The contributions of American psychologists to war have been substantial and responsive to changes in U.S. national security threats and interests for nearly 100 years. These contributions are identified and discussed for four periods of armed conflict: World Wars I and II, the Cold War, and the Global War on Terror. In contrast, about 50 years ago, psychologists in the United States and around the world broke with the tradition of supporting war and began focusing their scholarship and activism on the prevention of war and promotion of peace. Today, peace psychology is a vibrant area of psychology, with theory and practice aimed at understanding, preventing, and mitigating both episodes of organized violence and the pernicious worldwide problem of structural violence. The growth, scope, and content of peace psychology are reviewed along with contributions to policies that promote peace, social justice, and human well-being.

**Keywords:** peace psychology, negative peace, positive peace, cycle of violence, conflict resolution

Since the beginning of psychology in the United States, psychologists have been interested in war and peace. In 1906, William James delivered an address at Stanford University on “The Moral Equivalent of War” in which he argued for a civic substitute for war that would animate youth with some of the virtues instilled by war including duty, loyalty, and the pursuit of group interests over self-interest (James, 1910/1995). As he was a pacifist, James’s perspective on war was an outlier in the field of psychology, especially when judged against the many and varied contributions of psychologists to war, particularly during the first half of the 20th century. James’s perspective, however, finds a welcome home in the emerging area of peace psychology, which began to take shape during the Cold War (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008; Wessells, 1996). The current review offers a historical overview of the contributions of psychology to war and peace.

**Contributions of Psychology to War**

**World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII)**

Both WWI and WWII created a strong national consensus, and many psychologists were quick to apply their expertise to defend American values (Smith, 1999). As the United States mobilized for WWI in 1917, Robert Yerkes, president of the American Psychological Association (APA), sought and received support from the APA Council of Representatives to develop committees within APA that would gather information on potential applications of psychology to military problems. Yerkes emphasized the desirability of psychologists uniting in the interest of national defense and suggested it was psychologists’ duty to cooperate to the fullest extent possible to increase the efficiency of the Navy and Army (Yerkes, 1921).

Shortly thereafter, Yerkes became chief of the Section of Psychology within the U.S. Army. A central part of his brief was to classify men according to their mental ability in order to balance “mental strength” across companies, regiments, and divisions (Yerkes, 1921). Yerkes was able to draw on the expertise of Lewis Terman and a number of distinguished psychologists who developed the Army Alpha test of mental ability, a multiple-choice test based on an earlier draft by Arthur Otis, one of Terman’s students at Stanford University. While Terman and his team developed materials and methods, Yerkes fought the political battles within the military to convince skeptical commanders that the assessment of intelligence among troops mattered (Keene, 1994). The Army Alpha test did a reasonably good job predicting success in officer training schools and was used widely in the selection of candidates for officer training. Brigadier General Birmingham’s views are representative of officers who were pleased with the testing program:

General scores of drafted men, [and] mentally incompetent [men], have been identified by the psychological tests much earlier in their military careers than would have otherwise occurred. The classification of men according to mental ability, as determined by these examinations, has corresponded in general, in a very striking way with the estimates previously made by officers familiar with them; and many instances could be mentioned where men

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selected for responsible positions, solely on their psychological records, had fully justified that selection. (cited by Yerkes, 1921, p. 24)

Nearly two million recruits (out of four million) were tested in the army, a large number but one that would be dwarfed later by the widespread use of intelligence tests in the civilian sector (Jones, 2007). The classification of mental abilities was complemented by a program designed to match conscripts with specific types of jobs, based primarily on the success of placement tests that were previously used by employers in the prewar period (Lynch, 1968). Eventually, ability testing was integrated with personnel placement; as soon as Army recruits were given an intelligence rating, they were immediately sent to the personnel officer of the camp (Yerkes, 1918).

In addition to contributing to the efficiency of the military, psychologists sought to directly impact the warfighting capacity of soldiers by promoting high morale and motivating them to fight. With the help of Yerkes, Colonel Edward L. Munson of the Medical Corps was able to persuade the upper echelon in the Army of the need to promote morale before Americans sustained high casualties, like their European allies (Keene, 1994; Munson, 1921). Accordingly, the Morale Division was established to boost the morale of soldiers in combat; however, it soon became clear that a more pressing problem was the morale and discipline in training camps. Some of the problems were attributed to personal issues (e.g., soldiers’ concerns about family members back home), but the division also underscored the value of treating newly enlisted men with consideration and thoughtfulness, an approach that emphasized empathy, much to the dismay of some of the more traditionally oriented military officials (Keene, 1994).

