CONCLUSION:

PEACE PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Deborah Du Nann Winter, Daniel J. Christie, Richard V. Wagner, and Laura B. Boston

Peace psychology at the turn of the millennium has greatly expanded since its inception during the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the planet's bipolar international organization changed dramatically, as did the nature of war. The dyadic relationship between two superpowers no longer captures the psychological complexity of armed conflict in its many forms. At the beginning of the new millennium, war is no longer a matter of ideological struggle between two rival economic systems, and the global system of nation/states is no longer viewed as a set of dominoes falling to one side or another. War is not even primarily a matter of interstate conflict, since the vast majority of wars are fought within states. Instead of traditional military theaters with emphasis on extended deterrence and defense of borders (see Introduction), armed violence is now ubiquitous, occurring not only in jungles and villages, but in urban streets (see Kostelney & Garbarino, this volume), and households of all economic classes (see Abrahams, this volume).

1

As the settings for armed conflict have expanded, so has the number of victims increased. War-related deaths, especially to civilians, have steadily grown throughout the twentieth century. An average of twelve wars per year were conducted in 1950s; by the 1980s that figure had risen to 40 (Renner, 1999). Concomitantly, civilians have borne an increasing proportion of deaths from war (see Table 1). As Wessells, Schwebel, and Anderson (this volume) have noted, the twentieth century is clearly the bloodiest on record.

The twentieth century also ushered in new levels of affluence and an enlargement of choices for some people, and new levels of deprivation with a narrowing of choices for many others. As we begin the twenty-first century, peace psychology is confronting the structural roots of direct violence. Many forms of direct violence can be traced to structure-based inequalities, exacerbated by ethnic tensions, environmental degradation, and economic desperation, which powerful leaders exploit (Hauchler & Kennedy, 1994; Homer-Dixon, 1993; Renner, 1996).

Table 1 Largest Armed Conflicts since 1945 (from Renner, 1999, p. 17)

Conflict	Time Period	Number Killed (thousand)	Civilian Victims (percent)
China (civil war)	1946–1950	1,000	50
N. vs. S. Korea (international intervention)	1950–1953	3,000	50
N. vs. S. Vietnam (United States intervention)	1960–1975	2,358	58
Nigeria (Biafra civil war)	1967–1970	2,000	50
Cambodia (civil war; foreign intervention)	1970–1989	1,221	69

Bangladesh (secession from Pakistan)	1971	1,000	50
Afghanistan (Soviet interven-tion)	1978–1992	1,500	67
Mozambican (civil war)	1981–1994	1,050	95
Sudan (civil war)	1984–present	1,500	97

But the twentieth century in general, and the last few decades in particular, presented unprecedented opportunities for peace, and demonstrated some impressive accomplishments in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. For example, the world has been astonished by the *peacemaking* achieved by South Africa in its relatively nonviolent end to apartheid; by the "velvet revolution" of the Czech Republic; and in the relatively bloodless process in which the Soviet Union dissolved into independent nations. In international *peacekeeping,* the United Nations was established in 1945 and has taken an increasingly important role in protecting peace agreements in the last decade (see Langholtz & Leentjes, this volume). The United Nations's *peacebuilding* efforts are even more extensive, including human rights conventions, and agencies which promote education, health, and sustainable development (see below). Meanwhile, the world witnessed the proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which give representation and voice to a wider spectrum of citizen needs; the establishment of women's suffrage and civil rights; the growth of democracy; the promotion of compulsory education; and a general improvement in the quality of life for the average world citizen. Paradoxically, *both* the omnipresence of armed violence, and the prospects for peace, have never been greater than at the turn of the millenium.

FOUR-WAY MODEL

3

In this book, we have attempted to map the vast expansion of topics in peace psychology with a four-way model. Our model distinguishes direct from indirect violence, and direct from indirect peace. For example, forms of direct violence such as genocide (see Staub, this volume), domestic violence (see Abrahams, this volume), hate crimes (see Murphy, this volume), and ethnic violence (Niens & Cairns, this volume) are salient and episodic. But indirect structural violence, such as global economic oppression of third world citizens (see Pilisuk, this volume), violations of indigenous rights (see Lykes, this volume), and excessive militarization (see Britton, this volume; Winter, Pilisuk, Houck, & Lee, this volume) is chronic and insidious.

On the peace side, we have differentiated direct peacemaking from indirect peacebuilding. Conflict resolution and mediation techniques (see Sanson & Bretherton, this volume; Coleman & Deutsch, this volume), and peacekeeping (see Langholtz & Leentjes, this volume) create peace directly, whereas peacebuilding is a long term process of restructuring society's institutions to reduce oppression and create equality. Peacebuilding will require increasing rather than decreasing tension (see Montiel, this volume), redressing poverty (see Dawes, this volume), and the large scale project of building cultures of peace (see Wessells, Schwebel, & Anderson, this volume).

