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Redistricting: Did Radical Reform Produce Different Results?

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**Introduction**

Like all states with more than one House seat, California must redraw the boundaries of both its legislative and congressional districts every 10 years to account for population changes within the state. The most recent process, completed in 2011, broke sharply with the past in both style and substance. For the first time in state history, the decision about the location of district lines was made by a commission of citizens from outside government, rather than elected officials or court-appointed special masters, in a process that was much more inclusive and transparent than in the past. \(^1\) This new commission did not want for critics. Many observers, including members of the Republican Party and some minority groups, complained about the process and the commission that

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\(^1\) California voters first created a redistricting commission in 1926. However, this body was different in important respects from the commission that carried out redistricting in 2010. The earlier commission never actually oversaw the redistricting process in the state. Additional details can be found in Louis Brown, “Reapportionment in California: Where We’ve Been, Where We Go From Here,” unpublished manuscript (University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, 2000).
oversaw it. Indeed, Republicans went as far as to qualify a referendum to overturn the commission’s state Senate maps, and to urge the California Supreme Court to redraw the maps before the 2012 election.

In this chapter, we help place these criticisms in historical context and offer a broad assessment of the maps the commission produced. We discuss California’s experience with political redistricting since the 1960s and show how the process overseen by the state’s new Citizens Redistricting Commission (CRC) differed from redistricting of the past. We then evaluate the newly adopted plans, both on the specific criteria the CRC was mandated to consider and on the political implications the commission was required to ignore. On most of the mandated criteria—such as drawing compact districts and avoiding the division of cities and counties between districts—the commission’s plans represent an improvement over the maps drawn by the legislature in 2001. The plans are also somewhat more likely than the current plans to produce competitive races and to elect Democrats to office, although the latter effect is only notable for the congressional plan. In short, although the plans are far from perfect on any single dimension, they look like the sort of result one could expect given the mandates and constraints faced by the commission.

**California’s Redistricting Wars and the Creation of the Citizens Commission**

The creation of California’s Citizens Redistricting Commission through the passage of Proposition 11 in November 2008 represented an important shift in the redistricting battles that have been waged between the state’s two largest political parties for decades. If elections are the method through which voters pick their legislators, a common refrain is that redistricting in California has been a process through which legislators have chosen their voters. This description is not entirely accurate. Redistricting in California has involved a series of actors who have used the courts and direct democracy to influence the outcome, making each redistricting a protracted battle with significant input from actors outside the elected branches of government.

The modern era of redistricting began in the early 1960s. In *Baker v. Carr* (1962), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time required states to redraw legislative and congressional boundaries after the completion of every federal census to ensure equal population across districts. Since then, the courts have played a direct role in drawing lines in almost half the California redistricting battles. In both 1971 and 1991, redistricting plans drawn up by the Democratic state legislature were vetoed by Republican governors Ronald Reagan (in 1971) and Pete Wilson (in 1991). In the face of this partisan deadlock, the state Supreme Court stepped in to appoint independent experts—called “Special Masters”—to craft the new boundaries. These masters then created plans that appeared to be more favorable for the party of the governor who had appointed a majority of state Supreme Court justices.

Even when Democrats have controlled all levels of government, they have not exerted unchecked power over how to draw the lines. In 1981, a united Democratic government adopted a pro-Democratic gerrymander, but the plans were defeated by a set of referendums—one each for the congressional, state Senate, and state Assembly lines—placed on the ballot by Republicans. Republicans then allied with good government reformers on a follow-up initiative to establish a redistricting commission. When this measure lost, Democratic legislators rushed to redraw the lines, passing a compromise plan before lame duck Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown had left office and his Republican successor, George Deukmejian, could be sworn in. The plans were generous enough to Republicans to garner a two-thirds vote in each house, allowing them to go into effect swiftly and avoid another referendum challenge. Those lines stayed in place for the remainder of the decade, but a clear lesson from the episode was that direct democracy—whether real or threatened—would constrain the districts legislators could draw.

This contentious history, and the successful referendums in particular, provided the backdrop as California prepared for the 2001 round of redistricting. The Democrats again controlled both the state legislature and the governor’s office but agreed to a bipartisan gerrymander that protected incumbents from both parties with safe districts that minimized partisan turnover. They then cemented the deal with another two-thirds legislative majority, which protected the plan from any referendum challenge. This process and product angered many outside the legislature. Some minority group leaders argued the maps missed an opportunity to increase representation for historically excluded groups. Political reformers and newspaper columnists considered the plans a corrupt bargain crafted behind closed doors that put the interests of elected officials ahead of the voters they were supposed to represent. Some political observers also argued that, by creating safe political seats in which one party controlled an overwhelming majority of the
voters, the maps exacerbated the partisanship and polarization that had created per-
ennial delays in the adoption of the state budget.  