WWII ushered in enormous growth in applications of psychology to the war effort largely because the credibility of psychology had been established during WWI and the interwar period (Napoli, 1978). Psychologists were eager to contribute because, on the whole, they viewed WWII as a “good war” that was worthy of a deadly struggle to victory (Smith, 1999). An indication of the breadth of support can be seen in the efforts of Gordon Allport and others to organize the work of psychologists who were members of Division 9 of APA, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (Johnson & Nichols, 1998), an organization more known for its resonance with social responsibility than with the promotion of war. Allport thought social psychologists, in particular, had expertise that could be brought to bear on ways to persuade the public to support the war (Faye, 2011).

As WWII approached and the cost of medical care for the 2.3 million WWII veterans rose, the economic utility of psychologists became apparent, if only to screen conscripts for mental disorders and weed out those who might be most vulnerable (and costly). Neuropsychiatric disorders accounted for approximately 10% of all the costs for medical care, and it was estimated that a large percentage of conscripts had symptoms present at the time of their induction into the military (Cardona & Ritchie, 2006).

Also in anticipation of WWII, psychologists were called upon to work on the Army General Classification Test, a replacement for the Army Alpha test (Harrell, 1992). The purpose of the General Classification Test was to separate recruits into a range of categories depending on how quickly they could be trained. It is estimated that nearly 12,000,000 men, or one fifth of the male population in the United States, took the General Classification Test by the end of WWII (Harrell, 1992). In addition, psychologists developed a host of other tests to measure knowledge of trades as well as academic, mechanical, and clerical aptitudes (Napoli, 1978).

As the United States mobilized for WWII, psychologists worked on President Roosevelt’s rearmament plan, screening and selecting 20,000 trainees from existing Flying Cadet Training Centers. Because nearly all applicants aspired to pilot training, a battery of air-crew classification tests was developed and used to select personnel to be trained for various specialties such as navigation, communications, armament, meteorology, radar operations, and bombardiers (Jones, 2007). The mission of the Army Air Force Psychology Branch was broadened from test development and research to full responsibility for managing all aspects of air-crew selection, classification, and training (Jones, 2007). Psychologists also conducted research on the effects of stress on performance (Napoli, 1978) and on the design of display and control equipment, which led to increases in flight safety (Fitts, 1947).

While WWII catapulted research and practice on “aptitude,” WWII placed the study of attitudes and emotions center stage. Research on newspaper headlines indicated that people were more likely to take an active part in the war when headlines evoked anger rather than fear (Allport & Rhine, 1942) and emphasized American or Allied losses...
rather than gains (Allport & Lepkin, 1943). A sampling of actual newspaper headlines, however, revealed that most were optimistic and emphasized gains. Hence, Allport, Lepkin, and Cahen (1943) published an article in Editor and Publisher urging newspaper editors to frame the news negatively to bolster morale in the populace. There is little evidence that editors were influenced, but the research on headline framing had a direct impact on the Navy’s policy on disclosing casualties to the public (Johnson & Nichols, 1998).

Social psychologists also examined letters written by German citizens and inferred that morale was most affected by small numbers of surprise bombings rather than regular heavy bombing campaigns. Heavy bombing was associated with a “will to resist,” and regular bombing gave the enemy an opportunity to organize daily activities around predictable bombing patterns. Moderate, unpredictable bombing patterns were most effective in preventing lifestyle accommodations and created enough destruction to reduce morale (Johnson & Nichols, 1998), a finding that was lost on the military leaders of the Vietnam War some years later.

The war effort also was promoted by increasing the productivity of factories that fueled the war. U.S. shipyards, in particular, were a growing concern, as German U-boats were highly effective in destroying allied shipping of both war supplies and food across the Atlantic, which was essential for Britain’s survival. Katz and Hyman (1947) conducted survey research on the relationship between working conditions and low levels of productivity and high absenteeism. They suggested shipyard productivity could be enhanced through better working conditions and offered specific recommendations.