While our model allows us to map a vast terrain of topics under these four categories, there are, of course, many topics which we have failed to include, simply because no one single volume can include everything. Notably missing are the issue of terrorism and how it impacts national security (White, 1998), the problem of media violence and how it feeds a culture of violence (Bok, 1998), reemerging fascism and militia movements (Lee, 1997), warlords (Reno, 1999), the psycholinguistics of language which lead to conflict and violence (Tannen, 1998), the

problematic marketing of light weapons (Renner, 1998), and arms control (Renner, 1994).

Furthermore, by assigning our chapters to these four sections, we have stressed the distinctions rather than the connections between categories. But we also realize that our distinctions are often more conceptual than concrete. Direct and structural violence are reciprocal processes, in that they exacerbate each other. Peacemaking will not last long if peacebuilding isn't also addressed, and most forms of violence have both direct and structural features. Direct violence usually stems from structural violence because structured inequalities are predisposing conditions for outbreaks of violent episodes.

For example, we can understand incidences of neighborhood violence as an integrated system of direct and structural violence. In April of 1999, two boys from Columbine High School in Colorado, United States, killed twelve students and one teacher. These boys were widely known among their classmates as social outcasts. The brutality and scope of this massacre led many to focus on the psychopathology of the two perpetrators, and we certainly do not deny their emotional distress. But noting the systemic ways in which structural violence and direct violence interact leads us also to examine the adolescent subculture of high schools in the United States, where athletes rank much higher than non-athletes in status, respect, and popularity. Taunting and social isolation are forms of structural violence and often lead to anger, resentment, and direct violence. The U.S. economy, which makes guns easily available to children, enabled these boys to translate their fantasies of revenge and their frustration with the school's differential power structure into direct violence with dire consequences.

As this example clearly demonstrates, indirect structural violence and direct violence are highly interdependent. Social injustices fuel social unrest, often leading to a "malignant spiral of

hostile interaction," to borrow an image from Deutsch's (1983) analysis of the nuclear arms race. Attempts to halt violent conflict require recognition that opponents' needs must be met if long-term solutions are to be successful.

PEACE PSYCHOLOGY: TENSIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Our model implies several tensions that will shape peace psychology in the coming years. These tensions include activism vs. analysis, univeralism vs. relativism, proaction vs. reaction, and peaceful means vs. peaceful ends. We phrase these issues as tensions because they operate as dilemmas, where it is difficult to maximize both ends at the same time. Let us elaborate what we mean in each case.

Activism vs. Analysis

We believe that lasting peace requires active political confrontation against socially unjust institutions and traditions. Until human needs are met on a fairly equitable basis, prospects for peace will be slim. Our call to confront social injustice is a controversial (though not original) plea to psychologists. The bylaws of the American Psychological Association state that the APA exists to promote human welfare (APA Bylaws I.1, *http://www.apa.org/about/mission.html*). Throughout psychology's history, great thinkers have urged us to find ways to alleviate human suffering. George Miller admonished us to "give psychology away" (1969). B. F. Skinner (1971) believed that psychology should be applied to solve humankind's pressing problems. More recently, George Albee (1996, 1998) argued that prevention of mental illness and distress requires psychologists to address the economic and political structures that create suffering, especially poverty. And most recently, Martin Seligman's APA Presidential Initiative on ethno-political conflict

focused psychologists' attention on what we can do to "understand, predict, and even prevent such warfare" (1998, p. 2).

Just as practice and science constitute the larger discipline of psychology, we assert that peace psychology should be based on both activism and analysis. While the idea of political activism is not new, psychology students are not currently trained to practice and pursue it. Political participation is left to individual choice, rather than programmatic design, as if the political actions of psychologists are irrelevant to their work. Little wonder, then, that the voice of psychology is seldom heard by political leaders (Blight, 1987).

Will psychologists apply our knowledge to confront and change unjust social institutions? Because public policy is a psychological issue, we believe that students should be trained how to think about, research, lobby, and affect peace. We agree with Dawes (this volume) that peace is a political process and psychologists cannot abdicate the political dimension of our work. Our roles as scientists do not require us to remain politically neutral. Science itself is value laden; feigning neutrality is intellectually dishonest and socially irresponsible.

