CHAPTER 2

9/11 Aftershocks: An Analysis of Conditions Ripe for Hate Crimes

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This chapter offers an explanation for the surge in hate crimes that followed the attacks of 9/11. Drawing on research literature, I describe the cultural context in which the attacks of 9/11 occurred and point out that the attacks occurred at a time when nationalistic sentiments already were running high and the political culture was dominated by the political ideology called *realism.* (Chapter 1 contains an explanation of *essentialism.*) These cultural or macrolevel conditions were further fueled by the U.S. administration's divisive rhetorical framing (see Introduction, note 1) that emphasized essentialism and moral mandates. Using an ecological model (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), I demonstrate that macrolevel variables, combined with the attacks themselves and the administration's reactions to the attacks, heightened mortality salience, fear, and anger in the populace. As a result, a relatively small number of people in the United States—those who were most receptive to the climate of fear and anger and the ideology of exclusion and retribution—became perpetrators of hate crimes. In short, by using an ecological model, I illustrate how the cultural climate at the time of 9/11 interacted with a host of situational and personality variables and resulted in a spike in hate crimes (see Figure 2.1). Research and educational implications also will be presented.



Figure 2.1 An ecological model illustrating macro- and microinfluences on hate crimes.

The Surge in Domestic Hate Crimes: Macroinfluences

The Rhetorical Framing of the Problem in Terms of Realpolitik

On September 11, 2001, a group of 19 men hijacked four transcontinental flights, two from Boston's Logan International Airport, one from Newark International Airport, and one from Washington's Dulles International Airport. One of the airliners crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York, and within 20 minutes a second airliner crashed into the south tower. About 30 minutes later, a third airliner crashed into the Pentagon. Within the next 30 minutes, the fourth airliner crashed in the Pennsylvania countryside.

The largest single terrorist attack ever experienced in the United States reverberated throughout the country. Thousands died and tens of thousands knew someone who was killed or injured in the 9/11 attacks. Within three to five days after the attacks, 44 percent of Americans reported at least one symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (Schuster et al., 2002). One to two months after the attack, a national sampling indicated that approximately 4 percent of the population had signs of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The prevalence among New York City residents was 11 percent (Schlenger et al., 2002). No one has reported the prevalence of PTSD among those who were in positions of political power in the United States at the time.

On the evening of 9/11, President George W. Bush met with a small group of key advisors. By then, they were aware that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the attack. CIA Director Tenet noted that al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan were essentially one and the same, to which the president responded, "Tell the Taliban we're finished with them." The president continued by saying: "I want you all to understand that we are at war and we will stay at war until this is done. Nothing else matters. Everything is available for the pursuit of this war. Any barriers in your way, they're gone. Any money you need, you have it. This is our only agenda" (Clarke, 2004, p. 24).

The president and his administration quickly seized the concept of "war" and by so doing adopted political "realism" as a conceptual frame to organize their thoughts and direct their actions. From such a perspective, the 9/11 attack by al Qaeda called for swift retaliatory action by the United States. Recently, a task force of the American Psychological Association (APA) noted that the metaphor of "war" in the "war on terrorism" evokes in the public and in officials cognitions, emotions, and behaviors that promote conflict escalation and violence while inhibiting conflict management approaches (Kimmel, 2005). Within one month of 9/11, the United States was waging a war in Afghanistan, and even before that, there was a spike in hate crimes in the United States, directed at people who were thought to resemble the hijackers. Arab Americans, Muslims, and South Asians were victims of hate crimes. (The South Asians were not Muslims, but Hindu Sikhs.)

The concept of security was construed narrowly, as "peace through strength," and on Friday, September 14, President Bush announced his intention to "rid the world of evil," a view that would become thematic for the administration. Over the weekend, two hate crime deaths occurred.