By the end of the WWII, the applications of psychology permeated the military, and as Captain Lybrand Palmer Smith of the U.S. Navy noted in the foreword to Bray’s (1948) book Psychology and Military Proficiency, [Psychology] made the ‘man-machine’ a fighting unit more effective in the air, on the land, on the sea, and under the sea. [With the possible exception of work in applied mathematics] I believe that the application of psychology in selecting and training men, and in guiding the design of weapons so they would fit men, did more to help win this war than any other single intellectual activity . . . . Application of scientific methods by psychologists was a great factor in winning World War II. (pp. v–ix)

**Postwar Contributions**

The outlines of U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of WWII began to take shape in February of 1946 when George Kennan, deputy head of the U.S. mission in Moscow, sent a 16-page cable to the U.S. State Department warning that the Soviet Union was inherently an expansionistic power and therefore a threat to U.S. interests around the world (George & Smoke, 1974). Kennan argued for the “policy of containment” to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. His thesis was expanded and published in July 1947 and was quickly adopted by the U.S. foreign policy establishment (Kennan, 1947). Because U.S. policymakers increasingly viewed the world through a bipolar lens that pitted an expansionistic Soviet Union against the United States, deterrence became the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. According to the logic and psychology of deterrence, the United States could best ensure its security by persuading any would-be aggressor that the expected utility of aggression was substantially lower than the expected utility of the status quo (George & Smoke, 1974; Tetlock, 1987). During the ensuing decades, the United States and the Soviet Union became locked in a Cold War, an adversarial relationship in which they concentrated their resources in an arms race, competed for geopolitical influence around the world, and amassed stockpiles of conventional and nuclear weapons.

American psychologists worked closely with government and military officials during the Cold War. Psychologists used familiar tools: survey research, evaluation, training, and education. The core problems addressed were (a) the reduction of fear among military personnel exposed to atomic testing and (b) the assessment of public attitudes toward nuclear issues (Morawski & Goldstein, 1985). In the first instance, psychological research funded by the Department of the Army evaluated the impact of educational units on soldiers’ fear of atomic maneuvers. These educational units decreased soldiers’ anxiety and increased their confidence in carrying out atomic maneuvers and warfare; however, the units did not have a significant impact on soldiers’ willingness to volunteer for a mission that would expose them to radiological hazards (Schwartz & Winograd, 1954). In related educational research, it was suggested that soldiers could develop “battlefield courage” and “moral fiber” or a willingness to sacrifice their lives if they learned in advance of their deployment about the effects of radiation (i.e., preconditioning) and gained some experience with small, tactical nuclear weapons (Rand,
The second area of research, civilian attitudes toward atomic energy and weapons, was important to government officials because of the tension between civilian (including scientists), as opposed to military, control of nuclear weapons (Lanouette, 2009). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, psychologists conducted surveys and found that civilians were well aware of atomic energy and the bomb but had low levels of worry and fear (Cottrell & Eberhart, 1948; Douvan & Withey, 1953). These findings seemed puzzling because research also consistently indicated the public was not sanguine about the United States maintaining a monopoly on atomic weapons or the prospect of international cooperation to control the spread of atomic weapons; moreover, the public judged the probability that atomic weapons would be used within the next 10 years as very likely (Douvan & Withey, 1953). The lack of concern and fear was typically explained by “fear suppression” (i.e., denial rather than absence of fear) and powerlessness among the populace (Douvan & Withey, 1953; Harris, Proshansky, & Raskin, 1956; Morawski & Goldstein, 1985).

As the United States applied the policy of containment and deployed troops in Korea and later in Vietnam, psychologists continued to develop and administer aptitude and placement tests, just as they did during WWII and WWII (Maier, 1993). The Vietnam War, however, was distinguished by “psychological operations” (PSYOPS) on an unprecedented scale. General Westmoreland championed the use of PSYOPS to induce the enemy to behave in ways favorable to U.S. military objectives, and during his tenure, the number of PSYOPS personnel was increased to a total of 500 (Chandler, 1981). As the United States allied itself with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVT) and sought to contain the Communist drive to dominate the GVT, PSYOPS were applied to the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Inducement Program. Chieu Hoi offered amnesty and forgiveness to Vietnamese who voluntarily disarmed and withdrew their support from the Communist movement. PSYOPS promoted the program with over 300 million leaflets, radio and television appeals, and loudspeaker broadcasts. At its peak in 1967, Chieu Hoi induced 17,671 Vietnamese to lay down their arms, about one fifth the number of Vietnamese Communist troops killed or captured during that same year (Hunt, 1995). Bairdain and Bairdain (1971) isolated many of the components responsible for the effectiveness of the program (e.g., using appeals in tandem with combat operations) through structured interviews; however, by the time the results were available, the United States was deescalating the use of combat forces in Vietnam.

