only in a genius, and a certain **boldness** in expression and in general some deviation from the common rule is well suited to him, but is by no means worthy of imitation, but always remains in itself a defect which one must seek to remove, but for which[a] the genius is as it were privileged, since what is inimitable in the impetus of his spirit would suffer from anxious caution. **Mannerism** is another sort of aping, namely that of mere **individuality** (originality) in general, in order to distance oneself as far as possible from imitators, yet without having the talent thereby to be **exemplary** at the same time. – There are in general, to be sure, two ways (*modus*) of putting thoughts together in a presentation, one of which is called a **manner** (*modus aestheticus*) and the other of which is called a **method**
5: 319 (*modus logicus*), which differ from each other in that the former has no other standard than the **feeling** of unity in the presentation, while the latter follows determinate **principles** in this; for beautiful art, therefore, only the first is valid. But one calls a product of art **mannered** only if the presentation of its idea in that product is **aimed** at singularity rather than being made adequate to the idea. The ostentatious (precious), the stilted and the affected, intended only to distinguish oneself from the vulgar[b] (but without any spirit), are like the behavior of someone of whom it is said that he is fond of the sound of his own voice, or who stands and moves as if he were on a stage, in order to be gaped at, which always betrays a bungler.

§ 50.
On the combination of taste with genius in products of beautiful art.[48]

If the question is whether in matters of beautiful art it is more important whether genius or taste is displayed, that is the same as asking

[a] In the first edition, "for the likes of which" (*dergleichen*).
[b] *dem Gemeinen*

whether imagination or the power of judgment counts for more in them. Now since it is in regard to the first of these that an art deserves to be called **inspired,**[a] but only in regard to the second that it deserves to be called a **beautiful** art, the latter, at least as an indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*), is thus the primary thing to which one must look in the judging[b] of art as beautiful art. To be rich and original in ideas is not as necessary for the sake of beauty as is the suitability of the imagination in its freedom to the lawfulness of the understanding. For all the richness of the former produces, in its lawless freedom, nothing but nonsense; the power of judgment, however, is the faculty for bringing it in line with the understanding.

Taste, like the power of judgment in general, is the discipline (or corrective) of genius, clipping its wings and making it well behaved or polished; but at the same time it gives genius guidance as to where and how far it should extend itself if it is to remain purposive; and by introducing clarity and order into the abundance of thoughts it makes the ideas tenable, capable of an enduring and universal approval, of enjoying a posterity among others and in an ever progressing culture. Thus if anything must be sacrificed in the conflict of the two properties in one product, it must rather be on the side of genius: and the power 5: 320
of judgment, which in matters of beautiful art makes its pronouncements on the basis of its own principles, will sooner permit damage to the freedom and richness of the imagination than to the understanding.

For beautiful art, therefore, **imagination, understanding, spirit** and **taste** are requisite.*

§ 51.
On the division of the beautiful arts.[50]

Beauty (whether it be beauty of nature or of art) can in general be called the **expression** of aesthetic ideas:[51] only in beautiful art this idea must be occasioned by a concept of the object, but in beautiful nature the mere reflection on a given intuition, without a concept of what the object ought to be, is sufficient for arousing and

* The first three faculties first achieve their **unification** through the fourth. 5: 320
Hume in his history gives the English to understand that, although in their works they do not yield anything to any nation in the world with regard to evidence of the first three properties considered **separately**, nevertheless in that which unifies them they must come in second to their neighbors, the French.[49]

[a] *geistreiche*
[b] *Beurtheilung*

communicating the idea of which that object is considered as the **expression.**

Thus if we wish to divide the beautiful arts, we can, at least as an experiment, choose no easier principle than the analogy of art with the kind of expression that people use in speaking in order to communicate to each other, i.e., not merely their concepts, but also their sensations.* – This consists in the **word**, the **gesture**, and the **tone** (articulation, gesticulation, and modulation). Only the combination of these three kinds of expression constitutes the speaker's complete communication. For thought, intuition, and sensation are thereby conveyed to the other simultaneously and united.

5: 321 There are thus only three kinds of beautiful arts: the art of **speech**, **pictorial** art,[a] and the art **of the play of sensations** (as external sensory impressions). One could also arrange this division as a dichotomy, so that beautiful art would be divided into that of the expression of thoughts or of intuitions, and the latter in turn in accordance with their form or their matter (of sensation). But then it would look too abstract and not as suitable to ordinary concepts.

