

Introduction to the *Critique of Practical Reason*

The second Critique (KpV) is about the relationship between **law** and **happiness**.

Compare Analytic and Dialectic of KpV:

Analytic of KpV excludes concept of happiness from what is known in practical knowledge, the practical concept, first represented as law (the **moral law**)

The Analytic is concerned to exclude happiness from what is known of the law through its three main parts—

- 1 excludes consciousness of happiness from the determining ground of the will
- 2 excludes it from what is in the first instance good
- 3 excludes it from the motive of action

the **Dialectic** by contrast has as its topic the necessary inclusion of happiness in the complete object of practical knowledge

There are two guises of this necessary inclusion:

- 1 the idea of **holiness**—complete subjection of pleasure to consciousness of moral law as exhausting any consciousness of happiness
- 2 **das Reich Gottes**, kingdom of God: knowledge of law as ground for happiness

cf. way in which three transcendental ideas articulate 1 idea of satisfaction of theoretical knowledge

As in the KrV, we wonder, why the dialectic? Why bring in happiness?

We might suppose only 2 objects of the antinomies are present (not freedom which already figures in analytic) but in fact all 3 are there--happiness presuppose freedom

In the transcendental dialectic of KpV we reencounter Freedom, God and immortality of the soul

This because happiness is brought in. Why?

Because desire and happiness were present from the start—happiness is always already related to law

Practical reason is a power, reason as **will**, determining ground of will--reason as species or form of **power of desire**

Desire is a representation through which its subject is the cause of the reality of the object of this very representation--practical reason thus is a form of a power of desire

The **object of desire** is the changeable (cf. Aristotle)

Desire has an object that is not yet (insofar as it is the object of desire)

Desire is the form of representation through which its own idea of what is not yet is realized so as to be

So therein the concept of desire contains the concept of change

If we try to think through formal idea of desire, it is internal to it that it realizes that which it represents at the same time as not yet

Both the not yet and the idea of its overcoming—the idea of its own efficacy/causality

The thought of the causality of desire holds together **distance from what is to be** and **satisfaction**—two poles of a change—it brings what is in line with what is to be

pleasure is the holding together of these two moments (pleasure defined in the the *Critique of Judgment* as consciousness of the causality of a state to maintain itself within itself)
such causality contains the unity of distance and satisfaction—maintenance of pleasure through change requires work/labor

Insofar as **practical reason** is a power of desire and thus is conscious of itself as cause of being of that which it desires it is **pleasure**; Insofar as we consider it as a power it is **happiness**

It's the practicality of practical reason that makes it the case the pleasure must be included

in order for us to think of ourselves as practical reason that thought must manage in some way to comprehend itself as pleasure and happiness--if not the idea of its practicality falls away

Critique of practical reason must thematize the idea of itself as pleasure—that's what the transcendental dialectic does

thinking together law, reason, pleasure, happiness

it's the fundamental principle of the KpV that **law and happiness are not only distinct but opposed**

practical knowledge is not knowledge of what is, it is exclusively knowledge of what is to be--we already encountered idea in KrV that practical knowledge is always sensory

Consciousness of something as existing is sensory, depends on affection--this does not mean that practical knowledge is a form of knowing something to be...

These 2 thoughts—law and happiness distinct and opposed and that practical knowledge (of law) not knowledge of anything as being are the same—but one thought

If per impossibile practical knowledge were knowledge of something as being, it would be happiness

Now we can give an abstract statement of KrV—in empirical judgment I judge things to be thus and so (not otherwise)

The content of what I judge is limited

This limitation in its content is what prevents it from fully satisfying as fully necessary

Transcendental dialectic thinks through incongruence

I judge things to be so—there's the I, the infinite unlimited spontaneous

I think that things are thus and so

Holding them together the object of the transcendental dialectic

Now we have "I want to do A" where A is to be a concept of change

Doing A is a schema to describe someone changing something

This is a limited content: I want to do A

As such a limited content it is incongruent with the concept that knowledge has of itself as unconditionally necessary

to think such a limited content as unconditionally necessary would be to comprehend practical reason

Intro to Hegel Philosophy of Right begins with the I cannot be determined by anything limited

I can step back from everything

I am absolute spontaneity

And then I want to do this and that and the other

How can that be?

How can that make sense?

Seems it cannot

I judge that things are thus and so

How can that make sense?

Seems it cannot

Difference between first 2 critiques

In first the incongruence of what we know with our knowing it, with its being what we know comprehended within self-consciousness

Expressed by saying that what we know are appearances

This incongruence emerges only in transcendental dialectic

In third antinomy says as long as you don't seek to think through cosmological ideas you will find no meaning in the distinction between **appearances and reality**

Only in transcendental dialectic does this difference come to the fore

In KpV that incongruence is the starting point

Here what we know is the limited action that forms the object of our will

It is to be comprehended in an unconditionally necessary act of will