PSYOPS has played a role in virtually all military operations since the Vietnam War with some extraordinarily successful campaigns, such as the air-dropped leaflets on Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. The leaflets urged Iraqis to give up and stated clearly how to surrender and the consequences of not surrendering. Military officers believe the PSYOPS campaign, paired with a month of bombing, induced tens of thousands of Iraqis to surrender when U.S. forces entered Kuwait (Dittmann, 2003; Waller, 2001).

**Global War on Terror**

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States went to war, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Both wars have taken a heavy toll on soldiers, many of whom have been rotated between home and combat over an extended period of time. The cumulative effects of stress have been manifest in high levels of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, suicide, and divorce, posing an enormous challenge to mental health professionals (Hoge et al., 2004). From a more narrow military perspective, war stress adversely affects soldiers’ performance, readiness, and personal relationships (Casey, 2011).

In order to contribute to the Global War on Terror and enhance soldiers’ performance and well-being, a new and robust set of programs and collaborative relationships are emerging between psychology and the U.S. Army (Casey, 2011; Seligman & Fowler, 2011). The programs emphasize soldier and community resilience and elevate psychological fitness to the status of physical fitness, which together form a Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program (Cornum, Matthews, & Sullivan, 2011). Based on positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), the Soldier Fitness Program builds on human strengths and virtues (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005) and consists of four components: universal resilience training, assessment and monitoring of individual psychological fitness, training tailored to individual needs (e.g., emotional, social, family, or spiritual), and training of “master resilience trainers” who have regular and frequent contact with soldiers (Cornum et al., 2011). Although the details of the program are beyond the scope of this article, as Seligman and Fowler (2011) saw it in a special issue of the *American Psychological Journal* (January 2011, Vol. 66), once again psychology was positioned to play a role in supporting the military to defend the nation from various threats around the world.

The Global War on Terror also has reinvigorated PSYOPS. Among the lessons learned during the Vietnam War was that PSYOPS are most effective when integrated with combat operations (Hunt, 1995). Today’s “operational psychology” seeks to have a direct impact on the decisions made by commanders in the battlefield. According to Staal and Stephenson (2006),

[Operational psychology employs] … psychological principles and skills to improve a commander’s decision making as it pertains to conducting combat and/or related operations … . Because operational psychologists do not typically deploy as part of a medical unit but rather as a member of a commander’s battle staff, their contributions directly impact the mission through planning, risk management, assessment and selection, and so on. (p. 271)

Some examples of the role of operational psychologists in the 2003 Iraq War include the following: a psychologist engaged in counterinsurgency work with commanding generals that led to the identification of suspected kidnappers and former regime loyalists, the debriefing of a
rescued hostage in order to gather time-sensitive intelligence while guarding against retraumatizing the hostage, and assessment and selection of Iraqi personnel for an indigenous Special Forces Unit as part of an effort to increase Iraq’s internal security (Staal & Stephenson, 2006).

More broadly, operational psychologists have developed guidelines and training procedures for use in the interrogation of detainees at various sites around the world and have participated in interrogations as part of Behavioral Science Consultation Teams. Indeed, the controversial “exploitation-oriented” approach to interrogation that was practiced in Guantanamo and later migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq was developed and used by psychologists (Committee on Armed Services, 2008; Lewis, 2004).

Contributions of Psychology to Peace

In contrast to war, peace received very little attention during the first half of the 20th century. Instead, the newly emerging specialty of international relations was home for many scholars who studied interstate relations. The field of international relations was dominated by a realist philosophy (Burchill & Linklater, 2001) that maintained sovereign states operated within an anarchical international system, with each state seeking to advance its interests through the demonstration, consolidation, and projection of power (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985). There were, however, a few notable pieces of scholarship by psychologists in the 1940s that would likely fall within the rubric of “peace psychology” today; examples include surveys by Stagner, Brown, Gundlach, and White (1942) on public attitudes toward war and books by Cantril (1950), Klineberg (1950), and Murphy (1945).

In 1957, as the Cold War continued to take shape and the threat of global war seemed imminent, scholars from a variety of disciplines, including psychology, organized around the idea that disputes could be resolved through dialogue and conflict resolution rather than violence (Kriesberg, 2007). As the field of conflict resolution gained legitimacy in the United States, “peace” remained obscure in the academic lexicon largely because “peace” was suspect, especially during the McCarthy era (Kelman, 1981).