The Citizens Redistricting Commission

The popular displeasure with the 2001 maps provided fuel for a reform initiative in 2008, Proposition 11. The proposition created the Citizens Redistricting Commission, giving it authority to redraw the boundaries of state legislative districts. As with previous failed reform initiatives, Proposition 11 was funded primarily by Republican interests, reflecting their frustration with Democratic control of the legislature, which otherwise would have redrawn the boundaries. Nonetheless, Proposition 11’s advocates made a concerted effort to broaden their coalition. They attracted endorsements from several high-profile Democrats, and attempted to incorporate concerns from minority voting rights groups. These efforts paid off on Election Day 2008, when Proposition 11 squeaked through by the barest of margins. A follow-on measure, Proposition 20, then passed in November 2010, extending the commission’s authority to congressional lines as well.

Propositions 11 and 20 marked a firm departure from the old process. The two measures created a 14-member Citizens Redistricting Commission to draw all legislative and congressional lines from 2011 forward. 6 CRC members were chosen through a complicated series of steps designed to purge the applicant pool of any connection with the elected officials whose districts would be redrawn. The 2011 commission also included representation from every major ethnic group, and the law mandated five Democratic, five Republican, and four decline-to-state or third-party commissioners for partisan balance, with three of each required to approve any map. In short, the commission would either act in a bipartisan manner or deadlock trying. In the event of such a deadlock, the new law required the state Supreme Court to appoint a panel of special masters to draw the districts as in the 1971 and 1991 redistricting cycles. This left no scenario for the legislature to be directly involved in crafting the maps.

Proposition 11 also added new language to the state constitution listing spec-
ific criteria, in order of importance, for crafting new political districts. In many
ways, these criteria represented a backlash against perceived abuses of the 2001 process, including districts that split cities and created jagged edges and long pro-

6 George Skelton, “Polarization is Paralyzing California,” Los Angeles Times, Aug
10, 2009. For evidence to the contrary, see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard
Partnership (San Francisco, Calif.: Public Policy Institute of California, 2008).

7 The CRC is responsible for drawing districts for the Board of Equalization (BoE), a four-member institution responsible for specialized taxation decisions. The BoE’s small number of districts and narrow mandate made its districts less controversial, and we will not address it in this paper.

8 In fact, there are many legitimate reasons, including minority empowerment, for the drawing of irregularly shaped districts.

9 A different section of the state constitution prior to the passage of Proposition 11 had included nearly identical language protecting the boundaries of cities and counties, though not necessarily of neighborhoods and other “communities of interest.”

10 Bruce E. Cain, Karin Mac Donald, and Iris Hui, “Sorting or Self-Sorting: Compe-
tition and Redistricting in California,” in New Political Geography of California, ed.
Frederick Douglass, Thad Kousser, and Kenneth P. Miller (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of
Governmental Studies Press, 2008).
Table 1. Official California Redistricting Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Districts shall have reasonably equal population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Districts shall comply with federal Voting Rights Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Districts shall be geographically contiguous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>To the extent possible, geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, neighborhood, or community of interest shall be respected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>To the extent possible, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographical compactness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>To the extent possible, Senate districts shall be comprised of two whole, complete, and adjacent Assembly districts, and each Board of Equalization district shall be comprised of 10 whole, complete, and adjacent Senate districts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: California state constitution Article XXI, Section 2.

the legislature a decade earlier, we can quantify the extent to which the new district boundaries represent an improvement on the 2001 plans.

We also contrast the final maps adopted by the commission with the draft boundaries released in June 2011. This comparison is important because California underwent substantial demographic changes between 2000 and 2010. Comparing the draft and final plans, which were both based on 2010 census data, allows us to separate the minority gains due to demographic change from the commission’s conscious efforts on this score.

Minority Representation

Proposition 11 tried harder than earlier reform efforts to reassure advocates of minority rights that their interests would be respected. One such reassurance was language calling for compliance with the federal Voting Rights Act. In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Supreme Court interpreted part of the law to require the creation of political districts in which voters from racial and ethnic minorities would account for a numerical majority. Such majority-minority districts must be drawn when minority populations are sufficiently large and geographically concentrated and when there is evidence of racially polarized voting. Even where the Gingles preconditions may not be satisfied, other parts of Proposition 11 that task the commission with preserving the geographic integrity of local communities of interest provide additional protections (California Constitution, Article XXI, § 2, subdivision (d)(4)).

We calculated the proportion of each district’s citizen voting-age population (CVAP) that is Asian, black, and Latino, the three groups identified by the CRC as potentially worthy of VRA protections under the Gingles criteria. We focus on CVAP because this number best captures the universe of eligibles—rather than actual or registered—voters in each district.