Thus, for several reasons, we believe that peace psychologists should be activists. First, because peace cannot wait until all the data are in; second, because we learn from our ideas as we apply them; third, because we are likely to be better practitioners if we simultaneously test our ideas. Just as the Boulder Model (Raimy, 1950) urges that clinicians base their practices on the process of science, so do we as peace psychologists see the importance of empirical research in providing foundations for our work as practitioners.

Universalism vs. Relativism

Political activism brings with it the complicated question of universal values. To what extent can we assume that our claims about human rights and our conception of the elements of "cultures of peace" (see Wessells, Schwebel, & Anderson, this volume) are universal? We recognize that a great risk in doing peace psychology is that most psychologists are trained in a particular culture and Zeitgeist that supports capitalism and Western-style democracies (see Dawes, this volume). If we naively ignore our own situated, arbitrary, and limited worldview, we undermine our own effectiveness, as well as those we attempt to help (see Agger, and Pederson, this volume). The planet has watched the rapid spread of Western traditions and values during the last few centuries (see Pilisuk, this volume). Peace psychologists must be careful to avoid the colonial process of replacing traditional cultures with Western assumptions that promulgate capitalism and democracy as the only legitimate economic and political models of social organization.

Our discussion of structural violence assumes that equality and human rights are both universal values. But many values are not universally shared and we risk being ethnocentric as we articulate our values. For example, people in patriarchal societies assume that men deserve more resources than women (see Mazurana & McKay, this volume) and feminists who promote equality between the sexes are frequently seen as ethnocentrically operating through a narrowly Western set of lenses. In countries like China, where governments cope with huge numbers of people, human rights are not embraced, and those Westerners who raise questions about human rights are called ethnocentric. Some African cultures endorse involuntary clitorectomy, the surgical removal of young women's sexual organ. Although we risk being called ethnocentric, we believe that enforced annihilation of female sexuality is wrong. Similarly, we believe that equitable distribution of human resources is a necessary step for creating peace, even though we recognize

that many, both inside and outside our culture, would disagree with us.

To what extent is the promotion of equality and human needs in our definition a product of our naïve ethnocentrism? This difficult question defies easy answers. We cannot blithely assume that our definition is universal, but we cannot abandon the project of defining values simply because they are difficult to generalize and we are afraid of overstating our terms. All we can do is promote one definition as the best we have right now, staying aware of the risks involved in putting it forward, and assuming that we will learn more about how to improve it. Building peace requires us to take some uncomfortable stands: to practice activism alongside analysis, and to sincerely embrace and promote certain values, while continuously investigating the appropriateness of their universal application.

Pro-action vs. Reaction

Closely related to the activism issue is the question of pro-action vs. reaction. From the outset, peace psychology was reactive, originating in the 1980s as a reaction to the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Reactive approaches to peace focus on violence which either breaks out, or seems imminent. In contrast, proactive approaches aim at the pursuit of social justice, the mitigation of oppressive and exploitative structures that can be predisposing conditions for episodes of direct violence. Proactive approaches treat peace and social justice as indivisible, and take a long view of peace, committing resources to social changes that embrace the principles of equity and inclusion (Wagner, 1988). Given the reactive origins of peace psychology, will we be distracted in the future whenever major violent episodes occur? Or will peace psychologists also fix their attention on the structural roots of violent episodes, and take a long range view to the project of building peace?

Peaceful Means vs. Peaceful Ends

Although every author who addressed the issue of social justice endorsed the value of pursuing socially just ends, there is less consensus in peace psychology on whether the means toward peaceful ends should always be nonviolent. In the present volume, Wessells, Schwebel and Anderson point out that while nonviolence is a value in peace psychology, some peace psychologists (for example, White, 1998) find force necessary under certain conditions. In contrast, the Gandhian perspective, as articulated in the chapters by Steger and Mayton, endorses not only socially just ends, but peaceful means. Gandhi's view explicitly rejected violence of any kind. From his perspective, means and ends could be distinguished conceptually and temporally, but not morally (Ostergaard, 1990).

In the current volume, Montiel also endorses using only nonviolent means and notes that when violence is used, the actors merely switch roles in the dominant-subservient relationship. Both Steger and Montiel point out that nonviolence requires courage, and when used with commitment, is a powerful technique which produces change. Although peace psychologists do not endorse violence, they differ in the degree to which they see nonviolence crucial for effecting peace.

CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Our treatment of peace psychology via this four-way model means that peace psychologists will be challenged in important ways. Because peace is not a simple, unidimensional process, peace psychologists in the twenty-first century need to analyze conflict systemically, examine multiple levels of analysis, transform peace education, and work on building sustainable communities. We

discuss these challenges one by one.