Historically, American psychologists have generally supported the overall direction of U.S. foreign policy, but during the Cold War a number of psychologists broke ranks with U.S. policymakers (Morawski & Goldstein, 1985). In the 1960s, a raft of publications signaled an incipient shift from war planning to peace promotion (Wagner, 1985) as psychologists (such as Gordon Allport, Hadley Cantril, and Otto Klineberg) argued that the atomic age required a new dichotomy of “peace psychology” today; examples include surveys by Stagner, Brown, Gundlach, and White (1942) on public attitudes toward war and books by Cantril (1950), Klineberg (1950), and Murphy (1945).

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First, the level of analysis was shifted from an exclusive focus on the behavior of individuals to a more inclusive focus on the behavior of nations. Second, psychologists began to emphasize the prevention of war rather than preparations for war. And third, whereas previous research had attempted to document or generate public consensus with government policy, the new work was critical of U.S. foreign policies. (p. 280)

It is not clear whether any of these publications had an impact on U.S. policies, though Etzioni (1967) demonstrated how the runup to the passage of the Limited Test Ban Treaty by Kennedy and Khruschev neatly conformed to Osgood’s (1962) GRIT pattern. What is clear is that many psychologists in the 1960s were critical of the direction of U.S. foreign policy and believed that the science of psychology could offer some guidance to improve the dangerous superpower relationship.

Throughout the 1970s, domestic concerns took precedence over foreign policy. U.S. psychologists examined topics such as student activism, population growth, changes in sex roles, and a range of issues related to race relations. Psychologists had a significant impact on the desegregation of schools, but the issue of social justice was not yet integrated with the discourse of peace psychology. M. Brewster Smith seemed to capture the views of peace psychologists during the height of the Cold War when he wrote in the foreword to the first book with “peace psychology” in its title: “[During the Cold War I regarded it as a distraction to include the agenda of social justice under the same banner as avoidance of nuclear war (Smith, 2001, p. 1).”

Although domestic issues dominated the 1970s, some psychologists focused on the Vietnam War, the U.S. policy of containment, and tensions in the superpower relationship. Janis (1972) proposed “groupthink” as a construct to explain U.S. foreign policy fiascos, including decisions of the Johnson administration to increase troop strength repeatedly, thereby escalating combat in Vietnam. “Groupthink” refers to a dynamic that takes place when highly cohesive ingroup members strive for unanimity rather than critically evaluating alternative courses of action, resulting
in misguided decision making and foreign policy debacles. In other research, White (1968, 1969) used a variety of sources including polling data and interviews with well-informed South Vietnamese and academic scholars and concluded that the United States suffered from a “pro-us illusion”; he suggested that if Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had clearly realized that the attitudes of the South Vietnamese people at that time were much more “anti-us” than “pro-us,” the Vietnam War would have been avoided.

Another wave of scholarship appeared in the 1980s, with much of it benefiting from developments in political psychology. The psychological nature of the U.S.–Soviet relationship was captured by the title of White’s (1984) book Fearful Warriors. Two years later, White’s (1986) edited volume Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War featured highly regarded psychologists and political scientists who described psychological and political antecedents and consequences of the nuclear arms race, which included destructive communication patterns, mutually distorted perceptions, and coercive interactions. The volume added a measure of credibility and legitimacy to psychological analyses of the nuclear arms race and gave greater clarity and coherence to the literature in peace psychology.

The 1980s also gave rise to peace movements and organizations that institutionalized peace psychology. In 1983, President Reagan turned up the rhetoric, called the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” raised the possibility of “limited” nuclear war in the European theater, and approved the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in the backyards of Europeans (McNamara, 1983), sparking the anti-nuclear movements in Europe. As a result, the German Peace Psychology Association was established, which to this day holds annual meetings on research in peace psychology. Shortly thereafter, Psychologists for the Prevention of Nuclear War (now Psychologists for Peace) became a member group within the Australian Psychological Society, and Psychologists for Social Responsibility, an activist organization in the United States, was founded to promote the application of psychological knowledge to reduce the threat of nuclear war. In 1989, Cold War tensions abated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the following year APA established the Division of Peace Psychology (Wessells, 1996).

**Contemporary Contributions of Psychology to Peace**

As the bipolar geostrategic power relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union receded, a complex pattern of intergroup conflicts moved to the foreground in peace psychology. These conflicts were characterized by intercommunal tensions, oppositional social identities, deeply divisive ideologies, and violent episodes that typically occurred in and around communities, where they exacted a heavy toll on the lives and well-being of family members, friends, and neighbors (Eriksson, Wallenstein, & Sollenberg, 2003; Gurr & Moore, 1997). People were divided, not so much by state boundaries but by ethnicity, religion, economic well-being, and other markers of social identity (Tajfel, 2010) and identity-based conflicts (Rothman, 1997). Many of these conflicts yielded violent episodes that were repeated (i.e., cycles of violence) and qualified as “intractable conflict” because they were intergenerational and viewed as existential and zero-sum in nature (Bar-Tal, 2007; Coleman, 2003).