Table 2 lists the estimated number of majority-minority districts drawn under each set of redistricting plans. Overall, the commission’s 2011 maps created eight new majority Latino districts, with most of the gains coming from the Assembly plan. The bulk of these gains appeared only in the final plans; the draft maps released in June 2011 added just two majority Latino legislative districts, and eliminated one majority Latino congressional district, for a net gain of only one. This helps explain criticism of the draft plan by some civil and voting rights groups. The jump is the number of majority Latino districts between June and August suggests a deliberate effort on the part of the commission, rather than natural growth in the size of California’s Latino population since the last redistricting. In addition, the commission created one new majority-Asian district in the San Gabriel Valley—an area that had been split up among several districts in 2001 in the face of strong opposition from Asian voting rights groups.

Given the sizable increase in the number of Latino Californians over the past decade—from 32.4% of state residents in 2000 to 37.6% in the most recent census—it may be surprising that Latinos did not see greater gains, particularly in the state Senate and congressional maps. However, a smaller share of the Latino population is eligible to vote—due both to lower rates of citizenship and a higher


\[13\] Although our discussion focuses on point estimates, it is important to recognize that the CVAP figures are inexact because they are constructed, at least in part, from survey data. Unfortunately, due to a variety of methodological challenges, it is not possible to construct confidence intervals or margins of error that adequately capture this uncertainty. See Kenneth F. McCue, “Creating California’s Official Redistricting Database,” accessed at <http://swdb.berkeley.edu/dl0/Creat%20database.pdf> on Dec. 10, 2012, in particular, pp. 16-17. Those data limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting the results below.

proportion of Latinos falling below the legal voting age.\textsuperscript{15} As a percentage of CVAP, the Latino population increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 25.6% in 2010. Moreover, many parts of the state have seen large Latino gains that still fall short of a Latino voting majority.\textsuperscript{16} The number of districts where Latinos make up 30 to 40% of the voter eligible population has increased even as the number of majority-Latino districts has shown much smaller change. Latino candidates might succeed in these "influence" districts by attracting votes from other minorities or cross-over support among white voters. Indeed, more than a third of Latino candidates elected to the Assembly in 2012 ran in districts lacking a Latino voter majority.\textsuperscript{17} Latino candidates won in 11 of 14 majority-Latino CVAP districts.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Number of Majority-Minority Districts (by CVAP)}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Assembly & & & \\
Black & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Latino & 8 & 10 & 14 \\
Asian & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
Senate & & & \\
Black & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Latino & 4 & 4 & 5 \\
Asian & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Congress & & & \\
Black & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Latino & 6 & 5 & 7 \\
Asian & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{17} Susan Talamantes Eggman in AD 13 (26% Latino CVAP), Nora Campos in AD 27 (33%), Rady Salas in AD 32 (46%), Eric Linder in AD 60 (35%), Jose Medina in AD 61 (35%), and Rocky Chavez in AD 76 (17%).
\textsuperscript{18} African-American candidates won in two of these districts, AD 47 and AD 59.

City, County, and Community Splits

Proposition 11 also directed the CRC to minimize division of cities, counties, neighborhoods, and other "communities of interest" (COI). COI are difficult to identify objectively, and the phrase was left undefined in Proposition 11. Although a definition was added through Proposition 20, it remained rather vague and open-ended, providing little help for clearly pinpointing COI in the state. As a result, we avoid this topic and focus instead on the two types of political communities with clearly identifiable geographical boundaries: incorporated cities and counties. For each type of geography, we calculated how many jurisdictions were left intact—that is, drawn into a single district—as part of the redistricting process.

In Table 3, we report the percentage of intact incorporated cities produced by each set of plans. This calculation focuses only on communities small enough to fit into a single district and thus excludes major cities that would have been split under any redistricting plan.\textsuperscript{19} The table also tallies up the total number of community splits, including geographies too large to fit in a legislative district. Table 4 presents a similar analysis for county splits, except instead of percentages, this table reports the raw counts of intact counties.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite criticism from one political observer that the commission's work "whacks and hacks cities and counties for no apparent reason,"\textsuperscript{21} the 2011 plans kept between 91 and 96% of all incorporated cities intact. For both the Assembly and Senate maps, the number of intact cities increased slightly compared to 2001, while it actually declined somewhat for the congressional plan. Once split, however, a city in 2011 was less likely to be split again, leading to fewer splits overall compared to 2001.\textsuperscript{22} The commission was less successful in avoiding county splits: aside from the Senate plans, where the 2011 maps increased the number of intact counties, the number of county splits did not notably change.