Peace Psychologists as Systems Analysts and Practitioners

One implication of our model is that the interface between direct and indirect peace and violence prompts peace psychologists to inquire about both aspects in any conflict situation. Individuals will likely have preferences and training that lead them to give priority to one dimension over the other. Indeed, as a field, psychology trains its students to disregard the structural features of societies, in favor of focusing on individual responses to them (Sampson, 1983, 1993). For example, because most high school students are not outcasts and do not go on killing rampages, both the media and psychologists can easily focus on the individual psychopathology of those who do. Psychologists can no longer afford to work *simply* on the individual level, though of course, they are particularly well-trained to address individual responses. Long-term solutions require that we illuminate the systemic connections between direct and indirect levels of violence as well as between individuals and their communities. Treating only the individual's reactions to social injustice is analogous to fixing a flood by removing a teaspoon of water at a time, instead of shunting the water off at its source.

Building peace and ending conflict in the twenty-first century require that we begin to notice the ethnocentric bias of traditional Western psychology. In most developing countries, where collectivist thinking is more common than individualist thinking, Western psychology's excessive individualism makes it unsuitable for application (Moghaddam, 1987; Sloan, 1990). For example, reconstruction after war in African societies (see Wessells & Monteiro, this volume), as well as in Latin America (Lykes, this volume; also, Lykes, 1999) requires that psychology address community structures which give meaning to individual identity. Thus, the individual cannot be

separated from the collective.

Pushing the Limits of our Knowledge: The Levels of Analysis Problem

Addressing both direct and structural features returns us to the question of how well we can generalize from individuals to families, communities, nations, and societies. As we noted in the Introduction, peace psychology during the Cold War tended to ignore levels of analysis, and presumed that processes that apply to individuals generalize easily to larger units, such as social groups and nations. The bipolar world of two superpowers vying for prestige and security invited psychologists to think about the Cold War as a bad dyadic relationship: ineffective communication resulted from distorted perceptions, giving rise to mirrored enemy images (White, 1984). These phenomena were observed between the Soviet Union and the United States, just as they were between distressed couples.

In the post–Cold War world, however, we are invited to question whether principles of dyadic relationships can be generalized to other levels of analysis. Rubin and Levinger (1995) listed some important differences between couples and nations. First, international conflict tends to involve more than two parties and more than one issue, clearly challenging the dichotomized Cold War view. Second, unlike conflict in marriages and friendships, international conflict offers no opportunity for exit—countries can't divorce each other the way spouses can. Third, chronic power asymmetries tend to endure in international systems; a small, newly independent nation can't ask for the equivalent of "spousal support" because its economy suffers the disadvantages of a century or more of colonial exploitation. Because of these dissimilarities, international relations tend to be less fluid than interpersonal relationships. Communication difficulties are compounded by cultural differences, bureaucratic inertia, and lessened opportunity for trust.

Clearly, families, neighborhoods, high schools and embassies have different levels of complexity, different sets of competing values, different degrees of flexibility, and different opportunities for face-to-face contact. Yet, the premise of our book suggests that examining peace and conflict across these domains yields important insights. In particular, we posit that the chapters here demonstrate the importance of considering human needs across levels of analysis. Although countries are different from families, human needs operate in both units. If India and Pakistan are locked in an arms race, their needs for national security in the face of their neighbor's threat, and their needs for prestige in the world community, are comparable to a street gang's need to defend its territory and reputation. Both sets of players portray the human need for security and respect, and violence can be expected until those needs are satisfied.

On the other hand, it is also true that some phenomena cannot be generalized, and we must not ignore crucial differences that have an impact on our ability to facilitate peace in larger units of analysis. The bigger the unit of analysis, the more complicated and difficult is the resolution of conflict because of the heterogeneous constituencies whose interests are at stake in any decision (Kelman, 1999). Nevertheless, we claim that conflict and war are human behaviors that have human needs at their root. Our ability to track differences between levels is aided by attention to the psychological needs that various groups carry. We will say more about the importance of considering human needs in the final section of this chapter.

Transforming Peace Education: From Conflict Resolution to Societal Transformation

Traditional approaches in peace psychology have focused on conflict resolution and nonviolence. But to the extent that conflict resolution eclipses power differences, peace psychology will un-

wittingly contribute to the status quo, colluding with social injustice. In contrast, if peace psychology develops emancipatory aspirations, we join other pedagogies that address the empowerment of the oppressed. Peace psychology has much to learn from liberatory pedagogies, the central purpose of which is the empowerment of individuals and communities to challenge and change the world rather than adapt to unjust situations (Freire, 1993; Martín-Bar", 1994).