1) The arts of **speech** are **rhetoric** and **poetry. Rhetoric** is the art of conducting a business of the understanding as a free play of the imagination; **poetry** that of carrying out a free play of the imagination as a business of the understanding.[52]

The **orator** thus announces a matter of business and carries it out as if it were merely a **play** with ideas in order to entertain the audience.[b] The **poet** announces merely an entertaining **play** with ideas, and yet as much results for the understanding as if he had merely had the intention of carrying on its business. The combination and harmony of the two cognitive faculties, the sensibility and the understanding, which to be sure cannot manage without each other but which nevertheless cannot readily be united with each other without constraint and mutual harm, must seem to be unintentional and to happen on their own; otherwise it is not **beautiful** art. Hence everything contrived and laborious in it must be avoided; for beautiful art must be free art in a double sense: it must not be a matter of remuneration, a labor whose magnitude can be judged,[c] enforced, or paid for in accor-

5: 320 * The reader will not judge of[d] this outline for a possible division of the beautiful arts as if it were a deliberate theory. It is only one of the several experiments that still can and should be attempted.

[a] *die bildende Kunst*
[b] *Zuschauer*; in the first edition, *Zuhörer* (listeners).
[c] *beurtheilen*
[d] *beurtheilen*

dance with a determinate standard; but also, while the mind is certainly occupied, it must feel itself to be satisfied and stimulated (independently of remuneration) without looking beyond to another end.

The orator thus certainly provides something which he does not promise, namely an entertaining play of the imagination; but he also takes something away from what he does promise, namely the purposive occupation of the understanding. The poet, by contrast, promises little and announces a mere play with ideas, but accomplishes something that is worthy of business, namely providing nourishment to the understanding in play, and giving life to its concepts through the imagination: hence the former basically provides less than he promises, the latter more.[a]

2) The **pictorial** arts or those of the expression of ideas in **sensible intuition** (not through representations of the mere imagination, which are evoked through words) are either those of **sensible truth** or of **sensible illusion.**[53] The first are called the **plastic** arts, the second **painting.** Both make shapes in space into expressions of ideas: the former makes shapes knowable by two senses, sight and feeling (although in the case of the latter, to be sure, without regard to beauty), the latter only for the first of these. The aesthetic idea (archetype, prototype[b]) is for both grounded in the imagination; the shape, however, which constitutes its expression (ectype, afterimage)[c] is given either in its corporeal extension (as the object itself exists) or in accordance with the way in which the latter is depicted in the eye (in accordance with its appearance[d] on a plane); or else, whatever the former is, either the relation to a real end or just the appearance[e] of one is made into a condition for reflection. 5: 322

The **plastic** arts, as the first kind of beautiful pictorial arts, include **sculpture** and **architecture.** The **first** is that which presents corporeal concepts of things as they **could exist in nature** (although, as a beautiful art, with regard to aesthetic purposiveness); the **second** is the art of presenting, with this intention but yet at the same time in an aesthetically purposive way, concepts of things that are possible **only through art,** and whose form has as its determining ground not nature but a voluntary end. In the latter a certain **use** of the artistic object is the main thing, to which, as a condition, the aesthetic ideas are restricted. In the former the mere **expression** of aesthetic ideas is the chief aim. Thus statues of humans, gods, animals, etc., are of the first

[a] The clause following the colon was added in the second edition.
[b] *Archetypon, Urbild*
[c] *Nachbild*
[d] *Apparenz*
[e] *Anschein*

sort; but temples, magnificent buildings for public gatherings, as well as dwellings, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs, and the like, erected as memorials, belong to architecture. Indeed, all domestic furnishings (the work of the carpenter and the like things for use) can be counted as belonging[a] to the latter, because the appropriateness of the product to a certain use is essential in a **work of architecture,**[b] while by contrast a mere **picture,**[c] which is made strictly for viewing and is to please for itself, is, as a corporeal presentation, a mere imitation of nature, though with respect to aesthetic ideas: where, then, **sensible truth** should not go so far that it stops looking like art and a product of the power of choice.