\textsuperscript{19} This follows the methodology used by the commission in its final report, except the commission did not count splits that produced areas with zero population; such splits are included in our count.
\textsuperscript{20} Despite overall population growth, the number of counties too big to fit in a single legislative district did not change between 2000 and 2010. Thus, the comparison of the raw counts provides a useful metric for the differences between the 2001 legislative redistricting and the 2011 commission plans.
\textsuperscript{22} If we expand the analysis to include unincorporated census-designated places, which are well-defined areas with clear community character but which lack the legal standing of cities, the improvement between the 2001 and 2011 maps is somewhat more pronounced. Results are available from the authors on request.
Maximizing Geographic Compactness

Compactness—the spatial "spread" of a district—is a long-established criterion for evaluating political boundaries, and a legally mandated redistricting consideration in many states. Indeed, critics often use sprawling districts to make the case for reform. In California, for example, proponents of Proposition 11 pointed to California's 23rd Congressional District drawn by the legislature in 2001. Known as the Ribbon of Shame, the coastal district stretched nearly 200 miles from Monterey County in the north to Oxnard in the south, picking up heavily Democratic communities along the way.

Despite the straightforward intuition for what it means to draw compact districts, consensus on a formal mathematical definition has remained elusive, and scholars have proposed a variety of measures. Researchers have shown that aggregate statistics produced by these measures generally lead to similar conclusions about specific redistricting plans, so the precise measure we choose is not likely to affect our conclusions. We use the measure proposed by Daniel Polsby and Robert Popper. It ranges from zero to one, with higher values indicating greater compactness.24

To compare the degree of compactness achieved by the 2001 legislative redistricting and the two sets of commission-drawn plans, Table 5 presents the mean district Polsby-Popper score produced by each plan. Overall, the larger Polsby-Popper scores for the CRC-drawn districts provide clear evidence that the commission drew more compact boundaries than the legislature. This was the case for both sets of commission plans, although the August maps achieved somewhat greater compactness than the initial draft maps released in June.

Nesting Assembly Districts

The first criterion we evaluate is "nesting": the process of fitting two Assembly districts within a single Senate district. One impetus for nesting is the belief that it makes it easier for voters to correctly identify their elected representatives and accurately apportion credit and blame for policy outcomes. Some research has also shown that nesting can improve legislative productivity in bicameral systems by aligning electoral incentives of lawmakers, making it easier

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25 Daniel D. Polsby and Robert D. Popper, "The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering," Yale Law & Policy Review, vol. 5, no. 2 (1991): 301–53. The Polsby-Popper score for each political district is equal to the ratio of the area of the district to the area of a circle that has the same perimeter length as the district.
Table 5. Average Polsby-Popper Compactness Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Type</th>
<th>2001 Plan</th>
<th>Draft 2011 Plan</th>
<th>Final 2011 Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to build legislative coalitions across chambers. In fact, the special masters adopted perfectly nested plans in both the 1970s and the 1990s. Although nesting of lower-house districts was approved by voters as part of Proposition 11, this goal was given the lowest priority among the criteria listed in the constitution.

Table 6 compares the degree of nesting across the commission and legislative plans. For each Senate district, we calculated the percentage of its population that was contained in the two Assembly districts with the largest number of overlapping residents. In a perfectly nested plan, the percentage would be 100, because the two Assembly districts would contain all of the residents of the larger Senate district. The first row of Table 6 reports the average amount of population overlap between each Senate district and its two most nested Assembly districts. The second row reports the average number of Assembly districts covered, at least partially, by each Senate district. A perfectly nested plan would have a value of 2 or this measure, and higher values indicate weaker nesting.

The draft plan released in June 2011 achieved the greatest amount of nesting, with nearly perfect population overlap between the districts of the upper and lower houses of the legislature. Nesting was then reduced in the final plan, in large part a casualty of new majority-minority districts and an effort to reduce the number of community splits in the draft plan. However, the final maps still produced more nesting than in the legislature’s 2001 plan.

Summary

Overall, the results reported here suggest that the final commission maps adopted in August represented an improvement, although perhaps a modest one, over the 2001 legislative redistricting on nearly all of the criteria voters said were important to them when they passed Proposition 11. This is true even though the commission did not fully achieve any of the goals written into the state constitution. Though slightly more communities have been left intact, a small number of cities are still split into multiple districts. Likewise, while the new districts are more compact, none of them look like perfect rectangles or circles. The fact that the commission did not achieve perfect compliance with all of the criteria reveals the inherent tradeoffs between these important considerations—tensions that limit the potential gains from the reform and which few voters likely understood when they voted for the new system.

Nonetheless, conflicts between the criteria were less pronounced than might have been expected. The commission managed to improve the plans on nearly every criterion between the draft maps in June and the final maps in August. Only nesting, the lowest-ranked priority under Proposition 11, declined in the final maps—and likely because the commissioners worked to maximize other higher-ranked criteria, as directed by the state constitution. The criteria were in tension, but they were not mutually exclusive.