The kinds of hate crimes that have occurred since 9/11 are wide ranging. The Council on American-Islamic Relations has documented and classified them. They include employment discrimination, verbal harassment, and so-called profiling, to mention a few. Individual incidents such as the following are typical:

> On March 11th [2003], hate literature was found at the local Islamic center in Honolulu, Hawaii, warning Muslims that they will be watched by "patriotic residents." Hundreds of small leaflets, headlined "ATTENTION RAG HEADS" were reportedly thrown into the fenced yard of the mosque. The leaflet read in part, "During the war on terrorism, the vigilant, patriotic residents of Hawaii will be keeping an eye on our Muslim friends." It also warned "every curry fundraiser will be checked to ensure that funds are not being funneled to support terrorist

> groups. Anyone found in violation will be strapped with explosives and shipped to Iraq. MAY GOD (NOT ALAH) BLESS AMERICA!! (Council on American-Islamic Relations Research Center, 2004, pp. 22–23)
>
> On April 24th, 2004, A Muslim woman and her son were harassed, threatened and attacked by another woman while shopping in Pennsylvania. The woman yelled that American troops were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan so that women did not have to dress like her and also hit her with her cart repeatedly. Employees of the store refused to call security when she requested that they do so and did not assist her in finding a phone to call the police. (Council on American-Islamic Relations Research Center, 2005, p. 52)

It is not uncommon to see domestic backlashes when heads of state declare that a country is at war or when leaders vigorously pursue peace through the projection of force. Indeed, some of the most egregious domestic crimes against humanity can occur under such conditions (Staub, 1992). In the United States, the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans that took place during World War II is one example. Rhetorical framing that heats up nationalistic impulses can stir strong in-group identification and bonds of solidarity (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and authoritarianism and intolerance of out-group members (Druckman, 2001; Van Evera, 1994).

A Growing Nationalistic Climate

Even before the attacks of 9/11, survey research was indicating that Americans were experiencing extremely high levels of nationalism when compared to other countries (Smith & Jarkko, 1998). In the month following the attack, nationalistic sentiments reached even higher levels (Smith, Rasinski, & Toce, 2001), with 97 percent agreeing that they would rather be Americans than citizens of any of other country (an increase of 7 percentage points) and 85 percent reporting that America was a better country than others (5-point increase). Nearly half (49 percent) agreed that the "world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans" (11-point increase), and disagreement with the idea that there are aspects of America to be ashamed of was up 22 points (from 18 percent to 40 percent). The nationalistic climate was fueled by rhetoric that emphasized essentialism, divisiveness, and moral mandates.

Essentialistic Rhetorical Framing

On the evening of September 11, President George W. Bush returned to Washington, DC, and gave a brief televised speech to the American people. The tenor of the speech was nationalistic, echoing if not enhancing the nationalistic impulses of the public while laying the groundwork for rhetoric that would underscore the goodness and resolve of the United States and cast the war against terrorism as an epic struggle between the forces of good and evil:

> These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. (see Day of infamy, 2001)

The rhetoric used by the president can affect the way in which citizens understand the meaning of national unity and the degree to which they are likely to tolerate cultural differences. After 9/11, the president emphasized the fixed and immutable character of American identity (e.g., great people with resolve of steel), thereby defining national unity as an underlying essence unique and common to all Americans (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). He also emphasized people coming together at a particular point in time to achieve shared goals (Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998).

His use of essentialistic rhetorical framing united Americans but had some profoundly negative repercussions, not least of which was a decrease in tolerance for diversity. Evidence that bears on the relationship between rhetorical framing and tolerance was garnered by Li and Brewer (2004) in the weeks following 9/11. These investigators examined the effects of priming different construals of American unity. In one condition, American unity was construed in terms of "the core essence of what it means to be an American"; in another condition, participants were primed with a passage that focused on the "common purpose" Americans have in fighting terrorism and helping victims of the tragedy. In the core essence condition, higher levels of patriotism were associated with negative attitudes toward other nations (i.e., nationalism) and intolerance for cultural and lifestyle diversity within a nation. When priming emphasized "common purpose," high levels of patriotism were more weakly associated with nationalistic attitudes and were not incompatible with tolerance for

diversity. Clearly, rhetoric matters, and, to the extent that Americans interpreted the president's rhetoric as fostering an exclusionary type of patriotism, one would expect greater intolerance for diversity.

Divisive Rhetoric

In addition to underscoring the fixed and immutable character and inherent goodness of Americans, the rhetoric of the U.S. administration sought to divide the world into allies and enemies, drawing a sharp distinction between those who were aligned with the United States and those who were not. In an address to a joint session of Congress and the American people on September 20, President Bush made a stark statement: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."