Transforming peace education to address social justice presents challenges. First, there may be little consensus about what constitutes social justice, in which case, the most productive education might result from simply raising issues, pointing to social injustice in settings where the topic has never been raised before(see Opotow, this volume). Second, the education process is a multilevel enterprise, in which student culture, pedagogy, administrative decisions, and community values are relevant (see Coleman & Deutsch, this volume). Changes at one level, if they are at all substantive, will likely affect other levels and constituents. For example, if a public school teacher unilaterally introduces a peace education segment in a social studies course, especially a segment that focuses on social injustice, questions about values and politics are likely to come from parents, administrators, and community members. The problem is that a curriculum that attempts to transform peace education to address issues of social justice is itself embedded in socially unjust structures of society.

Promoting Sustainable Communities and the Satisfaction of Human Needs

Because we see the equitable satisfaction of human needs as a crucial element of effective peacebuilding, we close our discussion by examining the long-term prognosis for peace as a function of building sustainable cultures. Instead of assuming that military muscle will deliver peace, we find that it often leads to violence and war. Rather than focusing simply on national

security, peacebuilding in the twenty-first century will require that we pay careful attention to human security, and to our sustainable potential to satisfy human needs.

As the planet industrializes, hope for a better life becomes available for billions of people. At the same time however, we are quickly approaching the earth's carrying capacity. Key limits in the twenty-first century will be fresh water, range-lands, forests, oceanic fisheries, biological diversity, and the global atmosphere (Brown & Flavin, 1999). As Homer-Dixon (1993) and Renner (1996) have both shown, ecological stresses are common causes of armed conflict around the world, and we can expect wars to increase as environments continue to deteriorate. Indeed, some have made a persuasive case for the proposition that in the twenty-first century, environmental security will replace national security as a primary strategy for preventing war (Myers, 1993). Environmental security requires international cooperation because ecological damage does not respect national borders. Global treaties to protect environmental indicators will become as important as military alliances are now.

Education is crucial for building environmental security. Limiting population growth depends on education, since research has shown that minimal schooling for girls (fourth grade or above) is the best predictor of lowered fertility rates (Jacobson, 1992). Education for more extensive "ecological literacy" (Orr, 1992) is making progress in developing as well as industrialized nations. Ecological literacy requires that we educate in order to connect and integrate knowledge about the physical world with the decisions we make in our social institutions and personal lives. Ecological education means helping people assume responsibility and consciousness about the environmental impacts of their own households, organizations, governments, and militaries. A peaceful world will require a populace educated for civic life, committed to environmental re-

sponsibility, and determined to build a peaceful world.

Crucial in this regard is the growing importance of grassroots peacebuilding (see Pilisuk, this volume). Education does not necessarily have to move from the top down. "Bottom-up" information sharing, through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots groups, can be just as effective, if not more, than government-approved educational programs. In many nations, NGOs and local groups are working together to effect change and create both sustainable societies and peace.

There are many paths to peace: arms reduction and gun control, guaranteed livable wage, a stronger United Nations willing and able to intervene in early signal situations, a World Court to try war criminals, a powerful international agency for dispute mediation, effective and sophisticated peacekeeping forces. But we highlight the dimension of sustainable development here, for unless we learn to build sustainable cultures, the world cannot expect to see lasting peace. Natural resource scarcity will lead to war in the twenty-first century even more often than it has led to war in previous centuries; as population continues to increase and resources become increasingly rare and unevenly distributed, conflict over them will become more frequent and intense. Human security is, in the long run, environmental security. We will never build lasting peace until we design cultures that sustain themselves without oppressing either their neighbors or their progeny.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, peace psychologists, as well as citizens around the world, are recognizing that peace depends on ending poverty and making a commitment to justice and insuring environ-

mental security. Meeting human needs in the twenty-first century means that we begin building sustainable cultures immediately. Human security will require our best creativity, commitment, compassion, and idealism. It will also require that we continually ask difficult questions about activism vs. analysis, universalism vs. relativism, pro-action vs. reaction, levels of analysis, non-violent means and ends, and sustainable use and distribution of resources.

Peace psychologists can provide important leadership, analysis, activism, and support for the crucial task of building sustainable peace. Analyzing the causes of violence, rebuilding war-torn communities, lobbying for social justice and arms control, teaching and practicing nonviolent conflict resolution, sensitizing ourselves to our own ethnocentrism, consulting with peacekeeping operations, ensuring gender parity, addressing ethnic identities and hostilities, empowering alternative voices, and building environmental security are just a few of the myriad ways peace psychologists can contribute to building a peaceful world. Our work building peace will in turn build peace psychology. Hopefully, the twenty-first century will bring vigorous development of both. Peacebuilding is no small task—but, we ask, what else is more important?