Evaluating the Commission Plans: Political Effects

While the law required the CRC to consider geographic and minority representation, it also directed the CRC to ignore the partisan and political effects of its plans. All the same, many actors hoped for either more competitive seats, more victories for their own party, or both. In fact, the commissioners might have found ways to produce a partisan advantage using some combination of the demographic information available to them and their own knowledge of particular communities or incumbents. Even a strictly neutral commission was likely to produce partisan winners and losers—and a partisan impact that emerges from a neutral process still has real consequences.

In this section we evaluate the plans for two possible political effects: the number of competitive seats, and the share of seats each major party was likely to win under the new maps. We use party registration and incumbency to produce our estimates, first by fitting a statistical model that used these two variables to
predict the results of previous elections with data from those elections, and then by combining the model results with the relevant data from the new maps to generate predictions under the new lines. Incumbency and partisanship were the important factors within the commission’s control at the time they drafted the lines, so using them avoids crediting or blaming the commission for outcomes they could not have foreseen. Nonetheless, we also contrast our predictions with the actual results from the 2012 election to see just how accurate they were. As will be clear, our predictions were generally quite good. This suggests we can trust that our analysis identified the factors that matter and the ones the commission might have used to produce a desired result—whether more competition or an advantage for one party. Although our analysis shows that the plans affected the competition and the balance of partisan power, these effects are not always as large as some observers have suggested, nor have they necessarily emerged for the reasons that many critics claimed.

Competitiveness

The CRC was not allowed to consider partisanship, but advocates of reform clearly hoped the commission would draw more competitive seats,28 and the campaign on behalf of Proposition 11 strongly hinted that its passage would lead to that outcome.29 Did the commission live up to those expectations?

We consider a seat competitive if we predicted that no candidate would win by more than 10 percentage points. Table 7 has the share of seats predicted to be competitive under the new maps, with separate estimates for the 2001 districts, the CRC’s draft plan from June, and the first plan adopted in August. All the commission’s maps are more competitive on paper than the existing maps, with increases ranging from three percentage points (i.e., between two and three additional seats) for the final Assembly plan to 13 points (i.e., between six and seven additional seats) for the final House plan. The draft plan in June offered slightly greater

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7. Predicted Share of Seats with Competitive Outcomes: 2001 Plan vs. CRC Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant Difference?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual Result</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001 Plan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011 Plan to</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

competitiveness gains in both the Senate (6%, or between two and three seats) and Assembly (6%, or between four and five seats), but not in the House (11%, or between five and six seats), although none of the differences between the two commission plans are statistically significant.

When compared to the actual outcomes, our predictions of competitive races were too high by three to five percentage points in each chamber. Some of this is a problem with our model, which overstated competition in Assembly and Senate districts under the old plan, too.30 However, for congressional contests the problem stems from our modeling assumption that incumbents would run in the district where their homes were located. In fact, most incumbents avoided districts that favored the other party or where they would have had to run against another incumbent. This simple reality that public officials are strategic and choose their electoral tactics with care explains all of the difference between our prediction and the actual result for those House contests.

Overall, the new maps produced a modest increase in the number of competitive elections—though perhaps fewer than many reformers hoped for.

Partisan Balance

We conducted a similar analysis to gauge the impact of the new districts on the partisan balance of power, as measured by the Democratic share of seats in each legislative house and the California congressional delegation. We produce two sets of estimates: one based on election patterns in 2008, which we call a


29 For instance, supporters of Proposition 11 argued in the November 2008 voter information guide that “[t]here is a serious conflict of interest when legislators are allowed to draw their own district boundaries. They divide up neighborhoods and communities to create districts where they are virtually guaranteed reelection. Once elected, these politicians aren’t accountable to voters because they don’t have to earn our votes.” Later in the same guide, supporters also argue, “[Proposition 11] means fair election districts drawn by citizens, not politicians, so we can hold [the politicians] accountable and throw them out of office if they aren’t doing their jobs.” California Secretary of State, “California General Election, Tuesday, Nov. 4, 2008: Official Voter Information Guide” (Sacramento, Calif., 2008), 72-73.
“Good Democratic Year,” and one based on 2010, which we call a “Good Republican Year.”

State Senate races create special complications that are worth a short discussion. Under the state constitution, only half of the state Senate seats are up for grabs in each election year. Thus, the new even-numbered seats will not be used until the 2014 election cycle, and in the interim, incumbents currently representing seven-numbered districts will be allowed to remain in office. If they step down, the resulting special election will be held under the odd district lines. To capture this dynamic, we have generated separate Senate predictions for 2012 and 2014. For 2012, we generate model predictions only for the odd-numbered seats and assume that the rest will continue to be held by the party that currently controls them. We then generate estimates for 2014 based on all 40 seats, which assumes that our model predictions for those odd-numbered seats represent the best guess as to party control moving forward. We split the seats in the same way for our predictions using the old maps, to make the numbers as comparable as possible.