From a psychological perspective, we know quite a bit about the impact of such divisive rhetoric. Research on social cognition has identified some of the factors that are at play when sharp distinctions divide people into categories (Gerstenfeld, 2002). The formation of social categories simplifies our complex social world by accentuating differences between groups and attenuating differences within social categories (McGarty & Penny, 1988). The attenuation of out-group differences, known as the homogeneity effect, can account for the perception that out-group members all appear to be the same. Those who perpetrated hate crimes viewed members of the out-group (e.g., Middle Easterners) as all the same and included in that social category even Hindus and Sikhs, as illustrated in these examples from the Council on American-Islamic Relations (2005):

> December 1st, 2004—In Chesterfield, Virginia, a Sikh-owned gas station was destroyed by fire and anti-Muslim graffiti was found on a nearby trash container and shed. The fire is being investigated as an arson and possible hate crime. (p. 53)
>
> March 2nd, 2004—In San Diego, a man of Portuguese descent was beaten by a group of four white men who mistook him for being Middle Eastern. They yelled racial slurs at him and told him to go back to Iraq. (p. 52)

Dividing people into allies and enemies is consequential in another way; it yields more positive evaluations of the in-group, including the in-group's competency, friendliness, and strength as compared to the out-group (Messick & Mackie, 1989).

For several days following 9/11, the president's bellicose rhetorical framing continued. After two people were killed by hate crimes, President Bush spoke at the Islamic Center in Washington, DC, on Monday, September 17. He noted that these acts of violence against innocent people "violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith. And it's important for my fellow Americans to understand that" (Islam is peace, 2001).

After the speech, there were no further recordings of hate crime deaths that were thought to be connected with 9/11. Amnesty International and other nongovernmental organizations applauded the president's denouncement of the incidents of hate crime, but the administration sent mixed messages as the Department of Justice (DOJ) rounded up and imprisoned, without charges, over one thousand individuals of Arab or Muslim heritage. Detainees were not given access to an attorney, and family members were not contacted. The DOJ also mandated that local police conduct interrogations of more than five thousand Arab and Muslim immigrants (National Asian American Pacific Legal Consortium, 2003).

When defining a hate crime, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses the definition of the American Psychological Association: "not only an attack on one's physical self but also an attack on one's very identity." Although statistical estimates vary, the FBI reported a 17-fold nationwide increase in anti-Muslim crimes in the year 2001 as compared to 2000 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003). National trends were mirrored in major cities across the United States. In Los Angeles County and Chicago, officials reported 15 times the number of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim crimes in 2001 compared to the preceding year (National Asian American Pacific Legal Consortium, 2003). The year 2001 ended with a level of hate crimes against Arab Americans and Muslims that rivaled all previous years for which data had been collected (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003).

Moral Mandates

But spikes in nationalistic sentiments reflect attitudes, not necessarily behavior. It is not possible to know for certain whether nationalistic attitudes led directly to hate crimes, because there are many other variables. However, research on moral mandates offers some rather convincing evidence of an attitude-behavior link in hate crimes (Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

Moral mandates are strong attitudes that share three qualities with all strong attitudes: extremeness, certainty, and importance

(Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Moral mandates develop out of a person's moral convictions. Like attitudes, they have a feeling and belief component; in addition, they have built-in behavioral tendencies that are either prosocial or antisocial. For people who have a moral mandate, due process is irrelevant (Skitka & Mullen, 2002); instead, any procedure can be justified as long as the mandated end is achieved. There were moral mandates in the message delivered by President George W. Bush to the American people on the evening of 9/11, when he said: "The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."

It remains uncertain how many people took it upon themselves to carry out this moral mandate. Some perpetrators of hate crimes may have even felt that their assaults were their patriotic duty (Perry, 2001). What we do know is that a number of people with strong negative attitudes committed hate crimes toward others who appeared to look like Osama bin Laden and they had no interest in due process.

Microlevel Processes: Of Cognition, Affect, and Personality

Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg (2003) have proposed that terror management theory (TMT) provides a compelling account of the psychological dynamics that drove the behavior of both elite decision makers and the public in the wake of 9/11. Central among their concepts is mortality salience.

Mortality Salience

From the perspective of TMT, humans are vulnerable to existential terror because of our unique ability to be aware of our own mortality. The terror that such awareness engenders can be mitigated by culture, which provides us with humanly constructed and shared beliefs that mold our transient experiences into a worldview that imbues reality with order, stability, meaning, and permanence. Therefore, "the function of culture is not to illuminate the truth but rather to obscure the horrifying possibility that death entails the permanent annihilation of the self" (Pyszczynski et al., 2003, p. 22). What makes the attacks of 9/11 particularly threatening is

that they were aimed at the symbols that are seen to represent the American way of life, if not our worldview. The World Trade Center represented American economic dominance, while the Pentagon is emblematic of American global military dominance.

