

that prevented banks from selling insurance, because “lobbyists who persist in being stubborn in the face of consensus...find themselves marginalized, not only on this issue but on pretty much any other issue Congress might take up in the future” (p. 2). Certainly insurance agents were unhappy with their lobbyist. But the lobbyist knew their fate would have been much worse in the long run had he remained obstinate. Holyoke shows us that this lobbyist’s story is the norm, not the exception, in the competitive world of interest group politics.

After deducing expectations from a formal “competitive model” of lobbying, Holyoke carefully chooses six cases that meet two criteria: Lowi’s policy domain typology and salience. His case selection process is certainly defensible and systematic, but to be fair, it is also limited in its generalizability. Few issues fit Lowi’s typology neatly or consistently over time. Moreover, many issues are so far below the radar that they attract no competition, whereas others invite competition from multiple perspectives. The case selection is understandable in light of the wealth of systematic evidence gathered from interviews with lobbyists.

Holyoke puts his impressive data to good use in three empirical chapters. First, in the most-direct test, the model, he finds that lobbyists are more likely to move away from their client’s preferred position depending on their competitors’ resources and pressure from lawmaker allies. Yet, their client’s preferences are still a significant constraint. Second, he compares his model at the committee and floor stages of the legislative process, finding that conflict declines for low-salience issues as they progress through the legislative process. Finally, he finds that the more interest group conflict there is on an issue, the more likely it will suffer from the status quo bias. The latter two chapters stray somewhat from the central claims of the competitive model, but nonetheless offer insight into the dynamics of lobbying competition and cooperation.

Overall, interest group scholars will surely find themselves nodding their heads at Holyoke’s logic and findings. So too will lobbying practitioners who care to step back to see the forest for the trees. Perhaps they will learn precisely when to be stubborn, and when it is better to simply go along.

TIMOTHY M. LA PIRA  
*James Madison University*

**Paradise Plundered: Fiscal Crisis and Governance Failures in San Diego** by Steven P. Erie, Vladimir Kogan, and Scott A. Mackenzie. Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University Press, 2011. 360 pp. Paper, \$24.95.

A joke circulating among political wags in California: “Q: Why aren’t Californians afraid of earthquakes? A: The state is already broken.” In

elucidating the interlocking causes of governance failure in San Diego, *Paradise Plundered* speaks to the political crisis currently gripping the State of California, while providing a cautionary tale for state and local politics on a national level. It turns a sharply focused scholarly lens on San Diego, which has received little attention in the political science literature, being by reputation a politically innocuous second city to its upstate competitor, Los Angeles. The authors expose a city beset by political forces increasingly common to the urban landscape: fragmented governance institutions, voter-enacted fiscal restrictions, an increasingly anti-government political culture, and civic leadership hollowed out by global economic forces. Steven Erie, Vladimir Kogan, and Scott Mackenzie argue that these forces together foster the growth of “fiscal populists” (T.N. Clark, *Urban Innovation: Creative Strategies for Turbulent Times*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), who run for office on their managerial credentials. Once in office, they avoid the tough actions required for fiscal sustainability: “the path of least resistance is to forgo asking voters to dip into their own pockets to pay for public services.... The most effective line of attack is to tap into voters’ long-standing distrust of local government” (p. 268).

San Diego exemplifies the result, a sort of Ponzi scheme populism by which local officials use creative financing approaches to bridge the gap between residents’ attachment to services and their disinclination to pay for them. The passage of tax restrictions under Proposition 13 locked in the city’s undersized property tax base while limiting future revenue options by requiring voter approval, and frequently supermajority support, for tax increases. In ensuing decades, San Diego officials almost uniformly avoided undertaking tax or fee increases to pay for new public services required by the growing city. Rather, they aggressively pursued retail tax revenues through grandiose redevelopment projects, while diverting “excess” pension fund earnings to pay for general operating expenses. As fiscal pressures grew, the city sequentially adopted two “manager’s proposals” that provided short-term fiscal relief, reducing immediate city pension contributions in return for increased pension benefits in perpetuity. The result of fiscal mismanagement in San Diego was a pension scandal that came to be recognized more accurately as a structural budget crisis.