5: 323 The **art of the painter**, as the second kind of pictorial art, which presents **sensible illusion** in artful combination with ideas, I would divide into that of the beautiful **depiction** of nature and that of the beautiful **arrangement** of its **products.** The first would be **painting proper**, the second **the art of pleasure gardens.** For the former gives only the illusion of corporeal extension; the latter certainly gives this in truth, but gives only the illusion of employment and use for ends other than merely the play of the imagination in the viewing of its forms.* The latter is nothing other than the decoration of the ground with the same variety (grasses, flowers, bushes and trees, even

5: 323 * That the art of pleasure gardens could be considered as a kind of painting, although of course it presents its forms corporeally, seems strange; but since it actually takes its forms from nature (the trees, bushes, grasses and flowers from woods and field, at least to begin with), and to that extent is not an art like the plastic arts, and also has no concept of the object and its end (as in architecture) as the condition of its arrangement, but merely the free play of the imagination in the contemplation, to that extent it coincides with merely aesthetic painting, which has no determinate theme (which puts air, land, and water together by means of light and shadows in an entertaining way). – In general, the reader is to judge[d] this only as an attempt to judge of[e] the combination of the beautiful arts under one principle, which in this case is to be that of the expression of aesthetic ideas (in accordance with the analogy[f] of a language), and not regard it as a derivation of them that is meant to be definitive.[54]

[a] Reading *gezählt*, with the first edition, rather than *gewählt* (chosen) with the second.
[b] *Bauwerks*
[c] *Bildwerk*
[d] *beurtheilen*
[e] *beurtheilen*
[f] Reading *Analogie*, with the first edition, rather than *Anlage* (predisposition) with the second and third.

water, hills and valleys) with which nature presents it to intuition, only arranged differently and suited to certain ideas. The beautiful arrangement of corporeal things, however, is also given only for the eye, like painting; the sense of touch, however, cannot furnish any intuitable representation of such a form. To painting in the broad sense I would also assign the decoration of rooms by means of wallpaper, moldings, and all kinds of beautiful furnishings, which merely serve to be **viewed**; likewise the art of dressing with taste (rings, pill boxes, etc.).[a] For a terrace with all kinds of flowers, a room with all sorts of decorations (even including the finery of the ladies) constitute, at a splendid party, a kind of painting, which, just like painting properly so called (which does not have the aim, say, of **teaching** history or knowledge of nature), is there merely to be viewed,[b] in order to entertain the imagination in free play with ideas and to occupy the power of aesthetic judgment without a determinate end. The work in all these decorations may be, mechanically, quite different, and require very different artists; but the judgment of taste concerning what is beautiful in this art is determined in a single way: namely, to judge of[c] only the forms (without regard to an end) as they are offered to the eye, individually or in their interconnection, in accordance with the effect that they have on the imagination. – But how pictorial art can be counted (by analogy) as gesture in a language is justified by the fact that the spirit of the artist gives a corporeal expression through these shapes to what and how he has thought, and makes the thing itself speak as it were in mime: a very common play of our fantasy, which attributes to lifeless things, in accordance with their form, a spirit that speaks from them. 5: 324

3) The art of the **beautiful play of sensations** (which are generated from the outside), which must nevertheless be able to be universally communicated, can concern nothing other than the proportion of the different degrees of the disposition (tension) of the sense to which the sensation belongs, i.e., its tone; and in this extended meaning of the word it can be divided into the artistic play of the sensations[d] of hearing and of sight, and thus into **music** and the **art of colors.**[55] – It is remarkable that these two senses, besides the susceptibility to sensations to the extent that that is required in order to arrive by their means at concepts of external objects, are also capable of a special sensation connected with that, about which it cannot rightly be made

[a] In the first edition there is a comma rather than a period here.
[b] The first edition adds an "and" here.
[c] *beurtheilen*
[d] In the first edition, "play with the tone of the sensation."

out whether it has as its ground sense or reflection; and that this affectability can yet sometimes be lacking, although as far as its use for the cognition of objects is concerned the sense is not at all defective otherwise, but is rather exceptionally acute. That is, one cannot say with certainty whether a color or a tone (sound) is merely agreeable sensations or is in itself already a beautiful play of sensations, which as such involves a satisfaction in the form in aesthetic judging.[a] If one considers the rapidity of the vibrations of the light, or, in the second case, of the air, which probably far exceeds all our capacity for judging[b] immediately in perception the proportion of the division of time, then one would have to believe that it is only the **effect** of these vibrations on the elastic parts of our body that is sensed, but
5: 325 that the **division of time** by means of them is not noticed and drawn into the judging,[c] hence that in the case of colors and tones there is associated only agreeableness, not beauty of their composition. But if one considers, on the contrary, **first**, what can be said mathematically about the proportion of the oscillations in music and of the judging of[d] them, and judges of[e] contrasts among colors, as is appropriate, in analogy with the latter, and if one takes into account, **second**, those admittedly rare examples of human beings who, with the best sight in the world, cannot distinguish colors and, with the most acute hearing, cannot distinguish tones, and also, for those who can do this, the perception of an altered quality (not merely of the degree of the sensation) in various positions on the scale of colors or tones, and further that the number of these is determinate for **comprehensible** distinctions: then one may see oneself as compelled to regard the sensations of both not as mere sensory impressions, but as the effect of a judging of[f] the form in the play of many sensations.[56] The difference between the one or the other opinion in the judging of[g] music, however, would only alter the definition to this extent, that it would be explained, as we have done, as the beautiful play of sensations (through hearing), or as **agreeable** sensations. Only on the first definition would music be represented completely as a **beautiful** art; on the second, however, it would be represented as an **agreeable** art (at least in part).