The literature on mortality salience is voluminous, but a selection of some pertinent findings can illustrate its application to reactions to 9/11. Typically, in experimental studies on mortality salience, participants in the experimental group are induced to make mortality momentarily salient by having them think about their own demise and death. Using this procedure, Greenberg et al. (1990) demonstrated Christian college students evaluated Jewish students more negatively when mortality was salient than in the control condition when mortality was not salient. Not only do attitudes toward the out-group become more negative when mortality is salient, but some research indicates that mortality salience affects behavior in more subtle ways. In one such study, mortality salience led to a preference for sitting next to someone of the same nationality (Ochsmann & Mathy, 1994). In another study, students in the mortality salience group deliberately gave more hot sauce to those who opposed their political beliefs than those in a control condition who did not (McGregor et al., 1998). In short, having people reflect on their own mortality is associated with derogation of the out-group, physical distancing from the out-group, and even physical aggression toward those who have a different political worldview.

Nearly all the research literature on TMT shows that when people are made aware of their own mortality, the defense of their worldview intensifies. Of course, the U.S. war on terrorism has been framed as the clash of two very different worldviews. According to Pyszczynski et al. (2003), there are a number of ways to deal with existential threats when worldviews are in contention with one another: conversion (of the other), derogation, assimilation, and accommodation are all possibilities. But when strongly held worldviews are incompatible, and the existence of one view means the destruction of the other view, the preferred strategy of defense is annihilation. The call for jihad by Osama bin Laden and his associates puts in bold relief two incompatible worldviews and the call for annihilation:

> All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims . . . jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. . . . Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life. On that basis, and in compliance with Allah's

> order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. . . . We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson. (Jihad against Jews and crusaders, 1998)

Pyszczynski et al. (2003) maintain that ultimately all wars are holy wars. Perhaps as they suggest, George W. Bush was just being honest when he said in one of his first unscripted comments about 9/11: "This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while."

Under such tense conditions, a resolute leader can be most assuring to the public. As Wyatt (2005) suggests, religious fundamentalism and political conservatism have converged and together provide the public with a familiar and comfortable moral vision in the aftermath of 9/11. Not surprisingly, the sale of flags and bibles flourished after the attacks, as did the approval rating of President Bush, culminating in an unprecedented 94 percent approval rating within a month of 9/11 (Morin & Deane, 2001).

Emotions as a Moderating Variable

Although the powerful impact of mortality salience on intergroup attitudes has been well documented, it is unclear precisely what emotions are activated by reflection on one's mortality. Some investigators have suggested that mortality salience merely represents one instance of a larger class of aversive events that create anxiety by disrupting an adaptive mechanism that is involved in the formation of social networks, attachments, and coalitions (Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004). Other investigators have provided evidence for the proposition that the relationship between mortality salience and outcomes such as worldview defense is not mediated by the actual experience of anxiety but the potential to experience anxiety (Greenberg et al., 2003).

In any case, the available evidence suggests that anxiety plays a central role in worldview defense, and anxiety was frequently reported in response to 9/11. But the dominant response that the U.S. administration conveyed to the public after 9/11 was anger. On the evening of 9/11, when the president was speaking with advisors about retribution, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld pointed out

that international law only allows force to prevent future attacks and not for retribution. In response, the president said: "I don't care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass" (Clarke, 2004, p. 24). When addressing the nation that same evening, President Bush noted: "The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger."

Survey research indicates that the emotional state of the U.S. public resonated with the president. When asked what feelings they had when they first heard about the terrorist attacks, 65 percent of people reported anger as among their very deepest feelings. This was followed by worries about how one's own life would be affected (28 percent) and worries about whether anyone was safe (27 percent). Some felt shame (22 percent), concern about foreign relations (20 percent), domestic politics (17 percent), and a sense of confusion (16 percent). Only 6 percent felt that the nation brought the terrorist attacks on itself. The general pattern among New York City residents was similar, except anger was more dominant, reported to be among their deepest feelings by 73 percent of the sample (Smith, Rasinski, & Toce, 2001).

Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff (2003) have examined how emotion affects responses to terrorism. Drawing on appraisal-tendency theory, these investigators provide evidence that anger produces a different set of policy preferences than fear. According to appraisal-tendency theory, cognition drives emotions, and emotions elicit specific cognitive appraisals that help the individual cope with the event that evoked the emotion. Moreover, appraisals persist beyond the triggering event and become a perceptual lens for interpreting subsequent events. For example, in laboratory studies, one's appraisal of risk varies depending on the emotion being experienced. Anger evokes optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices; in contrast, fear evokes pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Lerner et al. (2003) were able to demonstrate that priming anger (e.g., "What aspect of the terrorist attacks makes you the most ANGRY?") or fear (e.g., "What aspect of the terrorist attacks makes you most AFRAID?") in response to 9/11 produced the expected pattern: optimism and risk-seeking choices for anger; pessimism and risk-averse choices for the fear condition. The same pattern was found when they examined the naturally occurring emotions that people experienced shortly after 9/11. Thus, both laboratory work and naturalistic study yield similar policy preferences. Compared with people who experienced fear, those who experienced

anger increased their support of a vengeful policy and decreased their support of a conciliatory-contact policy.

Not only is an angry populace likely to make policy choices that are different from a fearful one, but people can continue to be emotionally manipulated long after the triggering event (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005). In a 2002 study, people felt there was less risk of terror than in 2001, a finding that was not surprising because very few people in the study actually experienced terror-related events or disruptions in the year following 9/11 (e.g., being hurt by terror, traveling less, trouble sleeping, etc.). However, even though a year had passed since the attacks, the investigators were able to induce either fear or anger once again by introducing selected articles from the national news media and combining them with personal reflection. And once again, the fear-induced manipulation increased people's risk appraisals while anger induction reduced risk estimates. As Fischhoff et al. point out: "Anger's unrecognized effects can exaggerate the perceived effectiveness of personal and public actions (e.g., going to war); fear can do the opposite" (p. 126). The lesson: People can be emotionally manipulated, and, if they can be made angry enough, they will accept aggressive policies, even when the policies are unlikely to succeed.

Anger also is related to fear. One way to deal with intense fear is to focus attention on anger, the emotion that instills a sense of safety and control (Shay, 1994). Moreover, in times of great threat and uncertainty, fear can also be a tool to increase the support for candidates who are resolute, magnetic, and offer the promise of restoring a sense of self worth (Becker, 1973). Cohen, Solomon, Maxfield, Pyszczynski, and Greenberg (2004) demonstrated that mortality salience increased people's preference for candidates who emphasized an overarching vision (e.g., democratization of the Middle East), confidence in subordinates, and willingness to engage in risky but calculated behavior. Mortality salience decreased their preference for candidates who emphasized relationship building, civility, and consensus.

In a related study that examined voting preferences, mortality salience increased support for President Bush and decreased support for Senator John Kerry. In September 2004, registered voters were asked which candidate they planned to vote for in the upcoming November elections. In the control condition, mortality salience was not induced and voters were more likely to vote for Kerry. In contrast, when people were reminded of death, Bush was favored over Kerry (Cohen, Ogilvie, Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2005).

While 9/11 made the vulnerability of the United States salient and instilled anger in many Americans, not many Americans engaged in hate crimes. There were individual differences in the reactions that people had, differences due to the interaction of situational and personality factors. The question arises: Are there certain personality features or traits that are more receptive to the climate of anger and ideologies of exclusion?

Personality Variables and Violent Reactions

The best known effort to link personality types with prejudice attitudes was carried out by Adorno and colleagues in the aftermath of World War II (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Attempting to explain the atrocities committed by the Nazis, Adorno et al. proposed that individuals with certain traits that comprise the authoritarian personality type might be unusually receptive to ideologies of exclusion. Authoritarian personality type individuals are overly deferential and anxious toward authority figures and see the world in rigid, black-and-white, terms. Moreover, people with authoritarian personalities tend to be hostile toward others who are not members of the in-group.

People who rate themselves high on measures of authoritarian personality also tend to be high on xenophobia (Campbell & McCandless, 1951), antiblack prejudice (Pettigrew, 1958), and ethnocentrism (Meloen, Hagendoorn, Raaijmakers, & Visser, 1988). These relations hold across many cultures. In India, for example, among high-caste Hindu men, high scores on authoritarian personality are associated with prejudice against Muslims (Sinha & Hassan, 1975).