In addition, as the Cold War receded, American peace psychologists came to appreciate that the focal concern in many parts of the world was not the prospect of direct violence but structural violence, an insidious and ubiquitous problem that kills people just as surely as direct violence by depriving them of material resources and political representation in matters that affect their well-being. Hence, “structural violence” became an area of inquiry (Christie, 1997; Pilisuk, 1998; Schwebel, 1997) and a target of activism and policy change (Montiel & Noor, 2009; Montero & Sonn, 2009).

Recognizing the ubiquity of structural violence, peace psychology borrowed from the transdisciplinary field of peace and conflict studies (Galtung, 1969) a more differentiated perspective on the meaning of “peace” that included both “positive peace,” meaning the amelioration of structural violence or the promotion of social justice, and “negative peace,” referring to the traditional concern of preventing and mitigating violent episodes. Once again, the *Journal of Social Issues* captured the thrust and scope of the field by devoting an entire issue to research and activism in post-Cold War peace psychology. Taken together, the articles in the issue characterized post-Cold War peace psychology as (1) global in scope, (2) nuanced by geohistorical context, (3) focused on multiple levels of analysis (from interpersonal to international), (4) aimed at the prevention and mitigation of both structural and episodic forms of violence, and (5) framed as a system in which sustainable peace required nonviolent means combined with deep-rooted structural and cultural changes in the relationship between individuals and groups (Christie, 2006).

Using the post-Cold War framework as an intellectual scaffolding for peace psychology, peace psychologists have proposed a variety of concepts and processes as inputs that create a context conducive to violent episodes (Blumberg, Hare, & Costin, 2006; Christie, 2012; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2008). Some of the inputs have been durable concepts in the field of psychology for more than half a century. A few examples include the following: groupthink, realistic group conflict, relative deprivation, and right-wing authoritarian beliefs. Other concepts are more recent entries to the peace psychology lexicon and made their appearance during the cognitive revolution in psychology: conflict-inducing metaphors, (enemy) image theory, and destructive ideologies. Some concepts, such as delegitimization (of others), are integrative and subsume a number of other concepts. Many of the more recent entries have an emotional component, such as emotions that mobilize violent activism, conditions that produce hatred of the other, and the role of threat in defensively motivated violence. Not surprisingly, peace psychology draws heavily from constructs at the collective level of analysis: collective efficacy, collective memories of victimization, collec-
tive beliefs, and collective fear. Perhaps most distinctive, some peace psychology constructs pertain to structural and cultural contexts, invoking power differences and corresponding narratives that are used to justify social inequalities and violence.

In addition to the traditional concern with the antecedents and conditions of violence, peace psychologists have identified peaceful interventions that can be tailored to phases within a cycle of violence (Christie et al., 2008; Staub, 2013), that is, interventions that can take place either before, during, or after a violent episode.

**Peace interventions before a violent episode.** Conflict management strategies are interventions that seek to manage and prevent conflicts from turning to violence (cf. Deutsch, 1994; Kelman, 2010). Some practitioners and theorists have examined the management of conflict at multiple levels (Deutsch, 1973; Deutsch, Coleman, & Marcus, 2006); others have focused primarily on the intergroup and international levels (Fisher, 2005; Kelman, 2010); still others have proposed interventions for intractable forms of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007; Coleman, 2003). In order to prevent violent episodes, a host of conflict management concepts and processes have been identified (Blumberg et al., 2006; Christie, 2012; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2008). Generally, emphasis is placed on bringing adversarial groups in contact with one another in an emotional climate conducive to intergroup dialogue, active listening, cognitive and affective empathy, cooperation, and constructive interactions that build the relationship, promote an inclusive sense of social identity, and inculcate nonviolent values.