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *zu beurtheilen*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *Beurtheilung*
[e] *beurtheilt*
[f] *Beurtheilung*
[g] *Beurtheilung*

§ 52.
On the combination of the beautiful arts in one and the same product.

Rhetoric can be combined with a painterly presentation of its subjects as well as objects in a **play**; poetry with music in **song**; this, in turn, with a painterly (theatrical) presentation in an **opera**; the play of the sensations in a piece of music with the play of shapes in **dance**, etc. Further, the presentation of the sublime, so far as it belongs to beautiful art, can be united with beauty in a **verse tragedy**, a **didactic poem**, an **oratorio**; and in these combinations beautiful art is all the more artistic, although whether it is also more beautiful (since so many different kinds of satisfaction are crisscrossed with each other) can be doubted in some of these cases. Yet in all beautiful art what is essential 5: 326
consists in the form, which is purposive for observation and judging,[a] where the pleasure is at the same time culture and disposes the spirit to ideas, hence makes it receptive to several sorts of pleasure and entertainment – not in the matter of the sensation (the charm or the emotion), where it is aimed merely at enjoyment, which leaves behind it nothing in the idea, and makes the spirit dull, the object by and by[b] loathsome, and the mind, because it is aware that its disposition is contrapurposive in the judgment of reason, dissatisfied with itself and moody.

If the beautiful arts are not combined, whether closely or at a distance, with moral ideas, which alone carry with them a self-sufficient satisfaction, then the latter is their ultimate fate. They then serve only for diversion, which one increasingly needs the more one uses them to banish the mind's dissatisfaction with itself, by which one makes oneself ever more useless and dissatisfied with oneself. In general, the beauties of nature are most compatible with the first aim if one has become accustomed early to observing, judging,[c] and admiring them.

§ 53.
Comparison of the aesthetic value of the beautiful arts with each other.[57]

The **art of poetry** (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius, and will be guided least by precept or example) claims the highest rank of all.[58] It expands the mind by setting the imagination free and present-

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] The words "by and by" (*nach und nach*) were added in the second edition.
[c] *zu beurtheilen*

ing, within the limits of a given concept and among the unbounded manifold of forms possibly agreeing with it, the one that connects its presentation with a fullness of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate, and thus elevates itself aesthetically to the level of ideas. It strengthens the mind by letting it feel its capacity[a] to consider and judge of[b] nature, as appearance, freely, self-actively, and independently of determination by nature, in accordance with points of view that nature does not present by itself in experience either for sense or for the understanding, and thus to use it for the sake of and
5: 327 as it were as the schema of the supersensible. It plays with the illusion which it produces at will, yet without thereby being deceitful; for it itself declares its occupation to be mere play, which can nevertheless be purposively employed by the understanding for its own business. – Rhetoric, insofar as by that is understood the art of persuasion, i.e., of deceiving by means of beautiful illusion (as an *ars oratoria*), and not merely skill in speaking (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from the art of poetry only as much as is necessary to win minds over to the advantage of the speaker before they can judge[c] and to rob them of their freedom; thus it cannot be recommended either for the courtroom or for the pulpit. For when it is a matter of civil laws concerning the rights of individual persons, or of the lasting instruction and determination of minds to correct knowledge and conscientious observation of their duty, then it is beneath the dignity of such an important business to allow even a trace of exuberance of wit and imagination to be glimpsed, let alone of the art of persuasion and taking someone in for the advantage of someone else.[d] For even if it can sometimes be applied to purposes that are in themselves legitimate and praiseworthy, it is nevertheless still objectionable that the maxims and dispositions be subjectively corrupted in this way, even if the deed is objectively lawful: for it is not enough to do what is right, but it is also to be performed solely on the ground that it is right. Further, the merely distinct concept of these sorts of human affairs, combined with a lively presentation in examples, and without offense against the rules of euphony in speech or of propriety in expression, for ideas of reason (which together constitute eloquence), already has in itself sufficient influence on human minds, without[e] it being necessary also to bring to bear the machinery of persuasion, which, since it can also be used