While the concept of authoritarian personality continues to be widely studied, particularly in political psychology, the original explanation of the authoritarian personality as a function of ego-defensive processes in the service of a vulnerable sense of self (Adorno et al., 1950) has been largely supplanted by social learning (Altemeyer, 1988), group identification (Duckitt, 1988), and other theoretical perspectives. The original measure of authoritarianism also has been replaced by other measures, most notably the Right Wing Authoritarian scale (RWA), developed by Altemeyer (1981). The RWA scale corrected some of the problems with Adorno's measure and tapped three major beliefs: conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission. Although some evidence suggests the scale is primarily a measure of political conservatism rather than authoritarian personality (Ray, 1985), RWA has been

shown to correlate positively not only with political conservatism (Altemeyer, 1988), but also with beliefs in religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and negative attitudes toward out-group members (Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001).

There is evidence that individuals who score high on RWA are more sensitive to threat than those who score low, as demonstrated, for example, on tests that measure how quickly people recognize and respond to threatening words (Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002). In addition, threats can activate RWA tendencies. When people are presented with written scenarios that depict the future as threatening, authoritarian scores tend to increase, particularly among those who already believe the world is a dangerous and threatening place (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). In addition, when threat is manipulated by encouraging people to think about the inevitability of their own death (i.e., increasing mortality salience), those who are high on RWA tend to rate others with dissimilar social attitudes more negatively than those who are low on RWA (Greenberg et al., 1990). A recent thrust in research on RWA and other ideologies related to conservatism is to interpret these orientations as motivated social cognitions that are activated by threats to various needs, most notably epistemic (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), existential (e.g., loss prevention), and ideological needs (e.g., preservation of group-based dominance) (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).

Is there any evidence that the attacks of 9/11 actually activated authoritarian sentiments? Perrin (2005) drew a stratified random sample of letters to the editor and examined their content. The results indicated that both authoritarian and antiauthoritarian sentiments increased in the aftermath of 9/11. In short, research on RWA suggests that there are indeed certain personality types that are particularly receptive to ideologies of exclusion. Moreover, threats can activate an authoritarian orientation and negative out-group attitudes, and it is clear that 9/11 did just that.

Another measure of personality that engenders an exclusionary ideology is social dominance orientation (SDO), which refers to the tendency to endorse the belief that human relations ought to be hierarchically organized, with superior groups dominating inferior groups. For individuals who are high in social dominance orientation, equality between groups is neither desirable nor necessary (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). What may be necessary is the use of force to maintain patterns of dominance (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO is associated with negative affect toward members of low status groups

(Levin & Sidanius, 1999); ideologies that maintain a group's dominance; and a variety of political attitudes, including conservatism, racism, and sexism (Pratto et al., 1994).

Although SDO shares variance with RWA, there are important differences that can be seen when examining support for "terrorism" versus counterterrorism or "antiterrorism" violence (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, Pratto, & Nammour, 2005). In a study of Muslim and Christian students at American University in Beirut, support for "terrorism" increased with increased religious identification among Muslims. In contrast, support for "terrorism" decreased among Christians as religious identification increased. For these Muslim students RWA was positively related and SDO was negatively related to support for "terrorism". For the Christian students SDO was positively related to increased support for antiterrorist violence. Consistent with Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) contention that those who are high in SDO prefer current power arrangements, Henry et al. (2005) found high SDO was associated with opposition to "terrorist" violence of the weak against the strong but favored "antiterrorist" violence of the strong against the weak.

Hence, terrorism can be viewed as a tool for social change, especially for people who lack power, wish to upset the status quo, have a strong Muslim identity, and authoritarian tendencies. In contrast, SDO tends to be high among those who have power, a fundamentalist Christian identity, and who favor the status quo arrangement of power and the use of force to maintain current power arrangements.

Summary

From a psychological perspective, the attacks of 9/11 made mortality salient and elicited anger in many Americans who were already enveloped in a nationalistic climate that was further inflamed by the rhetoric of the U.S. president. Based on research on mortality salience, these conditions yield a number of predictable outcomes, including a strengthening of worldview defense, negative attitudes toward others who threaten one's worldview, and a tendency to use aggression against out-group members. When anger is the dominant emotional response, people are more likely to endorse risky policies and to desire retribution. When fear is dominant, people favor candidates who advocate actions that appear decisive in pursuit of a grand vision and the restoration of self-worth. Personality also plays a role and accounts for individual differences in receptivity to the rhetorical framing of exclusion and violence.