By December 2003, San Diego’s \$2.5 billion pension fund had unfunded obligations in excess of \$1.1 billion (p. 81). San Diego was harbinger of a looming state and local government pension crisis; by 2008, eight of the ten largest California cities had unfunded pension liabilities that ranged from 43 percent of annual payroll (Riverside) to the whopping 393 percent of payroll owed by San Diego. While the local government

pension crisis cannot be attributed wholly to a diversion of pension earnings to support general-fund spending, it is nonetheless illustrative of the general tendency of fiscal populists to promise public benefits while not establishing the financial mechanisms required to fund them. It thus illustrates the central thesis that effective urban governance demands the convergence of strong leadership, public interests rightfully understood, and workable governance institutions. In an ironic side note, Erie, Kogan, and Mackenzie quote Proposition 13 architect and anti-tax crusader Howard Jarvis: “If all cities were as well run as San Diego, we wouldn’t need Proposition 13” (p. 66).

Perhaps less recognized but of potentially greater concern has been the effect of fiscal populism on public infrastructure development in San Diego. A disinclination to finance development through revenue bonds or other politically risky financing strategies has marked pursuit of a series of ad-hoc and disconnected projects that serve special interests at the expense of longer-range and more broadly conceived planning efforts. Erie, Kogan, and Mackenzie show that a series of public officials have “sold” San Diego on working on a series of high-profile and expensive downtown projects: a library/ballpark project, civic center, and convention center. Facing fiscal insolvency, officials repeated the pattern of avoiding tax measures in support of civic development. Rather, they provided excessive concessions to developers in return for development support, or in the case of the new central library, initiated development without funding fully in place to support construction—much less operations—of the new library (p. 158).

Similarly, San Diego’s redevelopment policies have relied heavily on public-private partnerships in which private interests are heavily privileged. The result has been to reshape fundamentally the city’s bay front, but without making significant progress on the public priorities underlying state redevelopment policy, such as expanded low/moderate income housing, provision of employment opportunities, and creation of public spaces available to all citizens (p. 209). Erie, Kogan, and Mackenzie argue, “Public improvement land uses, such as parks, libraries, and waterfront vistas, have been crowded out by new hotels, condos, and other private spaces. These latter projects help enrich a few well-positioned developers but offer few benefits to most residents” (p. 210). The end result is a pattern of development that does little to provide needed broad-based infrastructure for the city, much less serve a rapidly growing bi-national urban region.

*Paradise Plundered* is a must-read for urban scholars and an invaluable resource for political science and public affairs courses, as it enriches an urban governance literature that has a place in naïve, simple-opposition, pluralist,

and elite explanations of urban policy. It convincingly demonstrates how pluralist forces expressed through district elections and restrictive fiscal institutions interact with elite development interests in the absence of a responsible civic sector or public officials committed to broader public interests. In San Diego, the global hollowing out of civic leadership, a conservative political culture, and fragmented governance institutions jointly fostered fiscal recklessness that enacted residents' "reflexive dislike of taxes and yearning for more government services" (p. 257). Public officials not only mortgaged future revenues to support pension liabilities, but continued historic underfunding of public services that became disastrous in the case of San Diego's failed responses to the wildfires of 2003 and 2007. The study makes an undeniable contribution to both political science scholarship and policy practice by compellingly elaborating the forces that constrain effective urban governance. As the authors aptly quote San Diego City Councilman Carl DeMaio: "There is a San Diego brewing in every community" (p. 21).

JULIET ANN MUSSO

*University of Southern California*

**Trust in Black America: Race, Discrimination, and Politics** by Shayla C. Nunnally. New York, New York University Press, 2012. 296 pp. Paper, \$26.00.

This book arrives at a propitious moment. Recent partisan polarization and its racial inflections raise important empirical and normative questions about political trust and its relationship to race. With this in mind, Shayla Nunnally's *Trust in Black America* attempts to develop an account of trust that combines structuralism and methodological individualism, and in the process, she hopes to refine our understanding of the American racial order and revise our thinking about trust. Unfortunately, the text never reaches these lofty and worthwhile scholarly heights. This book covers old terrain more than it breaks new ground.

In her pursuit of the racial origins of trust, Nunnally employs a dizzying and dense repertoire of concepts and theoretical propositions that do not offer much additional explanatory leverage. Foremost among these is "discriminative racial-psychological processing," her central theory. Despite its turgid label, the theory is simple: the extent to which an individual trusts a member of another race or a member of their own race depends upon their experiences, the information they receive, and their predispositions, particularly the stereotypes they hold. Nunnally then constructs an unwieldy