[a] *Vermögen*
[b] *zu beurtheilen*
[c] *vor der Beurtheilung*
[d] In the first edition, this period was a comma, and the sentence continued, "which, even though . . ."
[e] Following the first edition, reading *ohne daß* instead of *als daß*.

for glossing over or concealing vice and error, can never entirely eradicate the deep-seated suspicion of artful trickery. In poetry, everything proceeds honestly and uprightly. It declares that it will conduct a merely entertaining play with the imagination, and indeed concerning form, in concord with the laws of the understanding, and does not demand that the understanding be deceived and embroiled through sensible presentation.*

After poetry, I would, **if what is at issue is charm and movement of the mind,** place that which comes closest to it among the arts of speech and may also very naturally be united with it, namely **the art of tone.** For, although of course it speaks through mere sensations without concepts, and hence does not, like poetry, leave behind something for reflection, yet it moves the mind in more manifold and, though only temporarily, in deeper ways; but it is, to be sure, more enjoyment than culture (the play of thought that is aroused by it in passing is merely the effect of an as it were mechanical association); and it has, judged[a] by reason, less value than any other of the beautiful arts. Hence it demands, like any other enjoyment, frequent change, and cannot bear frequent repetition without inducing antipathy. Its charm, which can be communicated so universally, seems to rest on this: that every expression of language has, in context, a tone that is appropriate to its sense; that this tone more or less designates an affect of the speaker and conversely also produces one in the hearer, which then in turn arouses in the latter the idea that is expressed in the language by 5: 328

* I must confess that a beautiful poem has always given me a pure enjoyment, whereas reading the best speech of a Roman popular speaker or a contemporary speaker in parliament or the pulpit has always been mixed with the disagreeable feeling of disapproval of a deceitful art, which understands how to move people, like machines, to a judgment in important matters which must lose all weight for them in calm reflection. Eloquence and well-spokenness (together, rhetoric) belong to beautiful art; but the art of the orator (*ars oratoria*), as the art of using the weakness of people for one's own purposes (however well intentioned or even really good these may be) is not worthy of any **respect** at all. Further, both in Athens and in Rome it reached its highest level only at a time when the state was rushing toward its ruin and a truly patriotic way of thinking had been extinguished. He who has at his command, along with clear insight into the facts, language in all its richness and purity, and who, along with a fruitful imagination capable of presenting his ideas, feels a lively sympathy for the true good, is the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*,[b] the speaker without art but full of vigor, as **Cicero** would have him, though he did not himself always remain true to this ideal.[19] 5: 327 5: 328

[a] *beurtheilt*

[b] the good man, powerful in speech

means of such a tone; and that, just as modulation is as it were a language of sensations universally comprehensible to every human being, the art of tone puts that language into practice for itself alone, in all its force, namely as a language of the affects, and so, in accordance with the law of association, universally communicates the aesthetic
5: 329 ideas that are naturally combined with it; however, since those aesthetic ideas are not concepts nor determinate thoughts, the form of the composition of these sensations (harmony and melody) serves only, instead of the form of a language, to express, by means of a proportionate disposition of them (which, since in the case of tones it rests on the relation of the number of the vibrations of the air in the same time, insofar as the tones are combined at the same time or successively, can be mathematically subsumed under certain rules), the aesthetic ideas of a coherent whole of an unutterable fullness of thought, corresponding to a certain theme, which constitutes the dominant affect in the piece. On this mathematical form, although not represented by determinate concepts, alone depends the satisfaction that the mere reflection on such a multitude of sensations accompanying or following one another connects with this play of them as a condition of its beauty valid for everyone; and it is in accordance with it alone that taste may claim for itself a right to pronounce beforehand about the judgment of everyone.

However, mathematics certainly has not the least share in the charm and the movement of the mind that music produces; rather, it is only the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of that proportion of the impressions, in their combination as well as in their alternation, by means of which it becomes possible to grasp them together and to prevent them from destroying one another, so that they instead agree in a continuous movement and animation of the mind by means of consonant affects and hereby in a comfortable self-enjoyment.