Table 8 summarizes the results. (Because the estimates from the June draft plan were virtually identical, for the sake of space we have reported only a comparison of the final CRC map and the existing 2001 map.) Surprisingly, our model predicted a strong Democratic performance in the legislature under the

| Table 8. Predicted Democratic Seat Share 2001 Plan vs. Final 2011 Plan |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Senate: 2012    | 2001 Plan       | Significant Difference | 2011 Plan        |
| Party           | 2011 Plan       | 2001 Plan         | Differences      |
| Democratic Year | 67%             | No (p=0.30)       | 0.60            |
| Good Rep. Year  | 66%             | No (p=0.22)       | 0.43            |
| Good Dem. Year  | 69%             | No (p=0.56)       | 0.89            |
| Good Rep. Year  | 63%             | No (p=0.32)       | 0.35            |
| Assembly        | 68%             | No (p=0.52)       | 0.53            |
| Good Dem. Year  | 68%             | No (p=0.43)       | 0.66            |
| Good Rep. Year  | 62%             | No (p=0.30)       | 0.53            |
| Congress        | 65%             | No (p=0.35)       | 0.53            |
| Good Dem. Year  | 65%             | No (p=0.30)       | 0.53            |
| Good Rep. Year  | 63%             | No (p=0.30)       | 0.53            |

31 There is a common misconception that the national Republican tide of 2010 did not touch California. Although Republican candidates did perform poorly statewide, they gained substantial ground in legislative and congressional races. Controlling for party registration and incumbency and excluding uncontested seats, the average Republican candidate in 2010 earned an additional 4% of the vote in the Assembly, 5% in the Senate, and 6% in the House compared to 2008. Shifts of these magnitudes would qualify as substantial partisan tides in the broader sweep of American history. However, given the lopsided registration advantage for one of the two large parties in most districts, these swings did not produce any extra victories for Republican candidates.

32 Because both the odd- and even-numbered district estimates are based on the same model for 2014 (i.e., either a “Good Democratic Year” or a “Good Republican Year”) it assumes that both 2012 (when the odd seats are up) and 2014 (when the even seats are up) would be good years for the same party. In reality, a good year for one party is rarely followed by another good year for the same party. Thus, it is more than likely that the actual 2014 results will fall somewhere between the estimates we present.

33 The results are similar if we use an average of the vote for statewide offices in 2010 and the presidential vote in 2008 as our measure of the likely outcome, assigning those districts with an average vote share greater than 50% to the Democrats and all others to the Republicans. This approach does not allow us to distinguish between good years for each party, so the specific estimates vary somewhat. However, they all show a modest gain for Democrats in the Assembly and Senate plans and a larger gain in the House plan.
existing maps put in place in 2001—far stronger, in fact, than the Democrats actually achieved. Under the 2001 maps, a good Democratic year would have given Democrats better than even odds (p = 0.50) of claiming a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and only a good Republican year predicted a seat share (63%) close to what Democrats actually held in the run up to the 2012 election. Likewise, the existing Assembly districts already seemed to give Democrats good odds (p = 0.53) of claiming a two-thirds majority, at least in a good year for their party.

Nonetheless, the final CRC map still improved the odds of a two-thirds majority for the Democrats in 2012. The increase was modest for the Assembly (0.53 to 0.66), but much larger for the Senate (0.60 to 0.94). Taken together, our model gave Democrats a six-in-ten chance of winning two-thirds in both chambers in a good Democratic year.

The results were much different for 2014 (recall that estimates for this year incorporate model predictions for all seats). Under the 2001 maps, the odds of a Democratic two-thirds in the Senate were a little higher for 2014 than for 2012, while under the new maps the odds were actually a little lower. In fact, when the Senate plan is considered as a whole in this way (rather than as odd and even districts separately), a Democratic supermajority was if anything, marginally less likely under the new map than the old one (0.79 vs. 0.85). Though the odds of a supermajority in both chambers was about the same (0.52 vs. 0.47). Thus, the potential Democratic gains were less a function of the district lines themselves than the numbering of the Senate districts, which “front-loaded” seats in 2012 when the Democrats could expect to do better.

Our model predicted more substantial gains for Democrats under the new House plan, with up to four additional seats (7%) in a good Democratic year. Even a bad year for Democrats would likely net them the same share of seats they currently hold when the commission met to draw its lines. In contrast to the Assembly and Senate plans, Republicans in congressional races have performed about as expected by our model in recent elections, with the predictions using the 2001 seats closely matching what actually occurred. Thus, it seems fair to attribute any estimated gains to the redistricting plan itself. Nonetheless, the uncertainty inherent

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34 Our regression model predicts vote share, which we then translate into seat share. In an otherwise competitive race, even slight deviations from our model’s prediction will produce the wrong winner. The Democratic underperformance is therefore a consequence of better than expected Republican performance in key competitive districts. We cannot say whether this performance is a function of something predictable and systematic that we have not included in our model or simple random chance.