Some Research and Educational Implications

Research Implications

A Realistic Personal Security

The problem of domestic hate crimes is inextricably woven into the fabric of violent international relations, and, therefore, part of the solution to the problem of domestic hate crimes is a more peaceful international system. However, it may seem odd to question the use of force by the United States after the attacks of 9/11. Having identified the Taliban as among those who harbor terrorists, it might seem inevitable that the United States would go to war in Afghanistan. From the viewpoint of realist scholars, the basic motivation underlying state behavior is the struggle for power, and, therefore, state actions can be reduced to efforts that attempt "to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power" (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 21–22). More recently, Mearsheimer (2001) argued that maximizing one's power relative to other states is essential for survival in an anarchic international system.

If one believes the realist assumptions about the nature and imperatives of the international system, the violent U.S. reaction to al Qaeda leaves little room for a psychological analysis. Although al Qaeda is not a state, the organization threatened U.S. power in the international system, and, therefore, it was imperative for the United States to demonstrate its power and reclaim its hegemony. In the case of Iraq, realists argue that the United States was justified to topple the Iraq government because the promise of a democratic Iraq could begin a domino effect in the Middle East and extend the sphere of U.S. influence.

However, the perspective taken in this chapter is not the classical realist perspective. Similar to Waltz's (1979) conception of power, it is suggested that power in an anarchic international system is more usefully viewed as a means than an end. From a psychological perspective, the goal is not the acquisition of power, but, instead, a stronger sense of *realistic personal security,* and the demonstration of power may or may not serve that end. Framed against the backdrop of realistic personal security, the question is: Why did the United States choose the use of force to pursue military security rather than employing the full range of tools at its disposal, including noncoercive forms of influence, particularly when coercive actions lay the groundwork for retaliation and resultant cycles of violence?

The realist perspective provides a rough, and often misleading, fit with international interactions and relations largely because it makes numerous assumptions about what is happening at the microlevel, where the dynamics of human psychology operate. Accordingly, there is a great need for psychological research to flesh out these microprocesses and offer alternative views on the means to human security.

One entry point for developing research programs that deepen our understanding of human security is to examine some of the current research being done on attachment theory (e.g., Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005). Based in part on Bowlby's theoretical work on attachment, Hart et al. propose a "tripartite model of security maintenance" in which three processes—attachment, self-esteem, and worldview—work together to provide the individual with a sense of security. Threats to any one of the processes produces a compensatory action in the remaining processes to shore up one's sense of security. Thus, an attack on one's worldview can be compensated for by bolstering self-esteem and a sense of attachment to others, thereby maintaining a sense of security. Although this kind of research is just beginning to have an impact on peace research, peace psychologists will find this work promising for the development of theory and practice aimed at mitigating the cognitive, affective, and behavioral sequelae that follow threats to human well-being.

Distinguishing Patriotism from Nationalism

Ever since Allport's (1954) classic study on prejudice, there has been growing recognition among psychologists of the independence of in-group amity (e.g., patriotism) and out-group enmity (e.g., nationalism). According to Allport, attachment to one's in-group does not require out-group hostility, a proposition that has been supported by laboratory and field research (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Hinkle & Brown, 1990), nor out-group aggression (Struch & Schwartz, 1989).

Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) underscored the ambivalence some people have toward patriotism as they walk a fine line between pride and jingoism, feeling comfortable with patriotism but uncomfortable with nationalism. Through factor analysis they were able to demonstrate that patriotism and nationalism were distinct constructs, the former associated with love of country, pride in being an American, and attachment to the nation; the latter associated with beliefs about America's moral and material superiority and the desire to have

other countries fashion their governments after ours. These results suggested the independence and distinctiveness of these constructs: hence, one might be highly patriotic (love one's country) but not nationalistic (feel superior to other countries).

While the us-versus-them language used by the president may have shored up domestic support for a war on terrorism, an unintended consequence of attacking another group is an increase in the cohesion of the target group, in this case, countries with high concentrations of Muslims (Olson, 2002). Even before the war in Iraq, support for the U.S. war on terror was low in predominantly Muslim countries, ranging from 13 percent to 38 percent favor in five countries, as contrasted with relatively high support from European countries that varied from 69 percent to 81 percent in four countries (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005).

In addition to delineating clearly friends and enemies, President Bush failed to distinguish patriotism from nationalism so that those who opposed the war on Afghanistan or Iraq were regarded as unpatriotic; although the accusation was somewhat mitigated by peace communities such as United for Peace & Justice (www.unitedforpeace.org) that reacted by arguing that one can be patriotic and also opposed to war.