If, on the contrary, one estimates the value of the beautiful arts in terms of the culture that they provide for the mind and takes as one's standard the enlargement of the faculties that must join together in the power of judgment for the sake of cognition, then to that extent music occupies the lowest place among the beautiful arts (just as it occupies perhaps the highest place among those that are estimated according to their agreeableness), because it merely plays with sensations. The pictorial arts therefore far surpass it in this respect; for while they set the imagination into a free play that is nevertheless also suitable for the understanding, at the same time they conduct a business by bringing about a product that serves the concepts of the understanding as an enduring and self-recommending vehicle for its unification with sensibility and thus as it were for promoting the urbanity of the higher
5: 330 powers of cognition. The two sorts of arts take completely different paths: the former from sensations to indeterminate ideas, the latter,

however, from determinate ideas to sensations. The latter are of **lasting** impression, the former only of a **transitory** one. The imagination can recall the former and agreeably entertain itself with them; but the latter are either entirely extinguished or, if they are involuntarily recalled by the imagination, are burdensome rather than agreeable to us. Further, there is a certain lack of urbanity in music, in that, primarily because of the character of its instruments, it extends its influence further (into the neighborhood) than is required, and so as it were imposes itself, thus interfering with the freedom of others, outside of the musical circle, which the arts that speak to the eyes do not do, since one need only turn one's eyes away if one would not admit their impression. It is almost the same here as in the case of the delight from a widely pervasive smell. Someone who pulls his perfumed handkerchief out of his pocket treats everyone in the vicinity to it against their will, and forces them, if they wish to breathe, to enjoy it at the same time; hence it has also gone out of fashion.* – Among the pictorial arts, I would give the palm to **painting**, partly because, as the art of drawing, it is the basis of all the other pictorial arts, partly because it can penetrate much further into the region of ideas and also expand the field of intuition in accordance with these much further than is possible for the rest.

Remark[a]

Between that **which pleases merely in the judging**[b] and that which **gratifies** (pleases in the sensation) there is, as we have often shown, an essential difference. The latter is something that one cannot, like the former, require of everyone. Gratification (even if its cause may lie in ideas) always seems to consist in a feeling of the promotion of the total life of the human being, consequently also of bodily well-being, i.e., of health; so that Epicurus, who made out all gratification as at bottom bodily sensation, may to that extent perhaps not have been mistaken, and only misunderstood himself when he counted intellectual and even practical satisfaction as gratification.[61] If one keeps the latter distinction before one's eyes, one can explain how a gratifica- 5: 331

* Those who have recommended the singing of spiritual songs as part of the domestic rites of worship have not considered that by means of such a **noisy** (and precisely for that reason usually pharisaical) form of worship they have imposed a great inconvenience on the public, for they have forced the neighborhood either to join in their singing or to give up their own train of thought.[60] 5: 330

[a] Neither the first nor the second edition print "§ 54" here, although the next section (the first section of the Dialectic) is labeled "§ 55" in both.

[b] *Beurtheilung*

tion can even displease the one who feels[a] it (like the joy of a needy but right-thinking person over the inheritance from his loving but tightfisted father), or how a deep pain can still please the one who suffers it (the sadness of a widow at the death of her praiseworthy husband), or how a gratification can in addition please (like that in the sciences that we pursue) or a pain (e.g., hatred, envy, or vengefulness) can in addition displease us. The satisfaction or dissatisfaction here rests on reason, and is the same as **approval** or **disapproval**; gratification and pain, however, can rest only on the feeling or the prospect (whatever its basis might be) of a possible state of **well-** or **ill-being.**

All changing free play of sensations (which is not grounded in any intention) gratifies, because it promotes the feeling of health, whether or not we take satisfaction in the rational judging[b] of its object and even in this gratification; and this gratification can rise to the level of an affect, although we take no interest in the object itself, at least not one that would be proportionate to the degree of the latter.[62] We can divide it into the **play of chance,** the **play of tone,** and the **play of thoughts.** The **first** requires an **interest,** whether it be of vanity or of selfishness, which is, however, far from as great as the interest in the way in which we seek to satisfy it; the **second** requires merely the change of **sensations,** each of which has its relation to affect, but not the degree of an affect, and arouses aesthetic ideas; the **third** arises merely from the change in the representations, in the faculty of judgment, by means of which, to be sure, no thought that involves any sort of interest is generated, but the mind is nevertheless animated.