35 The p-value reported in the text corresponds to the odds of a Democratic two-thirds majority. With p = 0.6, our model estimates a 60% chance of a Democratic two-thirds majority in the Senate.

36 Our model predicts a 65% Democratic seat share in a good Democratic year and a 63% seat share in a good Republican year, compared to the 64% Democrats actually won in both 2008 and 2010.

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37 Consistent with this idea, the predicted seat shares under the old plan are much more precisely estimated than they are under the new plan, while there is no such difference in precision for vote shares.

38 In addition to the incumbent decisions about where to run mentioned before, the share of voters who registered as Republicans was notably smaller on Election Day had been the case when the CRC finalized the maps.

the vote share in every seat by the same amount. For example, if the Democrats received an average of 60% of the vote and then suddenly lost 5% in every district, the seats-votes curve would show how many seats the Democrats could expect to lose for that 5%, assuming that nothing else about the districts changed. A steep part of the curve reflects a point where the system is very responsive to changing voter preferences—where a lot of seats would change hands if the vote share shifted. A flatter or more horizontal portion of the curve reflects the opposite: a point where few seats are within range of shifting votes.

In Figure 1, the solid black lines identify the curve for the 2001 plan in each case, while the dashed lines identify the curve for the final CRC plan. We also label the actual 2008 and 2010 election outcomes on each graph for reference.

Each of the 2001 plans has a distinctive bowing in its seats-votes curve between a vote share of about 55 and 65% Democratic—exactly the range where elections in California tend to occur. This bowing shows the lack of competitive seats, because at the point where the curve bows, a shift in vote share (on the horizontal axis) produces a smaller change in seat share (on the vertical axis). For example, note how in the House plan Democrats win 5% more of the vote in 2008 than in 2010 (i.e., 63% vs. 58%), but only 2% more of the seats (65% vs. 63%). This is precisely what one would expect in a gerrymander designed to benefit incumbent of both parties, because the districts are lopsided in favor of one party or the other.
Redistricting: Did Radical Reform Produce Different Results?

By contrast, all three CRC plans come close to eliminating the bowling, leaving a straight line where additional votes translate into new seats at a much faster pace. In the Assembly and Senate plans, the original bowling was modest so the consequences of straightening it are less pronounced. But because the bowling was so severe in the 2001 congressional plan, it limited the gains Democrats might have achieved under a more competitive map. The predicted seat shares for 2008 make this clear. Whereas the old map gave Democrats only 65% of the seats in a good year for them like 2008, the new map gives them 72%. The new map allows the additional Democratic votes to translate into greater seat gains because there are competitive seats available for the party to win.

These results do not clearly tell us that the CRC avoided any and all attempts at gerrymandering. But they do show that the new plans all resembled each other in the seat share they predicted for similar shares of the vote, so the differences in partisan gains for Democrats between the new plans had at least as much to do with the 2001 plans to which they were compared as with the lines the commissions drew. Indeed, given the strongly uncompetitive nature of the 2001 congressional plan, any new plan that increased competition would likely have benefited Democrats.

Summary

Our analysis of political effects points to several conclusions. First, as many observers had hoped, the CRC maps are somewhat more competitive than the legislature’s maps from 2001. Apart from the congressional plan, however, the gains are fairly modest. Indeed, for the Senate and Assembly, the level of competition predicted by our model is higher than actually occurred. This suggests that factors besides either incumbency or the district lines have conspired to keep competition low and will continue to do so moving forward.

Second, the partisan change we predict for the new plans is generally modest, and where the Democratic gains are larger, the new lines are not necessarily responsible. Based on party registration and incumbency, Republicans had been outperforming expectations in the 2001 districts, especially in the Senate. This fact is visible without any statistical model. Under the 2001 Senate map, every Democrat represented a safe seat, while three Republican senators either represented Democratic-leaning districts or had won their last election by a small margin (Sen. Blakeslee in District 15, Sen. Cannella in District 12, and Sen. Strickland in District 19). Had two of these three races turned out differently, the Democrats would already have had a two-thirds majority. The handwriting for Republicans has been on the wall for several years.

This Republican overperformance means only a small fraction of the partisan effects are properly attributed to the commission’s new lines. In the Senate, the district numbers are mostly to blame. In fact, at the time the Senate map was drawn, it was conceivable that Democrats could claim more than two-thirds of the seats in 2012 but lose the supermajority in 2014 based largely on the districts at stake in each year. The strong Democratic performance in 2012 now makes that outcome far less likely, since Republicans need a net gain of three seats in 2014 rather than just two, and the landscape of 2014 makes more than a two-seat gain extremely difficult.