**Peace interventions during a violent episode.** When conflicts are not or cannot be managed constructively and violence ensues, the number of peaceful intervention options diminishes greatly, not least because organized violence intensifies a host of psychological processes that form barriers to peaceful overtures (Kimmel & Stout, 2006). Interventions are generally aimed at the de-escalation of violence through either (a) seizing moments of “ripeness” or times when one or both parties are “psychologically ready” to engage the other party in dialogue (Pruitt, 2007), (b) mediation efforts by third parties (Fisher, 2005), and/or (c) grassroots anti-war activism aimed at influencing elite decision makers (Bohnke & Shani, 2012). Notwithstanding the small number of intervention options that are available during organized violence, it is sometimes possible to identify and build on small “pockets of peace” or communities that remain peaceful despite being surrounded by violence. These pockets of peace, or zones of civility, have been identified in a wide range of geohistorical contexts including Wayame Village in Ambon, Indonesia (Braithwaite, 2010), Calicut in India (Varshney, 2003), Tuzla City in Bosnia (Armakolas, 2011; Wallace, 2002), and Joghori District in Afghanistan (Suleman & Williams, 2003). In all of these cases, civil relations prevailed inside the zone despite exogenous shocks as neighboring villages erupted in armed confrontations. People inside zones of civility communicate and cooperate across ethnic divisions, develop conflict-resolving mechanisms, resist political forces that would exploit divisions, quickly intervene in potential hot spots, and agree on the value of preserving intergroup relations. In addition, those within zones tend to have cohesive and enduring relationships, an inclusive social identity, and collective commitment to civility. Zones of civility manage to avoid the ravages of a war, thereby strengthening civil society while keeping local populations safe and infrastructures intact.

**Peace interventions after a violent episode.** In the aftermath of a violent episode, intergroup tensions do not necessarily abate; instead, feelings of distrust, victimhood, and motives for revenge can continue to dominate intergroup relations. The area of postviolence intervention has grown enormously in recent years. Some of the key questions, concepts and processes involved in postviolence interventions can be gleaned from entries in the Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology (Christie, 2012). Questions include the following: Under what conditions can an apology promote reconciliation? What is the role of collective memories in the reconciliation process? How is intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation defined and measured? To what extent can cooperative projects between adversarial groups reconcile differences? Do truth commissions promote reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of violence? What is the role of reparations in promoting reconciliation? What kinds of interventions are able to interrupt the intergenerational transfer of trauma? What types of psychosocial interventions promote reconciliation and sustainable development? When are traditional forms of healing useful in the wake of violence?

In postviolence settings, an important set of questions concern how to “do no harm” (Wessells, 2009) and assist violence-affected people, who are coming to terms with their violent experiences, while promoting intergroup reconciliation (Nadler, 2012) and collective actions that build security, economic well-being, and politically transparent and accountable institutions (Wessells, 2007). Ethical issues for peace psychologists include how to refrain from a neocolonialism that (a) creates jobs for Western aid agencies while promoting dependency among aid recipients, (b) encourages universal liberal political philosophies while failing to honor local traditions and wisdom, and (c) upholds the power structure of local elites rather than giving voice to the powerless (Fontan, 2012).

Finally, when peaceful interventions fail to prevent or mitigate a violent episode, a repeated cycle of violence (i.e., intractable conflict) may develop and last for generations. These intractable conflicts are indicative of deeply rooted problems that require “conflict transformation,” a complex set of processes that include changes in the personal, relational, structural, and cultural features of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007; Coleman, 2003; Lederach, 2003).

**Peace with social justice.** Because peace psychologists view the continuous pursuit of social justice as essential for sustaining peace, nonviolent social justice movements are central to contemporary peace psychology. While the Arab Spring has attracted a great deal of attention recently, psychological analyses have been applied to numerous “people power” movements that have taken
place in the past 25 years throughout Asia: in the Philippines (1986), Taiwan (1986), South Korea (1987), Thailand (1992), Indonesia (1998), East Timor (2002), Nepal (2006), and Pakistan (2008). These countries are wracked by histories of predatory colonialism, identity-based violence, and ruthless authoritarian regimes that have tried to remain in power through media censorship, forced disappearances, the destruction of villages, and other forms of oppression designed to terrorize and repress communities. From a peace psychology perspective, these nonviolent democratic transitions take place at multiple levels: Individuals grapple with historical traumas, while on a national level, groups collectively engage with the past and craft a positive future. For example, meaning-making about the anti-dictatorship struggle is done by political leaders in the new democracy (Montiel, 2010); emotional regulation toward the state is carried out on a large scale, as groups previously geared toward angrily overthrowing the state obtain new power and learn how to use state power carefully and wisely (Montiel & Rodriguez, 2009); disclosures about past abuses may be carried out through truth commissions or other politically transparent procedures (Hayner & Ash, 2002); storylines or narratives of forgiveness and social justice accompany democratic growth (Montiel, 2000); and pragmatic strategies for building homegrown democracy are implemented (Montiel, 2006).