How gratifying these games[c] must be, without there being any need to ground them in an interested intention, is shown by all of our evening social gatherings, for without games hardly anyone finds these entertaining. But the
5: 332 affects of hope, of fear, of joy, of anger, of scorn are here at play, changing their role every moment,[d] and are so lively that as a result the entire business of bodily life, as an inner motion, seems to be promoted, as is proved by the cheerfulness of mind that is thereby generated, even though nothing has been either gained or learned. But since games of chance are not a beautiful play,[e] we shall here set it aside. By contrast,[f] music and material for laughter are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas or even representations of the understanding, by which in the end nothing is thought, and which can gratify merely through their change, and nevertheless do so in a lively fashion;[g] by which they make it fairly evident that the animation in both cases is merely corporeal, although it is aroused by ideas of the mind, and that the feeling of health resulting from a movement of the viscera corresponding to that play constitutes the whole gratification in a lively party, which is extolled as so refined and spirited.[h] It is

[a] *empfindet*
[b] *Vernunftbeurtheilung*
[c] *die Spiele*
[d] In the first edition, Kant says simply "changing every moment."
[e] *das Glücksspiel kein schönes Spiel ist*
[f] *Hingegen*; the first edition reads *aber* (however).
[g] In the first edition, "and can gratify in a lively fashion merely through their change."
[h] *geistvoll*

not the judging[a] of the harmonies in tones or sallies of wit, which with their beauty serve only as the necessary vehicle, but the promotion of the business of life in the body, the affect which moves the viscera and the diaphragm, in a word the feeling of health (which otherwise cannot be felt without such a stimulus), which constitutes the gratification in which one discovers that one can get at the body even through the soul and use the latter as the doctor for the former.

In music, this play proceeds from the sensation of the body to aesthetic ideas (of the objects for affects), and then from them back again, but with united force, to the body. In the joke (which like music deserves to be counted as agreeable rather than as beautiful art) the play begins with thoughts which, as a whole, insofar as they are to be expressed sensibly, also occupy the body; and since the understanding, in this presentation in which it does not find what was expected, suddenly relaxes, ones feels the effect of this relaxation in the body through the oscillation[b] of the organs, which promotes the restoration of their balance and has a beneficial influence on health.

In everything that is to provoke a lively, uproarious laughter, there must be something nonsensical (in which, therefore, the understanding in itself can take no satisfaction). **Laughter is an affect resulting from the sudden transformation of a heightened expectation into nothing.**[63] This very transformation, which is certainly nothing enjoyable for the understanding, is nevertheless indirectly enjoyable and, for a moment, very lively. The cause must thus consist 5: 333
in the influence of the representation on the body and its reciprocal effect on the mind; certainly not insofar as the representation is objectively an object of gratification[c] (for how can a disappointed expectation be gratifying?), but rather solely through the fact that as a mere play of representations it produces an equilibrium[d] of the vital powers in the body.

If someone tells this story: An Indian, at the table of an Englishman in Surat,[64] seeing a bottle of ale being opened and all the beer, transformed into foam, spill out, displayed his great amazement with many exclamations, and in reply to the Englishman's question "What is so amazing here?" answered, "I'm not amazed that it's coming out, but by how you got it all in," we laugh, and it gives us a hearty pleasure: not because we find ourselves cleverer than this ignorant person, or because of any other pleasing thing that the understanding allows us to note here, but because our expectation was heightened and suddenly disappeared into nothing. Or if the heir of a rich relative wants to arrange a properly solemn funeral for him, but laments that he cannot get it quite right, because (he says), "The more money I give my mourners to look sad, the merrier they look," then we laugh out loud, and the reason is that an expectation is suddenly transformed into nothing. Note that it must not be transformed into the positive opposite[e] of an expected object – for that is

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] In the first edition, this word (*Schwingung*) is in the plural.
[c] The first edition here includes the clause, omitted from the second edition, "as in the case of one who receives news of a great profit in business."
[d] *Gleichgewicht*; in the first edition, "play" (*Spiel*).
[e] The word "positive" (*positive*) was added in the second edition.

always something, and can often be distressing – but into nothing. For if in telling us a story someone arouses a great expectation and at its conclusion we immediately see its untruth, that is displeasing, like, e.g., the story of people whose hair is supposed to have turned gray in a single night because of a great grief. By contrast, if in response to such a story another joker tells a very elaborate story about the grief of a merchant who, returning from India to Europe with all his fortune in merchandise, was forced to throw it all overboard in a terrible storm, and was so upset that in the very same night his wig turned gray, then we laugh and it gives us gratification, because for a while we toss back and forth like a ball our own misconception about an object that is otherwise indifferent to us, or rather our own idea that we've been chasing,
5: 334 while we were merely trying to grasp and hold it firm. It's not sending a liar or a dummy packing that arouses the gratification here, for even for itself the latter story, told with an assumed seriousness, would move a party to peals of laughter, and the former would not ordinarily even be worthy of attention.[a]