We find the largest partisan effects in the House map, but these gains stem from the old map as much as the new one. Low levels of competition in the 2001 plan ensured that a strong and improving Democratic performance over the course of the decade did not lead to gains in seat share. The new congressional plan is the most competitive of the three, so a good year for Democrats will probably allow them to pick up the seats they did not win before. Yet these gains could easily be lost again in a conservativizing partisan tide. Greater competition brings opportunity, but also risk.

The implications of these results depend greatly on one’s primary concern. If the question is whether the new maps are better for the Democrats, the answer is clearly yes. But the gains for Democrats are either uncertain, because they depend on competitive seats, or conditional, because they depend on the resterica of Senate seat numbering. The party’s strong performance in 2012 was not at all guaranteed at the time the districts were drawn and so cannot really be attributed to redistricting.

Discussion

There is little doubt that the maps produced by the CRC, and the process through which these plans came about, represented an important improvement method of numbering Senate districts (see p. 25 of the commission’s final report), so any argument about the numbering would presumably need to take issue with that process itself. The commission’s process intended to minimize the number of voters moving from an odd to an even numbered district or vice-versa. To our knowledge, neither the 2001 plan drawn by the legislature nor even the 1991 plan drawn the Special Masters followed a similar systematic process. The legislature made no attempt to explain any of its decisions, while the Special Masters simply noted that they “tried to assign the numbers randomly.” (Special Masters on Reapportionment, “Report and Recommendations,” p. 74) and that any errors they made could be corrected by the California Supreme Court (Special Masters on Reapportionment, “Report and Recommendations,” p. 60).

41 The 2014 seats are currently held by 6 Republicans and 14 Democrats. Party registration will provide six comfortable seats for Republicans moving forward. In addition, one more seat (SD 34) is highly competitive, and Republican Anthony Cunetta enjoyed an incumbency advantage that he might be able to hold. But there is no other district even as competitive as Cunetta’s, so Republicans will need to win in very unforgiving territory in order to claim the three seats required. More likely is a win in 2016, in one of the seats they lost during the 2012 cycle.

41 Of course, one might argue the commission adopted a systematic
on the legislature-led redistricting of 2001. The new district boundaries kept more communities together and created more compact districts while at the same time increasing opportunities for minority representation. They also have the potential to modestly increase competition in California elections and the responsiveness of the legislative branch to changing voter preferences.

These are important accomplishments, and many supporters of Propositions 11 and 20 will rightly point to them as Californians and political observers elsewhere evaluate our state’s innovative approach to redistricting. Yet any political reformer who believed that simply giving the job of drawing districts to regular citizens and attempting to take politics out of the process would produce maximum improvement on every desired dimension will surely be disappointed. As the 2011 redistricting experience has showed, many other social and political factors—such as the partisan self-sorting and segregation of the electorate—greatly limit the extent to which the redistricting process, no matter how fair and nonpartisan, can change the maps that are produced. Maximizing certain criteria, such as keeping communities intact and protecting the voting rights of historically underrepresented groups, makes achieving other goals, such as increasing competitiveness, more difficult. Perhaps most importantly, the experience of the CRC has shown that a nonpartisan, participatory, and transparent process does not eliminate the zero-sum nature of electoral competition. The commission’s maps have both winners and losers and may result in lasting impacts on the balance of political power. If Californians decide that they like their new system of drawing lines, they will need to jealously guard it in future iterations, because the organized interests who care most about the process will surely learn from this maiden voyage. They will attempt to either steer future commissions in their direction or sabotage the commission’s efforts entirely.

Polarization Interrupted?
California’s Experiment with the Top-Two Primary

Seth Masket

Introduction

In the summer of 2010, California’s voters, annoyed by legislative polarization in an increasingly dysfunctional state government, launched a statewide experiment by passing Proposition 14. This initiative instituted a top-two “jungle” primary for the state’s partisan offices, beginning in 2012. The idea was that by changing the very nature of the primary—placing candidates of all parties within the same primary contest—the state could encourage the election of more moderate state legislators and discourage excessive partisanship among elected officials.

This chapter is an attempt to assess just how successful this reform has been in changing the nature of California’s elected officials. To be sure, it is still quite early. At the time this is being written, those elected in the 2012 general elections are new to office, and we do not know how they will govern. Nonetheless, the June 2012 election featured the first top-two primary in state history, and we can glean some useful information from those results.

What those results suggest is that Proposition 14 was disruptive to some longstanding political patterns, creating greater competition in elections and reducing the electoral security of incumbents. The political parties, however, re-