In short, there are serious problems with approaches to security that emphasize nationalism. Research that further clarifies the distinction between patriotism, nationalism, and other isms, can deepen our understanding of the origins of intolerance, and methods to change intolerant attitudes. Such research can help people reduce the ambivalence they have when their critical analysis of policies does not match those of the ruling party, an important marker of a mature democracy.

Education and Prevention

The administration's narrow approach to security contributed mightily to the growth in peace education and antibias curricula designed to reduce the violence that Arabs and Muslims in the United States experienced after 9/11. More broadly, as one might expect when the "politics of opposites" are at play in a democracy (Nincic, 1988), the "peace through strength" approach produced a counter-reaction of "peace through cooperation" (Kimmel, 1985) with social scientists, peace activists, and others who opposed the projection of deadly force arguing for a greater understanding of the roots of terrorism, a deepening of democracy, and more peace education efforts (Friedman, 2003; Galtung & Fischer, 2002; Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004).

The rise in peace education efforts following a major episode of violence is a typical pattern of the twentieth century (Harris & Morrison, 2003). Even a cursory look at the last century makes the point: growth in peace education occurred in response to the authoritarianism of the 1940s and again when U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War escalated in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, the Cold War and the threat of nuclear war gave rise to increased peace education efforts.

Antibias education units and curricula were quickly developed in response to the surge in hate crimes. Although these initiatives were designed to address the problem of hate crimes in general, many were specifically aimed at the problems faced by Arabs and Muslims in the United States. South Asian Americans were most at risk, particularly Sikh (Hindu) Americans in part because their turbans and long beards resembled Osama bin Laden in the eyes of many. The violence included murders, physical assaults, death threats, arson, public harassment, vandalism to places of worship, and other property damage (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

Within one week after 9/11, a team of researchers and curriculum writers from the Education Development Center began disseminating a 25-page educational unit entitled "Beyond Blame: Reacting to the Terrorist Attack." The unit was designed to help middle school and high school students reduce the hostile climate toward Arab Americans. Comparisons to the Japanese internment were drawn and emphasis was placed on promoting social justice (Education Development Center, 2001).

Educators for Social Responsibility (ESR, 2003) also developed educational units to reduce the incidence of hate crimes. The units introduce the problems of prejudice, discrimination, scapegoating, and harassment to various age groups but are particularly well suited for high school and college levels. The purposes of the units are to help students understand the causes and consequences of prejudice and other attitudes that can be harmful. This antibias work was prompted by stories ESR staff had heard from teachers about incidents of bias and discrimination in their schools or communities.

Members of the Islamic Networks Group (ING) stepped up their efforts to educate and reduce bias following 9/11. Students of Muslim or Middle Eastern descent were particularly at risk, and it is noteworthy that perpetrators of harassment included fellow students, teachers, and administrators (Islamic Networks Group, 2003). Harassment occurred most often on school grounds, especially in hallways, bathrooms, and

cafeterias. Girls who wore the hijab (traditional Muslim dress) and Sikh boys were often victims.

ING began its work during the period preceding the Gulf War of 1991 because hate crimes had begun at that time. One initiative was taken by Muslim leaders who worked with the media to correct inaccurate reporting. Realizing that education might be a more proactive way of dealing with the problem, ING developed training in cultural sensitivity for schools, police, social service agencies, and several other public institutions.

Psychologists have a key role to play in partnering with educational and other organizations that are interested in developing and disseminating antibias curricula and educational units designed to reduce the incidence and prevalence of hate crimes. The field of psychology is particularly well suited to offer concepts, theories, and training venues because hate crimes have affective, cognitive, and behavioral components. Psychologists are also trained to help with the evaluation and modification of existing programs.

At the national level, psychologists have a role to play in facilitating dialogue among the FBI leadership and leaders of various organizations and ethnic communities, such as Arab Americans, Muslims, and Sikhs. One challenge is to help law enforcement officials become sensitized to incidents of hate crime and to provide them with communication and conflict-resolution skills to reassure local Arab and Islamic communities of their commitment to providing a safe place for all residents.

Psychologists who are politically astute and trained in cultural sensitivity can heighten public awareness when political events place certain segments of the population at risk for hate crimes. This applied focus needs to be informed by research and evaluation that identifies reliable and valid indicators for early warning purposes.

Finally, given that future acts of terrorism in the United States and conflicts in the Middle East can be expected to generate new outbreaks of violence against members of Arab and Muslim communities, there should be a proactive effort to develop plans at the local, state, and national levels to prevent and mitigate backlash violence.

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