It is noteworthy that in all such cases the joke must always contain something that can deceive for a moment: hence, when the illusion disappears into nothing, the mind looks back again in order to try it once more, and thus is hurried this way and that by rapidly succeeding increases and decreases of tension and set into oscillation: which, because that which as it were struck the string bounces back suddenly (not through a gradual slackening), is bound to cause a movement of the mind and an internal bodily movement[b] in harmony with it, which continues involuntarily, and produces weariness, but at the same time also cheerfulness (the effects of a motion that is beneficial to health).[c]

For if one assumes that all of our thoughts are at the same time harmoniously combined with some kind of movement in the organs of the body, then one will have a fair grasp of how to that sudden shift of the mind, first to one and then to another point of view for considering its object, there can correspond a reciprocal tensing and relaxing of the elastic parts of our viscera, which communicates itself to our diaphragm (like that which ticklish people feel), so that the lungs expel the air with rapidly succeeding pauses, and thus produce a movement that is conducive to health, which alone, and not what goes on in the mind, is the real cause of a gratification in a thought that at bottom represents nothing. – Voltaire said that Heaven has given us two things as a counterweight against the many burdens of life: **hope** and **sleep.**[65] He could also have added **laughter**, if only the means for provoking it in rational people were so readily available, and the wit or originality of fancy requisite for it were not as rare as the talent is frequent for composing works that **break one's head**, like those of mystical brooders, or **break one's neck**, like those of a genius, or **break one's heart**, like those of sentimental novelists (or for that matter moralists of the same kind).

One can thus, it seems to me, grant to Epicurus that all gratification, even

[a] The second edition uses *Aufmerksamkeit* instead of *Mühe* (worth the trouble).
[b] The word "movement" was added in the second edition.
[c] This clause was not enclosed in parentheses in the first edition.

if it is caused by concepts that arouse aesthetic ideas, is **animal**, i.e., bodily sensation,[66] without thereby doing the least damage to the **spiritual** feeling of respect for moral ideas, which is not gratification but self-esteem (of the humanity within us) that elevates us above the need for gratification, without indeed any damage even to the less noble feeling of **taste.** 5: 335

Something with a bit of both is found in **naïveté**, which is the resistance of the uprightness that is originally natural to humanity against the art of pretense that has become second nature.[67] One laughs at the simplicity that still does not understand how to pretend, and yet also rejoices over the simplicity of nature that here thwarts that art. One expects the normal custom[a] of artificial expression carefully aimed at beautiful illusion, and see! it is uncorrupted, innocent nature, which one was not at all prepared to encounter and which he who allows it to be glimpsed did not even intend to expose. That the beautiful but false illusion, which usually means so much in our judgment, is here suddenly transformed into nothing, that as it were the joker in ourselves is exposed, produces the successive movement of the mind in two opposite directions, which at the same time gives the body a healthy shake. But that something that is infinitely better than every assumed custom, namely purity of thought (or at least the predisposition to it), has not been entirely extinguished in human nature, adds seriousness and high esteem to this play of the power of judgment. But because it is an appearance that manifests itself[b] only for a short time, and the curtain of the art of pretense is soon drawn closed again, it also contains an element of regret, which is an emotion of tenderness, that can very well be combined as play with such good-hearted laughter, and which actually usually is combined with it, and at the same time usually compensates the person who provides the material for it for the embarrassment of not being sharp in the ways of men. – An art for being **naive** is thus a contradiction; but it is certainly possible to represent naïveté in a fictional person, and this is a beautiful although also rare art. Naïveté must not be confused with open-hearted simplicity, which does not artificially conceal nature only because it does not understand what the art of social life is.

Along with what is cheerful, closely related to the gratification from laughter, and part of the originality of spirit, but not on that account part of the talent for beautiful art, there may also be reckoned the **capricious** manner. **Caprice** in the good sense signifies the talent of being able to transpose oneself at will into a certain mental disposition in which everything is judged[c] quite differently from what is usual (even completely reversed), and yet in accordance with certain principles of reason in such a mental disposition. Someone who is involuntarily given to such alterations is **subject to caprice,**[d] but someone who can assume them voluntarily and purposively (for the sake of a lively

[a] *Sitte*

[b] The words translated as "that manifests itself" (*sich hervortuende*) were added in the second edition.

[c] *beurtheilt*

[d] *launisch*

presentation by means of a laugh-provoking contrast), such a person and his performance are called **capricious.**[a] This manner however belongs more to agreeable than to beautiful art, because the object of the latter must always display some dignity in itself, and hence requires a certain earnestness in the presentation, just as taste does in its judging.[b]

[a] *launicht*
[b] *Beurtheilung*