Contributions of Psychology to Peace and Social Justice Policies

It may seem overly ambitious to suggest that the science of psychology could contribute to policies related to peace and social justice in part because the discipline of psychology typically operates at the micro level of analysis and public policies are implemented at the macro level (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1991). Admittedly, the traditional focus of psychology on a decontextualized version of the individual (Gergen, Gulerce, & Misra, 1996) does not readily lend itself to policy formation. There are, however, some noteworthy examples of psychologically informed principles that have had an impact on policies bearing on social justice and peace around the world. One contribution of psychologists that took place before social justice was center stage in peace psychology was to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling against racial segregation in graduate school education, which was based on the testimony of social scientists on the harmful psychological effects of segregation (Tushnet, 1987). In addition, psychologically informed expert witness testimony by social scientists in lower court cases led to the U.S. Supreme Court decision declaring state laws establishing separate public schools for Black and White students unconstitutional (Jackson, 1998).

In the international arena, peace psychologists have developed methodologies that have led to policies supporting intergroup peace (Fisher, 2005; Kelman, 2005). For example, problem-solving workshops are mediated by third parties that bring together influential but politically unof-

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and murder. For instance, psychologists provided psycho-social support for the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo ( Hollander, 1997), a political movement of bereaved mothers and grandmothers who gathered and marched around the Plaza de Mayo in central Buenos Aires every Thursday for many years in an effort to pressure the military dictatorship to reunite them with their abducted children. For several decades, they protested, wearing white head scarves symbolizing the blankets of 30,000 children “missing” until 2006, when the law that prevented the prosecution of perpetrators of political violence was declared unconstitutional.

The global reach of liberation psychology was also manifest around the world in the rise of “Black consciousness,” which challenged racist representations of Blacks, beginning in the 1960s. In South Africa, for instance, the Black consciousness movement was accompanied by a shift among psychologists from a commitment to the advancement of White superiority to a critique of Apartheid and the role of psychology in perpetuating racism (Duncan, van Niekerk, de la Rey, & Seedat, 2001). Indeed, the field of psychology continues to transform itself, and today, the voices of Black scholars in South Africa are increasingly represented in the production of psychological knowledge (Duncan & Bowman, 2009). Moreover, echoing the concerns of South African psychologists, the critical issue of accessibility to mental health services for underserved populations has been given the force of policy in the government’s Reconstruction and Development Program (de la Rey & Ipser, 2004).

In the area of human rights, psychologists have contributed to policies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at The Hague (Anderson, 1999). Psychologists and other mental health professionals advised the tribunals on ways to reduce retraumatization for women survivors of gender-specific war crimes (in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) when they provided testimony before the tribunals. The potentially adverse psychological effects of social stigma were also taken into account when the tribunals decided to protect the identity of witnesses, a decision that required careful consideration of trade-offs between the right of the defendant to know the identity of his or her accuser and the protection of the witness from harm (Pieslak, 2004). Psychologists also drafted a resolution to increase the budget to provide psychosocial support of women testifying before the tribunals. Key provisions included the desirability of having culturally sensitive translators available so that survivors could provide testimony in their mother tongues and allowing survivors to have a support person travel and accompany them to The Hague (Anderson, 1999). The recommendation was adopted by the European Parliament.

Conclusion

While the contributions of psychologists to war have been substantial for nearly 100 years, in recent years peace psychology has grown as a force in its own right. New conceptions on the nature of organized violence, as well as its origins, mitigation, and prevention, continue to be developed in peace psychology. And while there has been respectable growth in scholarship, peace psychology is not an insular academic endeavor. Instead, peace psychologists around the world are involved in socially transformative processes through applied work and the development of policies that promote peace with social justice. Not surprisingly, we should expect tensions will remain between peace psychologists and psychologists more aligned with the goals of the U.S. defense establishment. At present, for example, the APA policy on interrogation and torture embraces the principle that psychologists play a critical role in keeping interrogations “safe, legal, ethical, and effective” (Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security, 2005, p. 8). In contrast, while peace psychologists are committed to “do no harm,” given the situational and systemic pressures that are operative during interrogations, a prescription more consistent with peace psychologists’ appreciation for the larger context within which individual behavior occurs would be to recommend that psychologists do not in any way participate in national security interrogations (Soldz & Olson, 2008). Clearly, these are the kinds of complex value-based conflicts that will arise as psychologists continue their efforts to contribute to war and peace.

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